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INTRODUCTION
Three booking agents and two assistants were on duty at 4:30 pm when a 
brick shattered the window of the China Viaje travel agency in Tijuana’s 
business district. At 6:00 pm all five were sitting in a row before their 
manager and two representatives of the Chinese Association of Tijuana. 
Pedro, the owner of the business, spoke to me in a surprisingly calm 
voice: “Now do you see? This is what I was telling you about: it’s been 
happening more and more to Chinese businesses. This has been a bad 
year. Is it because our employees are Chinese? When these things hap-
pen we try to hold our heads high and carry on without retaliating, and 
without drawing attention to ourselves. You’re the anthropologist, so you 
tell me, what’s going on? Have we done something wrong?” (interview, 
October 16, 2008).
The incident at China Viaje was not isolated. In November, a month 
earlier, a Chinese supermarket three blocks away had been vandalized 
and robbed, and the owners of a local department store specializing 
in imported Chinese home appliances discovered the words “pinche 
 Chinos” (damn Chinese) spray painted on its front window. When the 
mayor announced his support for the establishment of a Chinatown in 
downtown Tijuana, the opinion pages of local newspapers showed strong 
opposition: “How ridiculous, the damn Chinese have already inundated 
us with commercial piracy, and now they want to put a Chinatown in 
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Tijuana” (Salinas 2008). A similar comment appeared in relation to the 
newly established Chamber of Chinese Enterprises in the nearby city of 
Mexicali: “First they invade us [and] now they are getting organized to 
demand guarantees?? I hope the people of Sinaloa don’t plan to do the 
same” (Minor 2010). Comments like these, and the hostile actions that 
accompany them, reveal profound insecurity about China’s cultural and 
economic impact in Mexico.
Eighteen hundred miles away a distressed group of Chinese descen-
dants convened at a popular restaurant in Havana’s Cuchillo Lane, the 
heart of Latin America’s oldest Chinatown. Public hostility, inadequate 
legal protection, and official neglect were not among their concerns. On 
the contrary, they were worried about the growing attention and inces-
sant commercial regulations they had attracted from the Cuban state. 
The goal of their meeting was to appraise, five years on, the 2006 dissolu-
tion of the district’s coordinating body, the Grupo Promotor de Barrio 
Chino (Promotion group of Chinatown) and the assumption of its ad-
ministrative responsibilities by a government institution called the Of-
fice of the Historian of the City. Everything from foreign donations to 
proposals for cultural festivals and tourism development had since been 
assessed and regulated by the Office, signifying a total reorganization in 
the conduct of local business and politics.
Attending the meeting were Yrmina Eng Menéndez, Julio Hun Calza-
dilla, and Carlos Alay Jó, three founding members of the Grupo Promo-
tor. Each had been instrumental in the revival of Havana’s Chinatown 
(hereafter Barrio Chino) in the 1990s and early 2000s, and each believed 
that the Office’s centrally devised plan for growth and development had 
weakened the district’s cultural and economic potentials. The irony of 
their predicament, they said, was plain to see: “The tourists come here to 
see the new gift shops, the restored restaurants, and streets with fashion-
able cafés. What they don’t see is the human cost below the surface. Our 
social activities are not supported, our elderly residents are neglected, 
and our restaurants are paying higher taxes than ever. . . . The bureau-
crats behind all this become suspicious whenever we try to do something 
really useful for our community” (interview, February 22, 2011).
In both Cuba and Mexico, Chinese immigrants and their descendants 
are confronted by a common problem: their commercial activities are 
believed to be strongly bound up in ethnic favoritism and therefore ad-
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verse to national interests. It is a recurring narrative that has resurfaced 
in both countries during times of economic hardship, most powerfully 
in the 1930s when the Great Depression provoked the forced closure of 
Chinese businesses in Cuba and the expulsion of some ten thousand Chi-
nese people from Mexico. Today the narrative is fueled by China’s grow-
ing global influence and the role that overseas Chinese communities are 
thought to play in it.
It is striking that similar preoccupations should emerge in Cuba and 
Mexico, countries at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of economic 
openness and political ideology. A combination of downward coercion 
and upward nationalism continues to maintain the Cuban state’s firm 
grip on civic and economic administration. In contrast, three decades 
of privatization in Mexico have eliminated nearly all forms of state in-
tervention. China’s growing impact has exposed problems with both ap-
proaches. In Cuba, nascent bilateral trade and investment agreements 
have provoked a grudging awareness that uncompromising state control 
is ill suited to post– Cold War economic rationalism. In Mexico, unre-
lenting Chinese commercial competition has fueled new accusations of 
inadequate industrial policies and insufficient state support for manu-
facturers.
China’s rise and the so-called Asian Century it heralds are forcing pol-
iticians, businesspeople, and researchers to debate and formulate fresh 
solutions to an old problem: what balance of state, market, and civic 
inputs can best harness the world’s shifting economic currents? While 
Cuban and Mexican policy makers approach this question from con-
trasting ideological systems, all of them recognize a need for forms of 
public- private cooperation that diverge from conventional development 
models. As both countries attempt to respond to the challenges and op-
portunities brought by China, there is a growing awareness that more 
mixed approaches are needed to diversify productivity and to leverage 
the capacities of resident Chinese communities.
Integration with China is prompting the governments of Cuba, Mex-
ico, and most other countries to rethink the structure of their economies. 
The Cuban government’s 2011 Lineamientos de la política económica y 
social del partido y la revolución (Economic and social policy guidelines 
of the party and revolution) articulates the need to connect large state- 
owned enterprises with emerging private businesses, just as China began 
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to do in the 1980s. Chinese advisors have long recommended this course 
to their Cuban counterparts, who are in no position to disagree as their 
nation becomes increasingly reliant on Chinese trade, investment, and 
loans. In Mexico, the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto has 
acknowledged that long- established tax concessions and financial incen-
tives for the most powerful and successful sectors must be balanced with 
greater access to loans, information, and logistical support for small and 
medium- size enterprises (smes). China has taught Mexico this lesson 
not by example but by force: as Mexican textiles, electronics, and even 
automobiles face growing Chinese competition in the U.S. market, em-
powering the nation’s acutely underresourced smes is not only desirable 
but critical.
In social engagement, too, China’s rise is pushing the Cuban and Mex-
ican governments to explore less top- down approaches. Cuban politi-
cians and administrators have largely overlooked their nation’s Chinese 
community for decades—some would say since the mid- nineteenth cen-
tury. As Chinese diplomats and businesspeople forge new ties with Ha-
vana’s Chinese diaspora, particularly its enthusiastic descendant popula-
tion, the Cuban government has had to accommodate local demands for 
resources or risk being bypassed. Mexico’s government has been slower 
to act, but it too is beginning to engage with its Chinese residents. It is 
doing so more out of necessity than by choice: engagement offers the best 
hope for containing unregulated trade in goods, services, and people.
How are we to make sense of this forced disposition of governments 
to engage more assertively with their economies and societies? This book 
attempts to do so through concepts like public- private cooperation, syn-
ergy, linkage, and social capital. The first two invoke vertical notions of 
state- society engagement, and the last two horizontal conceptions of 
community solidarity. The book argues that a convergence of these ver-
tical and horizontal forces is necessary to unlock the opportunities for 
development and prosperity brought by China’s rise. The catalyst for this 
convergence, I argue, is trust.
Chapters 1 and 2 examine how pressure is growing on the Cuban and 
Mexican governments to reach out beyond national champions to smes, 
and in the process reap the political and economic dividends generated 
by independent cooperation at the grass roots. Chapters 3 and 4 show 
that government engagement with Chinese communities in Cuba and 
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Mexico is beginning to simultaneously leverage and engender purposeful 
solidarity within Chinese neighborhood associations. In all cases, verti-
cal state- society synergies and horizontal community linkages are inter-
acting in new ways to condition economic and social life, a process of 
convergence stimulated—and compelled—by China’s rise.
As China reaches out to international markets and diasporas, govern-
ments cannot hope to contain the resulting exchanges in official pro-
grams. Instead they must design more flexible development agendas that 
simultaneously accommodate global change, attract local participation, 
and build trust. The book explores how two nations with deeply con-
trasting economic and political orientations are responding to this chal-
lenge. It shows that their responses reflect different histories, cultures, 
and political structures but also a common convergence toward a more 
centrist balance of state, private, and civic power. This is not simply be-
cause the Chinese government is encouraging them along this path or 
because of their independent political evolution, but also because rebal-
ancing these structural forces is a necessary response to China’s global 
expansion.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA: LIKE A BICYCLE
After Venezuela, China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner: their bi-
lateral trade reached 1.39 billion in 2014, one- third of which consisted 
of Cuban exports. China is also Mexico’s second largest trading partner 
(after the United States): trade reached 72.24 billion in 2014, but only 
5.98 billion of this flowed in Mexico’s favor (United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database 2015). Neither Cuba nor Mexico exports large 
quantities of natural resources to China, making them exceptions in Latin 
America—a region whose rich endowment of commodities has seen trade 
with China grow from 10 billion in 2000 to over 250 billion in 2014. The 
flow of mineral, energy, and agricultural products westward across the 
Pacific is reciprocated by an eastward flood of toys, clothes, home appli-
ances, and industrial equipment from the factories of southern China. 
Cuba and Mexico do not share their neighbors’ concerns about resource 
dependency on China, but both are witnessing an unprecedented influx 
of Chinese consumer goods, with the full range of reactions this brings.
Cuba’s relationship with China is now more harmonious than Mexico’s, 
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but it has not always been. In 1960 Cuba’s new revolutionary govern-
ment became the first in the Americas to officially recognize the People’s 
Republic of China. However, against Mao Zedong’s wishes, Fidel Castro 
soon drew closer to the Soviet Union, whose leadership of international 
communism was disputed by China. Despite their contrasting relation-
ships with the Soviet Union, Cuba and China never broke diplomatic ties 
with each other. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989– 90, China 
replaced it as Cuba’s main foreign ally, enabling the Castro government 
to keep its struggling economy afloat. Asking its citizens for renewed 
austerity and self- sacrifice to overcome the warlike conditions of the 
so-called Special Period in Time of Peace, Cuba might well have imploded 
without Chinese support. Sustained by Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s 
determination to “save Cuba’s revolutionary project,” the two countries 
commenced what a Chinese government newspaper called a “period of 
completely new and steady development” (People’s Daily 1996).
The Chinese government has taken interest in the discovery of oil off 
Cuba’s north coast. As well as securing exploration rights, the Huanqiu 
Contracting and Engineering Corporation (owned by the Chinese state 
and a subsidiary of the oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation) 
is the lead financier of a 5.5 billion refinery in Cienfuegos. Furthermore, 
Chinese trade credits and unsecured loans have helped Cuban gross do-
mestic product to rebound, according to the World Bank (2015b), from 
32  billion in 2004 to 234 billion in 2014 (measured as purchasing 
power). This financial support has enabled Cuba to buy Chinese buses 
and trains to help alleviate the island’s transportation crisis, as well as con-
sumer goods ranging from clothing to home appliances and computers.
As is the case in other Latin American nations, China’s impact is per-
vasive in the daily lives of ordinary Cubans. However, unlike in Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, and many other countries, in Cuba China’s growing 
influence has not given rise to public hostility toward Chinese products 
and people. China poses no threat to Cuba’s domestic industries, and 
furthermore, the Cuban government goes to great lengths to emphasize 
China’s standing as a historical friend and ally. Televised documentaries 
and mainstream literature often invoke Beijing’s loyalty in the wake of 
the Soviet meltdown.
Despite the apparent resonance of their political philosophies, China 
and Cuba no longer look to socialist solidarity as the prime mover of their 
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relationship. Pragmatism is replacing ideology, in the process redefining 
the basis for trust between the two nations and reconfiguring the struc-
ture of the Cuban economy. China’s prior experience with reform and 
opening—professed by a constant stream of advisors from Beijing—pro-
vides Cuban leaders with insights into the making of a market economy. 
As chapter 1 shows, the countries’ newfound common interest in market 
socialism is producing impressive results, but as yet neither China nor 
Cuba trusts nonstate actors to exchange goods, services, and ideas.
Unlike Cuba’s relationship with China, Mexico’s has suffered from a 
lack of political engagement and economic complementarity. The im-
pact of Chinese exports on Mexico has been severe, displacing Mexican 
producers of clothing, toys, shoes, and other manufactured products at 
home and in the U.S. market. Mexican manufacturers argue that for ev-
ery two products they export, ten enter the country from China, and that 
consequently, between 900,000 and one million workers have lost their 
jobs (El Mural 2011).
Chinese officials insist that to remedy the chronic bilateral imbalance, 
Mexico should permit Chinese investment in the oil sector. Peña Nieto’s 
energy sector reforms may advance this prospect, but Chevron, Exxon, 
and other established multinationals have been waiting at the front of the 
line for contracts ever since President Lázaro Cárdenas expelled them 
during his 1938 oil nationalization program. With oil unlikely to bring 
balance to Sino- Mexican trade relations, Presidents Peña Nieto and Xi 
Jinping have turned instead to tequila, pork, and tourism. Here too, 
though, the search for complementarity will be an uphill journey. Even if 
the Chinese government reduces agricultural tariffs, encourages its citi-
zens to visit the Mayan pyramids, and awards safety approval to Mexican 
foods and drinks, Mexican firms are in a poor position to grasp resulting 
opportunities.
With little access to loans, tax breaks, overseas promotion, and gov-
ernment start-up grants, most Mexican companies are struggling to 
compete in their own market, let alone in China. Their predicament re-
flects the legacy of an outdated industrial policy, introduced by Presi-
dent Miguel de la Madrid in response to Mexico’s 1981 oil crisis and the 
(consequently) unsustainable spending of his predecessor. Joining the 
international wave of state retrenchments and privatizations of the 1980s, 
Mexico internalized the economic ideology championed by U.S. presi-
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dent Ronald Reagan and UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher. Ever 
since then, government assistance in Mexico has focused on a narrow 
set of leading private firms in sectors such as automobiles, banking, and 
media. Represented by powerful industry associations, these enterprises 
secure tax concessions and the lion’s share of government funding for 
research and expansion (Schneider 2002).
Chinese competition has hit Mexico hardest in the manufacturing 
sector, which has lobbied against the relaxation of tariffs on Chinese im-
ports and for greater government protection from the so-called China 
threat. Conscious that the sector accounts for 20 percent of Mexico’s 
1.1 trillion gross domestic product, politicians eager for votes have heard 
the manufacturers’ call and have kept tariffs on most Chinese items at 
35  percent. But in a nation beset by inadequate law enforcement and 
organized crime, high import duties have bred illegal countermeasures. 
Falsification of documents, collusion between Chinese exporters and the 
informal sector of the Mexican economy, and bribery of customs officials 
are commonplace, undermining public trust in the state’s ability to gov-
ern. A more effective industrial policy would rely less on import tariffs, 
broaden the tax base, and extend the funding and concessions enjoyed by 
big business to smaller, more dynamic enterprises. Chapter 2 shows that 
such an adjustment is tentatively beginning, and that its full implementa-
tion over time would build trust and cooperation where they are needed 
most: horizontally between Mexican businesses and citizens, vertically 
between state and society, and broadly between Mexico and China.
For Cuba and Mexico, China’s economic impact reaches beyond trade 
and investment to the heart of industrial relations. Large enterprises—
whether state owned or private—cannot by themselves effectively design 
and implement national responses to twenty- first-century globalization. 
The monolithic state- owned enterprises behind Cuba’s agriculture and 
energy sectors, for instance, are not efficient and competitive enough to 
meet domestic demand, let alone profit from China’s hunger for food 
and oil. Similarly, the small group of elite private firms at the helm of 
Mexico’s automobile sector faces unprecedented challenges as Chinese 
car makers establish factories in Latin America and set their sights on 
the U.S. market.
Small businesses have an increasingly important role to play in Cuba 
and Mexico, but they will require support if they are to generate jobs, 
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confidence, and stability. Both governments recognize this dynamic and 
are experimenting with policies to widen access to permits, finance, and 
markets. The reforms outlined in the Cuban government’s Lineamientos 
encourage self- employment in sectors ranging from tourism to educa-
tion, particularly if independent providers can efficiently supply larger 
state- owned enterprises (República de Cuba 2011). Meanwhile, Mexico’s 
reforms seek, among other things, to lower the cost of electricity, tele-
communications, and finance for small businesses. These initiatives re-
spond as much to domestic pressures as they do to global circumstances, 
including the erosion of citizens’ trust in the capacity of their nations’ 
public and private sectors to create economic opportunities.
In both countries the need for economic diversification, and propos-
als for achieving it, are documented in government statements, inde-
pendent position papers, and academic literature. However, the pathway 
from publication to policy is less certain. Chapter 1 shows that the pace of 
Cuba’s economic liberalization has been slowed by its expansive informal 
sector, which will continue to grow in the absence of functional wholesale 
supply chains. Chapter 2 points out that Mexican reforms that would aug-
ment opportunities for small businesses face competition from power-
ful lobby groups such as the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (Council 
for Business Coordination) and the Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de 
Negocios (Mexican Council of Businessmen). These domestic dynamics 
highlight a broad challenge facing both countries: to see through policies 
that stimulate local initiatives in ways that build trust rather than erode it.
The chapters that follow show that government support should not be 
overbearing, even when it is needed to pull through the bad times, but 
neither should it fade away into complacency in the good times. As the 
economist Robert Reich once wrote, “economies are like bicycles. The 
faster they move, the better they maintain their balance unaided” (1982, 
852). Cuba has found that economic bicycles do not accelerate under a 
domineering rider, while Mexico has found that when the road goes up-
hill bicycles cannot ride themselves.
HARNESSING OVERSEAS CHINESE NETWORKS
As global economic dynamism shifts to Asia, comprehensive responses 
require government engagement not only with businesses but also with 
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people, especially those with professional and personal knowledge of 
China. To this end, the worldwide Chinese diaspora is a powerful but 
often overlooked human asset. Its associations, small enterprises, and 
cultural activities are the human face of China, and when appropriately 
supported, they have begun to play a critical role in the formation of 
bilateral trust.
For overseas Chinese actors, brokering trust across borders means 
balancing allegiances among their homelands, host countries, and local 
communities. David Palumbo- Liu writes that this “political strategizing” 
animates diasporic identities at least as much as nostalgia for home does 
(2007, 283). As the book’s case studies demonstrate, widespread percep-
tions that Chinese expatriates and descendants are eternally loyal to the 
Chinese motherland fail to appreciate their disposition to pursue the 
new opportunities for internal and external collaboration generated by 
China’s rise. Chinese authorities are partly responsible for perpetuating 
exaggerated notions of nationalist loyalty among overseas Chinese com-
munities, describing them since imperial times as huaqiao (华侨). This 
term, writes Wang Gungwu, “was never used to depict the usual reasons 
for leaving home, such as to make a living, to trade, to seek one’s fortune, 
or to migrate in search for a better place to settle. Instead, it captured a 
sense of doing what had to be done, fulfilling duty. . . . But one thing is 
clear. Assimilated or not, the Chinese overseas did change. They have 
been variously adaptable, and they have demonstrated that the idea that 
‘once a Chinese, always a Chinese’ is simply not true” (2000, 39 and 47).
Chinese migrant workers have been building bridges to Latin Amer-
ica since the sixteenth- century voyages of the Manila Galleons, which 
for over two centuries brokered trade between the Chinese and Spanish 
empires (see chapter 4). By the mid- nineteenth century Chinese migra-
tion to Latin America had begun in earnest, underpinning Philip Kuhn’s 
observation that “emigration has been inseparable from China’s modern 
history . . . neither Chinese history lacking emigration nor emigration 
lacking the history of China is a self- sufficient field of study” (2008, 5).
To establish a foothold in Latin American economies, Chinese immi-
grants endured and sometimes overcame repressive work regimes and 
discriminatory commercial regulations. But their hard- won progress, 
writes Evelyn Hu- Dehart, provoked harsh responses: “The eventual suc-
cess of Chinese in converting themselves into small urban business pro-
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prietors and the influx of free Asian immigrants to Latin America in en-
suing decades were accompanied everywhere by anti- Asian agitation and 
mob action, as well as more organized state campaigns and persecution. 
In emulation of the U.S. Exclusion Act, Latin American governments in 
the early twentieth century enacted laws to severely limit further Asian, 
especially Chinese, immigration” (2007, 51). Discriminatory laws influ-
enced Chinese patterns of trans- Pacific immigration, settlement, and 
commerce, but as Adam McKeown has argued, the impact of such laws 
was conditioned by specific contexts of place, time, and hierarchy (2001, 
26– 27). Social forces were as important as legal codes, evident in the 
formation of solidarity networks to navigate and circumscribe official 
rules. Membership in mutual aid associations provided protection from 
discrimination, pathways to employment, and finance for small business 
development. But the same associations also deepened the segregation of 
their members from broader civic and social landscapes, perpetuating a 
vicious circle of external hostility and internal protection. Every rotation 
of this circle broadened the perception that resident Chinese groups were 
closed and self- serving (Chang 1973; Hira 2007, 64– 66; Oxfeld 1993).
Twenty- first- century anxieties about China’s growing global influence, 
intensified by the competitive apprehension of domestic manufacturers, 
have brought new pressures to bear on overseas Chinese communities. 
Ethnic associations continue to fill protective functions for their mem-
bers, including providing alternative pathways for economic advance-
ment, defense against discrimination, and mechanisms for bypassing 
regulations that are perceived to be inappropriate or unfair. Where ex-
ternal pressure has fomented in-group solidarity and loyalty over time, 
fairness is conceived not only in terms of individual advancement but 
also as the promotion of collective cultural and economic security (Hu- 
DeHart 2010; Velázquez Morales 2001). Family ties and ethnic allegiances 
have furnished network members with benefits such as start-up capital, 
market access, a flexible labor force, a loyal customer base, and infor-
mal advice about opportunities (A. Smart 1993; A. Smart and Hsu 2004; 
Y. Yan 2009).
While Chinese networks have sustained collective notions of ex-
change, loyalty, identity, and fairness, their informality and ethnic partial-
ity have led them into conflict with host country laws and public values. 
Internal affinities among Chinese people and their descendants in Indo-
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nesia and Malaysia, for instance, provoked riots against them in the late 
1960s and continue to complicate the multicultural agenda in both coun-
tries (Yahuda 1985, 222– 23). Recent studies show that perceptions of eth-
nic favoritism have also generated hostility toward Chinese immigrants 
across Africa and parts of Latin America. Governments, businesses, and 
societies in both regions have struggled to incorporate Chinese immi-
grant groups into domestic structures of governance and commercial 
compliance.
The following chapters show that entrenched ideologies, in support of 
state socialism or market liberalism, have impeded government engage-
ment with Chinese communities. Centralized regulations in Cuba are un-
able to accommodate the grassroots priorities and productive capacities 
of Chinese ethnic associations and neighborhood leaders. Meanwhile, 
the hypersensitivity of Mexican politicians and businesspeople to the 
opinions of voters and customers has prevented them from openly col-
laborating with resident Chinese entrepreneurs to leverage their unique 
potentials. Both states’ vertical linkages are too narrow to harness the 
capacities of the Chinese diaspora.
In Cuba, the revolution of 1959 led to the nationalization of Chinese 
businesses, the emigration of Chinese entrepreneurs to the United States, 
and mandatory recognition of the People’s Republic of China by Chinese 
ethnic associations. Twelve associations and their coordinating body, the 
Casino Chung Wah, survived these pressures and in the early 2000s were 
reinvigorated by the induction of over 2,500 enthusiastic second-, third-, 
and fourth- generation descendants. Biologically and socially integrated 
with Cubans of European and African origin, the island’s Chinese de-
scendants have gradually climbed through the ranks of the associations 
and initiated a range of dynamic initiatives. These include hosting inter-
national conferences on Chinese cultural influences in Cuba, convert-
ing the associations’ canteens into thriving restaurants with investments 
from the state and foreign sources, and increasingly conducting com-
mercial exchange with partners in mainland China. As the number of 
visiting Chinese diplomats and businesspeople grows, the Cuban state’s 
traditional strategies for inserting itself as an intermediary between local 
actors, foreign nongovernmental organizations, and visiting delegations 
cannot keep pace. Instead, as chapter 3 demonstrates, government offi-
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cials are increasingly forced to deal with Chinese associations on their 
own terms, which include demands for recognition and resources.
In Mexico, macroeconomic tensions with China have not stopped 
enterprising Chinese community leaders from reaching out both to 
their motherland and to the Mexican state. In the northern state of Baja 
California, they have worked with the city governments of Tijuana and 
Mexicali to create trade networks that are beginning to produce con-
crete benefits. In contrast to the situation in Cuba, the number of first- 
generation Chinese immigrants in Mexico has grown rapidly since the 
mid- twentieth century, but owing to the undocumented status of many 
of them, Mexican scholars have little faith in official statistics. While the 
census of 2010 reports 6,655 Chinese- born people residing in Mexico, 
the Chinese embassy in Mexico counts three thousand as well as twenty 
thousand Mexicans of Chinese origin—with the majority of both groups 
employed in the food industry, trade, and to a lesser extent, bureaucratic 
professional services. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office in Beijing cal-
culates only half the number of naturalized Chinese people in Mexico, 
living primarily in the northern border cities of Tijuana and Mexicali, 
the urban metropolis of Mexico City, and the southern state of Chiapas. 
Unofficial counts from Tijuana and Mexicali indicate that these two cities 
alone are respectively home to 25,000 and 35,000 Chinese immigrants 
and their descendants, many of whom arrived since 2000 and are not le-
gally registered. Whether in Mexico City or on the northern border, Chi-
nese people speak of a division between old and new arrivals, the former 
descending from the Cantonese- speaking immigrants of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, with corresponding ties to the Chinese National 
People’s Party (the Kuomintang, or kmt), and the latter hailing from the 
Mandarin- speaking urban centers of eastern China.
China’s growing influence in Mexico has subdued some of the differ-
ences between old and new arrivals and aggravated others. Since 2000 
the Chinese government has offered commercial partnerships and or-
chestrated prestigious visits from senior officials to persuade Mexico’s 
Chinese associations to renounce recognition of the kmt and adopt 
Mandarin as their official operating language. However, the recent wave 
of Chinese immigrants, most of whom are Mandarin- speaking young 
people with little interest in traditional ethnic associations, remains 
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disengaged from the older Cantonese- speaking communities and from 
Mexican society in general. These recent immigrants have generally fo-
cused on commercial activities, such as importing and retailing low- cost 
Chinese consumer goods, and have consequently drawn their predeces-
sors’ scorn.
A string of conservative Mexican governments has been reluctant 
to engage with the nation’s Chinese diaspora. Chapter 4 shows that the 
need to integrate Chinese commercial activities into an enabling and 
clearly governed environment is becoming more urgent. The bilateral 
trade deficit, the expansion of the black market, and the growing tide of 
negative attitudes toward China are all good reasons for more assertive 
leadership from above. An even more poignant call to action is the illegal 
exploitation of Chinese workers in Mexican factories, a practice that Chi-
nese associations have done little to stop and have sometimes supported.
The poor track record of Cuban and Mexican officials in working 
with Chinese communities is conditioned by contrasting ideological 
orientations, the Cubans favoring top- down control and the Mexicans 
almost complete neglect. As Chinese communities deepen their ties to 
the mainland, however, both governments are assessing the merits of 
closer engagement with the Chinese diaspora. This growing disposition 
to engage is motivated in part by fears that unregulated commercial ex-
changes could increase in step with deepening interpersonal ties, but it is 
also driven by hopes of leveraging local capacities to strengthen relations 
with China. Fueling these fears and hopes is a growing appreciation of 
the threats and opportunities posed by guanxi, social capital, and trust.
GUANXI, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND TRUST: PERSONAL FAVORS OR PUBLIC GOODS?
The term “guanxi” (关系, meaning relationship or connection) encom-
passes a wide range of formal and informal exchange practices that are 
pursued for both affective and instrumental reasons. Traditions of reci-
procity vary widely in meaning and purpose, but in most cases the “re-
lationship must be presented as primary and the exchange, useful as it 
may be, treated as only secondary” (A. Smart 1993, 399). In the gradual 
construction of guanxi, each transaction should be treated as a step in 
a series of interactions designed to deepen the relationship and foment 
certainty, especially when formal legal and financial institutions are weak 
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(M.  Yang 1994). In such contexts, guanxi has fostered the confidence 
necessary for foreign investment, informal loans, community mutual aid, 
and business partnerships (Hsu 2005; Keister 2002; J. Smart and A. Smart 
2009; Velázquez Morales 2001). Unlike many Western conceptions of 
gifting, in which instrumental considerations taint supposedly pure emo-
tional ties, Chinese Confucianism envisions the formation of affective 
relationships through the exchange of useful goods and helpful actions 
(Carrier 1999; Lo and Otis 2003).
Chinese business practices developed in domestic and foreign con-
texts where legal and financial institutions were deficient and antagonis-
tic. Contracts were difficult, if not impossible, to enforce through legal 
means (A. Chen 1999). Small business owners had little recourse against 
harassment from police and more influential competitors, and banks 
generally refused to loan them capital (Tsai 2002). Guanxi compensated 
for insecure contracts, weak institutional guarantees, and closed doors. 
Through ever- expanding networks of friends, aspiring business owners 
could raise capital, form partnerships, seek suppliers, gather informa-
tion, and conduct relatively secure transactions.
Drawing on guanxi relationships, investors from prospering commu-
nities in the Chinese diaspora (particularly in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Southeast Asia) were able to make connections and build cooperative 
relationships with actors in China. These investors were willing to send 
their capital “home” despite the lack of legal protections because guanxi 
provided grounds for security (Hsing 1998). Guanxi networks allowed 
them to penetrate the Chinese market more quickly and successfully 
than other investors, and as China began to integrate itself into the capi-
talist world economy, these overseas compatriots became key sources 
of finance, connections, and information. Ironically, insecure property 
rights and ambiguous or lax legal regulations for investors, along with 
widespread distrust of the system, encouraged reliance on personal rela-
tionships, which helped produce one of the fastest growing economies in 
history (Hearn, Smart, and Hernández Hernández 2011).
The unwritten rules of guanxi constitute mechanisms of coordination, 
enforcement, and dispute settlement that are commonly known and rela-
tively openly practiced in China (Bell 2000; X. Chen and C. Chen 2004; 
Hurst 2002, Wang H. 2000). Guanxi therefore differs from Western forms 
of reciprocity not only because it more seamlessly blends instrumental 
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goals with affective bonds, but also because liberal democracies publicly 
regard nepotism as antithetical to the principle of equal opportunity. In 
practice, meritocracy rarely exists free from bias anywhere in the world, 
but it is formally enshrined in Western codes of conduct from the law 
court to the company boardroom. Hence, as globalization exposes Chi-
nese enterprises to Western norms, Douglas Guthrie posits “the declin-
ing significance of guanxi” (1998).
Despite its more open public expression, guanxi has much in common 
with Western formulations of social capital. Wherever we live, we can 
all agree that well- connected friends are a valuable resource—if we have 
them. However, if we do not, we may conclude that social capital, like 
guanxi, impedes upward mobility and maintains the status quo. Nan Lin 
(2001, 24) sees a theoretical reflection of this rift in the contrast between 
Émile Durkheim’s cross- societal ‘‘organic solidarity’’ and Karl Marx’s 
class antagonism. While the former concept evokes the biological meta-
phor of individual organs functioning cooperatively for the benefit of the 
larger organism, the latter focuses on the economic inequalities that re-
sult from the domination of some sectors by others and the construction 
of exclusionary social boundaries between them. This core tension finds 
contemporary expression in analytic distinctions between social capital’s 
exclusive and inclusive dimensions.
Robert Putnam describes the exclusive, inward- oriented loyalties of a 
given network’s members as “bonding social capital,” in contrast to a more 
outward- oriented (and uncommon) form of solidarity that may extend 
to nonmembers, which he calls “bridging social capital” (2000, 22– 23). 
Case studies from around the world generally substantiate this distinc-
tion, demonstrating the tendency of strong internal bonds to discour-
age the formation of external relationships. Alejandro Portes and Julia 
Sensenbrenner (1993) for instance, find across a range of immigrant com-
munities that exclusion of outsiders is related to the pressures of group 
membership. Among these pressures are demands for subjects’ time and 
resources, restrictions on individual freedoms, and “downward leveling 
norms” that gradually drain members’ confidence and capacity to find 
common cause with those beyond their reference group (Portes 1998, 15). 
Putnam acknowledges these constraints, but more recently he has ar-
gued that bonding and bridging social capital are not mutually exclusive: 
“Without really thinking about it, we assume that bridging social capital 
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and bonding social capital are inversely correlated in a kind of zero- sum 
relationship: if I have lots of bonding ties, I must have few bridging ties, 
and vice versa. As an empirical matter, I believe that assumption is often 
false. In other words, high bonding might well be compatible with high 
bridging, and low bonding with low bridging. . . . Bonding social capital 
can thus be a prelude to bridging social capital, rather than precluding it” 
(2007, 143– 44 and 165).
The prospect of mutually supportive bonding and bridging social cap-
ital raises a pressing policy question for community development institu-
tions, articulated by Michael Woolcock: “Do the high levels of integration 
characterizing indigenous social relations in many poor communities 
actually constitute a resource that can be used as a basis for construct-
ing substantive development programs? If so, how?” (1998, 181). Scholars 
who study diasporas do not deal with “indigenous social relations” in a 
conventional sense, but they are well placed to explore this question, 
and the growth of Chinese communities around the world provides a 
valuable source of insight. As Rhacel Parreñas and Lok Siu observe, the 
inward pull of ethnic affinity among overseas Chinese communities 
does not necessarily impede their outward cooperation with external 
actors: “there is nothing inherent in diasporic identifications that pre-
vents the formation of broader political alliances. It does not have to be 
one or the other, but both forms of collective identification can coexist” 
(2007, 10).
In the Cuban and Mexican Chinese diaspora, people who simulta-
neously forge horizontal linkages within their community and vertical 
synergies with the public and private sectors are rare. As Mark Granovet-
ter observed forty years ago, this is because such people possess an un-
usual ability to work at arm’s length from the communities they bridge, 
enabling them to leverage the “strength of weak ties” (1973). Anthropolo-
gists are trained to seek out such liminal people precisely for their ability 
to explain and broker local relationships (Rabinow 1977). Chapter 3 shows 
that the difficulties of balancing allegiances to community and state in 
Havana’s Barrio Chino have spelled the undoing of several would-be in-
termediaries. Similarly, chapter 4 shows how Chinese community lead-
ers in Mexico who have developed strong ties with the export- processing 
maquiladora sector have seen their interests come into conflict with 
those of the immigrant Chinese workers they ostensibly protect.
18 INTRODUCTION
Intermediaries demonstrate the embodied nature of social capital, for 
however widely and densely connected they may be, their personal iden-
tities underpin its efficacy. Like guanxi, social capital requires direct in-
teractions between individuals who know each other or wish to, and it is 
therefore limited by the scope of the networks in which it operates. Social 
capital may generate “positive externalities” (Fukuyama 2000, 15), and 
societies with greater stocks of social capital are said to function more 
effectively and inclusively (Coleman 1988; Fedderke, de Kadt, and Luiz 
1999; Woolcock 1998). However, these stocks consist not of a collective 
public good, but of a cumulative reserve of personal favors to be recip-
rocated and of rewards and sanctions to be expected. Reserves of social 
capital are accessible only to group members and consequently are not 
fungible across distinct communities. Unlike financial capital, writes Ar-
iel Armony, “social capital does not have the same portability; therefore, 
it cannot be easily transferred from one setting to another” (2011, 49).
Trust relates better to collective scenarios than guanxi or social capital 
do, providing a more encompassing and inclusive organizing principle 
for responding to China’s rise. Long associated with efficiency, produc-
tivity, and prosperity, trust can take a “particularized” form between in-
dividuals who know each other but also a “generalized” form between 
“those whom we don’t know and who are different from us” (Armony 
2004, 21; also see Arrow 1974, 26; Uslaner 1999, 124– 25; Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994). Lin describes trust as a public resource necessary for 
civic order: “Societies must have consensual rules and collective trust for 
them to function” (N. Lin 2001, 148). Similarly, Francis Fukuyama argues 
that “one of the most important lessons we can learn from an examina-
tion of economic life is that a nation’s well- being, as well as its ability to 
compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the 
level of trust inherent in the society” (1995, 7).
It is widely agreed that generalized trust, untethered to specific ex-
changes between associated individuals, is an asset to any society, but 
pathways from personal favors to public goods are harder to define. 
Johannes Fedderke, Raphael de Kadt, and John Luiz argue that govern-
ments should encourage the assimilation of community- level allegiances 
and loyalties into a wider national system of regulated exchange. This 
“rationalization of social capital” involves the “the gradual replacement 
of informal associations and networks by formal administrative struc-
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tures, and the impersonal market mechanism no longer tied to individual 
identities of trading agents” (1999, 719). Particularized trust based on in-
formal reciprocity (for example, the exchange of gifts and favors) thus 
evolves into generalized trust based on formal transactions and codified 
civic norms (such as contracted exchanges of goods and services). Gov-
ernments can encourage and benefit from this evolution by investing in 
family, community, and education programs that build understanding, 
skills, and human capital appropriate to national development priori-
ties (ibid., 736– 38). As Theda Skocpol has argued, associational activity, 
entrepreneurial initiative, and the welfare state can thus reinforce each 
other in “close symbiosis” (1996, 20).
Others are skeptical that governments can inspire citizens to trust in 
each other and in shared civic norms. Fukuyama warns that state inter-
vention is futile because excessive “legal apparatus” is a “substitute for 
trust” (1995, 27). In a working paper for the International Monetary Fund, 
he supports this argument with historical examples:
If the state gets into the business of organizing everything, people will 
become dependent on it and lose their spontaneous ability to work 
with one another. France had a rich civil society at the end of the 
Middle Ages, but horizontal trust between individuals weakened as a 
result of a centralizing state that set Frenchmen at each other through 
a system of petty privileges and status distinctions. The same thing 
occurred in the former Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution, 
where the Communist Party consciously sought to undermine all 
forms of horizontal association in favor of vertical ties between party- 
state and individual. This has left post- Soviet society bereft of both 
trust and a durable civil society. (2000, 15– 16)
The conservative commentator George Will offers a similar zero- sum 
assessment of state intervention and trust: “as the state waxes, other in-
stitutions wane” (quoted in Skocpol 1996, 20; also see Schambra 1994). 
From this perspective, the state’s monitoring and compliance regulations 
impose cumbersome expenses and transaction costs while undermin-
ing the natural inclination of private actors to trust and cooperate with 
each other.
China’s impact in Cuba and Mexico opens a window into the poli-
tics of trust. The need for fresh development models in both countries is 
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forcing governments, businesses, and citizens to interact in new ways. To 
leverage benefits from these interactions requires smart policy making 
that is sensitive to social dynamics. Concepts like synergy, linkage, and 
public- private cooperation can help formulate government policies, but 
they are ultimately social propositions that envision distinct communi-
ties working together for a greater good. If they are to gain any traction 
on the ground, these concepts and the policies they inform must be used 
to build trust between strangers.
Whether the resources and responsibilities for participatory develop-
ment should come from the top down, the bottom up, or both has long 
been a matter of intense disagreement. Conflicting political philosophies 
have prevented academic theorists from finding common ground on this 
point, but entrenched ideologies have too often inhibited politicians from 
even debating it. The pressures and opportunities generated by China’s 
rise are stimulating more open public discussions about the optimal bal-
ance of state, market, and civic power. Setting out from contrasting po-
litical and economic systems, Cuba and Mexico show that forming more 
inclusive industrial policies (see chapters 1 and 2) and achieving civic en-
gagement with resident Chinese communities (see chapters 3 and 4) are 
challenges that governments of all ideological stripes must address.
BLACK MARKETS: THE DARK SIDE OF TRUST
There is no single formula for optimizing the balance of public, private, 
and civic inputs, but there are more and less effective blends for address-
ing specific challenges. The informal sector is a case in point. In Cuba, 
the gradual opening of consumer retail to small private entrepreneurs 
reflects a slow top- down process of decentralization, creation of regu-
lated supply chains, and assessment of results. Increasingly reliant on 
Chinese manufactured products and finance, this state- guided process 
aims to contain the expansion of the black market—a prerequisite for 
further liberalization (see chapter 1). In Mexico, high import tariffs on 
Chinese textiles, handicrafts, and other products have encouraged smug-
gling and fraud. Evidence is mounting that more sophisticated forms of 
state support, such as easier access to loans for small businesses and offi-
cial sponsorship of trade fairs, would better assist affected sectors of the 
economy (see chapter 2). While deepening commercial connections with 
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China are affecting the Cuban and Mexican informal sectors in different 
ways, they are exposing a common need for more innovative government 
policies.
A careful balance of state regulation and private initiative will also 
be necessary if the activities of Chinese diasporic communities are to 
be leveraged in support of national development. For a century and a 
half, Chinese associations in Cuba and Mexico have drawn on informal 
networks, personal determination, and trust to sustain connections with 
their motherland. Premised on shared ethnicity, these relationships have 
deepened in the twenty- first century, joining together people on opposite 
sides of the Pacific who often have little or no personal knowledge of each 
other. It is not unusual for mainland Chinese exporters and investors to 
take risks, brokered by intermediaries, with diasporic business partners 
they have never met. In these circumstances, writes Steffen Mau, trust 
is at once inclusive and exclusive: “Transnational trust is a form of gen-
eralized trust in the sense that it is extended to individuals whom we do 
not know and who are unlike us. And yet, it does not extend to an ab-
stract other, but to a specific nationally defined group” (2010, 110). With 
consensual policy making the state may harness the elusive social con-
nections of Chinese and other diasporic communities for use in official 
development projects, but as the Cuban and Mexican governments have 
found, administrators are hard pressed to regulate—let alone control—
the deployment of trust.
Less reliant on preexisting exchanges between specific people, trust 
within the transnational Chinese diaspora is more mobile and fungible 
than guanxi and social capital. Shared ethnic roots, real or imagined, 
constitute an affinity among some fifty million overseas Chinese people 
spread around the globe. But even globalized ethnicity does not define 
the outer limits of collective trust. Broadly shared experiences—for in-
stance, of life and livelihood in the developing world—can also provide a 
platform for common cause. The convergence of distinct yet overlapping 
practices, such as the Chinese tradition of conducting business through 
the “back door” (hou men 后 门), the Cuban custom of resolving prob-
lems “below the cover” (bajo el tapete), and the Mexican convention of 
“leveraging” favors (palanca), provides a basis for informal cooperation 
between people who may otherwise have little in common. Such a con-
vergence could pose new challenges to the rule of law in Latin America 
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as Chinese diasporic communities relink themselves with the mainland 
(Armony 2011, 40– 41; Tokatlian 2008, 77).
Enabling foreigners to find their social bearings, generalized trust 
built on similar precursor experiences—what Armony calls “gps capital” 
(2011, 27)—provides common ground between strangers. As this ground 
is traversed, though, strangers become friends and their trust evolves. 
Whether or not their relationship draws strength from ethnic solidarity, 
they likely belong to independent social capital networks whose goals and 
priorities may or may not overlap. Should the priorities of their broader 
networks intersect, the strangers- cum- friends may become channels of 
intergroup contact and mediation. For example, some Chinese commu-
nity leaders in northern Mexico have become well connected with the 
region’s political and economic elites and now broker partnerships for 
them with mainland Chinese wholesale suppliers and labor contractors. 
These exchanges may have originated in generalized trust built on ethnic 
affinity, shared experiences of development, familiarity with informality, 
and even appreciation of Chinese art (as in one case discussed below), 
but over time they have become more instrumental and focused. The 
material benefits they generate are unevenly distributed among mana-
gers, intermediaries, and factory workers, and the trust underpinning 
them has become exclusive and particularized.
The transformation of generalized trust into more particularized 
forms casts new light on Guthrie’s argument for the “declining sig-
nificance of guanxi” brought on by China’s integration into the global 
economy. Instead, as Mayfair Yang has argued, “guanxi practices may 
decline in some social domains, but find new areas to flourish” (2002, 
459). Drawing both on ethnic solidarity and “gps capital,” trust is foment-
ing new links between China and the Chinese diaspora in Cuba, Mexico, 
and elsewhere. As these linkages deepen, guanxi may find new grounds 
for consolidation.
From a policy perspective, the business generated by resident Chinese 
communities can augment tax revenue and widen trade networks, but 
only when it operates within the law. When it does not, ethnic entre-
preneurship can evolve into organized crime, and broad- based benefits 
into private profiteering. As Alejandro Portes puts it, “the capacity of 
authorities to enforce rules (social control) can [be] jeopardized by the 
existence of tight networks whose function is precisely to facilitate viola-
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tion of those rules for private benefit” (1998, 15). Inward- looking informal 
networks impede the efforts of governments and markets to harness do-
mestic talent and scale up local capacities for an ostensibly greater na-
tional good. The policy challenge, once again, is to intervene in ways that 
leverage trust rather than destroy it.
Government programs the world over attract public trust when they 
affirm community values. As a series of papers from the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government argues, regulatory frameworks are most effec-
tive when they are socially “embedded” and “tailored to take account of 
the culture, education, and priorities of intended audiences” (Fung et al. 
2004, 4 and 5; also see M. Graham 2001; Weil 2002). This book finds that 
responsiveness to bottom-up demands is becoming more central to the 
capacity of the Cuban and Mexican governments to establish and sustain 
the rule of law. Unofficial connections to China, whether through illicit 
trade networks or diasporic communities, require more refined policies 
of social engagement.
THE POLITICS OF WRITING TRUST
China’s profound impact on Latin America has generated a rich literary 
response. Trade is the most quantifiable dimension of this impact, as is 
evident in the early appearance of reports from the Inter- American De-
velopment Bank (Agosin, Rodas Martini, and Saavedra- Rivano 2004), the 
Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (Blázquez- 
Lidoy, Rodríguez, and Santiso 2006), and the World Bank (Lederman, 
Olarreaga, and Perry 2008). Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski’s 
The Dragon in the Room draws on these efforts to spell out the economic 
pressures that China has brought to bear on the region. China’s unprec-
edented demand for its natural resources, the authors argue, has kicked 
away the ladder that might otherwise lead to upgraded industries and 
value- added exports (2010).
The political implications of Sino– Latin American engagement have 
also attracted attention. Joshua Kurlantzick’s Charm Offensive (2007) 
presents interviews, media excerpts, and survey data that reveal the 
Chinese government’s soft power initiatives in Latin America and else-
where, from Confucius institutes to sports infrastructure. China in Latin 
America (2009) by R. Evan Ellis zeroes in on the strategic positioning of 
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Chinese state- owned enterprises in the region and the security dilemmas 
they may arouse. The seven case studies that constitute Latin America 
Facing China (2010a), edited by Alex Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Ho-
genboom, illustrate the risks of unbalanced Sino– Latin American trade, 
which emerged in sobering clarity when commodity prices collapsed in 
2008. The need for longer- term planning and coordination, the editors 
conclude, has fomented a “paradigmatic convergence between China and 
the leftist governments in Latin America” (Fernández Jilberto and Ho-
genboom 2010b, 191).
Chinese commentators steer clear of advocating any ideological con-
vergence with Latin America, at least in China– Latin America Relations: 
Review and Analysis (2012), a characteristically dutiful volume edited 
by the Latin Americanist He Shuangrong of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences. The book’s twelve authors appear in order of descend-
ing rank, dwelling on officially sanctioned concepts like mutual bene-
fit, collaborative development, and food and energy security. Although 
some of the book’s arguments resemble (and may well have informed) 
official policies, others elucidate Chinese perspectives on less- publicized 
topics, such as whether China is complicating security arrangements in 
the Western Hemisphere and anxieties that China’s rise may stir among 
Western analysts. Lin Hua’s chapter on overseas Chinese communities 
offers a glimpse into Beijing’s efforts to advance foreign policy goals 
through Latin America’s Chinese diaspora, which the author argues is 
“the most direct source to carry forward and spread Chinese traditional 
culture” and to “promote the development of China– Latin America trade 
relations” (2012, 115 and 116).
Two volumes have explored Sino– Latin American interactions on the 
ground. China Engages Latin America, which José Luis León- Manríquez 
and I edited (Hearn and León- Manríquez 2011), combines cross- regional 
analysis with country studies that examine how political ideologies, do-
mestic histories, and informal social ties are embedded in official rela-
tions with China. And From the Great Wall to the New World, edited by 
Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Armony (2012), presents ten essays that il-
lustrate how Chinese relations with Latin America have moved beyond 
trade and investment into the political and social spheres of sustainable 
urbanization, media (print and online), understandings of hegemonic 
challenge, and engagement with Chinese diasporic communities. The 
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editors argue that this “thickening” of Sino- Latin American interactions 
invites researchers to formulate new empirical approaches that “recast 
the ways in which we think about contemporary processes of globaliza-
tion” (Armony and Strauss 2012, 17).
The following chapters take up Armony and Strauss’s invitation by ex-
ploring China’s impact on the intersection of international engagement, 
domestic industrial relations, and community development. Researching 
these connections is as much a methodological challenge as a theoretical 
one, owing to a persisting academic division of labor that does not favor 
concurrent attention to macro and micro perspectives. The book draws 
inspiration from the pioneering cross- disciplinary work of Michael Bura-
woy (2000), George Marcus (1995), and Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier 
(2004), which established a two- way street between global economic sys-
tems and local initiative.
No single methodology can fully apprehend Chinese transnational-
ism, but a combination of historical and anthropological analysis can il-
luminate the articulation of international relations with social process 
over time. Multisited ethnography is well suited to explore transnational 
phenomena because, as Marcus writes, it opens the possibility of “tracing 
a cultural formation across and within multiple sites of activity” (1995, 
96). Setting out with this orientation, the book traces the cultural forma-
tion of trust, first as a principle for formulating China’s political interac-
tions with—and within—Cuba and Mexico (chapters 1 and 2) and then 
as a catalyst for purposeful solidarity among Chinese communities in 
the two countries (chapters 3 and 4). The goal is to generate insight into 
how top- down policies and bottom-up proposals at times converge and 
at other times diverge in response to China’s rise, and how trust shapes 
these critical junctures.
To see beyond official statements and statistics on China’s engage-
ment with Latin America requires time on the ground. Time, though, 
is a dwindling resource for twenty- first-century researchers. University 
budgets are shrinking, teaching loads are growing, and publications are 
increasingly assessed for their short- term impact. Graduate students in 
the social sciences—anthropology, in particular—are probably the last 
remaining group expected (and, if lucky, funded) to leave campus for ex-
tended periods to gather data. They can therefore contribute much to 
the future study of Chinese– Latin American relations, and established 
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scholars stand to deepen their knowledge by seeking out and supervis-
ing them.
I have been fortunate to secure a series of grants and fellowships to 
sustain fifteen years of full- time research and writing on Cuba, China, 
and Mexico. From 2000 until 2002 I lived in Havana and Santiago de 
Cuba to learn how Afro- Cuban religious associations were filling new 
civic spaces to compensate for underresourced government services 
(Hearn 2008a). These insights provided conceptual orientation for my 
subsequent work in Barrio Chino, where Chinese associations were also 
reaching out. Like their Afro- Cuban counterparts, they were consolidat-
ing their internal strengths, building bridges to other grassroots associa-
tions, and selectively participating in government programs that might 
empower them. Other neighborhood groups were also emerging at the 
time, with varying degrees of autonomy, to advocate women’s rights, 
Christian welfare projects, self- employment, and other civic agendas. To 
document this “rise of the local,” as it was becoming known among Cu-
ban observers, I worked with Ernel Mastrapa and María Teresa Montes 
de Oca Choy at the University of Havana to convene fifteen researchers 
from Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Camagüey to share their insights in 
a workshop and a book (Hearn 2008b).
Shortly after President Hu Jintao’s celebrated visit to Cuba in 2004, 
I returned to Havana for eight months to see Barrio Chino becoming 
a mass- mediated stop for visiting Chinese diplomats. Its street markets 
were bustling with local and foreign clients, and its rich cultural heritage 
was reemerging into public view. The dawn wushu tai chi sessions long 
conducted privately in the Chinese associations were expanding into va-
cant lots and public parks. Small votive statues of the Chinese deity Guan 
Gong (关公, known locally as San Fan Con) were appearing in Barrio 
Chino’s informal markets and on ecumenical home altars around Ha-
vana. The Chinese associations were welcoming tourists into their flour-
ishing restaurants and in-house museums.
Studying these issues over time inevitably drew me into local politics, 
reminding me of a lesson from undergraduate anthropology: it is im-
possible to be a fly on the wall. On several occasions I failed to appreci-
ate how this theory works in practice, only to recognize in hindsight the 
consequences of my actions. In 2013 Barrio Chino’s local government 
set about renovating a traditional Chinese pharmacy and asked my help 
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to find a Chinese source of homeopathic products (see chapter 3). I saw 
no harm in this, and with the assistance of colleagues in Beijing, had the 
government’s proposal translated and presented to a supplier we identi-
fied. Subsequent discussions in Barrio Chino revealed a broader agenda: 
a Chinese association was already importing these items formally and in-
formally from China, generating unwanted competition for the govern-
ment. My matchmaking may have unwittingly undermined this competi-
tion and compromised exchanges that over time could have benefited 
Havana’s Chinese community. On reflection I was reminded that par-
ticipant observation is never an innocent endeavor, a point I have tried 
to incorporate into this book by including occasional excerpts from my 
research diary.
As China’s engagement with Latin America deepened, conferences on 
the topic identified a need for closer dialogue with Chinese researchers. 
I shared this concern, and in 2007 I relocated to Beijing for one year to 
study Mandarin and explore the development of Latin American studies 
in Chinese universities and research institutes. I presented the prelimi-
nary arguments of this book at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Fudan University, Nankai University, Jinan University, and the China 
Center for Contemporary World Studies. Ensuing debates opened my 
eyes to the multiple opinions, agendas, and political pressures condition-
ing Chinese interactions with Latin America. These exchanges were the 
starting point for a series of workshops at the University of Sydney; the 
University of California, Berkeley; the Inter- American Dialogue; and 
the University of Chicago. Support from the Open Society Institute, the 
Australian Research Council, the Latin American Studies Association, 
and the Worldwide Universities Network enabled Chinese scholars such 
as Jiang Shixue, Sun Hongbo, Yang Zhimin, Wang Ping, Zhang Jianhua, 
and Zhang Xuegang to participate in these events, in turn generating a 
series of publications (Hearn 2010; Jiang 2011; Mao, Hearn, and Liu 2015; 
P. Wang 2013; also see Strauss and Armony 2012).
Working with Chinese scholars revealed the controversial place of 
Mexico in China’s foreign relations and sparked my curiosity about how 
China was perceived in Mexico. In 2008 I took up a lecturing position at 
the Autonomous University of Baja California (uabc) in Tijuana, home 
to one of Mexico’s largest Chinese diasporic communities. Classroom 
debates about the impact of Chinese manufactured exports on the city’s 
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small businesses provided me with valuable leads for follow-up research, 
and the uabc historian Catalina Velázquez Morales shared her extensive 
archives on Chinese settlement in the region. The Chinese consul general 
had recently gone on record condemning violence against Tijuana’s Chi-
nese community and accepted an invitation to participate in a public de-
bate on Chinese- Mexican relations at the uabc. He introduced me to 
Chinese business and cultural leaders, who in turn arranged meetings 
for me at the Chinese associations of Tijuana and Mexicali between 2008 
and 2011. The China- Mexico Research Center at the National Autono-
mous University of Mexico also became a focal point for me to consult 
with researchers and Chinese entrepreneurs in Mexico City between 
2010 and 2014.
Countless people contributed sensitive personal and political insights 
to enrich this book. I have tried to convey their perspectives as faithfully 
as possible and to build the book’s conceptual analysis on their ideas. 
My attempt to mediate bottom-up experiences of China’s impact with 
top- down analysis of state- society relations has involved compromises, 
which I hope will validate the trust of the many people who shared their 
knowledge with me. The mediations pursued by governments, compa-
nies, and community associations in their quest for effective responses 
to China’s rise have also required compromise. How diaspora and trust 
condition these interactions is the question to which we now turn.
Miguel, better known as Chino, gestured enthusiastically toward his new 
armchair. A carpenter by trade, he had always made his own furniture, 
but this was a piece to be proud of. It contained the best available fab-
ric and timber, affordable thanks to his new job. Since 2011 he had been 
working in a nearby marketplace, selling pipes, valves, and spare parts for 
home plumbing repairs. Chino took me to the small courtyard where his 
concrete cubicle stood alongside ten or so others, which sold everything 
from ground coconut to T-shirts (figure 1.1). A promotional sign indi-
cated his professional versatility: “Se realiza todo tipo de trabajo a domi-
cilio y en el puesto, gracias” (I provide every kind of service in-house and 
in-store, thank you).
Over the bustle of animated negotiations, Chino explained that he had 
acquired about half of the items on sale in his cubicle through official 
government- licensed suppliers, and the rest illegally through a network 
of friends working in state factories. Everybody in the courtyard, he said, 
relied on the black market for about half of their supplies because “other-
wise none of this would be possible. Unfortunately our system is broken, 
because it only works if you steal things. The newspaper says Raúl [Cas-
tro, Cuba’s president since 2008] is going to create a wholesale market . . . 
that’s why he went to China again to find suppliers.” I had known Chino 
for a decade, but I had never previously encountered him with money 
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in his pocket and optimistic about the future. In the absence of a legal 
supply chain, though, he would continue to operate under the table and 
under the threat of surprise inspections.
Chino’s uncertainty about the trajectory of Cuba’s development and 
China’s role in it is shared by observers around the world. Critics argue 
that in contrast to China’s economic liberalization over the past three 
decades, Cuba’s commitment to “updating the socialist system” consti-
tutes a justification for maintaining the fifty- year- old status quo, and that 
“nothing much will change” (Azel 2011). Others perceive real change un-
der Raúl Castro, describing the suite of reforms announced by his govern-
ment in 2011 as “a significant realignment of the paternalistic relationship 
that has existed between the State and its citizenry since the revolution-
ary period began in 1959” (Laverty 2011, 4). Even Freedom House, which 
has long doubted the sincerity of the Cuban government’s policies, finds 
that “the opening of a private sector, while still limited, is driving genuine 
change in Cuba” (Moreno and Calingaert 2011, 25).
figure 1.1 Chino and his wares, Havana. Photo by the author.
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The global financial crisis deepened efforts to shift the contours of 
Cuba’s post– Fidel Castro economic landscape, its impact transmitted 
through the island’s sensitivity to foreign credit, export earnings (par-
ticularly from nickel), remittances, and tourism (Mesa- Lago and Vidal- 
Alejandro 2010, 690– 91). Cuba’s response was unveiled in the April 2011 
Communist Party Congress: a series of 313 reforms called the Lineamien-
tos de la política económica y social del partido y la revolución (Economic 
and social policy guidelines of the party and revolution; República de 
Cuba 2011).
A prominent feature of the Lineamientos is an attempt to build syner-
gies between large state enterprises, small private actors like Chino, and 
suppliers for both. As in China, the goal is not to replace the state with the 
market, but to create a more liberal blend of state authority and market in-
centives capable of integrating aspiring entrepreneurs into existing hege-
monic structures. Through this process the Cuban government hopes to 
scale back its share of spending from 95 percent of gross domestic product 
(gdp) to around 40 percent by 2017 (Frank 2012). This optimistic goal 
resonates with the advice of Chinese policy researchers in a recent issue 
of the Cuban journal Temas, who argue that the optimal developmental 
path is one that prioritizes gradual opening under the “supreme guidance 
of the state” (J. Yan 2011, 13; also see Shi 2011). China is not simply an 
example for Cuba, but an active player in the reformulation of the Cu-
ban system. China helped Cuba survive the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and upgrade basic industrial infrastructure, and by 2014 Cuba’s gdp (in 
purchasing power parity) had rebounded to 234 billion (World Bank 
2015b). As noted in the introduction, China is now Cuba’s second largest 
trading partner, with annual bilateral trade reaching 1.39 billion in 2014. 
The dollar amount has fluctuated considerably since reaching a peak of 
2.3 billion in 2008, but it is up from just 314 million in 2000 (figure 1.2; 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 2015). Commercial 
agreements have been accompanied by advice about trade and investment 
liberalization, conveyed repeatedly to Cuban officials by their Chinese 
counterparts ever since Fidel Castro’s 1995 meeting with Chinese Premier 
Li Peng in Beijing (Y. Cheng 2007a and 2007b; Jiang 2009). As Chino indi-
cated above, Cuba’s emerging entrepreneurs continue to rely on the black 
market, a problem their government hopes to address in part through in-
bound supply of Chinese consumer products for the wholesale market.
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Ideological affinity is no longer the prime mover of Sino- Cuban en-
gagement. As a former Cuban diplomat in Beijing noted, “we can no 
longer knock on China’s door and ask for favors the way we used to. Po-
litical trust is still important in our relationship, but now it’s a matter of 
pragmatism, because the Chinese insist that the numbers have to add 
up” (Omar Pereira Hernández, interview, May 28, 2012). Cuba’s de facto 
ambassador to China during the Cultural Revolution, Mauro García Tri-
ana, described the situation this way: “The Chinese are very clear about 
one thing: they’re not going to be benefactors for Cuba like the Soviets 
were. I was once told in no uncertain terms by a Chinese diplomat: ‘Our 
relations with Cuba have to be mutually beneficial or they will not work’ ” 
(interview, January 11, 2007).
Political solidarity continues to shape the contours of Sino- Cuban co-
operation, but the ideological foundations of the relationship are shifting 
away from doctrines of top- down control. This shift reflects a common 
development trajectory: centralized governance once sought to com-
mand economic development and the social interactions it entails. As 
Lenin put it, “trust is good, but control is better.” More recently, appropri-
figure 1.2 China’s trade with Cuba, 1992– 2014. Source: United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database 2015.
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ately regulated private sectors have been gaining credibility in both na-
tions as experimental policies open new ground for small businesses and 
the independent exchanges they require. China and Cuba are grappling 
with this transformation in their own ways, in the process redefining the 
balance of vertical and horizontal power that underpins their domestic 
development and bilateral relations.
This chapter’s first section outlines the changing nature of Sino- Cuban 
cooperation since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1960, from 
state- to-state deals premised on political ideology to strategies for ex-
panding the private sector. It then considers bilateral cooperation in oil 
production, electronics manufacturing, transportation, and education. 
State management has enabled a high degree of coordination among 
these sectors, but unrealistic expectations of political solidarity on the 
part of Cuban negotiators have also produced tensions with increasingly 
market- oriented Chinese negotiators. The chapter’s final section exam-
ines the reforms proposed by Cuba’s 2011 Lineamientos, particularly 
their approach to decentralization, employment, and the informal sector. 
While China’s earlier liberalization has provided inspiration and insight 
for this process, the chapter concludes that an important next step will 
be to permit cooperation between independent Chinese and Cuban citi-
zens. This will require both governments to acknowledge that, in spite of 
Lenin, trust is sometimes better than control.
THE CHANGING BASIS OF SINO- CUBAN RELATIONS
Political affinities between Cuba and China date back to the early years 
of the Cuban Revolution. On September 2, 1960, Fidel Castro declared 
that Cuba would sever ties with Taiwan; this was done on September  28, 
making Cuba the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic re-
lations with the People’s Republic of China. In the first half of the 1960s, 
China provided economic and military aid to Cuba, supporting its repel-
ling of the Bay of Pigs invasion (People’s Republic of China Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1987, 365– 66). In return, Cuba supported China’s bid to 
restore its status in the United Nations. Bilateral trade was initiated and 
regulated through a noncash system of annual quotas, codified in 1960 
in the first five- year trade and payment agreement. The agreement was 
eminently political, with Premier Zhou Enlai proposing that China would 
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buy one million tons of sugar from Cuba (at the inflated price of 100 mil-
lion) and pay for it with industrial equipment. Ernesto “Che” Guevara rec-
ognized the added value of Zhou’s offer: “This [proposal] is not tenable 
from the economic point of view, but we raised it from the political point 
of view” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba 1960, 5).
Ideological differences and rivalry between the communist parties of 
China and the Soviet Union (known as the Sino- Soviet split) produced 
tensions—though never a rupture—in Sino- Cuban relations from the 
middle of the 1960s to the early 1980s (Zhu, Mao, and Li 2002, 319). To 
remain economically viable in the face of pressure from the United States, 
Cuba sided with the Soviet Union, and in 1967 the Chinese ambassador 
was recalled from Havana after Castro called Mao Zedong “a senile idiot” 
(Garcia Triana, Eng Herrera, and Benton 2009, xxi). The 1975 war in An-
gola, in which Cuba and China backed opposing factions, and China’s 
invasion of Vietnam in 1979 further strained bilateral relations. At the 
time of the invasion Castro called Deng Xiaoping a “caricature of Hitler” 
(ibid., xxi) and denounced China’s aggression during a speech in Havana’s 
Plaza de la Revolución, prompting the Chinese delegates to stand up in 
unison and leave.
As China ceased its policy of antagonism toward countries aligned 
with Moscow in the early 1980s, a confluence of political and economic 
interests motivated Beijing’s rapprochement with Havana. In 1983 Cuba’s 
minister of foreign trade, Ricardo Cabrisas, visited Beijing to negotiate an 
agreement enabling Chinese students, diplomats, and military officials 
to visit Havana (signed in 1984) and to expand the 1960 trade and pay-
ment agreement to accommodate the exchange of 100,000 tons of Cuban 
sugar for Chinese manufactured products (signed in 1988). Chinese lead-
ers recognized that a key problem for Cuba was its dependency on oil 
imports. In 1985 Cuban oil output was 870,000 tons, enough to meet only 
10 percent of domestic demand; the rest was provided at a heavily sub-
sidized rate by the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet Union 
forced Cuba to start paying market prices for oil, which seriously ham-
pered its economic growth and drained its foreign purchasing capacity. 
An exchange of Cuban and Chinese foreign ministers in 1989 focused 
on initiating cooperation in oil production, a goal that—as discussed be-
low—remains a bilateral priority.
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Cuban officials watched with trepidation as Eastern European citizens 
rose up at the end of the 1980s to challenge the Soviet system. Against all 
odds, the Castro government survived the so-called end of history, though 
with severe economic casualties. The withdrawal of Soviet support and 
the evaporation of trade with the Soviet bloc precipitated a 75 percent re-
duction in Cuba’s import capacity and a 35 percent decline in gdp. China 
played an important but little- known role in seeing Cuba through this 
tumultuous period. The Chinese Communist Party had also come under 
domestic pressure for change at this time, but it emerged intact in part 
through its 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square and in part through a 
decade of sincere commitment to opening the economy, improving living 
standards, and creating jobs.
Arriving in Havana in June 1989, just days after the Tiananmen Square 
incident, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was warmly received by 
Castro. The gesture was deeply appreciated in Beijing, since every other 
country on Qian’s itinerary had canceled his visit. As Cheng Yinghong 
notes, China’s relationship with Cuba became “one of the most important 
Sino- foreign relations in the eyes of the post- Tiananmen Chinese leaders” 
(2007b, 727). The show of solidarity was mutually beneficial: in 1993, a 
time when most of the world believed the downfall of the Cuban Revo-
lution was imminent, Chinese President Jiang Zemin broke the island’s 
isolation with a state visit and an offer of financial assistance. According to 
a Chinese diplomat I interviewed in Beijing (who requested anonymity), 
Jiang conducted the visit to “save Cuba’s revolutionary project,” expressly 
against the advice of China’s increasingly pragmatic Communist Party.
The basis for Sino- Cuban cooperation was shifting in step with global 
change. Without Soviet support Cuba could not sustain its 1988 accord 
with China to exchange sugar for manufactured products or the encom-
passing trade and payment agreement that for three decades had under-
pinned bilateral barter transactions. As Castro discovered during his first 
visit to Beijing in 1995, ideology would no longer trump economics. In-
adequately briefed by Cuban diplomats in Beijing, he found Chinese offi-
cials to be far more pragmatic than he had expected. Publicly, communist 
ideology was heralded as an enduring linchpin of bilateral relations, but 
privately Premier Li Peng advised him to liberalize the Cuban economy. 
Jiang tellingly arranged meetings with Castro both in Beijing and in the 
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Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, the heartland of China’s liberalized ex-
port economy. Shortly after, on January 1, 1996, China ended the trade 
and payment agreement with Cuba.
As Cuba’s vice president, Raúl Castro showed more interest than his 
brother in effecting domestic economic reforms and in building a prag-
matic relationship with China. According to a former employee of the 
Cuban embassy in Beijing, Raúl’s 1997 “week- long learning trip” to China 
actually consisted of a month of research into Chinese approaches to in-
dustrial reform, privatization, and urban development. As the evidence 
collected by Hal Klepak (2010) shows, the military institutions Raúl 
crafted on his return to manage operations in tourism and agriculture 
were subjected to essentially the same pressures as Chinese firms: to pro-
duce, be accountable, and make a profit. Raúl’s efforts to this end were as-
sisted by visiting Chinese advisors, such as a specialist appointed by Zhu 
Rongji, the future premier, to share insights into China’s experience with 
foreign investment and outreach to expatriates (Y. Cheng 2007b, 729). 
Another visitor was Mao Xianglin, a special envoy of the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party, who developed action plans for 
expanding Cuban consumer markets. This involved the establishment 
in 1997 of a bicycle factory with Chinese capital and technical expertise 
and a facility for producing electric fans and household consumer goods. 
Mao described this strategy as an incremental process:
I would hesitate to say that our Cuban manufacturing operations are 
entirely commercial, because what we’re doing is broader than that. 
We’re trying to help Cuba to incrementally upgrade its technical ability. 
If our products prove popular and useful then we assist by setting up 
factories. . . . It is interesting that China learned from the United States 
how to manage its economy, and now Latin America looks to China as 
a teacher of socialism. Today we are a global village, but for the village 
to be harmonious there has to be mutual understanding and respect. 
That is why we are helping Cuba to reach its goals. . . . Using Chinese 
expertise Cuba could come to produce electronic goods for sale to 
Latin America. (interview, December 14, 2007)
The mutual understanding pursued by Mao in Cuba was based not 
on orchestrated quotas and artificial prices, as had been the case until 
1996, but on the goal of modernizing Cuba’s infrastructure to enable the 
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country’s integration into international markets. To this end, Jiang vis-
ited again in 2001, providing a loan of 200 million to update Cuban tele-
communications with Chinese products and a 150 million line of credit 
to buy Chinese televisions (Erikson and Minson 2006). He also pledged 
to support Cuban production of rice, soy, sorghum, maize, and sugar for 
sale to the Chinese state, but the slow pace of Cuban land reforms lim-
ited this prospect. Cuba’s sugar exports to China nevertheless had grown 
from 91 million in 2001 to 210 million in 2014 (United Nations Com-
modity Trade Statistics Database 2015).
The Chinese Communist Party elite was privately less enthusiastic 
about Cuba than Jiang was, not least because the slow recovery of the Cu-
ban economy had delayed the repayment of loans. In 2003 Fidel Castro 
made a second visit to Beijing to explain. Together with Jiang, he pre-
pared a schedule of monthly payments from the National Bank of Cuba 
and a series of strict fiscal requirements to be imposed on Cuban en-
terprises. The plan’s strength was its diplomatic timing. In the context 
of China’s looming leadership transition, it provided Jiang and his allies 
with a tool to advocate continued support to Cuba. The Cuba lobby was 
further strengthened by Castro’s symbolic power: long revered in China 
as a revolutionary icon, his public praise of the Chinese system provided 
relief to a government facing growing concerns about its ability to deal 
with domestic inequality and advance the socialist cause. Jiang, General 
Secretary Hu Jintao, incoming Premier Wen Jiabao, Zhu, and other key 
figures all publicly expressed their solidarity with Castro (People’s Daily 
2003a and 2003b).
The reelection of U.S. President George W. Bush in November 2004 
generated diplomatic common ground for Cuba and China. Having be-
come China’s president in March 2003, Hu visited Havana the same 
month that Bush was reelected. Bush’s hard- line position on Cuba led 
to media commentary that for Castro there was “no better time for the 
visit” (Reuters Havana 2004). Hu affirmed the bilateral relationship with 
a thinly veiled reference to the United States, stating that China and Cuba 
“are fraternal brothers . . . passing the test of changing and adverse inter-
national circumstances” (quoted in Lam 2004, 3; also see Murray 2004). 
The visit yielded agreements in education, public health, biotechnol-
ogy, telecommunications, earthquake detection, solar energy research, 
cancer treatment, vaccine production, nickel mining, and oil explora-
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tion. China pledged to invest 500 million in Cuba’s nickel sector, and 
although Venezuela emerged as the leading financier of the Las Camario-
cas ferro- nickel plant near the city of Moa, by 2014 China had consumed 
3.8 billion worth of Cuban nickel—nearly all that had been produced 
since 2004 (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 2015). 
The visit also indicated a shift in economic thinking: Chinese electronic 
products imported by Cuba such as washing machines, televisions, rice 
cookers, air conditioners, and refrigerators would now be assembled on 
the island (see below).
Visiting Cuba again in November 2008, Hu offered extensions on the 
repayment of previous loans, a donation of 8 million for hurricane re-
lief, and a credit line of 70 million for health infrastructure (Granma 
2008). In another apparent reference to the United States, he stated that 
“the Chinese people will, as always, support the just struggle of the Cu-
ban people in safeguarding state sovereignty and opposing outside in-
terference” (quoted in Xinhua 2008). According to a member of Hu’s 
delegation, China offered thirty- seven investment projects on the un-
derstanding that Chinese technicians, investors, and their families would 
take up residence in Cuba (interview, November 21, 2008). Whether 
such an influx of Chinese employees would be viewed favorably by Cu-
bans or provoke hostile reactions as it has elsewhere in Latin America 
would remain unknown, since only a small number of the projects was 
approved.
In June 2011 Xi Jinping, China’s vice president, and Jiang Jiemin, presi-
dent of the China National Petroleum Corporation (cnpc), visited Cuba 
to sign thirteen agreements ranging from investment in oil and gas to 
banking and finance. Underpinning the first Five- Year Plan for Sino- 
Cuban cooperation, the accords demonstrated China’s long- term com-
mitment to assisting Cuba through its reforms. As the economist Rich-
ard Feinberg noted at the time, “some observers opine, albeit with some 
exaggeration, that China has become Cuba’s imf [International Mone-
tary Fund]!” (2011, 42). The director of the Latin America Institute of the 
Chinese Academy of International Relations, Wu Hongyin, had this to 
say of Xi’s visit: “The deepening of reform in Cuba and the broadening of 
liberalization measures will call more attention among Chinese compa-
nies. This, in turn, will increase Chinese- Cuban economic cooperation, 
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and create more opportunities for both nations in important economic 
sectors such as agriculture, telecommunications, infrastructure, services, 
energy, among others. Future economic relations will be closer” (quoted 
in Cuba Standard 2011).
Just as Fidel Castro had traveled to Beijing to meet incoming Presi-
dent Hu and Premier Wen in 2003, Raúl Castro went to China to meet 
incoming President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in July 2012. The 
visit secured agreements that the Chinese government would boost tour-
ism to Cuba and provide digital television and telecommunications tech-
nology, financial and banking services, infrastructure, and equipment for 
the health sector. It also consolidated cooperation in agriculture through 
Chinese provision of fertilizers, tractors, and irrigation equipment. Ex-
port contracts are a common feature of Chinese bilateral agreements, 
but as was the case during Fidel Castro’s 2003 visit, the deeper value 
for the incoming government was the Cuban leader’s ringing public en-
dorsement of China’s scientific progress, humanitarianism, economic 
stability, and faithful pursuit of socialism. As Cheng writes, “Cuba has 
been perceived as the most unyielding and thus the most admirable anti- 
American hero who, as the Chinese government has introduced to its 
people, sets an example of the defiance of ‘international pressures’ and 
of survival against all odds. In this way the image of Cuba has facilitated 
China’s newly emerging nationalism. The hardliners, old Maoists and 
new leftists have looked upon Cuba as the example of the socialism purer 
than China’s” (2007b, 728; also see Y. Cheng 2012).
Political solidarity continues to serve a diplomatic purpose in Sino- 
Cuban relations as was evident during Xi’s 2014 visit to the island, which 
he commended for “persisting on the socialist path, firmly safeguarding 
the sovereignty of the state” (quoted in Pérez 2014). The comment was 
accompanied by a commitment from China Minmetals Corporation to 
purchase 600 million of Cuban nickel, illustrating pragmatic substance 
beneath the diplomacy.
For over three decades ideology permeated Sino- Cuban relations, 
starting with grandiose commitments such as the 1960 trade and pay-
ment agreement and Zhou Enlai’s willingness to buy overpriced Cuban 
sugar. Political solidarity continued to prevail through the doctrinal dis-
putes of the Sino- Soviet split and rapprochement, marked by centrally 
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planned bartering of sugar for manufactured products. Castro’s support 
for China through the Tiananmen crisis and Jiang’s endeavor to “save” 
the Cuban Revolution after the Soviet collapse demonstrated the depth 
of trust between the two countries. The nature of bilateral relations be-
gan to change in the mid- 1990s, when China terminated the trade and 
payment agreement and began advising Cuba to pursue economic re-
forms. For two decades this advice has focused on the gradual liberaliza-
tion of markets and the empowerment of private actors to stimulate pro-
ductivity and reduce the burden on the state. It is only since Raúl Castro 
assumed the presidency in 2008 that Cuba has shown genuine interest in 
implementing these suggestions.
Although liberalization implies a greater role for the private sector 
and civil society, Cuban interactions with China remain notably devoid 
of contact between nonstate actors. All aspects of formal engagement 
are designed and managed through governmental accords, limiting the 
potential for cooperation between the two nations to keep pace with de-
velopments within them. Interactions between emerging Cuban small 
businesses, cooperatives, and nongovernmental organizations and their 
more established Chinese counterparts would provide a broader basis 
for building trade, understanding, and trust. The formulation of legal 
guidelines for regulating such exchanges would also enable both sides to 
more effectively contain informal connections between the two (a point 
discussed in chapter 3).
A prerequisite for the emergence of more heterogeneous forms of 
Sino- Cuban engagement is legal authorization—particularly from the 
Cuban side—to develop autonomous partnerships, conduct trade, and 
hold independent conferences and forums. As the Cuban private sector 
gains strength, to forbid such activities is to invite unregistered trade, 
clandestine negotiations, and political dissent born of oppositional soli-
darity. Esteban Lazo Hernández, a member of Cuba’s Politburo, predicts 
that the growth of private initiatives between 2012 and 2017 will see the 
state’s share of gdp production cut in half from its current level of 95 per-
cent (Frank 2012). The Cuban government will tread a dangerous path 
if it does not permit civil liberties to keep pace with this shift. For the 
time being, cooperation with China in everything from oil to education 
remains the preserve of the state.
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THE SEARCH FOR CUBAN OIL
The rapid development of the Chinese economy has provoked a global 
quest for oil. Sino- Cuban onshore oil cooperation was first envisioned 
in 1989, several years before oil and natural gas fields were identified in 
a 112,000-square- kilometer maritime area under Cuban jurisdiction in 
the Gulf of Mexico. Quickly attracting international interest, the offshore 
area was designated as an exclusive economic zone (eez) and divided 
into fifty (later fifty- nine) blocks, each spanning approximately 2,000 
square kilometers. Foreign capital and technology were introduced 
through joint venture contracts in seventeen (later thirty) of the blocks.
In 2004 fuel imports cost Cuba 1.31 billion, a significant figure con-
sidering that at the time Cuba’s gdp amounted to 32 billion (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2008, 48– 50). That year, ahead of President Hu’s visit, 
the Chinese enterprise Sinopec signed a “Memorandum on Blocks No. 1, 
2, 3 and 4” of the eez with the National Petroleum Company of Cuba 
(cupet), and in January 2005 the Shengli Oilfield Administration Bureau 
(a division of Sinopec) signed a product- sharing contract for prospect-
ing in a further three blocks. Hu’s visit paved the way for the Great Wall 
Drilling Company, a subsidiary of cnpc, to commence onshore opera-
tions in Varadero in 2005, producing thirteen million barrels of oil over 
the subsequent seven years. During Hu’s second visit, in 2008, cnpc and 
cupet expanded their projects in oil and gas field development, engi-
neering and technical services, and the export of Chinese equipment to 
Cuba (China National Petroleum Corporation 2008).
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico fields 
contain 4.6 billion barrels of crude oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas (usgs 2005). Cuban sources have estimated that the island’s mari-
time oil reserves exceed 20 billion barrels (compared to Mexico’s 11.7 bil-
lion), and that the exploitation of these reserves will place it within the 
top twenty oil- producing nations (“Cuba Claims Massive Oil Reserves” 
2008). In June 2011, during Xi and Jiang’s visit to Havana, cupet and 
cnpc signed a new framework agreement granting the latter five blocks 
at the western edge of the eez (numbers 19– 22 and 30), adjacent to the 
maritime border with Mexico (China National Petroleum Corporation 
2008). Exploratory drilling in the eez by the Spanish firm Repsol com-
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menced in January 2012, despite U.S. security and environmental con-
cerns (Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2011; Hutchinson- Jafar 2011; Piñón 
2011, 24).
The successful extraction of Cuban oil would significantly redirect the 
island’s development trajectory. As a bbc report put it in early 2012, “this 
is a key moment for Cuba. . . . Substantial deposits of oil, and most likely 
gas, would transform this struggling economy into an energy exporter” 
(Rainsford 2012). Pressure to end the U.S. trade embargo, or at least ad-
just it to permit cooperation in the oil sector, would mount, since “the 
United States would find it difficult to accept being sidelined without a 
piece of the pie, especially with regard to gas reserves that could reduce 
energy costs in some southern states” (Ravsberg 2012).
At the end of 2011 the Chinese- built (and Italian- owned) Scarabeo- 9 
Ultra- Deepwater Rig arrived in the eez, designed specifically to comply 
with U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba that limited components to less 
than 10 percent U.S.-made. Repsol (Spain), Petronas (Malaysia), Gaz-
promneft (Russia), and Petróleos de Venezuela (Venezuela) each leased 
Scarabeo- 9 to drill in the eez. All failed to achieve results, citing the 
compact nature of the underlying rock as unsuitable for oil and gas ex-
traction. In November 2012 the Scarabeo- 9 departed Cuba but was im-
mediately replaced by the Songa Mercur, a Soviet- built platform owned 
by Songa Offshore of Norway and leased for one year to the Russian oil 
giant Zarubezhneft for 88 million. Refitted in Trinidad and Tobago to 
replace its U.S.-made components (including five generators from Cater-
pillar, mud pump motors from General Electric, and cementing equip-
ment from Halliburton), the platform commenced drilling off the coast 
of Ciego de Avila and Villa Clara Provinces.
Zarubezhneft continues to prospect in the eez with the support of 
another Russian state enterprise, Rosneft, which has agreed to build a 
base at the Port of Mariel to relay equipment and personnel to offshore 
rigs (Gibson 2014). Should Zarubezhneft or any other company strike 
oil, China’s cnpc has positioned itself to take advantage of the event. 
Anticipating an eventual discovery, cnpc subsidiary Huanqiu Contract-
ing and Engineering Corporation has entered a joint venture with the 
Cuban- Venezuelan enterprise Cuvenpetrol and an Italian subsidiary of 
the French oil engineering company Technip to upgrade a refinery in 
Cienfuegos. The renovated facility will be capable of increasing produc-
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tion from 65,000 barrels per day to 150,000. Using Venezuelan reserves 
as collateral, Huanqiu is the main financier of the 5.5 billion project, 
which also involves building a gasification plant to process Venezuelan—
and potentially Cuban—liquid natural gas (Cuba Standard 2011).
As shale gas becomes globally available and the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (opec) tries to compete by oversupplying the 
world with crude oil, energy prices have declined by nearly half to their 
lowest point since 2009—and with them Cuba’s dreams of becoming an 
oil giant. In January 2015 Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro visited 
Saudi Arabia to request that opec reduce its production ceiling of thirty 
million barrels per day because oil revenue subsidizes his government’s 
hallmark social programs. It also underpins Venezuela’s Petro caribe oil 
distribution program, whose supply to Cuba diminished from 100,000 
barrels per day in 2013 to around 70,000 at the end of 2014 (Pitts 2014). 
Cuba’s oil supply is protected to an extent by its reciprocal provision of 
some thirty thousand health- care workers to Venezuela, but Maduro’s 
opponents have pledged to rescind the oil- for- doctors program if elected. 
To manage this risk the Cuban government is once again reevaluating its 
foreign relations, including with the United States. The diplomatic rap-
prochement announced by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro 
in 2014 is likely to stimulate a growing presence of U.S. firms in Cuba, 
including in the oil sector. There they will find Chinese counterparts 
whose state- backed trade and investment activities will pose competitive 
 challenges.
The Cuban and Chinese governments view their oil cooperation as 
national priorities and manage it entirely through state enterprises. This 
is logical considering the required capital outlays, which private firms 
even in China would have trouble raising, but state control of core in-
dustries also reflects a political strategy. As Joshua Kurlantzick writes, 
“The Chinese government wants to control the entire process, from 
taking commodities out of the ground to shipping them back to China, 
because it does not trust world markets to ensure continuous supplies 
of key resources. It is purchasing stakes in important oil and gas firms 
abroad, constructing the infrastructure necessary to get those industries’ 
resources to port, and building close relations with refiners and shippers” 
(2008, 200). By linking distinct sectors into an integrated system, the Chi-
nese government has attained a high degree of control over production 
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chains around the world (Ellis 2005, 193– 212; Hira 2007, 87– 96). As the 
next section shows, this approach is evident in Sino- Cuban projects that 
connect electronics manufacturing with the education and transporta-
tion sectors. Coordinating these initiatives has involved a high degree of 
top- down oversight but also some hard lessons for Cuban negotiators, 
whose faith in ideological solidarity has been shaken by the pragmatism 
of their Chinese counterparts.
THE SUM OF THEIR PARTS: ELECTRONICS, TRANSPORTATION, AND EDUCATION
The diversity of Chinese projects in Cuba distinguishes them from Span-
ish and other foreign investments, which have focused on enclave sectors 
like hotel construction and tourism services. Recent Chinese projects in-
clude a marsh gas extraction facility, a sheep- rearing farm, a reservoir 
fishery, a sugar biofuel power station, and three pesticide production 
plants. The China specialist Arsenio Alemán notes that Chinese initia-
tives in Cuba are designed to complement each other across sectors. For 
instance, Chinese light manufacturing, transportation upgrading, and 
port redevelopment projects are designed to function as a unified sys-
tem of domestic production, shipping, and prospective export to Latin 
American and Caribbean members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas (interview, January 10, 2012; also see Frank 2006).
Cuba’s capacity for foreign trade will grow significantly with the reno-
vation and expansion of the Port of Mariel. Expected to become the larg-
est shipping hub in the Caribbean, the port will handle more than two 
million cargo containers annually and accommodate the “post- panamax” 
(extra large) vessels that will pass through the Panama Canal when it has 
been widened. Mariel’s first phase was completed in January 2014 and in-
augurated by Castro and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, whose gov-
ernment loaned Cuba 682 million for the 950 million project. Cuban 
Foreign Trade and Investment Minister Rodrigo Malmierca has spo-
ken of Mariel’s significance for Chinese exporters, which he anticipates 
will use it as a distribution hub for markets in the Caribbean, Central 
America, and Mexico, none of which can accommodate post- panamax 
cargo ships.
A special economic zone adjacent to the revamped Mariel Port could 
also become a focal point of Chinese activity. In September 2013 Castro 
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signed a decree permitting foreign firms to import goods duty free into 
the zone, and to remain exempt from taxation on profits for ten years. 
Unlike previous regulations that have required foreign investors to form 
joint ventures with the Cuban state, the new framework permits inves-
tors 100 percent ownership and contracts of up to fifty years. The decree 
served as a basis for the 2014 revision of Cuba’s general Foreign Invest-
ment Law (last updated in 1995), which now protects investors against the 
nationalization of their assets, exempts them from personal income and 
labor taxes, and guarantees a profits tax ceiling of 15 percent preceded by 
an eight- year grace period. In the Chinese pavilion at the 2013 Havana 
International Trade Fair, Malmierca told representatives from sixty- five 
Chinese enterprises that “the Chinese companies that today produce in 
China and bring their goods here could produce here in Cuba, in this 
special zone . . . with many incentives” (quoted in “Cuba Seeks Chinese 
Investment” 2013).
The Havana fair has long attracted Chinese firms interested in Latin 
American markets. Since the early 2000s, Chinese state enterprises such 
as Haier and zte have dominated the fair’s electronics exhibits. The kiosk 
of one regular exhibitor, China Putian Corporation, has for several years 
been adorned with a banner that confidently outlines a regional strat-
egy: “China Putian Corporation was founded in 1980. It is an extralarge 
state- owned enterprise directly under the management of [the] Chinese 
central government. . . . China Putian Corporation will regard Cuba as a 
platform so as to develop its business in Latin America.” The ambition of 
state enterprises like China Putian to conquer Cuban markets and then 
use them as a springboard into Latin America is characteristically opti-
mistic but, for the time being, uncharacteristically impractical. For one 
thing, Cubans have yet to embrace Chinese brands. In the absence of 
affordable alternatives, they have become familiar with Chinese televi-
sions, rice cookers, and other appliances, but these products live noto-
riously short lives under local conditions. The extensive circulation of 
spare parts expertly recovered from antique Russian and U.S. models has 
done little to service the sleek, energy- efficient, but incompatible Chi-
nese versions.
A longer- term hurdle for China’s industrial ambitions in Cuba is the in-
ability of the latter’s markets and service sectors to provide capital goods, 
technical support, and capable employees. Aware of these deficiencies—
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and emerging opportunities to address them—in 2004 President Hu 
delivered his main Cuban speech at the leading information technology 
training facility, the Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas (University of 
Information Science). Proposing to link Cuba’s higher education system 
with existing Chinese projects, he declared that thousands of the com-
puters on campus had come from China and been bought at subsidized 
prices, and that Cuba’s growing expertise in information technology 
should feed into electronics manufacturing. This goal soon took concrete 
form in a three- story assembly plant for the production of rice cookers 
and television sets carrying the Chinese brand Panda. The project proved 
successful, stimulating an agreement during Hu’s second visit, in 2008, 
to establish a joint venture (signed in 2009) between the Grupo de la 
Electrónica (of the Cuban Ministry of Information and Communication) 
and the Chinese electronics firm Haier to manufacture electro- domestic 
products (refrigerators, air conditioners, etc.), and computer equipment 
in Cuba (Cubaencuentro 2009).
The Grupo’s director, Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, had been Cuba’s 
minister of information, and in 2009 was appointed by Raúl Castro as 
one of several vice presidents. He is a committed advocate of cooperation 
with China, and through his efforts, electronics has become a key nexus 
of bilateral collaboration. However, the management of resulting proj-
ects exclusively through state channels, and Valdés’s blend of political 
and commercial responsibilities, have generated suspicions about the 
rationale for Sino- Cuban electronics cooperation. The Cuban- American 
communications consultant Manuel Cereijo argues that “there are three 
main areas of concern for us in the new and dangerous axis formed by 
China and Cuba: radio frequency weapons, computer technology, mis-
sile capabilities. The problem with the Chinese Cuban rapprochment 
[sic] is that it is driven by . . . mutual hostility towards the United States” 
(2001).
Cereijo (2010) asserts that China has set up Cuban listening posts in 
the towns of Bejucal and Lourdes to monitor U.S. telecommunications. 
Similarly, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers alleges that the 
Chinese government is operating a former Soviet facility at Lourdes to 
engage in “cyber warfare” against the United States (2006). The evidence 
for this, though, is circumstantial and easily exaggerated. An image pub-
lished by Cereijo of “golf ball- shaped radar domes: Bejucal base Cuba” 
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drew international attention in the early 2000s, but on closer inspection 
the image turned out to be of the Echelon surveillance station operated 
by the U.S. National Security Agency at Menwith Hill in England (Rat-
liff 2006).
Less newsworthy but more verifiable is Chinese involvement in Cu-
ban transportation and logistics. Cooperation in these sectors is often 
praised in both countries, but below the surface, differing expectations 
about state management, ideological solidarity, and the role of the mar-
ket have caused headaches. In 2006 the China Export and Credit Insur-
ance Corporation (Sinosure) provided a 1.8 billion revolving credit line 
to upgrade Cuban transportation infrastructure, and the same year the 
Cuban government announced that contracts totaling more than 2 bil-
lion had been signed to improve the island’s road and rail networks. Five 
hundred Chinese freight and passenger train cars were ordered for the 
rail fleet, with twenty- one locomotives entering service in 2009. By this 
time, over 1,500 fuel- efficient cars from the Chinese manufacturer Geely 
had been shipped to Cuba, largely for use by the police and security ser-
vices (Pérez Pizarro 2009b).
The most significant development in this sector was Cuba’s 2008 bulk 
purchase of 1,000 energy- efficient Chinese buses, adding to an initial fleet 
of 400 purchased in 2005 (figures 1.3– 1.6). Rather than deliver complete 
vehicles, the Chinese state enterprise Yutong shipped components from 
its factory in Zhengzhou for assembly in Havana. This reduced the ship-
ping costs by around 15 percent and promoted skills transfer through the 
training of Cuban personnel by a team of thirty visiting Chinese techni-
cians (Pérez Pizarro 2009a). Two hundred of the buses were in circula-
tion by midyear and the other 800 several months later. In late 2008 
Rosa Oliveras of the Group of the Integrated Development of the Capital 
noted the positive impact: “When the Special Period [in Time of Peace] 
hit us, the vehicles and spare parts we had imported from the Soviet bloc 
fell out of production, and our transport system was so damaged that the 
mobility of Havana’s citizens was reduced to between 20 and 30 percent. 
Until recently people had to wait at bus stops for two or three hours and 
were forced to work half days, and sometimes not at all. We couldn’t have 
carried on like this. The Chinese buses have saved our city, and actu-
ally the whole country, from a very grave situation” (interview, Novem- 
ber 18, 2008).
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En route from Havana to Santiago de Cuba I experienced the impact 
of the Chinese buses firsthand, and I recorded the episode in my research 
diary:
NO DEJES EL CAMINO POR VEREDA (DON’T TAKE SHORTCUTS)
An hour after it was supposed to depart, we’re told the train to Santiago de Cuba has 
technical problems and is out of service. The transport officer blares at us (two hundred 
or so) through a megaphone: we’ll be taking a bus instead. People chatter and laugh: 
“Better call to say we’ll get there late . . . at least we’ll get there . . . coño maybe it’s 
one of those new buses . . .” We’re led out of the station and around the corner to see 
a gleaming Yutong bus, and the scramble for seats begins. Those who fight their way 
in first sit near the front, looking happy with themselves and commenting that the blue 
seats are soft and good for sleeping. I get one near the back and settle in. I’m woken by 
bumps. It’s 2:15 AM so we’ve been going four hours. The bumps are getting worse, more 
like flying through a storm than driving on a road, and it’s too dark outside to see what’s 
going on. The man sitting next to me, probably in his sixties, can see I’m perplexed and 
offers an explanation: “Looks like we’re taking a shortcut.” I ask him what he thinks of 
the new buses, and now he looks perplexed too: “They’re well built, though the seats are 
figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 Over the hump: Chinese- made Yutong buses and 
their predecessors, known as the “camellos” (camels). Photos by the author.
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too small . . . must have been made for Chinese passengers. These bumps are nothing 
compared to last time. Cuban roads are in very bad condition, especially when you get 
off the highway.”
—En route to Santiago de Cuba, February 27, 2006
The Chinese buses enabled Cuba to stay mobile, but in 2011 the ini-
tiative hit an ideological roadblock. Having entered service en masse 
in 2008, the buses were subjected to relentless use, often on unpaved 
roads, which caused many to break down simultaneously in 2010. Ac-
cording to an official close to the project, Cuban negotiators incorrectly 
assumed that political solidarity at the ministerial level would material-
ize in complimentary maintenance and replacement parts for the Cuban 
fleet. Their Chinese counterparts, meanwhile, felt that they had shown 
sufficient solidarity by providing Cuba with a loan to buy the buses in 
the first place. The setback was a stark reminder of the point conveyed to 
Fidel Castro by Li Peng in 1995: political trust would no longer subsume 
economic pragmatism.
As ideology becomes subordinated to pragmatism, Cuba and China 
have developed new projects to maintain common ground. People- 
to-people ties have become more important, propelled by high- level 
agreements in education and health. Academic exchanges between 
China and Cuba date back to the early 1960s, when 150 Chinese students 
were sent to Cuba to study Spanish. The program was suspended in the 
mid- 1960s when relations became strained and reinitiated on a small 
scale in 1984, following the landmark visit of Foreign Minister Ricardo 
Cabrisas to Beijing. Two decades later, during President Hu’s November 
2004 visit to Cuba, the two countries announced a program of annual 
scholarships for thirty Cuban students to visit China and twenty Chinese 
students to reciprocate. In 2006 the program was expanded to a hundred 
scholarships each way, plus a special initiative to host a thousand high- 
school graduates from central and western China to learn about Cuba’s 
medical system. Li Jianmin, the deputy secretary general of the China 
Scholarships Council, which funded many of these students, described 
China’s approach: “Look where the students come from: overwhelmingly 
from the western provinces of China, because that’s where our central 
government is trying to develop infrastructure and social programs. So 
these [newly trained] doctors will return from Cuba to western China 
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and fill an important need. In the meantime, a significant number of Cu-
ban doctors are in western China, filling the need for the short term” 
(interview, July 5, 2007).
Educational exchanges with Cuba, particularly in medical fields, give 
the Chinese government access to high- quality training and services at 
low cost. They also create a strong human bond between the two nations, 
evident in Premier Wen’s emotional praise for the Cuban doctors who 
responded to the Wenchuan earthquake in May 2008. Cuba’s medical ac-
tivities in China extend into the training of local technicians to manufac-
ture biopharmaceutical products in Beijing (anticancer drugs), Chang-
chun (interferon), and Xinjiang and Shandong (drugs for blood diseases). 
These initiatives have resulted in the sale of jointly produced, owned, and 
marketed pharmaceuticals in both countries. A Cuban- Chinese antican-
cer vaccine, Cimavax, was approved for European and Asian clinical tri-
als in early 2012, marking a key prospective return on this joint invest-
ment (“China and Cuba Co-develop New Anti- cancer Vaccine” 2012).
During his 2008 visit to Cuba, President Hu spoke at the Tarará Stu-
dent City, where some three thousand Chinese students of medicine, 
tourism, and Spanish were residing. His speech confirmed China’s inten-
tion to see five thousand Chinese students graduate from the program by 
the end of 2011, with the aim of building a human platform for long- term 
cooperation. The goal was met and surpassed: by 2014, over nine thou-
sand Chinese students had graduated. The number of Cuban students in 
China has been smaller, totaling around 130 in 2014. However, the Uni-
versity of Havana’s Confucius Institute has helped increase the numbers, 
preparing 535 students to sit the Chinese government’s Hanyu Shuiping 
Kaoshi (汉语水平考试) International Chinese Proficiency Test in 2012. 
Most of the students are from Cuban state enterprises that have projects 
in China, such as a rice cultivation initiative financed by the Cuban Min-
istry of Agriculture. As well as training the students in Chinese, the insti-
tute teaches them how shared cultural and political values have under-
pinned the history of Sino- Cuban cooperation. The institute’s director, 
Arsenio Alemán, notes that students learn about the changing nature of 
the Sino- Cuban relationship, including its growing reliance on concrete 
economic outcomes (interview, January 10, 2012).
Implicit in the institute’s curriculum is the message that trust between 
Cuba and China requires more than political ideology. It also requires 
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pragmatism, as became evident in the misunderstanding over spare parts 
for the Yutong buses, and in Malmierca’s recognition that the best way 
to draw Chinese investors into the Mariel project is through tax conces-
sions and operating incentives. The Cuban government has become more 
pragmatic, articulating a reform agenda that draws on insights both from 
 China’s successful economic transition and from a somewhat less success-
ful ex perience at home. The next section considers how these insights are 
in forming recent efforts to decentralize economic management, gener-
ate employment, and contain the informal sector. These long- neglected 
problems are integral to a key goal of the Lineamientos: to foster com-
mercial linkages between large state enterprises and emerging private 
actors. Their resolution implies a new balance of state and market forces, 
and policies that encourage rather than erode trust.
BALANCING THE FORCES: DECENTRALIZATION,  
EMPLOYMENT, AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR
When Ricardo Alarcón—then president of Cuba’s National Assembly—
visited Beijing in 2010, he publicly recognized the relevance of China’s 
economic evolution to Cuba’s development. Raúl Castro had already ex-
pressed this sentiment during his visits in 1997, 2005, and 2012, which 
focused on labor market reform, the integration of state and private en-
terprises, and the expansion of domestic markets. In China’s experience, 
particularly since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, these 
transformations were achieved through state oversight of market reform, 
an approach that Chinese officials have persistently advocated to their 
Cuban counterparts.
Under the stewardship of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, the Chinese 
government implemented pilot programs to introduce market structures 
into the planned economy (Devlin 2008, 129). Reforms were “incremen-
tal and gradual, with national policies decided only after evaluating the 
results of local experiments” (Dickson and Chao 2001, 6). Contrasting 
with Fidel Castro’s dictum “not to create individual millionaires but to 
make the citizenry as a whole into millionaires,” Deng Xiaoping pledged 
to “let one part of the populace become rich first” (quoted in Y. Cheng 
2007b, 729). Differences over this sensitive issue have long been buried 
beneath a shared commitment to what both countries call “socialism 
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with local characteristics,” but the Cuban government now acknowledges 
that China’s controlled introduction of private initiative provides useful 
insights.
As U.S. and European markets falter, President Xi Jinping has iden-
tified nationally led growth as imperative for maintaining employment 
and social stability in China. However, his administration’s attempt to 
shift the drivers of growth toward internal consumption is hindered by 
large, export- oriented state enterprises, which enjoy preferential access 
to rebates, loans, and subsidies. In contrast, small private firms face re-
strictions on acquiring credit and employing workers. The result is a 
high level of employment in state enterprises, whose health and pension 
benefits make them widely attractive to employees but economically un-
productive. In comparison, small companies that could provide products 
and services that add value to the economy currently have little capac-
ity to attract, employ, and maintain staff. To address this problem the 
Chinese government is ramping up spending on dedicated health and 
welfare facilities, freeing up consumer credit, and promoting the provi-
sion of paid vacation to employees, all of which will enable citizens to 
become less dependent on state enterprises, seek more productive jobs, 
and generate disposable income. The Chinese government predicts that 
as private investment grows, its own level of investment (particularly in 
infrastructure and heavy industry) will decline from 45 percent to 25 per-
cent of gdp. Calling for “reform and opening up,” the reduction of “undue 
emphasis on formality and bureaucracy,” and the eradication of “corrup-
tion and bribe- taking” (quoted in “China Confirms Leadership Change” 
2012), Xi’s November 2012 presidential acceptance speech might just as 
well have been delivered in Havana as in Beijing. Cuba is also attempting 
to streamline its overburdened public sector, expand domestic markets, 
contain the black market, and as noted above, reduce the state’s cur-
rent virtual monopoly of gdp. Consultation with China on these issues 
has become a focal point of bilateral dialogue, for instance through the 
regular summit meetings of Cuba’s Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Environment (citma) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Ac-
cording to a senior citma official, these meetings have increasingly fo-
cused on strategies for reducing citizens’ dependence on the state (Juan 
Luís Martín, interview, November 16, 2012).
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Among the insights that Cuba has derived from China—with varying 
degrees of attentiveness—are the gradual sequencing of reforms under 
the management of a state- appointed reform commission (Laverty 2011, 
65; Lopez- Levy 2011a, 9, and 2011b, 43– 44), the adaptation of social-
ist principles to national conditions (Mao et al. 2011, 199), the military 
management of commercial activities (Klepak 2010), the attraction of 
investment from emigrants (Ratliff 2004, 21– 22), and the testing of liber-
alization in target territories prior to wider implementation (Hearn and 
Alfonso 2012).
The Cuban private sector is growing in size and capacity, particularly 
through the 2014 opening of the housing and automobile markets and 
through the 2012 authorization of independent cooperatives in transpor-
tation, construction, fishing, restaurants, and repair services. A critical 
ingredient in this process is the confidence of citizens that their work will 
be rewarded, and that any benefits generated by partnerships with state- 
owned enterprises will be shared. Cuban policy makers have observed 
China’s approach to building public faith in the reform process, as out-
lined in the state newspaper China Daily: “Market discipline and incen-
tives drive labor productivity improvements, while a government ‘help-
ing hand’ protects labor welfare via job creation and higher wages. . . . 
Ensuring a ‘win- win’ situation—which, among other positives, should 
help assuage worker resistance to the privatization phenomenon—is im-
portant for any government wanting to create vested interests that sup-
port an agenda of reform” (Amess, Du, and Girma 2011).
The Cuban government’s attentiveness to China’s experience was 
sharpened by the global financial crisis and by spikes in international 
food and oil prices in 2008 and 2011. Its strategy was initially published 
in the draft Lineamientos in November 2010, which was debated dur-
ing the following six months and reissued in revised form following the 
sixth Communist Party Congress in April 2011. The resulting 313 recom-
mendations show growing, albeit tentative, acceptance of market forces 
to complement Cuba’s state- dominated system of trade and investment. 
Reflecting both external pressures and the more liberal approach of 
President Raúl Castro, the final document states that private property, 
long considered antithetical to socialism, would now be permitted on the 
condition that it is not “concentrated” (República de Cuba 2011, 5 and 11).
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While China has provided Cuba with useful insights, the Lineamientos 
also draw heavily on domestic experience. As the political scientist Rafael 
Hernández notes, “many of the concepts and proposals in the document 
cover themes that were already being debated” (Hernández et al. 2011, 
27). For instance, new provisions entitling small farmers and agricultural 
cooperatives to greater autonomy in selecting crops, managing budgets, 
and sourcing inputs (Lineamientos numbers 178– 84) build on legislation 
passed in the early 1990s that permitted farmers to sell their produce 
in designated urban marketplaces. Similarly, the reformist ethos of the 
Special Period, evident in the authorization of private taxis, home res-
taurants (paladares), and small trading in clothing and artisanal goods, 
has reemerged in the Lineamientos’ endorsement of self- employment 
(cuentapropismo).
Much of the legislation authorized by Fidel Castro in the early 1990s 
to diminish the impact of the Soviet collapse were later deemed excessive 
and rescinded. Two decades later, though, Raúl Castro has strong sup-
port in the National Assembly and appears determined to leave behind 
a legacy of profitable economic management (Ritter 2011). The resilience 
of the current strategy is bolstered by the involvement of the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces in key sectors of the economy, leading Eusebio Mujal- 
León to conclude that “these reforms could reduce the weight of the state 
and create conditions for the emergence of private property and a ‘social 
market’ economy” (2011, 159). To achieve this outcome, the Lineamien-
tos attempt to confront the long- standing challenges of decentralization, 
employment, and the black market.
Decentralization is critical for leveraging the range of potentials of-
fered by Cuba’s diverse socioeconomic geography. This geography is 
now set to diversify further, requiring locally appropriate policies to ad-
dress growing inequalities and maximize human capacities (Torres Pérez 
2011). The Lineamientos advocate local solutions to national problems, 
employing the words “territory,” “territorial,” “local,” or “municipal” no 
fewer than thirty- four times (Hernández et al. 2011, 29). The document’s 
introduction, for instance, identifies the need to “effectively promote the 
initiative harbored by the territories to empower, in a sustainable way, 
their own economic development” (República de Cuba 2011, 8).
Talk of decentralization in Cuba has long evoked suspicions of cor-
ruption, since the delegation of resources inevitably multiplies oppor-
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tunities for abuse. Previous moves to devolve executive authority—such 
as the constitutional reforms of 1992 and Decree Law 91 in 2000, which 
divided Havana into ninety- three (subsequently 105) Popular Coun-
cils—were therefore not accompanied by the devolution of economic 
resources (Fernández Soriano 1999). The 2011 proposals do not recom-
mend the dissolution or retrenchment of the state, but they go a step 
further than previous reforms by postulating more adequately resourced 
local governments. A combination of political and economic decentral-
ization, they suggest, will enable local governments to more effectively 
serve citizens’ interests.
Few citizens’ interests are as urgent for Cuban policy makers as em-
ployment. Recognizing that a greater degree of economic liberalization 
holds the best promise for providing jobs, the Lineamientos establish the 
legitimacy of private initiative: “socialism signifies equal rights and op-
portunities for all citizens, but not egalitarianism” (República de Cuba 
2011, 5). The 1974 constitution provides a legal basis for this assertion, 
guaranteeing access to employment for all Cubans without specifying the 
public or private status of their work. Lineamientos numbers 31 and 32 
therefore face no legal obstacle in shifting the burden of responsibility 
for employment away from the public sector: “The quantity of subsidized 
entities will be reduced to the minimum number necessary to guarantee 
the fulfillment of assigned functions. . . . Subsidized entities that are ca-
pable of covering their own expenses with their earnings and generating 
profits will become self- financing entities, without neglecting their as-
signed functions and attributes, or will assume, with prior approval, the 
status of companies” (13).
Critical to this process is greater interdependence between state en-
terprises and small businesses operating in their vicinities, which could 
provide staff, intermediate inputs, and services. The Politburo member 
responsible for reforming inefficient state- owned enterprises, Marino 
Murillo, has described the strategy this way: “If an institution has . . . 
200 million to import, and a local producer can produce what it plans to 
import, this body can directly pay that local producer with the approved 
funds” (quoted in Frank 2013). Rigid centralized supply and demand quo-
tas have long impeded the formation of such vertical synergies. This has 
been the case not only for heavy industry enterprises, such as Cubaniquel 
in the nickel sector and cupet in oil, but also in more dynamic indus-
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tries like tourism. The hotels and clubs lining the beaches of Varadero, 
for instance, “have become enclave economies, whose linkage to their 
surrounding territory is negligible, and the the spillover effects of these 
investments, and the dynamics of their growth, barely register in the ter-
ritory” (Hernández et al. 2011, 33).
Tourism will continue to underpin Cuba’s development, and there-
fore represents a key opportunity to build state- society synergies. Two 
decades ago, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, Andrés Oppenheimer 
summed up the political trauma associated with the sector’s growth: 
“The Revolution’s ideological principles were bent every which way in 
the bid for new tourist dollars” (1992, 286). In the words of a tour opera-
tor in Havana, “the Cuban government calls the Special Period a cancer, 
for which tourism is the chemotherapy: it can work, they say, if it doesn’t 
kill us!” (interview, April 25, 2003). Ideological trauma yielded economic 
results, and in 2002 Eusebio Leal Spengler, director of the Office of the 
Historian of the City of Havana, stated that “for every person employed 
in tourism, ten people live from their income” (interview, April 29, 2002).
Tourist arrivals in Cuba shot from 300,000 in 1990 to 1.77 million in 
2000, and to 2.85 million in 2013 (figure 1.7). The sector has attracted 
interest from the Chinese government, which approved Cuba as an 
ideologically sound destination for its citizens (the first country in Latin 
America to achieve this status) during Fidel Castro’s 2003 visit to Bei-
jing. Cuba soon established a tourism office dedicated to China and in 
2007 signed an “Operational Plan for Chinese Group Tourists Visiting 
Cuba.” That year, for the first time, the number of Chinese tourist arrivals 
in Cuba exceeded 10,000 (growing to 22,218 arrivals in 2013; Oficina Na-
cional de Estadísticas e Información 2014). According to Omar Pereira 
Hernández, former director of tourism at the Cuban Embassy in Beijing, 
the tourism office has focused on Chinese package tours to Cuba, which 
are growing in size and frequency and will grow further if direct flights 
are established. China Suntime International holds a 49 percent stake in a 
150 million tourism development project on Havana’s Marina Heming-
way, and community leaders in Havana’s Barrio Chino have proposed 
the construction of a hotel to cater to tourists from China’s growing 
middle class (see chapter 3). Conversely, the Gran Meliá Shanghai hotel, 
featuring Cuban artwork and the Havana Night Cuban Cabaret, was re-
cently completed with Cuban investment (amounting to 51 percent own-
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ership), targeting Asian travelers wishing to experience a taste of Cuba 
close to home.
To more effectively link tourism (and other sectors) to Cuba’s emerg-
ing private sector, the Lineamientos stipulate greater flexibility for state 
enterprises to select suppliers and for small businesses to cater to their 
needs. Lineamientos numbers 262– 66 note that tourism could generate 
new jobs and tax revenue in lodging and restaurant services, and that 
policy makers will “study mechanisms for supplying tourist facilities that 
take advantage of local productive forces” (República de Cuba 2011, 33– 
34). For this strategy to succeed, the list of 178 private occupations ap-
proved in early 2011 (and expanded to 199 in late 2013) will need to be 
further extended to accommodate the skills and capacities of Cuban em-
ployees. Lodging and restaurant services may be a logical starting point, 
but they are a far cry from the skills accrued by graduates of special-
ist institutions like the Colegio Universitario San Gerónimo in heritage 
management and urban development (discussed below). As the econo-
mist Juan Triana argues, “It would be a strategic mistake to limit, in the 
name of development, the growth of the nonstate sector to jobs or oc-
cupations that produce products or generate services of low added value. 
This would undermine an important part of the considerable investment 
made by our country in human development over more than fifty years” 
(Hernández et al. 2011, 33).
By mid- 2014 approximately 470,000 Cubans were registered as self- 
employed or working for a self- employed individual, compared with 
figure 1.7 Tourist arrivals in Cuba, 2000– 2013. Source: Oficina Nacional de 
Estadísticas e Información 2014.
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150,000 in 2010. Most self- employed Cubans occupy positions in the ba-
sic services sector and improvised retail markets, their rise up the value 
chain inhibited not only by the narrow selection of authorized jobs, but 
also by the absence of an affordable and reliable supply chain. One com-
ponent of the supply problem is a lack of financing available to private 
businesses for purchasing raw materials and inputs. The appearance of 
the word “credit” eleven times in the Lineamientos signals the state’s rec-
ognition of this obstacle. Cubans have been permitted to take out bank 
loans since 2011, but until recently they were required to provide liquid 
collateral, such as a guarantor with sufficient savings to cover the loan 
amount. Poor public uptake of the loans led the government to relax this 
condition in December 2013, decreasing the minimum amount from 
3,000 to 1,000 pesos (67) and permitting the use of jewelry, works of 
art, and even livestock as collateral. Foreign banks such as Canada’s Bank 
of Nova Scotia are exploring opportunities in the Cuban credits and 
loans market but have been discouraged by the limited growth capacity 
of small businesses (Simon 2011).
Cuba’s underdeveloped credit market has hindered the expansion of 
small businesses and their supply chains, but a more encompassing ob-
stacle is ideological antagonism toward the accrual of private property 
(Mesa- Lago 2013). Policy adjustments under Raúl Castro favor greater 
entrepreneurship and self- sufficiency, but the Lineamientos do not spec-
ify the extent to which private actors will be permitted to stock their back 
rooms and expand their activities. Instead, Lineamiento number 3 offers 
a general principle of conduct: “in the nonstate system, the concentra-
tion of property will not be permitted” (República de Cuba 2011, 11). This 
tension is borne out in Cuba’s new tax code, which introduces a long 
overdue graduated system of sales, personal income, public service, and 
payroll taxes but maintains tight deductibility limits and crippling overall 
rates. As a recent report from the Center for Democracy in the Amer-
icas observes, “taxes are a delicate issue within the Communist Party. 
Conservative party members demand maximum wealth distribution and 
measures to avoid inequality, whereas moderates are more inclined to 
listen to economists and cuentapropistas [self- employed people] who 
argue excessive taxes will stymie growth in the non- state sector. With 
several adjustments made thus far, it appears Raúl Castro’s government is 
searching for the middle ground on the issue” (Laverty 2011, 40).
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Functional supply chains are essential not only for the viability of 
private businesses and the creation of jobs, but—as Chino demonstrated 
at the beginning of the chapter—for containing the black market. It is 
difficult to distinguish among investments, gifts, and remittances as op-
portunities for private enterprise expand in Cuba, generating an acute 
need for start-up capital and supplies. Authorized by the Obama admin-
istration to travel and send remittances to relatives, Cuban Americans 
are thought to have financed over half of cuentapropia activities in 2010 
(Meo 2011). According to an International Monetary Fund economist 
Rafael Romeu, “The renewed visits of Cuban Americans have come at 
a critical time for the Cuban economy, because these are not traditional 
tourists—they have strong linkages to the real economy. They are as-
sumed to be financing an important part of the investment necessary to 
start Cuba’s budding microenterprises through visits to Cuba and remit-
tances. The latter are estimated to be at least 500 million, and perhaps 
exceed 1 billion annually” (Romeu 2012, 66).
Alongside remittances and gifts, undeclared investments and re-
sources—from cash to computer hardware—are also streaming steadily 
into Cuba. The official response has been to limit the pace of liberaliza-
tion through heavy taxation on remittances and the prohibition of un-
licensed reselling of clothing and other consumer goods brought into 
the country by Cuban American and other visitors. Seen from the top 
down, the strategy is to study the impact of liberalization on the flow 
of goods and services and adjust policies accordingly. From the bottom 
up, though, time is money. The prolonged absence of legal supplies has 
forced Cuba’s new entrepreneurs to rely on finances and inputs acquired 
illegally either from family overseas or from socios (well- placed business 
partners) in state factories. In this environment, broader legalization of 
frontline retail activities—a move often advocated by foreign commen-
tators—might be counterproductive, as it could deepen the underlying 
illicit wholesale market.
Functional supply chains would diminish the appeal of the black mar-
ket, but tight capital controls have inhibited foreign investors from sup-
porting this process. The former Cuban diplomat Carlos Alzugaray Treto 
notes that the European Union (eu) has long been willing to get involved: 
“As Cuba’s ambassador to the eu I often heard that as soon as the Cuban 
government is ready to support the expansion of small businesses, the eu 
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will be ready to provide credit for everything from small private loans to 
large logistics projects. This is still the case, but now the Chinese are filling 
that space on more favorable economic terms. . . . The Chinese are [also] 
less insistent about political conditions” (interview, November 25, 2012).
Furnishing Cuba with credits to finance the purchase of Chinese ex-
ports was an approach promoted by Jiang Zemin during his 2001 visit 
to Cuba. Credits and loans have since enabled Cuba to acquire Chinese 
products ranging from home appliances to farm machinery at low cost. 
Demand for Chinese supplies will increase as Cuban private businesses 
expand, a point Cuba’s Vice President Miguel Díaz- Canel discussed with 
his Chinese counterpart Li Yuanchao in Beijing in June 2013. Díaz- Canel’s 
visit secured an unspecified Chinese “donation” and interest- free credit 
for the purchase of Chinese agricultural equipment.
As Jiang discovered, the repayment of the credits that enable Chi-
nese sales to Cuba will require the latter’s economic diversification and 
growth. However, the state- centric solutions that characterize Sino- 
Cuban cooperation may hinder—rather than help—the development of 
Cuba’s private sector. Chinese trade credits enable the Cuban state to 
act as a surrogate for the market, distributing tractors to farmers, buses 
to the Ministry of Transport, and refrigerators to the masses according 
to centrally governed supply quotas. In this controlled environment, 
the prospect of greater enterprise autonomy, interdependence between 
emerging businesses, private credit, gdp growth in the nonstate sector, 
and loan repayments to China will remain limited.
State- centric cooperation with China may nonetheless be a neces-
sary first step for subsequent liberalization, as it could help to set Cuba’s 
nascent private businesses on a legally sustainable course. Retail and 
services with formal channels of supply, such as those established with 
China, are more amenable to regulation and auditing for tax compli-
ance and can therefore be more easily demarcated and extracted from 
the black market. As frontline retailers become less dependent on infor-
mal sources of supply, these sectors are more likely to be authorized for 
private management. The periodic extension of the Cuban government’s 
list of approved professions reflects this strategy of controlled economic 
opening. According to José Barreiro, an official in the Labor Ministry, 
the list’s expansion to 199 occupations in September 2013 resulted from 
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the government’s ability to securely supply equipment and basic inputs 
(A. García 2013).
Chinese suppliers have been closely involved in Cuba’s sequential eco-
nomic opening. Following Hu Jintao’s 2004 visit, Chinese mobile phones, 
dvd players, computers, and other appliances were approved for sale 
through Cuban government outlets to authorized individuals. By 2008 
the chain of supply from Chinese factories to Cuban retailers was well es-
tablished, enabling Raúl Castro to mark Hu’s second presidential visit by 
authorizing the unrestricted sale of these products to the Cuban public. 
Similarly, since 2009 the Chinese automobile manufacturer Geely has 
supplied the Cuban police and security services and is now expanding 
into Cuba’s newly liberalized automobile market. The establishment of 
regulated supply chains with Chinese support is enabling the controlled 
opening of sectors that would otherwise remain stocked largely by the 
black market.
The liberalization of sectors conducive to Chinese exports serves the 
interests of both governments. For Cuba it provides a secure mechanism 
for stocking the nation’s wholesale warehouses for the emerging private 
sector. For China it opens new export markets and an opportunity to 
recover unpaid loans. A businessman accompanying Hu’s 2008 delega-
tion put it this way: “We are hoping to see new opportunities for trade 
and investment in Cuba. . . . If some market factors can be added to the 
Cuban economy, Chinese enterprises will have more business opportu-
nities” (interview, November 21, 2008). To expand the range of goods 
and services they provide to Cuba, Chinese exporters clearly wish to see 
Cuba’s private sector grow.
Chinese support for market- oriented policies in Cuba contrasts with 
the centralized development programs that once underpinned bilateral 
cooperation. The history of Sino- Cuban relations nevertheless shows 
that state and market approaches can sometimes complement each 
other, and that China’s creation of a mixed economy over the past three 
decades can provide useful insights. Cuba’s Lineamientos indicate an 
official disposition to allow greater autonomy and empowerment at the 
grass roots, but it is not yet clear if this disposition will influence the 
way bilateral cooperation is structured. To complement existing state- 
led programs with more heterogeneous, nonstate forms of interaction 
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would first require the Cuban and Chinese governments to trust their 
private sectors to focus their interactions strictly on commercial pursuits 
and steer clear of politics. Experiments along these lines have previously 
been conducted—for instance, in the mid- 1990s, when small- scale trade 
was authorized between autonomous Cuban importers and Chinese ex-
porters to service the stores and restaurants of Havana’s Barrio Chino. 
As chapter 3 shows, Cuba’s Chinese associations have since drawn inspi-
ration from that early experience to foment contemporary partnerships 
with Chinese investors. However, they are still a long way from gaining 
the trust and leeway they seek from the Ministry of Justice and the other 
government institutions that are responsible for them.
Whether through microsocial connections or macroeconomic agree-
ments, the gradual shift away from top- down management envisioned 
by the Lineamientos will shape the contours of Sino- Cuban interactions. 
Greater space for free enterprise does not imply the erosion of the Cuban 
state, which is taking great care to embed the island’s budding entrepre-
neurs in its hegemonic structures. The likely result is a hybrid system 
of small private businesses that are more vertically integrated with large 
state enterprises, stricter (and clearer) regulation of supply chains, and a 
less pervasive black market. China’s development will continue to gener-
ate insights for Cuba, not least as the Xi administration attempts to open 
domestic markets, stimulate internal consumption, and scale back the 
power of large state enterprises. The slow process of exploring, decipher-
ing, and operationalizing insights from China may test the patience of 
ordinary Cubans, but they are more likely to trust their government’s 
judgment if they can sit back, like Chino, in self- made comfort.
CONCLUSION
The pros and cons of Cuba’s reform agenda are currently being debated 
throughout Cuba, in civil society publications like Temas and Espacio 
Laical and in organizations like the Association for the Study of the Cu-
ban Economy. Differences of opinion abound, but there is consensus that 
a more mixed economy is in the making and that its consolidation will 
require new approaches to decentralization, employment, and contain-
ment of the informal sector. In practical terms this means broader ca-
pacities for economic governance at the provincial and municipal levels, 
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a wider range of authorized private occupations, and supporting struc-
tures of commercial wholesale activities that respect what Lineamiento 
number 12 calls “the absolute observance of legality” (República de Cuba 
2011, 11).
Among the stakeholders with a vested interest in Cuba’s reforms is 
the Chinese government, which negotiated the first Five- Year Plan for 
Sino- Cuban cooperation in 2011. With considerable economic and po-
litical incentives conditioning the bilateral relationship, Fidel and Raúl 
Castro, Ricardo Alarcón, and numerous other past and present Cuban 
leaders have publicly recognized the appeal of China’s approach to re-
form. Gradualism, experimentation, and the incorporation of market 
forces into state structures of authority are principles that sit well with 
the Cuban leadership. It must be noted, though, that the aspirations of 
Cuban people to fill more sophisticated jobs may ultimately test their 
willingness to follow China’s lead. Any attempt to emulate the low- skilled 
manufacturing that provided the basis for China’s remarkable growth 
may prove to be at odds with these aspirations. As the Cuban anthro-
pologist Yenisel Rodríguez writes, “we are not so economically desperate 
that a maquiladora can bring us the taste of liberation” (Hernández et al. 
2011, 39). These words may soon be put to the test in the Mariel Free 
Trade Zone, and Chinese investors will be watching.
How China will influence the trajectory of private initiative on the 
island is a key question for the future. On the one hand, state- centric ac-
cords with China enable the Cuban government to supplant the market 
by controlling access to wholesale activities. On the other, the tight regu-
lation and stability of Chinese supply chains has enabled the insulation 
of some sectors from the black market—a precondition for their subse-
quent deregulation. In this sense, integration with China is helping Cuba 
to create the necessary conditions for economic opening.
Implementing policies that support rather than impede the emer-
gence of private initiative is a challenge faced as much by district- level 
administrators as by national lawmakers. Unless overarching policies 
create opportunities for employment and improved livelihoods, com-
mercial regulations will fail to earn the trust and compliance of citizens. 
Until recently this has been the case in Cuba, which is evident in the exis-
tence of an informal sector that pervades most aspects of daily economic 
life. As Chino showed at the beginning of the chapter, citizens are willing 
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and able to “provide every kind of service in-house and in-store.” There is 
no shortage of work ethic, but to entice Chino and his network of suppli-
ers out of the black market will require more sophisticated jobs, supply 
chains, and development policies.
Cuba’s emerging entrepreneurs want to shape their own futures, and 
this desire is becoming especially acute in the Chinese diasporic com-
munity. Commercial networking has long been one of the community’s 
strengths, but the informal connections and trust that underpin its net-
works are creating unprecedented policy dilemmas. As these networks 
extend across the Pacific, the need for improved state- society commu-
nication is nowhere more pressing than in the Chinatowns of Cuba and 
Mexico. Chapters 3 and 4 will consider recent attempts in both coun-
tries to harness the expanding economic connections and capacities of 
resident Chinese communities. First, though, chapter 2 examines how 
China’s impact is forcing the Mexican government to rethink the role 
that large elite enterprises and small businesses play in national develop-
ment. As in Cuba, there is a growing awareness in Mexico that industrial 
policies must build trust from the bottom up.
In 1974, two years after Mexico became the fourth Latin American coun-
try to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China 
(after Cuba, Chile, and Peru), its first ambassador to Beijing, Eugenio 
Anguiano Roch, was working hard to build trust. An exhibition of Aztec 
artifacts, meticulously coordinated by Anguiano, had drawn interest at 
museums in Beijing and Shanghai. Selected episodes of Mexican tv soap 
operas, first screened at the embassy and later released on public televi-
sion, had generated enthusiastic curiosity among the Chinese public. The 
breakthrough, though, was a Mexican movie about the 1938 nationaliza-
tion of Mexico’s oil industry under President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934– 40). 
Anguiano recalls: “They loved it! The Communist Party organized enor-
mous crowds of thousands of people. Chinese audiences had never seen 
Mexican movies, and this one fit perfectly with their political thinking 
at the time. They began to see us as comrades!” (interview, June 9, 2010).
Forty years later the comradeship has, as Marx might say, melted into 
air. In 2014 Mexico reported that its bilateral trade with China had grown 
to the impressive sum of 72.24 billion, but also that it sustained a bilat-
eral deficit of 60.28 billion (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database 2015). Mexico’s oil sector still provokes animated discussions 
in Beijing, but rather than praising Mexico’s defense of its sovereignty, 
Chinese officials bemoan the ongoing impediments to deregulation in 
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Mexico. Xu Shicheng, a senior Latin America analyst from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, argues that Chinese investment would boost 
Mexican oil sales to China, thereby reducing the chronic trade imbalance 
(interview, November 23, 2009). This is an uncertain prospect even un-
der Mexico’s promarket President Enrique Peña Nieto, a member of the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, 
or pri) who took office in December 2012. One year into his term, Peña 
Nieto secured the necessary two- thirds of congressional votes (353 votes 
to 134) to amend article 27 of the 1917 constitution, which proclaimed 
governmental ownership of minerals and energy resources. Despite its 
historical significance, this maneuver will not abrogate a 1939 decree 
guaranteeing the sole stewardship of the state enterprise Petróleos Mexi-
canos (pemex) over untapped oil reserves (Ely 1961, 10).
Peña Nieto’s oil reforms permit private contracts for exploration, 
drilling, and reservation of subterraneous oil, which remain government 
property until extraction. Multinational companies such as Exxon Mo-
bil, Chevron, Royal Dutch Shell, and ConocoPhillips will have priority 
access, thanks to the 2013 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons 
Agreement. The Mexican government favors these established firms 
over emerging Chinese rivals, for both conventional and shale activities 
(S. Hall 2013). Xu’s proposed injection of Chinese finance is still a long 
way from reality.
With oil cooperation yet to bear fruit and efforts to collaborate in 
copper mining, automobile production, and information technology 
repeatedly delayed, Sino- Mexican relations have little traction. As the 
rest of Latin America scrambles to balance competition from Chinese 
consumer products by exporting ever- larger quantities of natural re-
sources, Mexico has yet to formulate a China strategy. “Compared to the 
other Latin American countries,” writes Roberto Hernández Hernández, 
“Mexico is the most vulnerable, with 97 percent of its manufacturing ex-
ports—which represent 71 percent of the national export base—under 
threat from China” (2012, 76). The problem is as much cultural as eco-
nomic, underpinned by a history of overreliance on the United States 
and of intense ambivalence toward China. It is also political, owing to a 
steadfast skepticism of state- guided industrial policies among Mexico’s 
political and economic elites since the early 1980s (Cypher and Delgado 
2010, 86).
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Despite its hands- off approach, the Mexican government has provided 
federal funding, tax concessions, and personal advocacy to selected sec-
tors. As discussed below, large enterprises in the automotive and agri-
culture industries have been recent beneficiaries and have used this sup-
port to develop new products and build partnerships in China. There has 
also been some input from state- level governments, such as funding for 
universities to establish internship programs that build Mexicans’ famil-
iarity with the Chinese market. In these cases, government support has 
generated new partnerships, fomented cooperation, and strengthened 
bilateral trust.
The problem with these instances of successful public- private engage-
ment is that they are rare. Mexican analysts lament the track record of 
the federal government, particularly the Ministry of the Economy and 
its foreign trade division, ProMéxico, in withholding its support from 
vulnerable sectors. Industries from handicrafts to textiles have struggled 
both at home and overseas owing to their poor access to finance and 
official advocacy and their inability to upgrade. As Chinese manufac-
tured goods displace Mexican products in national and foreign markets, 
sectoral advocacy groups such as the Cámara Nacional de la Industria 
del Vestido (National Chamber of the Clothing Industry, or cniv) and 
the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales (Confederation of Industrial 
Chambers, or concamin) have spearheaded calls for the government 
to take firmer measures to mitigate the so-called China threat. Reluc-
tant to commit to assertive industrial policies but eager to placate voters, 
politicians have resorted to trade barriers on Chinese products. This has 
provided short- term respite but—as discussed below—has also encour-
aged smuggling and informal retail, undermining the prospects for trust 
between state and society in Mexico, within the Mexican economy, and 
between Mexico and China.
Although they are rare and overly focused on big business, instances 
of synergy between the Mexican public and private sectors offer useful 
insights into Sino- Mexican relations. They suggest the need, articulated 
by the economist José Luis Calva, for more systematic policies of national 
economic empowerment: “it is necessary to launch a genuine industrial 
policy characterized by long- term strategic planning, which includes 
support mechanisms for sectoral development, without undermining 
horizontal mechanisms of general economic development” (2012, 19). 
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Developing modes of cooperation that simultaneously cultivate vertical 
public- private synergies and horizontal commercial linkages is key to 
Mexico’s formulation of a China strategy. For the time being, though, this 
process has been derailed by a political riddle: what comes first—trust 
or policy?
TRUST AND POLICY: CHICKEN AND EGG
China’s impact is felt from the big business of Mexican industrial manu-
facturing to the small kiosks of the nation’s rampant informal sector. The 
emerging superpower encroached on traditional handicrafts in the early 
2000s, then on textiles and shoes in the middle of the decade, and is 
now provoking trepidation in the automotive industry (Dussel Peters and 
Ortiz Velázquez 2012, 22– 24). The consequences of China’s rise became 
clear between 2001 and 2003, when the export- oriented manufacturing 
sector saw the loss of over 25,000 jobs—many through the transfer of 
maquiladoras to China—and when China displaced Mexico as the sec-
ond largest exporter to the U.S. market. The informal sector is woven 
closely into these indicators, as 60 percent of clothing sold in Mexico 
is thought to consist of contraband, most of which is from China (May-
oral Jiménez 2011; Rodríguez 2011). By themselves, top- down directives 
from the state will not overcome the much- heralded China threat, but 
neither will unsupported initiatives from the private sector and civil 
society. Solutions will more likely emerge from a framework of engage-
ment between the two. However, a contentious question must first be 
answered: can industrial policies set in motion a virtuous circle of eco-
nomic growth and trust, or does state intervention inevitably throw the 
circle into a tailspin?
The latter view has reigned supreme in Mexico ever since the presi-
dency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982– 88). His administration sought to 
rebuild the credibility of the pri in the face of the enormous foreign debt 
accrued through social programs and infrastructure spending during 
Mexico’s oil boom (1976– 81). The boom had begun with the discovery of 
the Cantarell oil field, but it ended just as abruptly when the U.S. Federal 
Reserve increased interest rates to stem domestic inflation, prompting 
capital flight from Mexico and other indebted nations. As Calva explains, 
“instead of correcting the failures of macroeconomic management and 
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redefining the industrial strategy . . . the new governing group opted to 
apply an adjustment program of severe macroeconomic contraction and 
to dismantle industrial policy” (2012, 15). De la Madrid oversaw Mexico’s 
1986 accession to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, but there 
was also a decline in real wages by 30 percent, a rise in unemployment to 
25 percent, and a spike in inflation to 159 percent (United Nations Devel-
opment Program 1990, 35).
Mexico’s deteriorating situation prior to the 1988 election saw the pri 
facing possible defeat for the first time since its founding in 1929. Chal-
lenged by the left- leaning Frente Democrático Nacional—led by Cuauh-
témoc Cárdenas, son of the legendary President Lázaro Cárdenas—the 
pri’s candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988– 94) prevailed after the 
suspicious malfunction of a newly installed electronic voting system. 
Continuing de la Madrid’s hands- off economic policy, Salinas negotiated 
Mexico’s entry into the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta), 
but his fervent pursuit of privatization generated popular discomfort 
with the country’s conservative adherence to the Washington Consen-
sus. Salinas’s minister of commerce and industrial development, Jaime 
Serra Puche, epitomized this approach, famously stating that “the best 
industrial policy is no industrial policy” (quoted in Boltvinik 2003, 387).
Appointed by Salinas to direct the Ministry of Finance (Secretaría 
de Hacienda), Pedro Aspe assured citizens that free market economics 
was working in Mexico except for one detail: the country’s population 
of eighty- five million people was fourteen million too many. Some inter-
preted this as an insinuation that 15 percent of Mexicans—the number 
living below the poverty line at the time—were an economic burden and 
would do everybody a favor if they left. However, as Alexandra Délano 
has shown, the Salinas administration generally tried to “delink” migra-
tion from trade and investment to strengthen Mexico’s negotiating posi-
tion vis- à-vis the United States (2011, 139). Telling citizens that his gov-
ernment would “export goods, not people” (quoted in García Zamora 
2009, 79), Salinas tried to keep migration off the nafta agenda to avoid 
having to trade Mexican oil for U.S. immigration permits. U.S. demand 
for labor was growing at the time, propelled by a combination of decreas-
ing fertility and economic growth. Encouraged by a U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service amnesty for 2.3 million undocumented Mexicans, 
legal emigration from Mexico to the United States reached a historic an-
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nual peak of 946,167 in 1991, slightly fewer than the estimated number 
of illegal entries the same year (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001; U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 2002, 27).
Among nafta’s side effects for Mexico were the loss of jobs in tradi-
tional agriculture and a resulting displacement of rural workers, creating 
a pool of economic emigrants. Their resettlement in the United States 
would pay off for Mexico: remittances grew from 2.5 billion in 1990 to a 
high of 26 billion in 2007 prior to the global financial crisis (Iliff 2009; 
Mark Lopez, Livingstone, and Kochhar 2009, 9; Zamora 2005, 4). De-
spite its deleterious impact on social integration and national pride, emi-
gration is a convenient alternative to industrial policy for the Mexican 
government: it involves neither investment nor political risk.
Mexico’s so-called lost decade under de la Madrid and Salinas gener-
ated ambivalent reactions to the country’s free market trajectory both 
among citizens and in the pri, resulting in the nomination of Luis Don-
aldo Colosio as the party’s candidate in the 1994 elections. Early in his 
campaign Colosio enjoyed the support of Salinas and the party machine, 
but he soon showed progressive leanings, proposing new state industrial 
investments and social programs to be financed with property taxes. Co-
losio’s increasing advocacy of a “redistributive” state, his support for as-
sertive industrial policies, and his conciliatory stance on the Zapatista 
insurgency suggested that as president he would depart from the Salinas 
model (Marquez 1994). These gestures, summarized in his public state-
ment that Mexico was “hungry and thirsty for justice,” augmented his 
popularity, but they may have ultimately gone too far. During a campaign 
rally on March 24, 1994, Colosio was assassinated, the first Mexican poli-
tician of such status to meet a violent end since 1928.
Whether or not the gunman acted alone is still unknown. The opposi-
tion alleged that he was linked to Salinas, who encouraged his protégé 
Ernesto Zedillo (1994– 2000) to campaign for office on the platform of 
continuity with the country’s free market trajectory. Unfortunately for 
Zedillo, continuity brought with it the repercussions of the preceding 
months. Within days of his victory, foreign investors nervous about the 
potentially destabilizing impact of Colosio’s murder and an invigorated 
Zapatista uprising in Chiapas withdrew portfolio capital and sold for-
eign debt instruments they had bought on unrealistically favorable terms 
under Salinas. To compensate for the central bank’s dwindling foreign 
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reserves, Zedillo, a Yale- trained economist, reversed several macroeco-
nomic policies inherited from Salinas, such as a commitment to mini-
mizing inflation by pegging the peso’s exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. 
During Zedillo’s first year in office, the free- floating peso lost 55 percent 
of its value (from 3.4 pesos per dollar in December 1994 to 7.6 pesos per 
dollar in December 1995), bringing on a rapid increase in the price of 
goods and services. Zedillo attempted—with some success—to offset ris-
ing living costs by implementing the progresa program of cash subsidies 
to Mexico’s poorest households, 2.5 million of which had registered in 
the initiative by 2000 (Bate 2004).
The crisis had a negative impact on other Latin American economies 
(a process termed the “tequila effect”), leading President Bill Clinton’s 
administration to negotiate a bailout for Mexico’s banking sector in 1995. 
Critics argue that this maneuver served mainly to protect the capital—
both financial and social—of the U.S. investment bank Goldman Sachs, 
whose former cochairman Robert Rubin had become Clinton’s treasury 
secretary. A financial analyst explained it this way: “Goldman Sachs has 
steered billions of dollars of its clients’ money into Mexico. The bank’s 
clients, partners and reputation all stand to suffer large losses in Mexico 
unless a successful bailout can be engineered. Heavy losses could encour-
age lawsuits from disgruntled clients” (Wheat 1995). Zedillo’s policies 
were economically coherent, but their reliance on U.S. investment and 
his unequivocal commitment to nafta were a continuing source of dis-
illusion for advocates of industrial diversification.
The latter would find no respite under Mexico’s next leader (and for-
mer president of Coca- Cola Mexico) Vicente Fox (2000– 2006). The first 
non- pri president in seventy- one years, Fox promised Mexican auto and 
textile manufacturers that his incoming Partido Acción Nacional (Na-
tional Action Party, or pan) would secure them a greater share of the 
U.S. market under nafta. His pursuit of closer economic integration 
between Mexico and the United States reflected his commitment to 
Washington’s push for market reforms across Latin America. This liberal- 
democratic orientation also characterized his broader foreign policy, 
which became clear when, in 2002, Mexico voted with the United States 
for the first time against Cuba at the un Human Rights Commission. 
Fidel Castro described Mexico’s decision as evidence of Fox’s subservi-
ence to U.S. interests, and to prove it Castro released the transcript of his 
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telephone conversation with Fox a month earlier. The transcript revealed 
that Castro had abruptly left the 2002 un Summit on Development Fi-
nancing in Monterrey because Fox had asked him to, and that despite the 
Mexican government’s insistence to the contrary, the request had come 
from George W. Bush. Fox’s political embarrassment drew attention to a 
broader divergence of Mexican and Cuban political ideology, the former 
marked by an intensifying commitment to U.S.-led market liberalization 
and the latter by an enduring devotion to socialist planning.
Fox’s promise to take advantage of the opportunities presented by 
nafta was a credible pursuit, but its regrettable corollary was a further 
narrowing of Mexico’s productive capacities to manufacturing indus-
tries dependent on specific niches in the U.S. market. Less fortunate still 
was the subjection of these industries to intensifying competition with 
China. In 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization, and by 2002 
Chinese exports to the United States had surpassed those of Mexico, 
causing the loss of over 672,000 Mexican jobs across twelve industrial 
sectors. The export- processing maquiladora sector was particularly hard 
hit: by 2003 Sony, nec (Nippon Electric Company), VTech, and Kodak, 
together with 85 percent of shoe manufacturers in Mexico, closed their 
Mexican operations and moved to China (Comisión Económica para 
América Latina 2004; Domínguez et al. 2006, 38– 39). Textile producers 
were similarly affected, and even the auto parts sector registered growing 
Chinese competition in the U.S. market (Álvarez Medina 2007; Watkins 
2013). All the while, Mexico’s annual trade deficit with China was grow-
ing to enormous proportions: from 2.6 billion in 2000 to 22.8 billion 
by the end of Fox’s administration in 2006 (United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database 2015). Between 2000 and 2009, Mexico exhib-
ited an extreme degree of export competition with China (figure 2.1).
China’s impact revealed the need for Mexico to upgrade and diver-
sify its industrial sector, but instead of guiding manufacturers through 
this process, the Fox administration simply advised them to divert pro-
duction away from competing sectors. Fox hoped that by creating the 
Mexico- China Bi- National Commission in 2004, key problems could 
be delineated and addressed in the private sector, but the commission’s 
most noteworthy finding was that Mexico’s chronic trade imbalance with 
China resulted largely from inadequate state support to industry and lack 
figure 2.1 Selected countries’ export competition with China, 2000– 2009: 
Average coefficients of specialization and conformity (Latin American countries 
shaded). Source: Santiso and Avendaño 2011, 79.
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of dialogue with the Chinese government. Rather than address these is-
sues, Fox focused on building domestic credibility by aligning himself 
with angry Mexican manufacturers, attributing the blame for Mexico’s 
predicament to unfair competition from China. His political discourse 
targeted the lack of civic values in China, which he said had produced 
an authoritarian labor system, low wages, and anticompetitive exports 
(León- Manríquez 2011, 168– 69). More assertive industrial guidance from 
the Mexican government was not on the agenda, much less collaboration 
with Chinese authorities. Seeking popular support for his conservative 
pan in the coming elections, Fox cautioned voters about the ideological 
track record of the opposition pri, which he said had deceived Mexicans 
“as if we were vile Chinese when they were selling their grandiose ideas, 
populism and demagoguery” (quoted in Canseco 2006).
Serving as Mexico’s president from 2006– 12, Felipe Calderón was 
elected by a razor- thin margin to succeed Fox for the pan, prompting 
millions to protest in the streets that he had stolen the election. Calderón 
demonstrated a more conciliatory approach to China early in his tenure, 
signing seven agreements in Beijing in 2008 and assuring Mexican man-
ufacturers that cooperation with China would create new opportunities 
for inter- industry collaboration. Just as the bilateral relationship seemed 
to be improving, in April 2009 the first cases of swine flu (AH1N1) were 
announced in Mexico. With memories of the 2003 outbreak of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (sars) fresh in the minds of Chinese offi-
cials, their government immediately quarantined more than fifty healthy 
Mexican citizens without consulting Mexico City. In a veiled criticism of 
China, Calderón stated in a televised intervention that “some countries 
and places are taking repressive and discriminatory measures because of 
ignorance and disinformation” (quoted in Branigan, Borger, and Tuck-
man 2009).
Swine flu could not have struck at a worse time for Mexico. The im-
pact of the global financial crisis, after a series of optimistic evaluations 
by the Mexican government, was by then becoming painfully evident. In 
February 2008, Minister of Finance Agustín Carstens had distinguished 
the crisis from previous downturns, stating that for Mexico it signified “a 
slight cold and not pneumonia as before” (El Universal 2008). Optimis-
tic that the crisis would soon recede, the Mexican Ministry of Finance 
predicted growth of 3 percent in gross domestic product (gdp) for 2009 
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(Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 2009, 13). To mitigate the im-
pact, Calderón announced a stimulus package in October to finance the 
construction of a new refinery for the state oil company pemex, a spe-
cial program to support small and medium- sized enterprises (smes), and 
further deregulation of trade (Calderón 2008). These measures, com-
bined with the Finance Ministry’s forecast, seemed to validate the “slight 
cold” thesis.
But the global financial crisis turned out to be more akin to pneumo-
nia, manifested in shrinking oil prices, declining exports to the United 
States, diminishing remittances from U.S.-based Mexican workers, and 
a contraction of domestic demand. In January 2009 the Ministry of Fi-
nance downgraded its growth estimate to 0 percent, imposing emer-
gency measures that included a freeze in the prices of gasoline and elec-
tricity and credit disbursements of some 150 million for industries hit by 
credit restrictions. In mid- 2009 the World Bank forecasted that Mexican 
growth would plunge to – 6 percent, while the International Monetary 
Fund predicted – 7.3 percent. The economy ultimately registered growth 
of – 6.5 percent, the worst contraction since the so-called tequila crisis of 
1994– 95, and arguably the most serious since the 1920s. Overly confident 
in the health of their economy, Calderón’s ministers had implemented 
the much- touted stimulus measures only half- heartedly at best, and of 
Mexico’s 106 million citizens, the number in poverty soared from 14 to 
20 million (Cortés 2009).
While governments around the world fended off the global financial 
crisis with assertive countercyclical strategies and stimulus packages, 
Mexico’s official response was characteristically hands- off. Some federal 
funds were employed to prevent further devaluation of the peso against 
the dollar, but the country’s reserves, which in July 2008 approached 
87 billion, remained virtually untouched. In November 2009 the promi-
nent economist Joseph Stiglitz stated that Mexico’s performance in 
handling the crisis had been among the worst in the world, adding that 
the Calderón administration had not adequately supported the capaci-
ties of smes to engage in international trade (Lombera 2009). Stiglitz 
suggested that Mexico consider new pathways to revitalization, such as 
government investment in technology, education, and infrastructure. In 
response, Ernesto Cordero, minister of social development (and later 
minister of finance), declared: “I believe that Stiglitz does not know in 
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detail the countercyclical policies implemented by the Mexican govern-
ment; he does not know the reality of Mexican public finances. I think he 
should read a little more about Mexico” (quoted in Ramos Pérez 2009). 
Apparently overlooking Stiglitz’s observation that “the only real source 
of growth is in Asia,” Mexico’s response to the crisis was in keeping with 
history: wait for the United States to recover. In 1990, 70.2 percent of 
Mexican exports went to the United States, and by 2009 the figure had 
increased to 80.7 percent (Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean 2010).
Integration with the United States has favored some sectors of the 
Mexican economy, such as the automotive industry, but it has also nar-
rowed the nation’s industrial base and produced an overconcentration of 
within- sector output since the mid- 1980s (Organisation for Economic Co- 
Operation and Development 2009, 104). The country’s twelve free trade 
agreements (with forty- four countries, including the European Union and 
Japan) harbor the potential to reverse this trend, but a macro economic 
strategy for generating exports, rewarding up- and- coming companies, 
and incentivizing the diversification of trade has yet to be articulated. As 
José Luis León- Manríquez puts it,
In contrast to China and other East Asian countries, the expression 
“industrial policy” has become almost taboo in the discourse of Mexican 
economic officials, even in the midst of a recalcitrant economic crisis 
that saw national gdp plunge to –6.55 percent by the end of 2009. 
Mexico’s development banking, led by Nacional Financiera (nafinsa), 
appears to be heading toward extinction; commercial banking does not 
support large industrial and exporting projects; investments in applied 
research and development by Mexican firms are virtually nil; and 
subsidies to production in the secondary sector have long exhibited 
levels below the average in member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. (2011, 170)
As Mexico’s trade deficit with China grows, vote- conscious politicians 
have come under pressure to formulate a response. Following a series 
of street protests in the early 2000s demanding protection from the 
so-called China threat, the Ministry of the Economy agreed to maintain 
commercial tariffs on products imported from China. This quelled the 
anger of the textile, toy, electronics, and other labor- intensive sectors, 
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but it did not resolve the underlying problems of overreliance on the U.S. 
market and poor competitiveness.
Rejecting the argument that their problems result from excessive state 
protection, industry advocates ask why the subsidies, tax breaks, seed 
funding, and diplomatic support that have sustained the competitiveness 
of big business are not extended to them (Cámara Nacional de la Indus-
tria Textil 2006; Dussel Peters 2011a, 98). Their grievances resonate with 
the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2011– 2012, 
which lists “access to financing” as one of the most serious problems fac-
ing businesses in Mexico, alongside violence and corruption (2012, 258). 
To make matters worse, what gains in efficiency have been achieved in 
recent years have resulted largely from the downsizing of the labor force 
(Calva 2012, 18– 19). According to a survey by Vanderbilt University’s 
Latin American Public Opinion Project, 40 percent of Mexican house-
holds had a member who lost his or her job between 2009 and 2010, the 
highest figure in Latin America (Parás García, López Olmedo, and Var-
gas 2011, 25). The survey also found that 65 percent of Mexicans do not 
trust their political parties to govern, and that this distrust is associated 
“primarily with the management of the economic crisis and government 
budgets” (2011, 110).
Distrust permeates Mexican political culture, limiting citizens’ will-
ingness to engage in collective action. A 2014 study by Mexico’s Na-
tional Electoral Institute found that 73 percent of citizens did not trust 
“most people” and that less than one in ten respondents had ever signed 
a petition. According to the report, widespread suspicion of politicians, 
political parties, police, and judges constitutes a profound “distrust and 
disconnect among citizens, and between the population and the govern-
ment” (Saldierna 2014). This environment of weak horizontal and verti-
cal trust reflects the civic apathy produced by seven decades of de facto 
one- party rule and corruption in the twentieth century (Morris 2001; 
Morris and Klesner 2010, 1259– 60). The trend is fortified by a series of 
more recent electoral disputes, such as the infamous computer malfunc-
tion of 1988 that installed Salinas as president, the 1994 assassination of 
Colosio, and the allegations of fraud that tainted Calderón’s 2006 victory.
The prevailing “distrust and disconnect” has been deepened by the 
continuing diffusion of criminal violence under the Peña Nieto admin-
istration. The alleged June 2014 execution of twenty- two criminal gang 
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members by Mexican police in a warehouse in Ttatlaya, Mexico State, 
has deepened public perceptions of impunity for corrupt officers. The 
case is complicated by conflicting accounts, including by three women 
apparently rescued from the warehouse and subsequently accused of be-
ing members of the gang. The protracted trial has provoked allegations 
of government corruption on the one hand, and street protests in Mexico 
City for the human rights of the twenty- five accused police officers on the 
other hand (La Jornada 2015).
Even more damaging to the government’s credibility is the Septem-
ber 2014 disappearance and murder of forty- three students from a rural 
teachers’ college in Ayotzinapa, in Guerrero State. An official investiga-
tion has found that the students were detained by police in the nearby 
city of Iguala while protesting preferential government funding for urban 
colleges. An operative of the Guerreros Unidos crime syndicate states 
that Iguala police handed the students over to him, and believing they 
were involved in a rival gang, he ordered their incineration in a munici-
pal landfill. Iguala’s mayor and his wife fled after the incident but were 
apprehended in Mexico City, while the Iguala chief of police remains 
at large. The governor of Guerrero subsequently resigned in the face of 
mounting accusations of collusion between crime syndicates, police, and 
government agencies. As Ángel Calderon writes, “the killing fundamen-
tally shakes the pillars of trust between individuals and institutions and 
highlights lack of accountability in the lines of command” (2015).
Public trust in government has been further shaken by Peña Nieto’s 
personal indiscretion. Following a 2013 interview with the president’s 
wife, Angélica Rivera, in the glossy magazine Hola, journalists found that 
she was in the process of buying a 7 million mansion (dubbed the Casa 
Blanca, or White House) from a subsidiary of the public works contrac-
tor Grupo Higa. In 2014 another of the company’s subsidiaries was con-
tracted to build the Mexico City– Querétaro high- speed rail link as part 
of a Chinese- led consortium. The conflict of interest became a liability 
in September 2014, when Peña Nieto visited New York to assume the 
presidency of the Alliance for Open Government, promising to “ensure 
that transparency and accountability are daily practices among all gov-
ernment offices and bureaus of member countries” (quoted in Resén-
diz 2014). Facing allegations that he had not declared the purchase of 
the mansion as required by law, in November 2014 the president can-
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celed the high- speed rail contract over concerns that the selection of the 
Chinese- led group did not demonstrate “absolute clarity, legitimacy and 
transparency” (quoted in Webber and Mitchell 2014).
The Casa Blanca debacle damaged Peña Nieto’s credibility at home 
and in China, since the 3.6 billion high- speed rail project depended on 
2.9 billion from the China Railway Construction Corporation (85 per-
cent of which would have been financed by the Chinese government’s 
Export- Import Bank). Days after he rescinded the contract, Peña Nieto 
visited Beijing for the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, where 
Premier Li Keqiang implored him to treat Chinese companies “fairly” 
(quoted in Global Times 2014). Mexico’s director of rail transport, Pablo 
Suárez Coello, anticipated a new tender application led by China Rail- 
way within weeks, but in February 2015 the Mexican government shelved 
the project, together with other public works, owing to the falling price 
of oil (Tan 2015).
The Peña Nieto administration has attempted to rebuild public trust 
mainly through economic reforms. The president describes his goal of 
attracting 250 billion of private capital into the oil sector as “the center-
piece” of his tenure, and as Bloomberg reports, foreign investors appear 
to believe it:
Investors anticipate that President Enrique Peña Nieto will deliver on 
his promises for economic growth. Their conviction stems from the 
constitutional changes pushed through by the 48-year- old president. . . . 
In his first two years in office, Peña Nieto pushed through the biggest 
economic overhaul since the North American Free Trade Agreement 
took effect in 1994. The government estimates that allowing companies 
including Exxon Corp. and Chevron Corp. to produce crude [oil] on 
their own for the first time since the 1930s will help lift annual growth 
to above 5 percent, a level not seen since 2010, by the end of Peña 
Nieto’s six- year term in 2018. (Bain and Martin 2014)
The achievement of these goals would enhance the pri’s stature as a 
party governing with a comprehensive industrial plan ranging from trade 
tariffs to structural reform, but optimism has been tempered by the de-
clining price of oil. Investors are unlikely to plunge into the energy sec-
tor unless the price recovers, an uncertain prospect as shale gas produc-
tion increases in the United States, Europe, and Australia. When the oil 
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price fell below 50 per barrel in early 2015, pemex canceled contracts in 
Campeche, one of its most important production zones, leaving 10,000 
subcontractors out of work. The government simultaneously announced 
that it would cut spending by 8.57 billion owing to oil’s poor long- term 
outlook. Carstens, now governor of Mexico’s central bank, told legisla-
tors: “We no longer have those revenues, especially when it appears that 
the drop [in oil prices] is pretty durable and we can say it is going to 
be a question of years, not months” (quoted in efe 2015). One month 
later the Mexican president bucked concerns over the future of oil, trav-
elling to London to accept a 1 billion loan from U.K. Export Finance to 
purchase British oil technology. Questions about presidential integrity 
followed Peña Nieto to Buckingham Palace as Mexican social media cir-
culated photographs of his wife and daughter “on tour” in London wear-
ing a 3,000 gown and a 7,000 dress, and of his wife carrying a 7,000 
handbag (“Indigna en redes” 2015).
The only solace Mexico can derive from the declining price of oil is the 
cheaper energy it affords manufacturers, whose total production costs in 
2014 were 5 percent below those of China (Sirkin, Zinser, and Rose 2014). 
Hopes of bringing back industries that abandoned Mexico for China dur-
ing the pan’s tenure (2000– 2012) are becoming more realistic, especially 
given the inflation of Chinese wages by more than 400 percent since 2004.
The Peña Nieto administration’s reforms have focused on macroeco-
nomic conditions and foreign investment, but they also have important 
implications for small businesses. This is evident in the 2014 budget, 
which pledged to work with lenders to loosen credit for small enterprises, 
noting that lending in Mexico amounts to only 16 percent of gdp (com-
pared to 50 percent in most of Latin America). The government has also 
promised to reduce the inordinate cost of mobile phone services, one 
of the most pernicious daily barriers to the success of small businesses. 
To this end, the government has ordered Carlos Slim’s América Móvil 
telecommunications monopoly to divest so that smaller firms might in-
troduce lower- cost services into the market. A potentially less popular 
measure is a 2014 tax (of one peso per liter) on drinks with high sugar 
content, generating much- needed revenue for government programs but 
increasing the price of this Mexican staple by 14 percent. Peña Nieto’s 
budget also envisions a 10 percent tax on personal profits from stock 
sales and dividends, while sparing food and medicine from an antici-
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pated value- added tax because, he said, this would hurt Mexican families 
(Cattan and Martin 2013).
Tax reform is long overdue in Mexico, both because of the narrow 
taxation base and because evasion has seen the government’s tax take 
decline to the lowest among the thirty- four members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co- Operation and Development. In 2014 the Mexican Tax 
Administration Service responded by initiating investigations into seven 
large multinational firms in the automotive, mining, and retail sectors. 
This has generated popular approval for the government but may fall 
short of formal audits into ingrained evasion practices, such as shifting 
profits to countries with lower taxes. Nevertheless, the above measures 
constitute tentative steps toward a more diverse economy that is less reli-
ant on large enterprises and more likely to generate economic activity at 
the grass roots.
Broader opportunities for small businesses are critical for generating 
public trust in government, for—as Kenneth Newton puts it—“the rela-
tionship is likely to be reciprocal . . . winners tend to be trusting” (2001, 
207; also see Armony 2004, 28; Freitag 2003). Mexico demonstrates bet-
ter than most countries that collective action and the trust it generates 
are strongest in sectors that benefit from political and economic condi-
tions. “Big business in Mexico,” writes Ben Schneider, “invests far more 
time and money in voluntary encompassing associations than do the 
business sectors in other countries in the region” (2002, 78). For instance, 
major industry associations like the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial 
(Council for Business Coordination, or cce) and its affiliate the Consejo 
Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios (Mexican Council of Businessmen, 
or cmhn) maintain symbiotic relationships with government institu-
tions and funding bodies like the National Council of Science and Tech-
nology. Consensus and trust among the members of these associations 
have advanced their ability to influence policies and win state support, 
from tax breaks to subsidies for research and development. For Mexico’s 
political and economic elites, targeted industrial policies and trust have 
reinforced each other. It remains to be seen whether or not Peña Nieto’s 
policies will extend the radius of this virtuous circle beyond elite enter-
prises to smaller actors.
As Chinese exports encroach on Mexican markets in progressively 
higher value– adding sectors, including automobiles, economic diversi-
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fication will become increasingly necessary. The next section illustrates 
why customs duties on Chinese products are no substitute for industrial 
policy. On the contrary, tariffs have encouraged the expansion of smug-
gling, eroding rather than fomenting trust among the state, businesses, 
and citizens.
IMPORTING FROM CHINA: EVADING THE GREAT WALL OF MEXICO
Until the mid- 1980s Mexico stood out as an industrialization success 
story. Despite its limited export capacity, 85 percent of its foreign sales 
were manufactured goods such as textiles, household appliances, and au-
tomobile parts. While consolidating this industrial agenda in the 1970s, 
President Luis Echevarría developed cordial relations with the Chinese 
government, supporting its position on Taiwan and making Mexico Chi-
na’s leading trade partner in Latin America. But at that time China was 
laying the institutional foundations that would underpin its transition to 
market socialism, a transition whose enormous commercial output has 
now undercut Mexico’s industrial achievements.
Mexican newspapers have made much of the dangers posed by un-
trustworthy Chinese products such as disintegrating automobile tires; 
contaminated pet food; seafood containing high levels of antibiotics to 
prevent infections from the industrial waste of China’s eastern shores; 
and toothpaste and cough medicine containing lethal quantities of di-
ethylene glycol, a cheap substitute for glycerine. An article reprinted in 
the Mexican newspaper El Mural concludes: “There was a time when 
the words ‘made in China’ evoked an immediate perception of ‘bad qual-
ity.’ These days many North Americans and Europeans perceive ‘danger’ ” 
(Martin 2007). Chinese media have responded by accusing commercial 
competitors of overreporting such incidents to spread distrust of Chi-
nese products and fuel perceptions of a China threat (French 2007).
Almost all Mexican industries, from traditional handicrafts and tex-
tiles to the export- oriented assembly sectors, have complained to the 
Mexican government about the lack of protection against the flood of 
low- priced products arriving from China and the loss of employment due 
to low wages in Chinese factories (Páramo 2008). To quell public anger, 
Calderón declared at the 2007 General Assembly of the cniv: “it is nec-
essary to take action to reduce the notable unjust disadvantages that are 
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crippling the textile industry vis- à-vis those of other countries, particu-
larly China” (quoted in Epoch Times 2007). In a country where 55 per-
cent of people  described China’s economic development as a threat—the 
highest figure in Latin America, according to the Pew Research Center 
(2007)— Calderón’s statement resonated with concerns within and beyond 
the textile sector. His call for action, though, was never developed into 
a coherent strategy. Instead, the Mexican government adopted a politi- 
cally safe solution: commercial tariffs on products imported from China.
Trade barriers have not significantly staved off Chinese competition; 
nor have they fomented horizontal cooperation between Mexican busi-
nesses or vertical cooperation with the state. On the contrary, they have 
eroded trust between state and society as basic manufacturing indus-
tries, offered little support to advance and upgrade, have fallen further 
behind foreign competitors. Furthermore, tariffs on Chinese products 
have fueled the growth of the informal sector by providing a disincentive 
to declare trade.
Mexican protectionism against Chinese products became politically 
controversial with China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Unable to derail China’s bid to join the group, Mexico negotiated 
a six- year grace period during which import tariffs would apply in 953 
product categories, allowing its national industries time to upgrade their 
technologies, enhance efficiency, develop new strategies for inserting 
themselves into global production chains, and generally become more 
competitive. As the expiration date approached in November 2007, Mex-
ican manufacturers successfully lobbied the Ministry of the Economy to 
seek an extension. The 2007 Transition Trade Agreement on Compensa-
tory Fees established a period of four more years for Mexican industrial 
sectors likely to be affected by the elimination of the tariffs. Duties had 
previously ranged from 100 percent to 1,105 percent; under the agree-
ment they would be 60– 360 percent in the first year and 35– 250 percent 
in the last (Hernández Hernández 2012, 83– 84).
When the four- year extension expired in December 2011, tariffs in the 
204 most sensitive sectors (such as clothing, shoes, bicycles, and baby 
strollers) were reduced to 35 percent. Although this figure was still fifty- 
nine times greater than Mexico’s average general import duty, conca-
min opposed the tariff ’s reduction and the government’s plan to progres-
sively phase it out. According to concamin, for every two manufactured 
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products exported by Mexico, ten were entering the country from China, 
and consequently, by 2011 between 900,000 and a million workers had 
lost their jobs (El Mural 2011). Together with other sectoral advocates, 
concamin continued to lobby the Ministry of the Economy to reinstate 
tariffs at their previous levels.
Industry pressure prevailed in August 2014, when Peña Nieto’s min-
ister of finance, Luis Videgaray, announced a new tax on imported foot-
wear and potentially other items, based on benchmark value (estimated 
market price) rather than declared customs value. Videgaray argued that 
the tax, levied at 25– 30 percent, would correct the previous government’s 
negligence: “We [the previous government] eliminated benchmark prices 
and decided unilaterally to begin reducing tariffs, and for industry, from 
the perspective of industrial policy, that essentially amounted to wishing 
them good luck” (quoted in efe 2014). The minister’s attempt to improve 
the “luck” of embattled manufacturers may temporarily alleviate their 
anxiety about Chinese imports, but if history is any guide, tariffs will not 
overcome their competitive woes.
One negative but logical consequence of Mexico’s successive barri-
ers against Chinese imports is that suppliers and retailers have found 
creative ways to circumvent them. According to the 2007 Inquiry into 
Antidumping Quotas against Imports of Chinese Origin, undertaken by 
the Mexican consultancy iqom Trade Intelligence, Mexican firms have 
habitually arranged legal loopholes and exceptions to antidumping quo-
tas for their Chinese suppliers (M. García 2007). Interviews I conducted 
between 2008 and 2014 indicated that illegal methods are even more 
common, particularly bribery of customs officials. It is well known, for 
instance, that shipping containers entering the ports of Manzanillo and 
Lázaro Cárdenas frequently pass through customs without their con-
tents ever being reviewed.
A related practice known as technical smuggling involves the classifi-
cation of goods under an incorrect harmonized tariff schedule code that 
receives a smaller tax. Informally known as the salto arrancelario (tariff 
jump), this enables new T-shirts to enter Mexico as used T-shirts, petro-
leum engines as diesel engines, and so on. Textile products such as suits, 
underwear, and curtains are falsely classified as containing no cotton or 
other inputs that are also produced in Mexico. Should they choose to 
inspect a shipping container, customs officials often lack the necessary 
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training to discern an item’s true composition or function. An erroneous 
approval by customs agents—whether honest or subsidized—can there-
fore be explained to meticulous supervisors, if necessary, as an error de 
dedo (literally, an error of the finger). Technical smuggling first emerged 
as a serious concern between 2003 and 2005, when the Ministry of the 
Economy recorded that imported textiles classified as used clothing in-
creased from 6,500 to 17,500 tons (Dussel Peters 2009, 304). Customs 
officials acknowledge the problem but argue that they cannot overcome 
it because most of these products arrive from China, where they have no 
authority to conduct investigations (López 2006b).
Another form of tariff avoidance underlying Sino- Mexican commerce 
is illegal transshipment, known in Mexico as triangulación (triangula-
tion). Chinese exports enter the United States, Guatemala, and Belize 
free of duty as temporary imports destined for a third country. While the 
merchandise is held in storage, criminal accomplices acting as inspectors 
replace “made in China” shipping papers and package labels on the mer-
chandise with documents stating “made in USA.” Under nafta these 
products then enter Mexico free of duty. They are sold in street mar-
kets around the country at prices that are impossibly low for products 
genuinely manufactured in the United States. The yarn- textile- garment 
chain has been particularly hard hit by triangulation, and studies show 
that between 2006 and 2011, 60– 65 percent of Mexican retail in clothing 
consisted of illegal imports from China (Dussel Peters 2009, 304; I. Ro-
dríguez 2011). As Mexico’s ambassador to China from 2001 to 2006, Ser-
gio Ley witnessed the diplomatic fallout firsthand: “When I was working 
in Beijing, a Mexican official gave a public speech here in Mexico City, 
declaring that China was responsible for the influx of contraband. Today 
this is still the dominant perception. But a Chinese friend of mine told 
me, ‘How can we be responsible? We don’t control Mexican customs!’ 
He was absolutely right, and I’ll tell you the real culprit: the enormous 
quotas against Chinese products, which are higher than the Great Wall! 
With these quotas it becomes logical to ‘pagar la mordida’ [literally, pay 
the bite—meaning to offer a bribe]” (interview, June 15, 2010).
Ley has good reason to oppose tariffs on imports from China. As 
chairman of the Asia- Pacific section of the Mexican Business Council 
for Foreign Trade, Investment and Technology, he dedicates himself to 
promoting Sino- Mexican trade. His family, of Chinese origin, owns sev-
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eral baseball teams and the successful Casa Ley department store chain, 
which retails the popular Ley brand of jeans. Although Casa Ley is known 
to import from China, and although Sergio and his brother are widely 
known as Los Chinos Ley for their Chinese heritage, these connections 
have not damaged their sales. “The important thing,” Sergio insists, “is 
that we have the lowest prices.”
The same can be said of imported Chinese products generally, which 
retail not only in stores like Casa Ley but also in informal street markets. 
Studies conducted in 2012 found that 53 percent of Mexicans aged 16– 25 
habitually purchase contraband, and that the informal sector constituted 
15 percent of gdp that year (“La economía informal representa 15 del 
pib” 2012). Statistics from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geo-
grafía (National Institute of Statistics and Geography) suggest that infor-
mality is likely to be more widespread: between 2007 and 2012, 7.2 mil-
lion Mexicans entered the workforce and 2.4 million jobs (including both 
permanent and temporary jobs) were created, implying that only a third 
of new workers entered formal employment (figures cited in Dussel Pe-
ters and Ortiz Velázquez 2012, 15). Labor Minister Alfonso Navarrete 
has acknowledged that some 60 percent of Mexicans do not pay taxes 
and have no social security benefits, and that economic opportunities at 
the grassroots are critical for turning the situation around: “If there are 
no real incentives to make it attractive for informal workers to turn for-
mal . . . it’s difficult to get this group to migrate” (quoted in Hughes 2013). 
A popular Mexican saying confirms the point: “For every ten people who 
lose their jobs, eight will go to the informal sector.”
Mexico’s most famous outlet for unregistered consumer goods is 
Tepito, an expansive informal marketplace on the eastern perimeter of 
Mexico City’s historic center (discussed in chapter 4). Customers are 
drawn to the district by its famous slogan: “dress yourself for 100 pesos 
[approximately 8].” One of Tepito’s innumerable suppliers is Ángel, a 
twenty- three- year- old from Harbin, north of Beijing, who has a master’s 
in business administration and moved to Mexico City in 2009 to join his 
older sister. In 2003 she had opened a women’s clothing store, but over 
the next two years it was robbed three times. On each occasion the police 
ignored her reports, leading her to abandon her legitimate business for 
underground trading in counterfeit shoes, jackets, and handbags from 
China. Soon after arriving in Mexico, Ángel established a new product 
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line of Chinese- made watches and office equipment. Unlike his sister, 
he chose to import items that are not also produced in Mexico and that 
therefore have relatively small tariffs. According to Ángel,
In five days I can get any brand of watch you want shipped over by 
ups [United Parcel Service]. My suppliers in China write lower 
prices on the papers to reduce the tariff, but even without their help 
the tariff is smaller than for jackets and shoes. Jackets are charged [a 
tariff of ] 50 percent in Mexico because they make jackets here, but 
only around 15 percent in Guatemala, so my sister ships them by boat 
[from China to Guatemala] and sends a van to pick them up. People 
working at the Guatemala border are easy to bribe, so getting the 
products into Mexico is easy. Most of our customers are Mexicans 
who sell the products in street plazas and markets like Tepito, and 
in Guadalajara. . . . It’s dangerous. Even when my sister started [her 
legally registered business] the police couldn’t be trusted. We’re 
Chinese, and if there’s a problem we can’t rely on the police, so we call 
the Chinese embassy instead. (interview, June 17, 2010)
The niche that Ángel and his sister fill results from the high import 
tariffs on products that compete with those made in Mexico, combined 
with easy access to inexpensive alternatives from China. Employing a 
range of strategies to circumvent these tariffs, Ángel and his associates 
operate outside the law. The fact that they turn to the Chinese embassy 
rather than the police for protection indicates their precarious and mar-
ginal status in Mexico. This is to be expected considering the illicit nature 
of their trade, but it was a lack of trust in the police on the part of Ángel’s 
sister that led her (and by extension him) into the black market to be-
gin with. Distrust of official authorities is common in Mexico’s Chinese 
communities, whose members typically turn to ethnic associations and 
informal support structures rather than the police when their businesses 
are robbed or vandalized (see chapter 4). The result for Ángel has been 
diversion away from registered forms of Sino- Mexican exchange and as-
similation into a tight- knit underground network of smugglers.
The case of Ángel bears out Michael Woolcock’s observation that 
tightly integrated illicit networks with thin linkages to the public sphere 
impede inclusive development and broader societal cohesion (1998, 172– 
77). When such instances of what Woolcock calls “integration without 
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linkage” grow to the extent that Mexico’s informal sector has, the capac-
ity of governments to enforce the rule of law and for societies to “get 
ahead collectively”—in Albert Hirschman’s (1984) sense—is powerfully 
undermined. Instead, reliance on “informal institutions” (O’Donnell 
2006) engender what Alejandro Portes calls “downward leveling norms” 
(1998, 15) that ingrain expectations of illegality and preclude the forma-
tion of extragroup relationships (Hilgers 2008). The only viable pathway 
to vertical cooperation under these conditions is to draw government of-
ficials into covert networks, as has recently been alleged in Mexico City’s 
historic center (see chapter 4).
Weak state- society ties also undermine the formation of horizontal 
cooperation at the grass roots. As unchecked rival networks vie for po-
litical and geographic hegemony, loyalties become sharply defined and 
trust is limited to immediate associates. It is a far cry from the “spon-
taneous sociability” that conservative theorists argue should flourish as 
the state scales back its interventions to unleash society’s entrepreneurial 
initiative (Fukuyama 1995, 27).
Vertical disengagement in Mexico since the 1980s has impeded legally 
compliant forms of cooperation not only among informal networks, but 
also among registered small businesses. The latter have had to fend for 
themselves, often in bitter competition with each other, envious of the 
support reserved for a narrow band of large enterprises. Outside of major 
representative bodies like the cce and cmhn, private- sector coordina-
tion, cooperation, and trust are remote prospects in this fragmented con-
text, and consequently, so is Mexico’s ability to compete with China. The 
problem is deepened by excessive import tariffs, which may have gener-
ated short- term political capital for officials seeking the trust (and votes) 
of workers, but have not empowered national industries to explore new 
markets, develop technologies, and expand formal employment. Despite 
these difficult circumstances, as the next section shows, there have been 
cases of successful cooperation between the public and private sectors, 
and they offer useful lessons for improving Sino- Mexican relations.
EXPORTING TO CHINA: IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC- PRIVATE BALANCE
In November 2013 the Confederation of Chinese Associations of Mexico 
(cachimex) sponsored the fifth annual Expo China trade fair. Held in 
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the city of San Luis Potosí, the fair hosted some fifty Mexican companies 
alongside their counterparts from China, Peru, and Vietnam. Hoping to 
extend their reach into Chinese markets, participants secured export 
contracts for Mexican fruits, vegetables, and shellfish. Since Expo China’s 
establishment in Mexico City in 2009, its organizers have presented it 
as an initiative that serves Mexican interests. According to cachimex’s 
Secretary General Jimmy Li, “by promoting exports to China we hope 
to reduce the perception that our fairs are all about bringing ‘made in 
China’ products into Mexico” (interview, June 11, 2010).
Ricardo Chang, public relations manager for cachimex, says he 
wants to distance Expo China from accusations that Chinese businesses 
are perpetrating a trans- Pacific invasion of cheap textiles, shoes, toys, 
and steel products, voiced on Mexican websites like “Pinche Chinos” 
(Damn Chinese) and “Ten Reasons Not to Buy Chinese Products This 
Christmas.” Using Expo China to import Chinese products would only 
deepen this perception and, according to Chang, undermine the long- 
term networking strategy of Chinese exporters: “Chinese manufacturers 
have become interested in the Expo, but not to sell their products. What 
they want is to raise awareness of Chinese brands and build distribu-
tion networks. Just look what they sent to the last Expo: buses made by 
Yutong and a submarine! No one’s going to buy these things, but they 
might be impressed by them and start to trust their makers. In the end 
 cachimex is about building international networks, and that means 
building confidence in products” (interview, May 27, 2014).
Politicians and business executives have been reluctant to endorse 
events like Expo China for fear of popular criticism. Although Chang has 
found the pri more receptive than the pan to working with cachimex, 
“it’s still an uphill battle . . . some local governments now let us use their 
logos, but not much more than that” (interview, May 27, 2014). Expo 
China’s vertical ties to government are therefore weak, a predicament 
that the economist Enrique Dussel Peters believes has undermined its 
ability to advance Mexican interests: “The Mexican government—and 
even the Chinese government—won’t get involved because it’s too sensi-
tive, so Expo China is run 100 percent by the business community. This 
won’t work because it results in a focus on importing over exporting and 
leaves no space for policy strategies that could turn this around” (inter-
view, June 16, 2010). For Li, the first step to turning the situation around 
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is simple: “We’d like some high- ranking officials to come to the opening 
ceremony and cut a ribbon or something” (interview, June 11, 2010).
Endorsement from above will be critical if Expo China and similar 
trade fairs are ever to place more than fruit, vegetables, and shellfish in 
Chinese markets. Expo China’s organizers believe that Mexico would 
find ready consumers in China for everything from tequila and abalone 
to ground-up rubber from used tires, but owing to a lack of official spon-
sorship, national suppliers are either unaware of the event or have little 
faith in its legitimacy. Sponsorship would help build public confidence 
and encourage new domestic linkages between Mexican producers and 
exporters. In Li’s words, “culture and commerce are like two hands of 
the same person . . . as we say in China, first make friends, and then do 
business” (interview, June 11, 2010). While the Ministry of the Economy’s 
Fondo para Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (Small and Medium Enter-
prise Fund) has financed the participation of several Mexican companies 
in an Expo- related marketing mission to Chengdu and Fuzhou, the an-
nual event has been set back by “the lack of government support for sell-
ing to China” (Tai 2012, 367, 370).
Expo China is not unique in the lack of support it receives. As noted 
above, smes have little access to subsidies and tax breaks and have there-
fore been unable to compete in domestic markets or through Mexico’s 
twelve free trade agreements (León- Manríquez 2011, 169– 70). Although 
smes comprise 52 percent of gdp and 72 percent of formal employment, 
they contribute almost nothing to Mexico’s exports (“Importancia de las 
Pymes” 2011). For a country that scores well on the World Economic Fo-
rum’s indices of market size (11th out of 142 countries), time required 
to start a small business (35th), and gross national savings (40th), Mex-
ico’s ranking of 92nd in ease of access to loans is an aberration (World 
Economic Forum 2011, 259). Such scant financial support for smes is far 
from ideal in a global environment that rewards the diversification of 
exports, particularly for a country whose output does not include a heavy 
concentration of primary products.
The Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development 
recommends that Mexico adopt a long- term approach to export com-
petitiveness by investing in education and technical training (2009, 114– 
16; also see Santiso and Avendaño 2011, 88). The federal government 
has been slow to follow this advice, but in 2005 nine state governments 
MEXICO, CHINA, AND THE POLITICS OF TRUST  91
jointly formed the Program for Mexico- China Business Formation un-
der the Asociación de Secretarios de Desarrollo Económico (Associa-
tion of Mexican Secretaries of Economic Development, or amsde) to 
fund Mexican students at the master’s and doctoral levels to undertake 
internships in China, learn Chinese, and research opportunities for tech-
nology transfer and bilateral trade. Eloy Vargas Arreola, former secre-
tary of economic development of the state of Michoacán, argued that 
the initiative was a critical factor in building familiarity with China and 
overcoming the existing commercial imbalance (Wu 2006). Having sent 
over 200 students to China, the amsde program was suspended in 2008 
amid reports that grants had been awarded to friends and relatives of 
politicians and influential businesspeople with little interest in advancing 
bilateral cooperation.
The China- Mexico Research Center (cechimex) at the National Au-
tonomous University of Mexico has established a more successful grant 
program. Funded by Mexico City’s government, the program placed 46 
students in Chinese internship and research programs between 2007 and 
2015. As well as studying the development of technical linkages between 
Chinese universities and industrial parks, grantees have designed strate-
gies for boosting Chinese tourism to Mexico, establishing a high- level 
Spanish- Mandarin interpretation service, harmonizing Mexican and 
Chinese professional and academic qualifications, convening a bilateral 
commission on agricultural biotechnology, and duplicating a Chinese 
plastic injection molding facility in Mexico City (Trápaga Delfín, Dussel 
Peters, and Martínez 2012). The Asia Pacific Institute of the Tecnológico 
de Monterrey has also leveraged state- level funding to develop a strategic 
plan for China, working with its permanent staff members in Beijing and 
Shanghai to coordinate activities with the Mexican embassy in China. 
Over 500 students have passed through its programs in Beijing, Shang-
hai, Guangzhou, and Harbin, where the Tecnológico offers placements 
in engineering, international relations, business, and language through 
student visits to embassies, factories, and work centers.
Despite these achievements, state funding has sometimes been 
awarded to advance political agendas instead of genuine outcomes. One 
program in Hangzhou hosts eighty Mexican government- funded stu-
dents annually to live together in an on- campus residence hall, where 
their level of interaction with Chinese society—even academic society— 
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is very low. Familiarity with Chinese culture is apparently not an objective 
of the local coordinator (a former Mexican bureaucrat whose program 
has never been formally audited), who has set up a taco restaurant at the 
gates of the university. Interviewees in Mexico and China reported that 
such programs are not unusual; while they ostensibly focus on language 
and business training, they function largely as propaganda for Mexican 
politicians eager to convince their electorates that they are dealing with 
the so-called China threat. As a former student of one such program put 
it, “I think it’s good that the Mexican government is trying to do some-
thing about China, but I feel very angry that the money is so often mis-
used, and with no consequences!” (interview, November 3, 2007).
Mexico’s state- sponsored travel grants have generated information 
and opportunities for national exporters, but the political scientist Laura 
Rubio of the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (Autonomous 
Technological Institute of Mexico) notes a lack of follow- through once 
initial strategies have been drawn up. One student, she reports, de-
signed a project to export tequila to China and soon identified a Mexi-
can provider and a Chinese buyer and distributor. Chinese consumers 
responded enthusiastically, but the Mexican provider was unable to meet 
their demand. The project soon collapsed because the provider, having 
secured phytosanitary certification from Chinese customs, was unable to 
secure seed investment to expand production and develop partnerships 
with other Mexican producers. As Rubio notes, “it’s precisely the kind 
of company the government should support” (personal communication, 
October 8, 2010).
These cases illustrate the considerable potential of state- backed edu-
cational and research programs to advance cultural and commercial en-
gagement with China. Implementation, though, has been undermined by 
a lack of strategic and financial follow- through. Frustrated by this state of 
affairs, in 2008 Dussel Peters founded the Mexico- China Working Group, 
which has published a set of twenty- nine proposals for commercial en-
gagement with China. The Working Group recommends that the Min-
istry of the Economy and its international division, ProMéxico, urgently 
“undertake an exhaustive campaign” to promote the export of Mexican 
primary products, auto parts, electronics, food, and drink to China; at-
tract Chinese tourists to Mexico; and secure Chinese investment in the 
mining, infrastructure, alternative energy, textile, and automotive sectors 
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(quoted in Dussel Peters 2011b, 5). The reluctance of Mexican political 
and commercial elites to engage with China is reflected in poor invest-
ment figures: according to the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, between 1990 and 2011 Chinese firms invested 19.7 
billion in Brazil, 9.2 billion in Argentina, and 718 million in Costa Rica, 
but only 132 million in Mexico (Mingramm 2012, 101).
The Working Group also calls on ProMéxico to reopen its offices in 
Shanghai and Hong Kong, and on the Ministry of the Economy’s under-
secretary of smes to ensure that Mexican products appear in Chinese 
trade fairs (Dussel Peters 2011b, 6– 7). Furthermore, it suggests fully re-
instating Mexico’s tourism office in China (which was closed in 2010 to 
cut costs and reopened in 2011 with only one staff member) to increase 
Mexico’s share of China’s fifty million annual outbound tourists from its 
current base of 0.1 percent, and running a series of educational courses 
in the Mexican Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Migration to “improve 
knowledge about China and its culture, and especially to eradicate preju-
dices” (Dussel Peters 2011b, 6). These recommendations have since been 
elaborated into the Agenda Estratégica México- China (Mexico- China 
strategic agenda), a compilation of over eighty proposals presented to 
President Peña Nieto under the auspices of the newly formed think tank 
AgendAsia (AgendAsia 2012).
State support will be a critical factor in Mexico’s ability to compete 
with China, but as Mexican business consultant Rafael Valdez Mingramm 
has argued, national companies must also become more proactive: “The 
responsibility does not lie exclusively with the state. The Mexican private 
sector also needs to modify its agenda with China, to look beyond par-
ticular or group interests, and take advantage of our country’s wide range 
of offerings and comparative advantages. . . . All that’s needed is to stop 
focusing exclusively on the North American market and reestablish the 
strategic relationship that we constructed with China over the past 500 
years” (2012, 103 and 105).
Mexican firms that have done well in China are large enterprises with 
global reach. A good example is Nemak, the world’s leading producer 
of aluminum engine blocks, cylinder heads, and transmission parts for 
automotive applications. The company has close to fifteen thousand em-
ployees in thirteen countries, including China, and has established re-
search and development partnerships and joint ventures with a range of 
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original equipment manufacturers (oems) (Santiso and Avendaño 2011, 
83). A key factor in Nemak’s success has been the establishment since 
2000 of overseas factories, in anticipation of Chinese competition, to fill 
specific niches in the automotive chain. Although these niches do not 
occupy the highest value– adding segments of the production process, 
Nemak has demonstrated design and technology innovation through its 
lightweight aluminum engine blocks, or monoblocks, which are suitable 
for a range of oems. Exporting to China since 1995, Nemak does not 
control the production process, but it is one of only a handful of Latin 
American companies working in close partnership with long- term cli-
ents like Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Hyundai, and bmw. It is also 
one of the few Latin American firms to invest heavily in China, acquiring 
a plant from Fiat- Teksid in Nanjing in 2007 for 18.1 million and con-
structing a new facility in Chongqing in 2012 for 42 million to service 
its China- based customers (Dussel Peters 2012, 10).
Nemak stands out as an exceptional example of private initiative, but 
it also demonstrates the importance of long- term strategic support from 
the state. The company would probably not exist at all had the Mexi-
can government not awarded its parent company, Alfa Group, 12 billion 
pesos (480 million) in 1981 to get it through the oil crisis. Five federal 
decrees between the 1960s and the signing of nafta in 1994 ensured the 
health of the automotive sector, and a series of tax breaks and research 
grants has since supported Nemak’s expansion. Alfa Group is a promi-
nent member of cmhn, and in 2007 Nemak was the primary beneficiary 
of an investment of 142 million pesos (13 million) awarded jointly by the 
state government of Nuevo León and the National Council of Science 
and Technology (P. González 2007). Foreign governments have also pro-
vided Nemak with concessions to generate jobs in their territories, such 
as a 3 million tax break to establish an engine block production plant in 
Windsor, Ontario, in 2010 (Macaluso 2010). Similarly, energy and land 
use incentives provided by the Chongqing city government were critical 
in attracting Nemak’s investment (Dussel Peters, personal communica-
tion, December 27, 2012).
High- level diplomatic support from Mexican officials has been impor-
tant in securing outcomes for Nemak and other large- scale operations. 
Patricia Espinosa, Mexico’s secretary of foreign affairs, demonstrated 
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this when she visited Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in 2012. Reflecting the Calderón adminis-
tration’s more conciliatory approach to China, her personal advocacy 
overcame five years of impasse to secure official Chinese endorsement 
of Mexican pork imports (Bermúdez Liévano 2012). However, as any-
body who has worked in China knows, cooperation is forged over time, 
and Espinosa’s efforts will not produce economic outcomes without 
diplomatic follow-up. The current challenge is to steer pork and other 
Mexican products such as beef, poultry, mangos, and avocados through 
China’s inevitably political quarantine regime. By 2014 Chinese inspec-
tors had assessed and approved six of nine pork processing facilities in 
Mexico, and further delays will be averted only through a combination of 
high- level advocacy and improved coordination between private- sector 
producers and government trade representatives.
China’s growth has created new opportunities for large Mexican firms 
like Nemak, but it is also generating unforeseen competition for the au-
tomobile, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors, particularly in the U.S. 
market. For the time being, federal assistance is supporting the viability 
of Mexico’s automotive and agriculture sectors, but the future of manu-
facturing and small business is more precarious. Over the past decade, 
numerous studies have advocated measures that the government should 
adopt to strengthen the long- term competitiveness of these sectors. It 
remains to be seen if these studies are reaching and influencing the rele-
vant officials in the Peña Nieto administration.
CONCLUSION
Strategies for building the competitiveness of Mexican businesses have 
been slow to emerge, in part because of overreliance on the U.S. mar-
ket (deepened by nafta), and in part because “the expression ‘industrial 
policy’ has become almost taboo in the discourse of Mexican economic 
officials” (León- Manríquez 2011, 170). As discussed above, conservative 
thinkers have provided a rationale for this policy orientation, arguing that 
intrusive regulations, reporting requirements, and unnecessary costs in-
curred by state intervention undermine the trust necessary for economic 
cooperation and growth. The recent history of Mexico’s trade relations 
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with China does not support the view that intervention is a “substitute 
for trust” (Fukuyama 1995, 27); on the contrary, instances of targeted 
state support have stimulated a range of partnerships and associations.
In the absence of a coherent industrial policy, import tariffs have be-
come an ad hoc response to Chinese competition. While the political 
mileage generated by trade barriers cannot last forever, there is strong 
popular support for maintaining them, as demonstrated by the protests 
of industry groups discussed above.
As a substitute for more sophisticated and proactive measures, import 
tariffs have generated opportunities for informal traders. Tax evasion 
and smuggling are too difficult to resist for thousands of people like Án-
gel, the Tepito supplier whose illicit dealings and tight networks demon-
strate the toll that “integration without linkage” takes on social cohesion, 
the rule of law, and trust. The informal sector will grow further unless 
opportunities at the grass roots entice people like Ángel into registered, 
tax- paying occupations. Assertive industrial policies may therefore be 
Mexico’s best defense against the black market, especially since the influx 
of Chinese manufactured goods shows no sign of slowing down. The fact 
that the otherwise conservative Peña Nieto administration should pub-
licly identify a need to diversify the Mexican economy through credit and 
tax breaks for small businesses indicates its awareness that inadequate 
formal opportunities are driving the black market’s growth.
There is a growing consensus that genuine solutions to the Sino- 
Mexican trade imbalance could be achieved through greater efforts from 
the Ministry of the Economy, ProMéxico, and other state institutions 
whose mandates include coordinating and promoting trade and develop-
ment. These efforts could focus on establishing vertical synergies for in-
dustrial upgrading through public- private partnerships and encouraging 
horizontal linkages among suppliers, exporters, and importers. Without 
these connections, small entrepreneurs who have identified and begun 
to exploit niches for Mexican products in the Chinese market, as was the 
case with tequila, have been unable to acquire start-up grants, logistical 
support, and official endorsement. The Expo China trade fair, founded 
in 2009 to promote exchange between Mexican and Chinese small busi-
nesses, is well placed as a hub for such connections. Its organizers la-
ment, though, that politicians and businesspeople have been too wary of 
criticism on the sensitive issue of Chinese competition to endorse and 
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promote their efforts. In the absence of sponsorship, Mexican producers 
and exporters have remained unaware that they could use Expo China to 
develop partnerships with each other and potential Chinese customers.
In spite of Mexico’s competitive woes, there have been several illumi-
nating examples of success. The automotive parts producer Nemak has 
identified niches for its specialized engine blocks in China, which since 
2009 has produced and consumed more automobiles than any other 
country. Nemak’s exemplary performance is underpinned by a combina-
tion of private business acumen and government support in the form of 
research and development funding and incentives. Such awards would 
yield more broadly shared benefits if extended across Mexican busi-
nesses, particularly to smes. Results have also been achieved for Mexi-
can farmers, who can take comfort in China’s April 2012 commitment to 
opening markets initially to large- scale pork producers and potentially 
also to smaller beef, poultry, fruit, and vegetable suppliers. Markets do 
not open by themselves, but rather as a result of assertive high- level dip-
lomatic engagement and personal advocacy, in this case under the lead-
ership of Espinosa.
At the level of small businesses, state governments have been more 
active than federal institutions in building relationships and pursuing 
emerging opportunities. The Mexico City government, for instance, has 
provided research grants enabling cechimex to establish a systematic 
program of student placements in internships in China. The project has 
generated detailed proposals, publicly available on the cechimex web-
site, for building commercial partnerships and familiarity with the Chi-
nese market. This and the other cases analyzed in this chapter suggest 
that Mexico’s problems with China will not be solved simply through 
more government, but they may diminish through more sophisticated 
and assertive policies of domestic and foreign engagement.
Chapter 4 will describe another positive case of vertical synergy, 
driven by the state government of Baja California—where, despite po-
tentially debilitating anti- Chinese popular sentiments, local officials have 
developed trusting relationships with the resident Chinese community. 
Long- term cooperation built on legislation to facilitate commerce and 
migration has enabled a range of initiatives, from registered street mar-
kets to high- level visits from Chinese trade and investment delegations. 
Before examining microlevel developments in Mexico, we first return to 
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Cuba, where the Chinese diasporic community has also come to perform 
an important diplomatic function between China and Cuba. The capac-
ity of governments to build nationally beneficial relations with China de-
pends not only on vertical state- society relationships, but also on robust 
horizontal linkages in civil society and the private sector. The activities 
of members of the Chinese diaspora illuminate the formation of such 
horizontal linkages, and how their effectiveness is integrally tied to the 
delicate project of building vertical trust with the state.
FACING THE FUTURE
The 120th anniversary celebration of the legal registration of the Casino Chung Wah 
marks a return to prominence for the coordinating body of Cuba’s Chinese community 
and its seventeen nationwide sub- associations. Four smartly dressed waiters—
employees of the Casino—are serving green tea and black coffee during an intermission 
in the speeches. Nearby a well- meaning European scholar is firing pointed questions at 
Juan Eng, the Casino’s president: “In other countries Chinese associations are pushing 
business relationships with China like never before . . . what’s holding you back?” The 
renowned Chinese Cuban artist Flora Fong unveils her latest work: a photographic 
tapestry chronicling Chinese Cuban faces past and present, mounted on a six- foot- tall 
sculpture of her signature icon 人 [ren, meaning person]. Eng sips his tea and answers 
as well as possible: “We’ve been waiting patiently for a long time, and now things are 
starting to change.”
—Havana, May 20, 2013
The question put to Eng had long been on my mind, though it had seemed 
to me better not to ask. It is a question suited to observation and explora-
tion over time, and it raises many others. Among them: Since Cubans can 
now legally buy and sell houses and cars, are Chinese associations filling 
the niche of informal commercial brokers? As Cubans take advantage of 
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permission to establish small businesses, are the thick social networks 
of the Chinese community once again coalescing—as they did a century 
ago—into networks of supply, distribution, and retail? As Cubans in-
creasingly travel overseas, to what extent are Chinese community leaders 
connecting with friends and relatives in China to develop independent 
lines of supply and investment? To answer these questions requires sen-
sitivity to the legacies of history. They are, after all, questions about rela-
tionships, social capital, and trust, all of which take time to build.
Barrio Chino is less endogamous than other overseas Chinese com-
munities—for instance, those in Indonesia and Malaysia, where strong 
ethnic affinities and inward loyalties provoked anti- Chinese riots in 1965 
and 1969 (Heryanto 1998; Yahuda 1985, 222– 23). In Cuba, first- generation 
Chinese immigrants have been declining in number ever since their busi-
nesses were nationalized in the 1960s. Jorge Chao Chiu, secretary general 
of the Casino Chung Wah, reported in 2011 that the Casino registered 
only 171 surviving first- generation Chinese immigrants on the island (in-
terview, February 23, 2011). By mid- 2013 the number had fallen to 141 
(table 3.1).
To breathe life back into Cuba’s seventeen remaining Chinese associa-
tions (twelve of which are in Havana), in 1986 the Casino Chung Wah 
advised them to open their membership to second- and third- generation 
Chinese Cubans. In the early 1990s most did so, and by 2013 the asso-
ciations together reported 2,223 members. Unlike their first- generation 
predecessors, the descendants driving this revival hold Cuban rather 
than Chinese citizenship, and they are more culturally and genetically 
integrated into Cuban society. Chinese descendants have demonstrated 
a strong interest in the associations and now occupy senior (though not 
the highest) posts in the most important of these, including the Casino 
Chung Wah.
Since the turbulent post- Soviet decade of the 1990s, Barrio Chino 
has been at the forefront of Cuba’s economic evolution. In 1994 a group 
of descendants of Chinese immigrants successfully lobbied the govern-
ment for permission to establish Cuba’s first freely operating markets and 
stores since 1959 and to import products directly from China. Today the 
district’s restaurants are among the most popular and profitable in Cuba, 
and their success has provided a point of formal and informal entry for 
Chinese suppliers. As the government rolls out its plan to promote heri-
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tage tourism in Barrio Chino, a steady stream of visiting Chinese officials 
and investors has expressed interest in supplying the required goods and 
services, including Chinese- themed hotels and supermarkets.
Its emerging public profile imbues Barrio Chino with diplomatic 
appeal. Combining the allure of what Rosalie Schwartz (1997) calls the 
“pleasure island” with growing international interest in China and its 
diaspora, the district carries the credentials of an up- and- coming na-
tional icon. It showcases a relatively underrepresented feature of Cuban 
cultural heritage at a time when the Cuban and Chinese governments 
are emphasizing their historical ties. As bilateral trade and investment 
accelerate, leaders from both countries habitually invoke these ties to 
draw attention to the human link that has long connected their nations. 
table 3.1 Members of the Casino Chung Wah in May 2013
province
first- generation  
chinese immigrants
second- and third- 






Pinar del Río    
Isla de la Juventud    
Artemisa    
Mayabeque    
Havana   , ,
Matanzas    
Villa Clara    
Cienfuegos    
Sancti Spíritus    
Ciego de Ávila    
Camagüey    
Las Tunas    
Granma    
Holguín    
Santiago de Cuba    
Guantánamo    
Total   , ,
source: courtesy of maría teresa montes de oca choy.
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In  November 2008, during his second state visit to Cuba in four years, 
Chinese President Hu Jintao proclaimed: “Even though the physical dis-
tance that separates China and Cuba is great, friendship between both 
people goes back a long way” (quoted in Weissert 2008). The sentiment 
was symbolically enacted in media coverage of Hu’s delegation taking a 
guided tour of Barrio Chino.
High- level diplomatic exchanges inevitably make headlines, but more 
common are quiet visits from small entrepreneurs exploring potential 
new openings for their products, including in Barrio Chino’s informal 
sector. The innumerable retail kiosks and stalls that have sprung up 
across Cuba under Raúl Castro peddle everything from kitchen items 
and clothing to home appliances and dvd players, often supplied on the 
black market. In Barrio Chino undeclared exchange of goods and ser-
vices has long been a way of life, in part because of a legacy of protective 
associations predisposed to discreet business conducted through ex-
tended mutual aid networks. Webs of informal cooperation infused with 
interpersonal trust have historically underpinned the local economy and 
have now begun to accommodate encounters between Chinese Cubans 
and visitors from mainland China. Conscious of the political ramifica-
tions of these exchanges, district administrators have attempted to bring 
them under control through stricter bookkeeping requirements, heavier 
taxation, and programs to strengthen state- society engagement. In this 
respect too Barrio Chino reflects the broader regulatory challenges fac-
ing Cuba, and the attempts of the state to meet them.
As a cultural and diplomatic bridge between Cuba and China, a po-
tentially profitable site for tourism development, but also a hub of un-
registered commerce, Barrio Chino concentrates a variety of nationally 
pertinent threats and opportunities into twenty- three city blocks. Seen 
from the bottom up, two encompassing challenges are shaping the rules 
of the game. The first is the task of carving out civic spaces that enable 
a broader range of small business activities and autonomous commer-
cial relationships with partners in China. The efforts of Raúl Castro’s ad-
ministration to stimulate independent entrepreneurship and local self- 
sufficiency have inspired confidence that these outcomes will soon be 
within reach, though important legal steps remain unresolved. Second 
is the task of defining a development agenda for Barrio Chino that bal-
ances unity of purpose with diversity of voices. Meeting this challenge 
HAVANA’S CHINATOWN AND THE QUEST FOR SYNERGY  103
is arguably a prerequisite for exerting upward pressure on the state and 
achieving greater local leeway, but two decades of calls for unity from 
community leaders suggest that there is no easy pathway toward grass-
roots solidarity.
The support of Barrio Chino’s residents is crucial for the state’s capac-
ity to elicit compliance and boost tourism in the district. Administrators 
have therefore tried to consolidate their authority to govern by reach-
ing out to community leaders. But Barrio Chino’s budding entrepreneurs 
argue that trust must be earned. Stable supply chains, the relaxation of 
commercial restrictions, approval of would-be investors, and less crip-
pling taxation would stimulate goodwill, they say, more than the statues 
of Confucius and exotic tourist attractions appearing around them. They 
also point out that trust takes time to build, and that bitter memories 
of the 1960s—when the state nationalized Barrio Chino’s thriving busi-
nesses—are yet to fade away. Even more deep- seated are historical narra-
tives of crimes committed by successive colonial and republican Cuban 
governments against their ancestors.
This chapter’s first section examines the arrival and settlement of Chi-
nese contract laborers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, a turbulent process that laid the foundations of Barrio Chino’s 
contemporary governance challenges. To protect themselves from the 
conditions of de facto slavery, Chinese immigrants established mutual 
aid networks that over time evolved into thick networks of informal ex-
change. For Chinese newcomers, the trust and cooperation fomented 
by the ethnic associations were a matter of survival, but colonial com-
mentators seized on the apparent refusal of Chinese Cubans to integrate 
into mainstream social and economic life. Interracial unions were com-
mon, but Barrio Chino nevertheless became disarticulated from its civic 
and legal surroundings. By the mid- twentieth century, tourism from the 
United States cemented the district’s infamy as a hub of gambling, drug 
activity, and organized crime.
The second section considers Barrio Chino’s predicament after the 
rebel movement led by Fidel Castro seized political power in 1959. Early 
strategies to bring the district into the revolutionary fold included a 
neighborhood campaign staged by a Chinese Cuban division of the Na-
tional Revolutionary Militia and the nationalization of Chinese busi-
nesses during the 1968 Great Revolutionary Offensive. The disruption 
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of local life was compounded by the deterioration of Cuba’s diplomatic 
relations with China during the Sino- Soviet split (see chapter 1), leading 
Barrio Chino into two decades of stasis and neglect. As China reached 
out to former Soviet allies in the 1990s, a team of entrepreneurial Chi-
nese Cubans set up the Grupo Promotor de Barrio Chino (the Barrio 
Chino promotion group) to develop commercial partnerships in China 
and simultaneously build fresh ties with the Cuban state. The project 
showed early signs of success, but the task of mediating local, national, 
and foreign interests became increasingly difficult as bottom-up commu-
nity demands came into conflict with top- down government directives. 
The team learned the hard way that strong bonds of inward- looking trust 
can easily be characterized by competitors as nepotism and by municipal 
regulators as corruption. Their plight reflects a known sociological para-
dox: allegiances are often most effective when they are weak.
Barrio Chino’s entrenched informal sector has long represented a 
frontier in the regulatory quests of Cuban governments. The chapter’s 
third section draws on three years of participant observation, conducted 
between 2000 and 2014, to explore the circles of cooperation underpin-
ning contemporary informality in the district. Propelled by the popular-
ity of its restaurants, Barrio Chino’s prominence has generated legal and 
illegal opportunities for commercial expansion. Newly established state- 
operated convenience stores and countless improvised private  kiosks 
simultaneously sell registered and unregistered products, from pirate 
dvds and contraband clothing brought into Cuba by foreign accomplices 
to recycled rice cookers and mobile phones. Services are equally vulner-
able to informal trade, as Barrio Chino’s restaurants demonstrate. Efforts 
to effectively tax them—whether through national or local strategies—
have failed, providing insight into the state’s broader battle to enforce the 
rule of law. The section concludes with an analysis of the more benign in-
formal relationships that emanate from the Cuban School of Wushu. Or-
chestrating exchanges between visiting Chinese officials, Barrio Chino’s 
residents, and the state, the school’s charismatic director is a key broker 
of consensus. The Cuban government has recognized that working with 
such individuals offers the best hope of containing informal activities and 
building vertical trust.
The fourth section looks at recent government attempts to redefine 
Barrio Chino’s development agenda around tourism. On the instructions 
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of Cuba’s paramount executive body, the Council of State, in 2006 the Of-
fice of the Historian of the City assumed responsibility for Barrio Chino’s 
administration. Drawing on its experience in the neighboring municipal-
ity of Old Havana, the Office has attempted to integrate Barrio Chino 
into a broader scheme of civic governance oriented toward economic 
growth, stricter transparency requirements, and a public sense that these 
goals are consistent with local history and culture. This agenda has pro-
voked mixed reactions, ranging from support for the fashionable cafés 
and cobblestone streets brought by gentrification to resentment that an 
outside institution should presume to know what is best for the Chinese 
Cuban community. These polarized responses illustrate the complexity 
of defining an inclusive neighborhood development agenda, much less 
one that builds unity of purpose.
The fifth section argues that the dynamics of state- society relations in 
Barrio Chino have begun to be affected by China’s rise. This is the first 
time since the neighborhood’s establishment a century and a half ago 
that the Chinese Cuban community has been able to draw support from 
an external superpower. Thickening interactions with mainland Chinese 
visitors focus largely on informal small investments and supplies for local 
restaurants and emerging businesses. Unable to contain these expanding 
nonstate linkages, the Office of the Historian has attempted to diminish 
their appeal by providing official alternatives. Consensual and respon-
sive governance has long been the Office’s stated mission, but as China’s 
reach extends across the Pacific, the Office must now demonstrate its 
sincerity. With their bargaining power augmented, community leaders 
have found the Office more responsive than ever before to bottom-up 
proposals, two of which are discussed in the section. The opportunities 
generated by this nascent vertical synergy are also making Barrio Chino’s 
diverse actors more willing to work horizontally with each other. There 
is room for optimism, I conclude, that the historical legacies of distrust 
are fading.
FROM DECEPTION TO DECEPTION: THE ROOTS OF SELF- EXCLUSION
Cuban and Chinese portrayals of enduring brotherhood are common, 
especially among the nations’ leaders, but historical records reveal that 
from its inception Chinese immigration to Cuba was neither patriotic 
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nor glorious. Rather, it set in motion a vicious circle of personal sacrifice, 
racial hostility, objectification, and resistance whose legacy endures to 
the present day.
The 1843 Treaty of Nanking marked the end of the first Opium War, 
establishing the British as the dominant traffickers of Chinese labor at 
the same time that they were abolishing the transatlantic slave trade. De-
terred by a British naval embargo, imports of enslaved Africans to Cuba 
dropped from 10,000 in 1844 to 1,000 in 1847, a 90 percent reduction 
in just three years that was compensated for by the arrival of Chinese 
coolies in 1847 (Yun and Laremont 2001, 102). The enterprise was profit-
able for the British merchants who monopolized this new legal source of 
labor from eastern China. On January 2, 1847, 300 Chinese indentured 
workers, or coolies (from the Chinese kuli—苦力—literally, bitter use 
of strength) boarded the Spanish frigate Oquendo in Amoy (now called 
Xiamen), bound for Cuba. Through contracts with the Manila and Tait 
Company in London, they had agreed to serve the Spanish Real Junta de 
Fomento y Colonización (Colonial and Development Office) as laborers 
for eight years. The 206 coolies who survived the transpacific voyage ar-
rived in Havana’s port of Regla on June 3 and were joined ten days later 
by 365 more coolies who had traveled on the British vessel The Duke of 
Argyle. By 1853 more than 5,000 Chinese had arrived in Cuba, and by 
1873 there were an additional 132,453 (Padura Fuentes 1994), initiating a 
cross- cultural encounter that artist Pedro Eng Herrera has portrayed as a 
“paradigm between two cultures” (figure 3.1).
Chinese workers arrived in Cuba with the hope of fulfilling their con-
tracts and returning home wealthy, but on four pesos per month, few 
returned home at all. Transcripts of an 1874 court case analyzed by Lisa 
Yun (2008) demonstrate that whether or not the coolie trade constituted 
slavery, the social conditions in which Chinese laborers and enslaved Af-
ricans lived were practically the same. The deception of the endeavor is 
still registered in Cuba through a popular phrase used to denote com-
mon cheating: “Lo engañaron como un chino Manila” (he was tricked 
like a Chinese person from Manila).
The Chinese in Cuba were almost all male, and they mixed with females 
of similar economic standing, most of whom were African Cuban. This 
added to the already intricate cultural and biological blend—described 
by Fernando Ortiz as an “ajiaco” (stew; 1940; [1940] 1995)—already pres-
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ent in Cuba through European and African mixing. Nevertheless, as Ro-
gelio Coronel writes, “in truth, it is incorrect to imagine a profound pro-
cess of transculturation between the Chinese and the Spanish, but rather 
[there are] some indications of a selective intercultural blend” (2008), for 
instance in Chinese Cuban cuisine. Indeed, accounts of the time, such 
as the following report from Manuel Villanueva in 1877, suggest that the 
Chinese community was shunned by Cubans of both European and Afri-
can origin, and was marginalized to such an extent that it had to depend 
on criminal activities:
Induced to abandon their native land through the stimulus of false 
promises which they begin to suspect they will never see realized 
within a few days after they embark, separated from their native land 
by a distance which their imagination exaggerates upon recollection 
of the immense amount of water crossed during the long voyage, 
exploited by the rapacity of the ship’s crew, placed at tasks foreign 
to their training, subjected to the discipline of a plantation ruled by 
figure 3.1 Paradigma Entre las dos Culturas (Paradigm between two cultures) by 
Pedro Jesús Eng Herrera, 1999. Courtesy of the artist.
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the criterion and traditions of slavery, walking from deception to de-
ception even to seeing in many cases a lack of religious fulfillment of 
their contracts, excluded from family life because of a lack of women 
of their own race, despised by the Whites, hated by the Negroes, 
separated from their master more than are the slaves in proportion as 
the time of expiration of their contracts approaches and for the same 
reason treated with less consideration, real pariahs in Cuban society, 
how can it be questioned that this condition produces crimes and 
vices? (quoted in Corbitt 1971, 81– 82)
Nineteenth- century accounts of Chinese immigrants in Cuba reflected 
a fundamental paradox of Latin American modernism: a heterogeneous 
and inclusive national identity must also be narrow enough to permit 
unity. As Francisco Morán writes, Chinese immigrants—and China towns 
in particular—did not fit into the nation- building agenda: “The Oriental 
subject is probably one of the most resistant to any attempt to delimit a 
sense of ‘inside’ vs. ‘outside.’ If Chinatowns can be read as marginal spaces 
in relation to the national center, then for the same reason they impede 
the homogenization to which all nationalist imaginaries aspire. . . . The 
Oriental subject was persistently considered a foreign body within the 
national body, and decadent in physical and moral constitution. This 
decadence represented a danger—and it questioned from within—the 
vigor of the Nation in particular, and Latin America in general” (2005, 
385). Writing for an audience in Madrid, in 1864 the prominent Cuban 
historian José Antonio Saco expressed his conviction that Chinese im-
migrants were undermining Cuba’s already tenuous demographic bal-
ance: “If the African race has in recent times threatened Cuba’s hope-
ful future, the Chinese race, which has begun to be introduced, further 
complicates our situation since instead of the two irreconcilable races 
we had before, there now joins a third party that can amalgamate with 
neither, owing to complete differences in language and color, ideas and 
feelings, functions and customs, and religious opinions” ([1864] 2000, 
196). Hostile appraisals and bleak prospects for domestic advancement 
disposed Chinese Cubans to join the collective national insurgency that 
culminated in the Ten Years’ War (1869– 78). The rebel leader Gonzalo de 
Quesada praised their patriotism with the legendary words: “There was 
not a single Chinese Cuban traitor; not a single Chinese Cuban deserter.” 
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Their vitality in battle deepened perceptions in Madrid that the Chi-
nese coolies were ungovernable, and on the advice of the Cuban captain 
general, the Spanish government issued a decree in 1871 outlawing their 
passage to Cuba (Chou 2002, 50). The Chinese government—informed 
by its special envoy, Chin Lanpin, in 1874 that its subjects in the towns 
of Matanzas and Las Villas were being exploited—also banned further 
contracting of Chinese labor.
The U.S. consul in Matanzas at the time of the Ten Years’ War, Cap-
tain James William Steele, described his perceptions of the cultural back-
wardness, yet unparalleled work ethic, of “the Chinaman,” concluding 
that the Chinese “colonists” were inherently inward looking and resistant 
to integration:
He is always neat, and his house is always dirty. It is among the 
contradictions of his character. . . . If you enter the back room of his 
store, you will find there enthroned in a red shrine the deity he still 
believes in, with every appurtenance of his peculiar worship. It is all 
wrong, and the height of unconverted and unregenerate paganism in 
a country devoted to the true church. . . . Whenever, in the time to 
come, the Chinaman shall have gained over a district of the New World 
to himself—and he will do it—he will make that district like Canton 
or Macao, in no way modified save by climate and resources. . . . 
There will be no discussions about the government, and all that the 
community will desire will be to be let alone, and if it should be so left 
alone, the colony will increase and multiply, and spread by a steady 
and contiguous growth. . . . And through all his residence there, the 
colonist will still think of the flowery kingdom [China], and still intend 
to go back, and never become a citizen of the country which surrounds 
his temporary home. (Steele 1885, 96– 97 and 100)
Most nineteenth- century reports, like Steele’s, portrayed Chinese cul-
ture in condescending terms that overlooked patriotism and emphasized 
instead the “contradiction” of congenial appearances and hidden vices, 
including a penchant for prostitution and opium. For the Cuban “so-
cial hygienist” Benjamín de Céspedes the two misdeeds were intimately 
linked, finding refuge in the murky corners of Barrio Chino among “a 
race that is dead to human civilization” (Céspedes 1888, 201– 2).
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Supplied or withheld by their contractors—often through Chinese 
middlemen and subcontractors—opium devastated the economic and 
physical well- being of Chinese laborers (Hu- DeHart 2005a). As early as 
the 1860s well- organized distribution networks were trafficking the drug 
between Cuban cities and plantation zones, and by 1936 half of the 2,225 
drug addicts ever committed to the Mariel lazaretto (isolation hospital) 
were Chinese Cubans (Rovner 2004). María Teresa Montes de Oca Choy, 
director of the University of Havana’s Center for the Study of Chinese 
Immigration to Cuba, and Roberto Vargas Lee describe how the abject 
predicament of Chinese immigrants drove them not only to opium, but 
also to social withdrawal: “This [oppression] led to the self- exclusion of 
the Chinese community and, together with the difficulty of verbal com-
munication, led the coolies to close themselves off for a period of many 
years, looking almost exclusively within. They became hostile and resis-
tant to any process that implied a loss of culture and the humiliating ac-
ceptance of the work regime they were subjected to” (2008, 172– 73).
By the end of the nineteenth century the Chinese community had 
become diverse, incorporating at least 5,000 “Californian” Chinese, de-
scribed by Juan Pérez de la Riva as “a hybrid mix of American and Orien-
tal, gentlemen in jackets and ties” (2000, 116). When it occupied Cuba in 
1899, the U.S. military reported that the Chinese population amounted 
to just 14,614, but this figure increased between 1919 and 1924 after the 
governments of China and Cuba (following pressure from sugar produc-
ers) lifted bans on labor contracts. Lok Siu (2008, 169) notes the difficulty 
of accurately determining the number of Chinese arrivals in the early 
twentieth century, citing a statistical discrepancy in the records of the 
Cuban Department of Housing (showing 373 arrivals between 1903 and 
1916 and 11,311 between 1917 and 1924) and those of the Chinese consul-
ate in Havana (showing 6,258 arrivals between 1903 and 1916, and 17,473 
between 1917 and 1924). As Siu suggests, the discrepancy probably re-
sults from widespread illegal immigration at the time (c.f. Herrera Jerez 
and Castillo Santana 2003). Chinese immigrants who arrived in Cuba 
from the United States were already familiar with discrimination and had 
developed collective strategies for overcoming adversity: “Barred from 
factory employment by nativist prejudice and prevented from bringing 
wives and other family members by the Chinese Exclusion Act, these 
hapless seekers of the ‘Mountain of Gold’ had no recourse but to band 
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together in tightly knit communities that were the precursors of today’s 
Chinatowns. . . . Solidarity born out of common adversity is reflected in 
the ‘clannishness’ and ‘secretiveness’ that outsiders were later to attribute 
to these communities” (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, 1328).
Wealthier than the coolies, the “Californian” Chinese consolidated the 
local economy of Barrio Chino, which since 1858 had grown up around 
the family restaurant of Chang Li and the fruit market of Laig Siu- Yi. “The 
creation of Havana’s Barrio Chino,” reads a Cuban government newslet-
ter, “arose precisely from the need of these migrant people to protect 
themselves in a hostile, exclusionary, and marginalizing environment” 
(Opus Habana 2013). In the early to mid- twentieth century, interdepen-
dent businesses and convenience stores trading in fruits and vegetables, 
laundry services, artisanry, and restaurants underpinned Barrio Chino’s 
expansion to forty- four city blocks, making it the largest and most impor-
tant Chinatown in Latin America and the rival of those in San Francisco 
and New York. Forbidden by law to live within the city center (today’s 
Old Havana), the Chinese community developed Barrio Chino as “an in-
dependent sector that sought to be the Cuban extension of the province 
of Canton” (Fornieles Sánchez 1993, 26).
Local businesses were supported by the Chinese ethnic associations, 
which were organized according to members’ family names (Sociedad 
Lung Kong Cun Sol, Sociedad Chang Weng Chung Tong, Sociedad Chi 
Tack Tong, Sociedad Long Sai Li, Sociedad On Teng Tong, Sociedad Sue 
Yuen Tong, Sociedad Wong Kong Ja Tong, and Sociedad Yee Fung Toy 
Tong), members’ region of origin (Sociedad Chung Shan and Sociedad 
Kow Kong), and political affiliation (Alianza Socialista China de Cuba 
and Sociedad Min Chih Tang). Their coordinating body, the Casino 
Chung Wah, was founded in 1883 and registered as a legal entity in 1893 
under the honorary presidency of the Chinese consul general in Cuba, 
Tam Kin Cho. The associations provided crucial support to local busi-
nesses, helping them overcome the legal segregation of the Chinese com-
munity by linking suppliers to consumers through networks of mutual 
aid and ethnic solidarity. They also fostered the development of Chinese 
restaurants as sources of employment and acculturation for new arriv-
als, and as social epicenters where community affairs were discussed and 
deals negotiated. Together, the associations and restaurants epitomized 
the development of the social economy, relying on informal lines of trade 
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with agricultural producers on the outskirts of Havana for ingredients 
and supplies. Duvon Corbitt, who worked as a lecturer in Havana in the 
early 1940s, described the commercial success of Chinese agricultural 
initiatives: “Today the growing and distribution of green vegetables is 
largely in Chinese hands; they compete successfully with the Spanish im-
migrants in the operation of groceries and general stores. . . . So widely 
distributed is their business that there is scarcely a town or important vil-
lage in Cuba without some enterprise owned by Orientals. The Chinese 
have been successful as truck- farmers, and in a few instances have taken 
to large- scale agriculture” (1944, 131).
Despite their success in agriculture, laundry services, and other niche 
sectors, wealth eluded most Chinese Cubans, and beyond the economi-
cally elite “Californians,” it was only those involved in organized gaming 
and opium trafficking who prospered. Nevertheless, their perceived af-
fluence provoked protests against Chinese businesses in the early 1930s, 
leading the government of Ramón Grau San Martín (1933– 34, 1944– 48) 
to implement laws (as Mexico had done in 1930 and as Panama would do 
in 1935) requiring them to diversify their workforces to include at least 
50 percent (later 80 percent) non- Chinese Cubans. Jealousy and resent-
ment toward the Chinese community is evident in the music of the time, 
featuring imitated Chinese accents and lyrics about Chinese immigrants 
and their descendants working multiple jobs, buying up property both 
locally and in the United States (Pérez Brito 1953), and attracting Cuban 
women with their wealth (J. López 1942). Corbitt observed that behind 
the image of harmonious ethnic integration, discrimination was wide-
spread: “The good terms on which almost all Chinese live with their Cu-
ban neighbors, and the relatively numerous marriages between the races, 
would seem to belie the fact that prejudice exists; nevertheless, close 
contact with the situation will reveal that the Cubans generally look on 
the Chinese as social, and even intellectual inferiors (1944, 131).”
By the 1930s Barrio Chino was attracting tourists from the United 
States, who found abundant facilities and accommodation (by 1915 Cuba 
boasted seventy- two hotels, a third of them in Havana), and whose de-
sire to mix with the purportedly ungovernable Chinese community was 
driven in part by Prohibition at home (D. Hall 1992, 109). As Schwartz 
writes, “guidebooks lured tourists to Havana’s Chinese quarter with ac-
counts of murky opium dens and pungent herbs sold in Oriental mar-
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kets. Newspapers heightened a sense of mystery tinged with danger in 
reports of tong wars, assassinations, and acts of terrorism perpetrated 
by political rivals among naturalized Cuban Chinese and immigrant Chi-
nese nationalists. In the popular imagination, the Chinatown ‘labyrinth’ 
became an ‘exotic, impenetrable, obscure’ neighborhood. What an ex-
traordinary accumulation of touristic possibilities! Cuba could embellish 
its identity and character and invent a distinctive personality to enthrall 
the most jaded foreigner” (1997, 76). Chinese Cubans and Barrio Chino 
had again been portrayed for foreign eyes as a community disarticulated 
from its surroundings and impervious to the law.
Postwar decadence generated mutually reinforcing descriptions, ex-
pectations, and experiences as travel writers emphasized those aspects of 
the district most likely to attract and resonate with audiences back home. 
A guidebook by Walter Roberts tempted its readers with the tantaliz-
ing opportunity to observe Chinese Cubans hopelessly addicted to gam-
bling and, if lucky, to join in: “The Chinese of Cuba cannot be induced 
to forego [sic] their special games of chance, which they are willing to 
share under certain conditions with thrill- seeking foreigners” (1953, 224). 
And thrills there were. Visiting Barrio Chino in the 1950s, the novelist 
Graham Greene found that the Teatro Shanghai lived up to its notorious 
reputation: “For one dollar and twenty- five cents one could see a nude 
cabaret of extreme obscenity with the bluest of blue films in the intervals” 
(1981, 184).
By the mid- 1950s Cuba outpaced Jamaica and other regional competi-
tors as a destination for recreational visitors, 85 percent of whom were 
from the United States (Villalba Garrido 1993). The mounting wave of 
tourists found Barrio Chino particularly appealing. As James Pringle 
notes, it was “the most notorious district in the most notorious city in 
the Caribbean—a playground for sun and sin- seeking tourists, especially 
Americans who arrived on 10 flights from Key West, Florida, to drink, 
gamble and indulge in the pleasures of the flesh” (2003, 53). The Canadian 
scholar Hal Klepak, who went to school in Havana in the 1950s, reports 
both that his parents forbade him to visit Barrio Chino for precisely these 
reasons and that he found their concerns to be justified (personal com-
munication, February 28, 2011). The tendency of outsiders to seek, find, 
and advertise Barrio Chino’s darker corners did not escape Enrique Lab-
rador Ruiz, a prominent Cuban writer of the time who objected to the 
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district’s vilification: “It is said that opium is smoked in Chinatown and 
that there is heavy gambling. Whether or not this is true, such disorders 
are not visible to the world. The people are sober and honest” (1952, 43).
While there was no shortage of foreign fascination with Barrio Chi-
no’s sordid temptations, little external attention was paid to its vibrant 
artistic qualities. As the Cuban ethnologist María Teresa Linares Savio 
(2000) reminds us, from the 1870s until the 1930s actors, puppeteers, 
and singers performed regularly in local theaters such as the Gran China 
and the Teatro Pacífico. The Afro- Chinese Cuban writer Antonio Chuffat 
Latour (1927) observed that enthusiasm for the arts made Barrio Chino 
a regular port of call for visiting Chinese opera companies from Guang-
dong, Hong Kong, and the United States. Linares Savio notes that these 
artistic delicacies, including a local Chinese opera troupe, were a pillar of 
cultural memory for Chinese immigrants and their descendants in Cuba.
By the mid- 1950s Barrio Chino’s theaters had adapted to the lucrative 
new market generated by the arrival in Cuba each year of some 380,000 
tourists, who provided the second largest foreign currency earnings 
after sugar (Padilla and McElroy 2007, 651; Sharpley and Knight 2009, 
242). Labrador Ruiz described the local transformations brought on by 
the tourism boom in a 1952 article: “The tourists prefer the new style to 
the way it used to be. They got very bored, the present theater owners 
say, with those unendingly tedious outpourings. A horse represented by 
a tassel of corn, and no women on the stage” (1952, 42). Indeed, Nancy 
Wonders and Raymond Michalowski point out that most tourists had 
fixed their gaze on more carnal entertainment: “In the eyes of many po-
tential tourists in the 1950s, the estimated 270 brothels and as many as 
100,000 prostitutes who operated there, defined Havana” (2001, 560).
Barrio Chino’s moral reputation was at an all- time low, but in truth, 
as the historian Kathleen López (2013) has documented, Chinese immi-
grants in Cuba had endured a lack of respect, trust, and honesty since the 
arrival of the first indentured laborers from Amoy in 1847. From the out-
set, the contractual conditions underpinning the coolie trade were mis-
leading and did not fully disclose the conditions awaiting the coolies on 
Cuba’s sugar plantations. For at least the rest of the nineteenth century, 
condescending reports and communiqués described the closeted moral 
and social vices of Chinese workers, from “unregenerate” pagan religious 
beliefs to a hopeless addiction to opium. Historians have since argued 
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that the oppression suffered by Chinese immigrants provoked both self- 
destructive forms of escape (the use of opium and suicide among them) 
and self- protective forms of collective withdrawal. Chinese ethnic asso-
ciations institutionalized the latter through a network of informal supply 
and demand that eventually enabled members to become successful in 
the formal agricultural and commercial retail sectors. All the while, a 
growing wave of foreign tourists sought out, and provided incentives for 
the expansion of, Barrio Chino’s reclusive and unregulated underworld. 
Such were the pressures and opportunities facing the Chinese commu-
nity at the dawn of the Cuban Revolution.
THE LOCAL IMPACT OF REVOLUTION
Notorious as a shady retreat for unscrupulous foreigners, Barrio Chino 
epitomized the revolution’s grievances against the regime of Fulgencio 
Batista, particularly its collusion with U.S. gangsters, pimps, and drug 
dealers (Simoni 2009, 100– 106). When Fidel Castro marched into Ha-
vana in 1959, the district continued to function as a hub of unregistered 
commerce, economically and socially disarticulated from its surround-
ings. On February 17, 1960, a special unit of the National Revolutionary 
Militia was created and charged with bringing order to Barrio Chino. 
Named the José Wong Brigade in honor of a young Chinese Cuban com-
munist assassinated in 1930 after founding the illegal newsletter Grito 
Obrero Campesino, the unit launched a campaign against gambling, pros-
titution, and drug trafficking. Comprised entirely of Chinese Cubans and 
operating in Cantonese, the brigade was led by Pedro Jesús Eng Herrera 
(also known as Tai Chao), who has since become a prominent painter of 
Chinese Cuban cultural history (see figure 3.1). According to him, “an 
important achievement of the José Wong Brigade was to bring together 
people of different Chinese ethnic backgrounds, from Hakkas to Cali-
fornians. These folks were members of different associations and hadn’t 
gotten along with each other until the Brigade forced them to. When the 
Brigade started working in Barrio Chino, we found that prostitution was 
rife, though more on the outskirts of the neighborhood than in its center. 
The exception was the Teatro Shanghai, which was famous in the 1950s 
for showing pornography and selling adult magazines right in the heart 
of Barrio Chino” (interview, May 17, 2013).
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On Zanja Street, opposite the Teatro Shanghai, the Brigade took con-
trol of the Alianza Nueva Democracia de China en Cuba (New China 
Democratic Alliance in Cuba) and renamed it the Chinese Socialist Alli-
ance of Cuba. It also took over the Casino Chung Wah, which until then 
had maintained its allegiance to the Taiwan- based Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Kuomintang, or kmt), with a portrait of Chiang Kai- Shek hang-
ing in its main hall. Alfonso Bu of the local Chinese opera company was 
asked to sew the flag of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from tra-
ditional stage costumes, which the Brigade’s second- in-command, Ru-
fino Alay Chang, raised on the Casino’s roof. This event occurred on the 
eleventh anniversary of the founding of the PRC, shortly after Cuba and 
China established diplomatic relations, but before Fidel Castro declared 
that his government would adopt a socialist course. Eng Herrera notes 
that “one of our main objectives was to rid the neighborhood of the kmt, 
because until then all of the associations were obliged to register with the 
kmt through the Casino Chung Wah. Not surprisingly, many in Barrio 
Chino branded me as a communist, so I guess you could say I was a step 
ahead of Fidel!” (interview, May 17, 2013). In 1961 the Brigade was sent to 
the Isla de Pinos (now called the Isla de la Juventud) to defend it from a 
potential U.S. invasion. Eng Herrera reportedly told his troops: “We will 
fight to the death to impede the conversion of the Isla de Pinos into an-
other Taiwan!” (quoted in A. González 2005).
Despite their apparent ideological affinities, China’s relations with 
Cuba cooled when Fidel allied his government with the Soviet Union in 
the early 1960s (see chapter 1). At this time the Chinese community in 
Cuba and its ethnic associations experienced various forms of discrimi-
nation, intensified by the nationalization of Chinese small businesses, 
which began in the early 1960s and culminated in the Great Revolution-
ary Offensive of 1968. Only those restaurants linked to the Chinese as-
sociations remained in community hands. According to Montes de Oca 
Choy, the combination of geopolitical tension and local frustration sent 
Barrio Chino on a downward socioeconomic spiral:
I started studying the history of the Chinese presence in Cuba at a 
difficult time. The Chinese community, and anything to do with it, 
was discriminated against because of the political problems with 
China. When Chinese businesses were nationalized in the early 1960s 
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and in the Great Revolutionary Offensive, some felt they had been 
unfairly targeted and neglected, and so they left Cuba. Others said this 
would allow the Chinese community to participate more fully in the 
revolution, and up to a point it did. . . . Many were able to keep their 
restaurants, but they kept to themselves and quietly bought whatever 
they needed from their socios [informal business partners] in the 
countryside instead of official suppliers. Effectively, Barrio Chino was 
forced underground. (interview, February 10, 2006)
The revolution had successfully stemmed the flow of foreign thrill 
seekers to Barrio Chino, but by nationalizing the district’s economic base 
it also disrupted a century of ethnic entrepreneurship. Facing diminished 
commercial opportunities as their community had thirty years earlier 
under Grau San Martín, a large portion of Chinese Cubans left the island, 
while those who remained turned once more to the informal support 
networks of the ethnic associations.
The precarious standing of the Chinese Cuban community was com-
pounded by the 1975 war in Angola, in which Cuba and China backed 
opposing factions, and by China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Public 
activities related to Chinese Cuban heritage, from academic research to 
artistic performances, practically disappeared from view. Some people in 
Barrio Chino report feeling disillusioned when Fidel Castro declared in 
1975 that Cuba should henceforth be recognized as an Afro- Latin nation, 
since their own contributions to nationhood had never been openly ac-
knowledged. The anthropologist Jesús Guanche notes the ongoing rele-
vance of this problem: “Our national assembly has always had trouble 
coming to terms with Cuba’s demographic diversity, since it has always 
prioritized the nation over race” (interview, May 15, 2013).
As Sino- Cuban relations improved in the 1980s, developments in 
Barrio Chino kept pace. In 1982 the Chinese Socialist Alliance of Cuba 
worked through the Casino Chung Wah and the Ministry of Culture to 
organize a public display of traditional Chinese opera costumes at the 
Provincial Center of Plastic Arts and Design in Havana. Using the 1983 
centennial of the Casino as a platform, the associations began rehearsing 
and reviving the dragon dance, and in 1986 they performed it openly for 
the first time since 1960 (Hun Calzadilla 2010; Alay Jó and Hun Calzadilla 
2015). They also oversaw the production of two short films on Chinese 
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traditional festivals, both of which were shown on national television. 
To promote understanding of contemporary China, the Chinese Social-
ist Alliance began hosting regular evenings of Chinese cinema. Accord-
ing to the Chinese Cuban scholar Yrmina Eng Menéndez, these state- 
endorsed activities were designed to show both the Cuban population 
and the growing number of Chinese visitors that Barrio Chino had a 
place in the Cuban Revolution (interview, January 17, 2006).
Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s 1993 visit to Cuba and Fidel Castro’s 
reciprocal visit to China in 1995 heralded an era of post- Soviet bilateral 
cooperation. In 1994 a small group of descendants of Chinese immi-
grants seized the opportunity created by China’s rising public profile by 
creating a neighborhood advocacy association, the Grupo Promotor de 
Barrio Chino. Under the leadership of Eng Menéndez, the Grupo lob-
bied the municipal government of Central Havana for authorization to 
oversee the creation of a small private sector to supply local Chinese res-
taurants: “It was something of a magic moment that allowed us to take 
advantage of the links we’d built to the municipal government and the 
[Com munist] Party. Our main achievement was that through periods of 
economic opening and closure, we managed to maintain the indepen-
dent character of the restaurants. For their part they [the restaurants] 
promised to use the markets and follow the rules” (interview, January 17, 
2006).
Another of the Grupo’s achievements was to secure permission for the 
small- scale retail of consumer goods imported from China. Silk sheets, 
shoes, clothing, lip balm, and specialty cooking items began to appear 
in neighborhood kiosks and marketplaces. Hosting one of the first legal 
farmers’ markets of the Special Period, Barrio Chino drew the attention 
of international media eager to report on the way Cuba might implement 
market reforms to overcome the deepening economic crisis of the time 
(Strubbe and Wald 1995; Xinhua 1994). The 1999 construction of a tra-
ditional Chinese archway (pailou, 牌楼) at Barrio Chino’s entrance sym-
bolized China’s deepening engagement with Cuba (figure 3.2). Donated 
by the Chinese government, designed by a team of Chinese engineers, 
and crafted with Cuban hands, the pailou represented a convergence of 
global and local ambitions to revitalize Barrio Chino.
A key political goal framing Barrio Chino’s revival was to draw its 
residents out of the informal sector into a program of regulated market 
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exchange. Mediating between the municipal government of Central Ha-
vana and the Casino Chung Wah, the Grupo was asked to ensure that the 
reemergence of local commerce—especially its connections with main-
land China—remain aboveboard. Unofficial trade had for decades linked 
the associations and their restaurants with suppliers of meat and vege-
tables on the outskirts of Havana and had continued to provide an al-
ternative to understocked state outlets (Cheng 2007a, 40; Corbitt 1944).
The Grupo’s senior administrators—Yrmina Eng Menéndez, Carlos 
Alay Jó, and Julio Hun Calzadilla (figure 3.3)—were descendants of Chi-
nese immigrants with a high regard for the grassroots priorities of their 
community and the official opportunities afforded them by the state. 
They worked to position the Grupo as an intermediary between the com-
munity and the state, but they found that advancing local interests within 
the broader structures of state authority became increasingly difficult. 
While the Grupo’s affiliation with the Casino Chung Wah afforded it a 
unique ability to convey government objectives to the Chinese associa-
tions and vice versa, its proximity to community concerns generated an 
increasingly severe conflict of interests. The leadership team refused to 
figure 3.2 The symbolic entrance of Havana’s Barrio Chino. Photo by the author.
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demand greater financial transparency from informal welfare programs, 
food and medicine distribution schemes, and elder care initiatives such 
as those of the Lung Kong Cun Sol and Min Chih Tang associations and 
their restaurants. According to Carlos Yion Lee, then president of the 
Min Chih Tang, social welfare had been the associations’ guiding prin-
ciple since their inception, and protecting this principle was the Grupo’s 
moral responsibility (interview, February 23, 2011).
By the late 1990s the Grupo’s ambition to balance diverging commu-
nity and state interests had become untenable, reflecting a sociological 
phenomenon observed by Alejandro Portes: when community affiliation 
demands loyalty, external allegiances have little chance of survival (1998, 
15– 18). Had it kept the demands of the Chinese community at arm’s 
length, the Grupo could have maintained a functional relationship with 
the state. However, leveraging “the strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 
1973) was a remote possibility for the Grupo as its community loyalties 
were too strong. Consequently, despite the government’s calls for tighter 
regulation of local trade, the accounting procedures of Barrio Chino’s 
associations, restaurants, and other economic actors remained obscure.
figure 3.3 The founding members of the Grupo with the author, 2011. Left to right: 
Yrmina Eng Menéndez, Julio Hun Calzadilla, the author, and Carlos Alay Jó.
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For four years Eng Menéndez and her team brokered deals between 
the Cuban state, Barrio Chino retailers, and their suppliers in China, 
but the rising tide of foreign trade raised the stakes of allegiance and 
accountability. To monitor the Grupo’s activities more vigilantly, in 1998 
the municipal government forced it to give up its independent status and 
become a state institution. Formalization brought executive power as the 
Grupo became officially responsible for Barrio Chino’s general economic 
development. It also brought a raft of internal changes, the most drastic 
of which was the replacement of the Grupo’s founding members with 
external career administrators. By 2004 the Grupo was led by an execu-
tive council with departments of investment and accounting, together 
employing some 400 people. One of its leaders was quoted by a German 
development agency as describing the Grupo as “a state within a state, 
like the Vatican” (quoted in Par Darmstadt 2004, 133).
The transformation of any informal association into an official insti-
tution inevitably involves compromise. As grassroots loyalties and alle-
giances are formalized, weakened local autonomy should, in theory, be 
compensated for by expanded economic and legal capacities for commu-
nity protection and advocacy. Johannes Fedderke, Raphael de Kadt, and 
John Luiz describe this process as the “rationalization of social capital” 
through “the gradual replacement of informal associations and networks 
by formal administrative structures, and the impersonal market mecha-
nism no longer tied to individual identities. . . . In effect trust is rendered 
abstract rather than concrete” (1999, 719– 20). Accordingly, the Grupo’s 
institutionalization should have given Barrio Chino’s community leaders 
the ears of senior politicians committed to achieving broadly beneficial 
development outcomes.
A convergence of structural and personal weaknesses threw Barrio 
Chino’s development off course. Central Havana’s municipal govern-
ment, now the Grupo’s line manager, was already overburdened with 
responsibilities and lacked sufficient resources to develop regulations 
tailored to the district’s unique socioeconomic needs. Restaurants con-
nected to the associations were subjected to general civil codes designed 
for Cuban nongovernmental organizations (ngos), and as such were re-
quired to deposit their profits in designated bank accounts and could 
not then withdraw funds without written permission from the Ministry 
of Justice. As the number of their foreign and national customers grew, 
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this monolithic management framework generated easy opportunities 
for illicit personal gain in both the restaurants and the Grupo. The “ratio-
nalization of social capital” ultimately failed because it subordinated in-
terpersonal trust and community identity to the authority of anonymous 
bureaucrats who had no personal stake in local development. Irregulari-
ties became so pronounced that after eight years as a state institution, the 
Grupo was disbanded.
In 2006 the Council of State appointed the Office of the Historian 
of the City to replace the Grupo and oversee a new approach to Bar-
rio Chino’s economic and civic governance. The Office was charged with 
ensuring the transparency of bookkeeping and rescuing—as the Council 
of State put it—cultural traditions to attract foreign tourists and finance 
local development projects. I discuss the Office’s successes and failures in 
this endeavor below, but first it will be useful to examine Barrio Chino’s 
entrenched informal sector, which constitutes the most serious challenge 
facing any external institution aiming to build trust in the district.
INFORMAL CONNECTIONS IN BARRIO CHINO
Throughout Cuba’s colonial, republican, and revolutionary years, Barrio 
Chino’s informal sector survived the attempts of successive governments 
to regulate it. For over a century the tight- knit mutual aid and trade net-
works of the Chinese associations guarded the interests of their members 
from public hostility and discriminatory legislation. In the early twenty- 
first century, a legacy of what Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner 
call “solidarity born out of common adversity” (1993, 1328) continues to 
underpin Barrio Chino’s capacity to resist the law.
The spate of formal agreements between Cuba and China in the early 
2000s was accompanied by a flow of informal trade in both directions. 
Cigars, for instance, were becoming popular among China’s emerging 
wealthy class and resident foreign executives, who were paying upward 
of 250 renminbi (40) for a Don Diego from the Dominican Republic, 
a Flor from Honduras, or a Cohiba from Cuba. At this price cigars are 
beyond the reach of most Chinese people, but in a country of 350 mil-
lion cigarette smokers (one- third of the world’s total), where conspicu-
ous consumption has become increasingly pervasive, demand for cigars 
has grown. The British tobacco giant Altadis has developed a strategy 
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for meeting Chinese demand: a less expensive line of synthetic cigars, 
flavored with vanilla and cognac. Unconvinced, aspiring aficionados opt 
instead to buy genuine Cuban puros on the streets of Beijing’s cosmopoli-
tan San Li Tun district or under the table in trendy cigar bars for the stan-
dard price of 100 renminbi (17). Owing to a combination of high import 
duties and a shortage of official retail licenses, contraband is alleged in 
one Chinese report to represent approximately 90 percent of cigar sales 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Zhuhai (Hua 2005, 37).
The early 2000s also saw an expanding flow of Chinese goods into 
Cuba. A combination of low commercial returns and insufficient wages 
in Barrio Chino’s registered kiosks and marketplaces quickly drove re-
tail of Chinese consumer goods—many of which were imported by the 
Grupo—underground. By 2006 it was possible to obtain not just lip balm, 
soy sauce, and shoes on the so-called mercado chino (Barrio  Chino’s 
black market), but also dvd players, rice cookers, pressure cookers, and 
other Chinese appliances.
The appearance of Chinese electronic goods on the mercado chino 
reflected the progression of Sino- Cuban economic relations. Hu Jintao’s 
2004 visit to Havana secured the initial supply of these items for ap-
proved state stores and authorized individuals, but long- standing net-
works of socios and middlemen ensured spillover into the informal sec-
tor (see chapter 1). “Temporarily” assuming presidential powers in 2006, 
Raúl Castro declared an assault on corruption, and by the time Hu visited 
again in 2008 the supply chain was secure enough to permit direct sale of 
electronics, supplied mainly by China, to the Cuban public. As discussed 
below, in 2006 the Council of State charged the Office of the Historian 
with taming Barrio Chino’s informal sector, a development that the Chi-
nese Cuban writer Manuel Chiong Lee perceived as an attempt to stem a 
problem that had been growing since the 1960s:
My relatives owned three restaurants and five grocery stores. This was 
before 1959, so the businesses were privately owned and the accounting 
was meticulous. In the early revolution many of the Chinese businesses 
were nationalized and the neighborhood fell into stasis. The only way 
for people to make a profit since then has been to work bajo el tapete 
[literally, below the cover] with the societies [Chinese associations] 
and producers. . . . The corruption has always had its limits. It’s petty 
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fiddling, and nobody has a yacht or anything like that. But it’s been 
growing. It didn’t used to be as rampant. So the government has now 
decided that it is time to put an end to this. The Office of the Historian 
is the tool for achieving it. (interview, February 24, 2006)
Fortunate enough to work in Barrio Chino during this administra-
tive transition, I found by late 2005 that many of the relatives, friends, 
and acquaintances visiting my host family’s apartment were conducting 
more than social calls. Unassuming debates about dinner recipes and the 
narrative twists of blockbuster Hollywood movies segued into calculated 
negotiations about price markdowns, bartering arrangements, and dis-
creet delivery. I recorded the business practices of my neighbor, Felipe, 
in my research diary:
BELOW THE BAR IN BARRIO CHINO
Since a local bar frequented by tourists charges $4 for a bottle of beer, and roughly the 
same for a rum mojito, Felipe has developed a business venture with its staff. Shortly 
after the delivery truck makes its weekly round, one of the waiters calls and tells him 
the serial numbers on the containers of beer and rum. Felipe then drops by some of the 
liquor stores supplied by the same truck, buying twenty bottles of beer (at $1 each) and 
five bottles of rum (at $4 dollars each), making sure they have the same serial numbers 
as his accomplice’s. Late at night he pays a surreptitious visit to the bar and sells the 
beer to his associate at $2 per bottle and rum at $10. The waiters serve their foreign 
clientele as usual, but frequent lapses of memory prevent them from recording sales in 
the account book. If the manager becomes suspicious, her only recourse is to verify the 
serial numbers to make sure the products came from the official supply truck, which 
they did.
Felipe said his days of conducting business bajo el tapete are drawing to a close, 
as he no longer has energy or time for such things. I asked him about the two bottles 
of rum he was trying to push on a Spanish tourist earlier this week, the fee he charged 
me for arranging interviews in Barrio Chino, and his informal bicycle rental business. I 
couldn’t argue with his answer: “That Spanish tourist has been coming here for years, 
and I know him like a friend. I didn’t charge him much because it was more of a gift than 
anything, just like I’m not charging you much for the interviews because you’re a friend, 
and notice also that I only rent my bicycles to friends.”
—Havana, October 25, 2005
HAVANA’S CHINATOWN AND THE QUEST FOR SYNERGY  125
Felipe’s expansive circle of “friends” provided a ready network of in-
formal commercial partners. Although I never discerned the full extent 
of its radius, I learned over time that his circle overlapped with other 
webs of unregistered “friendship” and trust. I visited Felipe every year 
between 2005 and 2015, and I observed the increasing sophistication of 
his operations. By 2013 he seemed to have even more time and energy 
than when I first met him, and he described himself as a “product place-
ment specialist.” He was working with a young Chinese Cuban entrepre-
neur, Daisy, who told me about one of their income- generating schemes, 
or mecánicas: “My brother works in a taller [workshop or office] that 
handles Chinese rice cookers and kitchen appliances. They get sent to 
him for repair when they don’t work properly or get damaged. . . . He 
has an arrangement with his supervisor to keep the ones that can’t be 
repaired quickly, and then to repair them privately and resell them. I have 
good relationships with some of the shops here [in Barrio Chino] so I help 
him. They put my products on the shelf and keep a commission” (inter-
view, May 16, 2013).
Opportunities to work under the table are growing in step with the 
flow of foreign and national visitors to Barrio Chino’s restaurants. Res-
taurants are the district’s primary source of income and employment: the 
ten I surveyed between 2011 and 2014 earned between 2,000 and 5,000 
net income per day. Restaurants in the famed Cuchillo Lane are the leg-
acy of the Grupo, which in the mid- 1990s acquired authorization for de-
scendants of Chinese immigrants to operate them with fewer restrictions 
than those imposed on other Cuban family restaurants (paladares). For 
instance, the independent owners of restaurants in Cuchillo Lane have 
always been permitted to seat an unlimited number of customers and 
to purchase equipment and ingredients from dedicated wholesale ware-
houses. However, as discussed below, the Office of the Historian taxes 
them heavily and maintains meticulous oversight over their activities. In 
contrast, restaurants owned by the Chinese associations are classified for 
tax as ngos and are afforded corresponding rights to internal financial 
management. However, they are required to comply with the central pol-
icy guidelines of the Ministry of Justice, under which they must deposit 
profits in a designated bank account, as mentioned above.
The different codes governing Barrio Chino’s two varieties of restau-
rants have produced contrasting results, with important implications for 
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the informal sector. Those subjected to the decentralized regulations, 
taxes, and bookkeeping requirements of the Office of the Historian have a 
better record of forthright and transparent accounting, but they are con-
siderably less profitable, and consequently cannot offer steady employ-
ment. Paradoxically, those subjected to the elaborate top- down codes of 
the Ministry of Justice are flourishing because inadequate enforcement 
of central directives has enabled their owners to undertake private and 
undisclosed investments in staff, equipment, and maintenance. The dis-
parity highlights how excessive oversight and unrealistic tax margins can 
stifle economic viability, while at the other extreme, the absence of locally 
sensitive oversight can give rise to fraud and tax evasion.
The Cuban informal sector—replete with exploits like those of Felipe, 
Daisy, and the Chinese restaurants—is primarily a domestic concern, but 
Barrio Chino’s circles of illicit trade have begun to extend overseas. The 
number of visiting Chinese officials and businesspeople is growing, and 
many of them have formed cooperative relationships with their Cuban 
counterparts and community leaders. Just as foreign investors seeking 
opportunities and contracts in mainland China have historically relied 
on informal connections with Communist Party officials (often brokered 
through intermediaries in Hong Kong and Taiwan), the evidence emerg-
ing from Cuba, Mexico, and other Latin American countries suggests 
that Chinese commercial initiatives in the region are also preceded by the 
pursuit of trust and goodwill from influential public- and private- sector 
authorities and prominent figures in overseas Chinese communities.
Unofficial pathways to trade and investment extend from China into 
both Cuba and Mexico, but the Cuban urban planning specialist Rosa 
Oliveras cites Mexico City’s rampant black market as the pitfall that Ha-
vana must avoid at all cost (interview, February 24, 2011). Mexico’s com-
paratively deregulated economic environment, she says, is ill equipped to 
contain the unrelenting flow of Chinese contraband into informal street 
markets like Tepito. Furthermore, three decades of state retrenchment in 
Mexico have left local governments with insufficient resources to engage 
citizens in strategies for breaking out of the informal sector. Among the 
consequences is a growing rift between lawful conduct and local prac-
tice, which Mexican authorities have tried—unsuccessfully—to close 
with so-called iron fist (mano dura) approaches to policing (discussed in 
chapter 4). In contrast, the Havana government’s Grupo para el Desar-
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rollo Integral de la Capital (Group for the Integrated Development for 
the Capital) argues that assertive regulatory intervention is the best way 
to “bridge the widening gap between state structures and community 
life” (2001, 1).
Cuba’s political and business environment is clearly more restric-
tive than Mexico’s, and in this regard it is less susceptible to large- scale 
organized crime. However, the experimental and sometimes haphazard 
introduction of market reforms has opened loopholes for unregistered 
foreign finance and supply. A Barrio Chino administrator estimated that 
between 2006 and 2011, twenty neighborhood homes were converted 
into small businesses or restaurants with Chinese financing. These ven-
tures resulted either from Chinese family ties to the property holder or 
undisclosed partnerships with local residents. This practice not only 
skirts foreign investment laws and property rental levies, but it also saves 
the business 96 percent on electricity, water, and gas, since utilities are 
charged to citizens in Cuban pesos (moneda nacional) rather than “con-
vertible” pesos (convertibles) (interview, February 27, 2011).
For Chinese diplomats and entrepreneurs interested in exploring op-
portunities in Cuba, Barrio Chino is an inevitable port of call. There they 
usually seek out a man with unparalleled public and private influence: the 
renowned Chinese Cuban master of wushu martial arts, Roberto Var-
gas Lee (see figure 3.4). After his return from a year of study in Shang-
hai, Vargas Lee worked with the Grupo to establish the Cuban School of 
Wushu in 1995. With over 1,700 students in the city of Havana ranging 
from four to ninety years of age and a weekly martial arts television show, 
Vargas Lee has come to command broad popular respect. The school, he 
says, teaches more than martial arts:
We are the only country in the world in which an overseas Chinese 
community fought in a national war of independence. Chinese blood 
has been spilled in Cuba because our patriotic Chinese brothers saw 
the need to defend Cuba’s independence. . . . The School of Wushu is 
a symbol of friendship and a bridge between Cuba and China, and 
the work we do is closely united with the programs of the Chinese 
embassy. Chinese visitors, diplomats, and students consider the school 
to be a bedrock of mutual cooperation. . . . China is not seeking to 
dominate Latin America but rather to establish stable commerce and 
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gain respect from the ground up. Its support for our transportation, 
education, and medicine sectors is a symbol of Chinese goodwill that 
we teach our students about, and I hope it becomes known throughout 
the region. (interview, December 20, 2008)
Among the school’s daily functions is popular education about Cu-
ba’s deepening relationship with China. While official media inform the 
masses about Chinese history, culture, and political solidarity with the 
Castro government, public knowledge about bilateral economic initia-
tives and actual development projects is limited. Hungry for information 
on Sino- Cuban affairs, the school’s students and their families provide 
an enthusiastic audience for visiting Chinese officials, who share their 
thoughts on world development, commercial relations with Cuba, and 
the growing sophistication of Chinese products. As a beginning student 
of tai chi and the editor of a book for which Vargas Lee was coauthoring 
a chapter (Montes de Oca Choy and Vargas Lee 2008), I was permitted 
to enroll in the school’s daily training sessions in 2005 and 2006. Below is 
an excerpt from my research diary:
figure 3.4 Balancing the forces: Roberto Vargas Lee. Photo by the author.
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FIGHTING FOR THE REVOLUTION
It is peaceful when I arrive at 7:20 AM. There are around a hundred students between 
fifteen and eighty years old chatting quietly, their shiny tai chi suits standing out in the 
dim light. Before starting class we stand in rows in the school’s courtyard as the Cuban 
flag is raised. Next to the flag is a bust of José Martí (figure 3.5) with a phrase inscribed 
on the wall above it. We all shout the phrase together while striking our left palm with 
our right fist: “Wushu: salud y vida; una arma de la revolucion!” (Wushu: health and life; 
an arm of the revolution!). . . .
Around 9:00 AM Roberto Vargas Lee arrives with three Chinese officials and his elite 
students, who are carrying a Chinese flag, swords, curved axes, and other impressive 
looking weapons. The instructors tell us to form a circle around Master Lee in the center 
of the courtyard, where he addresses us in a clear and decisive tone. He will soon be 
leaving for Hanoi in Vietnam and Hainan in China with the school’s best students, he 
says, to represent Cuban wushu: “China has always been a brother to us, and now it is 
also a friend. We are going to show the world that China lives in Cuba.”
He describes China’s advances in clean energy and the positive consequences for 
figure 3.5 Bust of José Martí in the courtyard of the Cuban School of Wushu 
below the words “Wushu: health and life; an arm of the revolution.” Photo by the 
author.
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Cuba’s transportation industry and then speaks in Mandarin with one of the visitors, 
who steps forward to address us. Through his translator, the official thanks Master Lee 
and the Chinese embassy and then tells us about the expansion of trade between China 
and Cuba and says that he hopes Cuban students will find Chinese computers to be 
helpful in their studies. By this time, onlookers have gathered at the school’s circular 
front gate, pushing for a glimpse through the metal bars. I don’t know if they are more 
interested in listening to the official or watching the wushu demonstration that usually 
follows these kinds of speeches. . . . At the end of class, at 12:00 PM, the twenty or so 
people in the novice group have to stand at the front and recite the phrase. Many of 
us can’t remember it and have to turn to read it off the wall, causing two of my fellow 
beginners to laugh. Our instructor looks upset and shouts at us that wushu is no joke, 
and that Martí deserves better. “Do it again,” she orders, “and this time with the fist 
[wushu salute] and some conviction!”
—Havana, November 16, 2005
As a champion of Chinese culture in Cuba, the school fills multiple 
functions. Opening a personal channel of communication between Chi-
nese officials recommended to Vargas Lee by their embassy and hundreds 
of Cuban students—and potentially thousands of their family members—
it is a source of information about Chinese perspectives on the world and 
the implications for Cuba and Barrio Chino. There is no pretense of de-
tailed reporting on the environmental impact of Sino- Cuban industrial 
ventures or on the labor standards, hiring practices, or remuneration 
policies of Chinese firms operating in Cuba. Even so, spontaneous pre-
sentations directly from Chinese vips on the goals and achievements of 
bilateral projects provide a valued supplement to official news coverage 
(figure 3.6). They also provide the Chinese government with an unmedi-
ated platform for explaining these initiatives and promoting forthcoming 
Chinese products. The crowds that regularly gather around the school’s 
gate, whether to glean insights from visiting dignitaries (figure 3.7) or 
to steal a glimpse of the acrobatic performances staged for them, reveal 
considerable curiosity about China’s growing impact (figure 3.8).
The school’s lessons are conveyed through a powerful blend of political 
and cultural symbols: beneath the Cuban flag and the gaze of Martí, stu-
dents young and old practice an ancient Chinese art, learn how to count 
in Mandarin, and become proud of their connection to an emerging su-
perpower. Their pride adds newfound confidence to a long- standing dia-
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figure 3.6 Celebrating at the Cuban School of Wushu, May 10, 2013. From left 
to right: Jorge Chao Chiu (secretary general of the Casino Chung Wah), Xu Kezhu 
(the Chinese consul), Juan Eng (president of the Casino), Zhang Tuo (the Chinese 
ambassador), General Gustavo Chui, and General Armando Choy. Photo by the 
author.
sporic process observed elsewhere by Rhacel Parreñas and Lok Siu: “To 
be part of a diaspora is to reference one’s relationship and belonging to 
some larger historical cultural- political formation—a people, a culture, 
a civilization—that transgresses national borders. It is a way of reformu-
lating one’s minoritized position by asserting one’s full belonging else-
where” (2007, 13).
Far from a handicap, being “minoritized” appears to be an asset for 
Cuba’s wushu students. Their physical appearance generally shows little 
evidence of Asian heritage, but their enthusiastic embrace of Chinese 
martial arts asserts a statement of belonging to a distant homeland whose 
growing power is globally recognized. However great their enthusiasm, 
though, the students must accept an implicit hierarchy of devotion: as 
una arma (an instrument, tool, or arm) of the revolution, the school—
and, by extension, the Chinese culture it represents—is subordinate to 
the larger political organism, the Cuban state. It is within this hegemonic 
structure that students and their families learn from Chinese visitors 
figure 3.8 A window into the future? The entrance of the Cuban School of Wushu, 
January 2012. Photo by the author.
figure 3.7 General Moisés Sío Wong delivers a speech at the Cuban School of 
Wushu, November 2005. Photo by the author.
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about the products, services, and new possibilities that are changing 
their lives: affordable refrigerators and rice cookers, energy- saving light 
bulbs, inexpensive medicines stocking previously bare pharmacy shelves, 
Panda television sets screening weekly Chinese movies, low- emission 
buses and trains that run on time, and the encompassing message that 
Cuba’s future is secure. As China’s impact reaches further each day into 
the lives of ordinary Cubans, it is logical that the school should diffuse a 
vision of order that accommodates this impact within the hegemony of 
Cuban state nationalism.
Another indispensable contact for business- minded Chinese visi-
tors is Vargas Lee’s father- in-law, Tao Jin Rong, an entrepreneur from 
Shanghai who moved to Barrio Chino to invest in the restaurant sector. 
He and a small group of colleagues assist prospective investors by ar-
ranging visas, coordinating meetings with interested counterparts, and 
helping them navigate Cuba’s complex and changeable business environ-
ment. His acclaimed Tien Tan (Temple of Heaven) restaurant has gained 
a reputation among Chinese businesspeople as an auspicious venue for 
meeting accommodating Cuban officials. Among its patrons are Ramiro 
Valdés, Cuba’s vice president and minister of information, who has over-
seen a joint venture with the Chinese firm Haier to produce consumer 
electronics in Cuba (see chapter 1). Former Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez 
Roque and Vice President Ricardo Cabrisas, both advocates of closer en-
gagement with China, have also conducted meetings with Chinese offi-
cials in the restaurant’s private dining room. Omar Pereira Hernández, 
the former director of tourism at the Cuban embassy in Beijing, notes 
that he would frequently refer outbound Chinese officials to the restau-
rant, since “in Cuba money alone cannot rule; it has to be backed up by 
political approval and social connections” (interview, June 14, 2010). The 
time invested by Chinese officials in cultivating relationships with Vargas 
Lee, his father- in-law, and Cuban diplomats indicates their familiarity 
with this code of practice.
Coordinating the potentially chaotic multiplicity of demands from the 
Cuban and Chinese governments and Barrio Chino’s residents, Vargas 
Lee treads with precision. The task of balancing all of these interests is 
complicated further by internal differences between two subgroups of 
the Cuban state (the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Historian) 
and two subgroups of the Barrio Chino community (the Chinese associa-
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tions and local entrepreneurs, discussed below). In Nan Lin’s (2001, 67) 
terms, Vargas Lee is a bridging individual, adroitly navigating the distinct 
but overlapping demands of these interest groups.
The encounters Vargas Lee orchestrates at the Cuban School of 
Wushu and the Tien Tan restaurant are infused with opportunities for 
Barrio Chino’s stakeholders. The school gives Chinese government offi-
cials and executives a platform for explaining the benefits of Sino- Cuban 
cooperation and Chinese products directly to hundreds of Vargas Lee’s 
students and their families. In the more intimate environment of Tien 
Tan’s vip room, the Chinese acquire insider knowledge on trade and in-
vestment from the elite of Cuba’s China enthusiasts and inevitably ex-
press the merits of economic liberalization. The Chinese government has 
compensated Vargas Lee for his work: the school’s gold- painted minivan 
is hard to miss as it zips around Havana displaying a message stenciled 
conspicuously on its side: “donation of the embassy of the People’s Re-
public of China.”
For their part, the Chinese associations and the independent restau-
rant operators of Chuchillo Lane are hopeful that with Vargas Lee’s sup-
port, reforms in Barrio Chino under the Office of the Historian will bring 
new opportunities for commercial expansion. The lack of such opportu-
nities to date has led to reliance on informal connections, illustrated in 
the infamous case of a Barrio Chino association elder observed by Cu-
ban agents at the Fair of Canton in Guangzhou with a U.S. investor pur-
chasing supplies, equipment, and decorations for the elder’s restaurant. 
Clearly articulated legal codes that permit foreign financing and com-
mercial expansion are foremost on the wish list of Barrio Chino’s Chinese 
associations, a growing pool of self- employed small business owners, and 
the Chinese embassy. Vargas Lee advocates this goal from a solid foun-
dation: he has a personal stake in the restaurant sector and is a former 
member of the executive board of the Chinese community’s foremost 
body, the Casino Chung Wah.
To mitigate any top- down doubts about his revolutionary loyalty, Var-
gas Lee often begins his public speeches with a positioning statement: 
“I speak to you in the name of the state.” There is nothing hollow in this 
claim, as the state has benefited considerably from his work. His centrally 
conferred functions extend beyond building diplomatic ties and demon-
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strating the Cuban government’s regard for traditional Chinese culture. 
He also advances a century and a half of official attempts to regulate Bar-
rio Chino’s informal sector. As the depth and reach of Cuban linkages 
with China intensify, he ensures that emerging connections are disclosed 
and integrated into an official framework of bilateral cooperation. Re-
spected by elders and embedded in local networks, he has the capac-
ity to convey community priorities upward and official requests down-
ward, which has proven particularly useful to the Office of the Historian 
since 2006.
The next section examines the Office of the Historian’s efforts to 
achieve in Barrio Chino what no other state institution has been able to: 
clamp down on the black market while stimulating economic growth. 
Implicit in the Office’s agenda is an attempt to rationalize social capital in 
a more consensual way than has previously been the case, by integrating 
community networks intact into official programs for promoting tourism 
and neighborhood revival. To their own detriment, external administra-
tors have long overlooked the benefits that sensitivity to Barrio Chino’s 
history, culture, and people could bring to their projects. Local opinions 
of the Office’s civic stewardship reveal that it has improved on past prac-
tice, but that it still has much learn before it can harness Barrio Chino’s 
most powerful but elusive resource: the trust of residents.
FORMALIZING THE INFORMAL: THE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN IN BARRIO CHINO
Cuban and foreign observers agree that strategies for containing the is-
land’s black market are desperately needed. The Havana- based Grupo 
para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital has been arguing for over a de-
cade that the most pressing task facing the nation is to “formalize the 
informal” (2001, 1). Tighter regulations may help, but, as Archibald Ritter 
writes, top- down controls can be counterproductive: “Paradoxically, in 
attempting to control everything in the past, the government has ended 
up controlling very little. The effectiveness of stricter state controls actu-
ally leads to weaker genuine control due to their promotion of illegalities, 
corruption and the ubiquitous violation of unrealistic regulations” (2011, 
20). As discussed in chapter 1, decentralized authority and functional 
supply chains will help overcome this problem, but to achieve the “ab-
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solute observance of legality” stipulated in Lineamiento 12 (República de 
Cuba 2011, 11), greater bottom-up respect for the state and the rule of law 
will also be necessary.
As Cuba moves beyond the political stability of the Castro presiden-
cies, the state must find new ways to marshal popular support for its lead-
ership and regulatory systems. Social allegiances embedded in neighbor-
hood identity, protective solidarity within ethnic communities, loyalty 
galvanized by religious kinship, and other forms of group membership 
therefore have considerable influence in contemporary Cuba. As a hub 
of unregistered trade, headquarters to the nation’s Chinese associations, 
and a source of emerging ties to China, Barrio Chino is a case in point. 
Transpacific ties are augmenting the capacity of community leaders to 
contest top- down directives and pursue alternative development agen-
das. Adopting the position that the support of residents holds the key 
to administrative success in Barrio Chino, in January 2006 the Office of 
the Historian of the City became the latest institution to propose a new 
regulatory framework for the district.
The Office assumed managerial control of Barrio Chino at a time when 
the long- standing grievances of municipal administrators over inad-
equate decentralization were at last catching the ear of national lawmak-
ers. In 2000, as noted in chapter 1, Decree Law 91 had divided Havana 
into 93 (subsequently 105) Popular Councils, but the councils’ ability to 
implement economic development projects that might draw citizens out 
of the informal sector was undermined by inadequate financial devolu-
tion. Cuban officials acknowledge that the transfer of executive power 
to Raúl Castro in 2006, while motivated by Fidel Castro’s failing health, 
generated broad optimism that there might finally be progress toward 
decentralization (both administrative and economic). The prospect of 
growing the formal economy through local reinvestment and business 
development was on the horizon. New commercial powers and territo-
rial jurisdictions subsequently conferred on the Office of the Historian 
afforded cautious hope, though it was not until the 2011 Lineamientos 
that decentralization was officially recognized as a catalyst for coop-
eration between state- owned enterprises, local governments, and small 
businesses.
There is no Cuban institution more experienced in simultaneously 
reining in informal practices and expanding registered commerce than 
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the Office of the Historian. Its principal objective is to design and im-
plement commercially viable urban development programs that draw 
on local cultural heritage. Founded in 1938, the Office was directed by 
the Cuban intellectual Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring until his death in 
1964, when it came under the directorship of the new historian of the 
City, Eusebio Leal Spengler. In 1981 the Office assumed administrative 
jurisdiction of Old Havana, the municipality adjacent to Central Havana 
(where Barrio Chino is located). The Office has developed stable coop-
erative synergies with actors ranging from Old Havana’s seven local gov-
ernments (Popular Councils) to religious communities and unregistered 
artistic ensembles (Hearn 2008a; Scarpaci, Segre, and Coyula 2002).
The Office’s economic plan—managed since 1994 by its commercial 
enterprise Habaguanex—centers on establishing hotels, shopping cen-
ters, and bars oriented to foreign tourism and reinvesting revenues in 
municipal development projects. While residents have benefited indi-
rectly from this plan, most cannot afford to patronize the chic lounges 
and hotel lobby restaurants springing up around them. Leal’s strategy has 
nevertheless created jobs, and those willing to commercialize their cul-
tural heritage have found ready demand for their talent on cabaret stages. 
Folkloric performances of Afro- Cuban religious traditions and other cul-
tural exotica have done especially well (Hearn 2004). The political upshot 
is the incorporation of a broad range of local actors, some of whom might 
otherwise seek to develop independent unregistered operations, into of-
ficially regulated projects.
Leal’s plan for reinvesting profits from tourism in municipal develop-
ment was propelled by the austerity of the early years of the Special Pe-
riod, which left the Office without a central subsidy, and by the 1993 col-
lapse of a revered eighteenth- century heritage site, the Colegio del Santo 
Ángel (Hill 2007, 59). The incident paved the way for Decree Law 143 of 
1993, which designated Old Havana as a Priority Zone for Conservation 
and made the Office a national exemplar of decentralized municipal eco-
nomic management (replicated in the late 1990s in the smaller historic 
centers of Santiago de Cuba, Camagüey, and Trinidad). Henceforth the 
Office answered not to the provincial government of Havana but directly 
to the Council of State, in this way acquiring legal authority to establish 
relations with foreign investors and to tax economic actors in its terri-
tory. This authority was expanded in 1995 through Accord 2951, which 
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recognized Old Havana as a Zone of High Significance for Tourism and 
eased restrictions there on foreign investment, gastronomy services, and 
trade in U.S. dollars. In 2003, Accord 4942 extended the boundary of 
the Priority Zone for Conservation from Old Havana to Barrio Chino, 
though negotiations with the Grupo and local Chinese leaders delayed 
the Office’s administrative takeover until January 1, 2006. The Office’s 
powers were augmented across both districts in June 2011 by Decree Law 
283, signed by Raúl Castro, which enhanced its capacity to levy taxes, 
authorize private businesses, approve new guesthouses, and procure 
buildings and facilities.
Leal expressed interest in Barrio Chino as early as 1992. In his key-
note address at a conference titled “Tourism and Its Importance for Un-
derstanding the History and the Culture of the People,” he stated: “Bar-
rio Chino: Is there anything more beautiful and interesting in Havana? 
And yet I’m convinced that Barrio Chino will die in the coming years 
if a fundamental task is not accomplished. What is the task? To keep 
the Chinese community alive . . . it is not a matter changing or adorning 
the Barrio; it’s a matter of making it live, and life always comes from the 
inside out” (quoted in A. Wong and Baez 1993, 7– 8). Leal’s advocacy of 
bottom-up development reflects the Office’s long- standing attempt to le-
gitimize commercial initiatives by linking them to widely recognized his-
torical processes, or what Sherry Ortner (1991) calls “cultural schemas.” 
Just as Afro- Cuban religious heritage in Old Havana has provided the 
Office’s cabaret clubs with ready material for what it calls “folklore tour-
ism,” Chinese settlement in Barrio Chino in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries provides a widely recognized theme for the district’s 
commercial “revival.” In both contexts the Office has leveraged vague but 
enthusiastic local and foreign understandings of Cuban history as a basis 
for specific development projects.
How genuinely history informs the Office’s work is debatable. As Clif-
ford Geertz observed four decades ago, invocations of the past to justify 
the present always involve creative manipulation, or the transformation 
of a “model of tradition” into a “model for tradition” (1973, 93). Such a 
transformation is evident in the Office’s approach to Barrio Chino, where 
Mandarin has become the officially endorsed Chinese language and a 
statue of Confucius the latest photo opportunity. Mandarin, taught at the 
Confucius Institute (soon to be relocated from the University of Havana 
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to Barrio Chino), was unknown to Cuba’s Cantonese- speaking Chinese 
immigrants. They would have been similarly unfamiliar with Confucius, 
whose statue is now the centerpiece of a park in the heart of Barrio Chino. 
Unveiling the statue to inaugurate Confucius Park in December 2012 with 
the Chinese ambassador and the president of the World Confucian Acad-
emy, Leal expressed his vision of multicultural harmony: “Chinese people 
joined Cubans to form a family; they did not exclude the Cuban family 
of which they are today a part” (quoted in People’s Republic of China 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). Invoking the past to shape the present, 
Leal’s mastery of cultural schemas appears to be aimed at encouraging 
Chinese Cubans to follow the historical disposition of their forebears to 
cooperate.
Over the decades Confucius Park has itself been reinvented, in step 
with the changing currents of Cuban politics (figures 3.9– 3.12). Eng Her-
rera recalls that its visitors were previously less concerned with the wis-
dom of Confucius: “Until 2012 that place was known as Shanghai Park 
because, before the Revolution, it sat next to the Shanghai Theater, the 
most notorious adult venue in Barrio Chino. That’s where people would 
go to meet fleteras [literally, flirting women] after watching pornographic 
films and shows. One thing’s for sure: its conversion into Confucius Park 
couldn’t be further from its roots” (interview, May 17, 2013).
Shanghai Park’s makeover reflects Kathleen López’s observation that, 
“rather than being restored to an approximation of what it once was, 
Havana’s Chinatown is being ‘remade’ into something new, both out of 
demographic and economic necessity” (2009, 197). As López implies, the 
Office’s mission is both to promote Cuban heritage and to govern, a dual 
responsibility that has yielded a pragmatic approach to history: authen-
ticity derives in large measure from local endorsement. This position is 
logical for an institution whose success depends on the support it builds 
among citizens. Whether in Old Havana or Barrio Chino, ensuring local 
benefits is a priority for Leal, who argues that tourism is contiguous with 
Cuban history because it represents
a recuperation of the capacities the city has historically enjoyed. We 
endeavor to look at the past as a point of departure, but with our eyes 
on the future, which is the only way to conserve one’s patrimony while 
confronting the dynamic challenge of sustainability. . . . The point is to 
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use tourism as a mechanism for development. I calculate that for every 
one Cuban employed in tourism, ten people live from their income. 
That said, we reject the idea of turning our historical center into a 
theme park and novelty show; instead, we work to improve schools, 
living conditions, participation, and jobs. (interview, April 29, 2002)
Quick to note the historical precedent of tourism as a Cuban “capacity,” 
Leal nevertheless appears determined to break with past practice, par-
ticularly the essentialization of cultural heritage for foreign audiences. 
The spillover benefits he envisions confirm John Kirk’s observation that 
“tourism remains a premier influence in showing Cubans a different ap-
proach to development” (2007, 416).
figures 3.9– 3.12 The changing face of Shanghai Park. Top left, a community 
recreational space (2006); top right, vacant and closed to public (2011); bottom left, a 
handicrafts and souvenir market (2012); bottom right, rebranded as Confucius Park 
(2013). Photos by the author.
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The need for a different approach to development is nowhere more 
pressing than Barrio Chino. A historical reputation smeared by shame-
less foreign thrill seekers and overregulation of the district’s once thriv-
ing businesses substantiate the need for innovative governance. Except-
ing the efforts of the Grupo, local concerns rarely figured into Barrio 
Chino’s management prior to 2006, a deficiency the Office has tried to 
correct by creating opportunities for residents to participate actively in 
their neighborhood’s revival (figure 3.13). As Kathleen López puts it, 
“second-, third-, and fourth- generation descendants of Chinese, by tak-
ing advantage of special economic opportunities and learning about and 
participating in Chinese traditions, are claiming an ethnic and cultural 
heritage and redefining themselves. In the process, they are ultimately 
forging new spaces along the margins, where the expression of identity 
and the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity may develop” (2009, 197).
Aware of Barrio Chino’s historical subjection to external pressures, 
Leal acknowledges that solutions must come from within. Prior to of-
figure 3.13 A sign erected by the Office of the Historian in Barrio Chino, which 
reads: “The hand executes what the heart demands.” Photo by the author.
142 CHAPTER 3
ficially taking over the district, he commissioned a series of studies from 
prominent Chinese Cubans to assess local perspectives on tourism. Held 
in the archives of Barrio Chino’s House of Chinese Arts and Traditions, 
these studies shed light on how residents imagine their neighborhood 
fitting into Cuba’s broader strategy for tourism development. One report 
states:
We feel we must diversify and amplify as much as possible the options 
for tourism and break the scheme of beach and hotel tourism. We 
want to encourage tourists to come and spend time getting to know 
the people and places that, unfortunately, are often left out of their 
programs. . . . In our opinion we are not exploiting all the possible ways 
to satisfy the desires of tourists in order to promote our industry’s 
objectives and increase the inflow of currency that our country 
needs. . . . In Cuba, in our city, in our municipality we have a Barrio 
Chino; let’s convert it into one more of our country’s products for tourism. 
(quoted in Wong and Baez 1993, 8, 9, and 12; emphasis in original)
To achieve this objective, another report recommends attracting tour-
ists from the adjacent municipality of Old Havana by employing actors 
to walk around its plazas wearing traditional Chinese clothes, imitating 
the fruit and vegetable street vendors of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Similarly, small groups of actors portraying reli-
gious figures such as the Afro- Cuban Changó, the Catholic Saint Bar-
bara, and the Chinese San Fan Kon (or Kuang Kong), would draw atten-
tion to the contribution of Chinese spirituality, alongside African and 
European influences, to the formation of Cuba’s multicultural heritage 
(Chong López 2006, 6).
A third report recommends establishing a museum of Chinese Cu-
ban culture and a Chinese- style hotel where visitors can enjoy massages 
and tea. To capture the market potential of the emerging Chinese middle 
class, the report advises: “We must make Chinese visitors feel at home. 
Consequently, Asian visitors will recommend the hotel to their families 
and friends as the best place for a comfortable stay in Cuba, since upon 
arrival at the hotel, the negative reactions provoked by the encounter 
with unfamiliar customs will be alleviated.” The report concludes that 
key factors in Barrio Chino’s capacity to develop such facilities will be 
upgrading the infrastructure and improving relations with foreign tour 
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operators, since “the success of such an initiative inevitably depends on 
how well it is organized” (quoted in Alay Jó, Alay Jó, and Alay Jó 2002, 30). 
Perhaps following the report’s advice, in 2007 Cuba established a Chi-
nese tourism office and signed an Operational Plan for Chinese Group 
Tourists Visiting Cuba with the Chinese government, permitting Chi-
nese tour operators to bring package tours to Barrio Chino. That year the 
number of Chinese tourists in Cuba exceeded 10,000 for the first time, 
leading Raúl Castro to declare during Hu Jintao’s 2008 visit that tour-
ism and training in hospitality would become focal points of coopera-
tion between their two countries. By 2013 there were more than 22,000 
Chinese tourists annually, substantiating this goal and affirming the Of-
fice of the Historian’s efforts to refashion Barrio Chino as an attractive 
destination.
The Office set about “rescuing traditions,” as it had previously de-
scribed its work in Old Havana, by renovating Barrio Chino’s histori-
cally prominent streets, refurbishing the Cuban School of Wushu, cre-
ating Chinese- themed shops and markets operating in convertible pesos, 
erecting street signs written in Chinese, and arranging guided tours of the 
Chinese association buildings. One resulting highlight is the altar of San 
Fan Kon, the patron saint of the Chinese Cuban community, which is 
one of only three in the world (the others are in Singapore and Malaysia). 
Until the Office of the Historian renovated the altar in 2011, it was a fo-
cal point of private reflection and celebrations of community weddings, 
birthdays, and funerals. Members and guests of the Lung Kong Associa-
tion could visit the altar to participate in the tradition of kau cim (求籤) 
divination, in which a vessel containing a hundred short sticks is shaken 
by hand until one of them falls to the ground, corresponding with a short 
metaphoric text read from a book of prophecies. The altar is now open 
to tourists, who for a “donation” can also receive the wisdom of kau cim 
(figure 3.14).
Barrio Chino’s revival has brought opportunities for generating rev-
enue from the display of Chinese heritage, a phenomenon not unique 
to Cuba. Sylvia Van Ziegert writes: “It is precisely the commodifica-
tion of Chinese culture which helps it to circulate throughout diasporic 
spaces. . . . Traditional Chinese forms and ideas are repackaged and de-
ployed in order to bridge time and space, and create new Chinese cosmo-
politanisms. This new transnational Chinese imaginary seeks to use hip, 
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glitzy appeal to attract new audiences, including many non- Chinese and 
second generation Chinese” (2006, 10– 11).
The Office’s efforts to repackage history are generally undertaken 
with local consent, but its selection of some projects instead of others 
has produced competitive tensions. Graciela Lau Quan, president of the 
Lung Kong Association, noted that the restoration of the altar (and the 
accom panying renovation of the restaurant downstairs from it) provoked 
jealously from associations less likely to attract tourism (interview, Feb-
figure 3.14 Tourist brochure for the altar of San Fan Kon. The caption reads: “Visit 
us and try your luck!”
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ruary  25, 2011). The deterioration of community goodwill has become 
evident in the annual Chinese New Year dinner, which for years brought 
the associations together in a show of grassroots unity. This changed in 
2006, when the Office became the dinner’s official sponsor and began 
hosting it in the Office’s new Columnas shopping center. Since then, the 
associations prefer to celebrate New Year independently, though their 
presidents typically make a brief appearance at the Office’s party.
To convince Barrio Chino’s community leaders of the broad benefits 
flowing from its intervention, the Office established a restaurant called 
La Muralla de China (the Great Wall of China). Combining traditional 
Chinese decor with stricter accounting standards and market research, 
the restaurant was to provide a model for the conduct of local business. 
La Muralla quickly attracted Cuban and foreign clients, who were hungry 
for the low- cost pizza and spaghetti that appeared on its menu alongside 
fried rice, spring rolls, and other ostensibly Chinese food also available 
from its competitors. Chinese Cuban elders were furious that the limits 
of tradition had been pushed so far and mobilized some forty association 
members and independent restaurant owners to protest the erosion of 
cultural heritage in the heart of Barrio Chino. According to one protestor, 
“How could the Office of the Historian have any idea about our culture? 
It is run by white people who live in El Vedado and Miramar [compara-
tively wealthy districts of Havana], and it has its own plan. Since it came 
to our neighborhood there’s nobody we can negotiate with” (interview, 
March 11, 2006). While unwelcome commercial competition surely gal-
vanized local opposition, La Muralla’s outsider status provided a power-
ful theme for unifying dissent. At a time when the Office was seeking to 
build community support and distinguish itself from the state’s previous 
attempts to assimilate Barrio Chino into the revolution, the incident ex-
posed the contrast between the Office’s economic rationalism and the 
Grupo’s bottom-up approach.
The Office’s popularity deteriorated further when it subjected Bar-
rio Chino’s private (cuenta propia) restaurants to a meticulous book-
keeping scheme aimed at bringing their informal supply chains into the 
official economy. Owners objected to the financial impact of the plan: 
in addition to an existing tax levied by the Organización Nacional de 
Asuntos Tributarios (National Organization of Tributary Affairs), they 
would now have to pay the Office a “donation” (in fact, a tax) to fund 
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neighborhood development projects. The restaurants belonging to the 
associations were also asked to donate to the fund and follow new sourc-
ing restrictions that sought to formalize their supply chains through of-
ficially nominated wholesale providers (Cheng 2007a, 40). As they had 
under the Grupo, the associations argued that the new regulations would 
force them to curtail or abandon the independent charitable services 
they provided, including complimentary meals for the most needy local 
residents. An administrator of the Chi Tack Tong Association lamented 
that “the Office of the Historian said it would invest our money in local 
development, but what it meant was advertising for tourism. Look at the 
buildings and the new streets: all very beautiful and restored, but what 
about our culture, and looking after the elderly Chinese people?” (inter-
view, February 28, 2011).
Detailed regulatory codes were also introduced to community organi-
zations that maintained foreign linkages, such as the Residencia China, 
which provides housing, medical care, and other services to many of 
Barrio Chino’s remaining first- generation Chinese residents. According 
to Kristina Nib, then director of the Residencia, “we’ve always received 
donations from foreigners. Usually these have been private individuals, 
and many of them have been Chinese. The gifts went through the Grupo 
because we always had a high level of understanding with them. But now, 
if I need to get a new sofa for the Residencia I will have to first go through 
a long approval process, and then every penny needs to be accounted for” 
(interview, January 16, 2006).
The Office’s attempt to incorporate local collaborative ties and 
trust—what Nib called “understanding”—into a scheme of transparent 
and regulated transactions was criticized openly by the Casino Chung 
Wah. On December 30, 2005—two days before the Office’s takeover, and 
shortly before his death—Casino President Li San began a public speech 
in the iconic Cuchillo Lane by invoking a sense of imperiled commu-
nity: “Our unity is under threat, and we must be stronger now more than 
ever before.” Whether or not this comment was intended to incite non-
compliance, the expansion of the informal sector over the next five years 
turned the Office’s objectives on their head. A neighborhood leader, who 
asked to remain anonymous, described the situation in early 2011: “We 
are governed by a series of bureaucrats whose eyes have become rounder 
[physiologically more Caucasian] over the years. Most of them live in El 
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Vedado, and they know little about our culture. From 5:01 pm until 8.59 
am they are not concerned with Barrio Chino. The new system has prob-
lems. Do you know that the leaders of the associations take a cut of about 
25 percent before submitting their profits to the Ministry of Justice bank 
account? That way they can live more comfortably and invest more freely 
in their restaurants” (interview, February 27, 2011).
Riding the momentum of success in Old Havana, the Office apparently 
presumed it could transfer commercial regulations from one context to 
another with little adjustment for local conditions. As a senior Office 
administrator put it, “Chinese immigrants and their descendants have 
always been integrated into Cuba. Remember, one of our most famous 
national icons is the mulata cubana [the racially mixed Cuban woman]. 
Because of Cuba’s long history of racial integration we have been able 
to work in Barrio Chino with no problems. It’s just like working here in 
Old Havana” (interview, February 28, 2011). This optimism has proven 
counterproductive, as it underestimates the efficacy of trust accrued in 
Barrio Chino over generations and perpetuated by ongoing perceptions 
of external interference. As I discussed in the introduction, scholars have 
shown that social capital is generally not fungible across distinct con-
texts, and it stands to reason that the same holds true for attempts to 
rationalize it. Herein lies a core challenge to the Office’s plan: trust is a 
resource possessed by a community of insiders, and it cannot be incor-
porated into externally administrated development projects without that 
community’s consent.
Governments around the world have long attempted to scale up grass-
roots loyalties into a public good by converting “bonding social capital” 
into a “bridging” form (Putnam 2000, 22– 23), and transforming “par-
ticularized trust” into a “generalized” form (Armony 2004, 21; also see 
Uslaner 1999, 124– 25; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). From decentral-
ized health care in India to affordable housing in Brazil, government pro-
grams have sought to diminish the prominence of disenfranchised social 
enclaves rooted in ethnicity, religion, and class that may otherwise turn 
to informal trade and undermine state authority. In designing such proj-
ects, governments often fail to recognize that the more consolidated and 
inward- oriented trust is, the harder it is to rationalize (Fedderke, de Kadt, 
and Luiz 1999, 724– 26). External pressure to acquiesce tends to reinforce 
collective internal opposition and over time has been shown to propel 
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resistance horizontally outward to incorporate an ever- growing number 
of insiders bonded in antagonistic solidarity (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993, 1343– 44). The wider the radius of oppositional trust, the harder it 
becomes to focus official development interventions.
The Office of the Historian has experienced precisely these problems 
in Barrio Chino. Meticulous taxation and supply controls were intro-
duced together with practical examples of how businesses should oper-
ate, such as La Muralla. These measures were intended to regulate an 
economy that had long relied on informal networks of tight- knit coop-
eration and to rescue an imagined tradition of multicultural integration 
and legally compliant entrepreneurship. In the process, though, they 
revived perceptions of external interference and unwelcome state mi-
cromanagement of local business. The Office’s installation of Confucius 
Park, restoration of the altar of San Fan Kon, and broader gentrification 
agenda evoked concerns that the historical revival was producing few 
direct benefits beyond tourism. Community leaders argued that the Of-
fice’s projects, financed largely by new taxes on restaurants, were under-
mining their ability to provide welfare services for Barrio Chino’s aging 
pioneers.
Behind the scenes of the Office’s eye- catching projects, the Chinese 
associations have pursued alternative development strategies, includ-
ing exploring cooperation with a growing flow of enthusiastic Chinese 
visitors. As the radius of trust that defines Barrio Chino’s community of 
insiders expands overseas, the district’s political weight and the capac-
ity of its leaders to negotiate with the state have increased. This chang-
ing dynamic is reflected in the Office’s evolving approach to governance, 
which—as the chapter’s final section shows—has recently become more 
flexible and responsive to local priorities.
SYNERGY: TRADITIONAL MEDICINE TO AWAKEN THE BLOOD
Experience has taught the Office of the Historian the pitfalls of coercion 
and the merits of consensus. Since 2006, one of its more successful tac-
tics has been to work with locally respected intermediaries, such as Var-
gas Lee. His school has been refurbished by the Office; his students are 
funded jointly by the Chinese and Cuban governments to compete inter-
nationally; his father- in-law’s restaurant is one of the most successful in 
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Barrio Chino; and locals stand in awe of his eloquence, physical prowess, 
and martial arts television show. After Li San’s public call for unity on 
the eve of the Office’s takeover, Vargas Lee addressed the audience with 
characteristic diplomacy:
After more than 150 years of friendship with China, Li San is correct 
that more than ever we need one united Barrio Chino of Havana, 
under the guidance of our elders in the Casino Chung Wah. . . . The 
changes that we are going to see in Barrio Chino are going to be very 
beneficial for us, and we’re seeing the results already. There are many 
things that we want to see, but we know we can’t have everything; we 
entrust these decisions to the wise vision of the city authorities, and 
we have to have full confidence in them.
Reflecting Leal’s proven strategy of recruiting community leaders 
who command respect and authority in relation to cultural history and 
neighborhood affairs, Vargas Lee’s advocacy distinguishes the Office’s 
activities from earlier external attempts to manage Barrio Chino’s devel-
opment. The Office’s approach has opened channels of direct communi-
cation with the executive board of the Casino Chung Wah, independent 
restaurant owners, and other local leaders. As noted, it has also enabled 
the Office to frame face- to-face contact between visiting Chinese officials 
and Barrio Chino’s residents in a patriotic light.
As China goes global, the outward flow of its diplomats, students, and 
investors is beginning to overcome the Cuban government’s containment 
strategies. Commercial connections are thickening, as demonstrated 
above by the association elder caught red- handed at the Fair of Canton. 
Barrio Chino’s emerging small businesspeople will evidently go to great 
lengths to acquire the products they need, but the need for such lengths 
is diminishing in step with the arrival of prospective Chinese partners 
on their doorsteps. Emerging nonstate ties to China have provoked the 
Office to explore new, more sensitive approaches to neighborhood de-
velopment. This, it has found, is the best way to learn about and address 
community needs before entrepreneurial visitors beat them to it.
One of the Office’s key projects in Barrio Chino in 2013 and 2014 was 
the restoration of the Chinese pharmacy, first established as the San Man 
Woo medical center in the early twentieth century and now the only 
one of five Chinese pharmacies that continues to operate in Cuba (Al-
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fonso Rodríguez 2009, 40). The project’s genesis was a letter to the Office 
from the Casino Chung Wah decrying the scarcity of medicinal herbs 
and teas to treat the ailments of Barrio Chino’s aging Chinese residents. 
Eager to pinpoint local needs and identify how they might be resolved, 
Mayelín Alfonso Rodríguez of the Office’s investment bureau took on 
the project and quickly identified mutual interests. Demand for specialty 
natural medicines at the Office’s recently refurbished Sarrá Pharmacy in 
Old Havana had been steadily generating revenue for local street light-
ing and sewer works. If restored in partnership with community leaders, 
she reasoned, the Chinese pharmacy could finance similar infrastructure 
upgrades in Barrio Chino while satisfying a local health need (interview, 
May 14, 2013).
By mid- 2013 construction on the new and improved pharmacy was 
underway, including a museum wing to exhibit the San Man Woo medi-
cal center’s appearance in the early twentieth century (figure 3.15). Al-
fonso Rodríguez envisioned the sale of traditional medicines at minimal 
cost to association members registered with the Casino (as had long been 
the case), but also an expanded inventory of specialist relaxation and 
meditation items for sale primarily to foreign tourists at international 
prices. The project’s main problem, she said, was that the Cuban govern-
ment’s medical procurement branch, Empresa Medicuba, was taking too 
long to secure competitively priced Chinese medicines, herbs, and teas. 
The delay had provoked some locals to acquire these items independently 
through friends and associates visiting from China and, in one instance, 
to sell them to the public at a local restaurant. Arguing that this illicit 
supply chain could spiral out of control, the investment bureau’s direc-
tor, María Isabel Martínez, convinced the Office of the Historian’s head 
office to prioritize the pharmacy project and authorize her to indepen-
dently explore low- cost bulk contracts in China. Alfonso Rodríguez and 
Martínez asked if I could assist by introducing the Office to a Chinese 
supplier. I did so, and in early 2014 Beijing’s Tong Ren Tang wholesale 
pharmacy was pursuing a supply contract.
Another of the Office’s ongoing projects is the Kwong Wah Po, a news-
paper founded in 1928 and printed (then and now) in Spanish and Can-
tonese for local readers. Chinese characters are painstakingly arranged 
by hand for an antique printing press by Guillermo Chiu, the only re-
maining person with the requisite technical expertise (figures 3.16 and 
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3.17). Concerned about the newspaper’s precarious future, the Casino 
requested that the Office rescue it as an emblem of cultural patrimony. A 
series of meetings between the Casino, association leaders, and Alfonso 
Rodríguez led to an agreement to convert the newspaper into a glossy 
magazine with news and editorials in Spanish and Mandarin to attract 
the interest of descendants of Chinese immigrants to Cuba, language 
students, and Chinese speakers around the world. Produced digitally by 
word processors, scanners, printers, and five professional staff members, 
the magazine is expected to generate revenue for upgrading neighbor-
hood infrastructure both through direct sales and by attracting tourists 
to a museum featuring the working antique press (and presumably a 
photo opportunity with Guillermo Chiu).
Like the pharmacy, the newspaper reflects the Office’s attempt to 
address local needs while advancing a political agenda. The revamped 
Kwong Wah Po is a way not only of generating revenue, but also of bal-
ancing China’s growing media presence in Cuba. A journalist from the 
Cuban newspaper Juventud Rebelde noted that Chinese soft power in 
Cuba has grown through news, current affairs, and artistic media (inter-
figure 3.15 Watch this space: The Chinese pharmacy under construction in 2013. 
Photo by the author.
figures 3.16 and 3.17 Guillermo Chiu and the Chinese printing blocks he 
arranges by hand to produce the Kwong Wah Po newspaper, January 2012. Photo by 
the author.
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view, May 11, 2013). China Today, Xinhua, and other publications are dis-
tributed each month by the Chinese embassy in Cuba on the understand-
ing that they be made publicly available in hotel lobbies and at trade fairs, 
conferences, and cultural centers like Barrio Chino’s House of Chinese 
Arts and Traditions. The new Kwong Wah Po will ensure that an official 
Cuban perspective accompanies these Chinese publications.
The pharmacy and newspaper serve the Cuban state’s interests, but 
the proposals for both were developed through community meetings co-
ordinated by the Casino Chung Wah and then submitted to the Office of 
the Historian. They were rare instances of local consensus in a context of 
growing competition for the Office’s attention. A prominent Chinese Cu-
ban general, Gustavo Chui, believes that the deliberations that initiated 
the two projects may set Barrio Chino on a new course of bottom-up 
development:
There is no shortage of interest from partners in China in investing in 
Barrio Chino; the holdup is on our side. The way I see it, this process 
has to follow a bottom-up formula. The first thing is for the commu- 
nity to agree on solid development proposals; the next is for these to 
be presented to the Office of the Historian or directly to the National 
As sembly; and from there, legal changes can happen. With the com-
mer cial benefits it brings to Barrio Chino, this process should be enough 
to awaken the blood [despertar la sangre] of the community, and this 
has finally started to happen with the pharmacy and the newspaper. 
Remember the case of La Muralla restaurant? When it began selling 
pizza and spaghetti, the community came together in opposition. No 
law mandated them to do that; on the contrary, it was direct collective 
action that brought about change. This is the same kind of activism 
that is needed for broader change in Barrio Chino today.
 Thirteen of Cuba’s eighteen Chinese associations are in Barrio 
Chino [including the Casino Chung Wah], so China’s influence in Cuba 
is entering there first. Young people are important for this process, and 
the Chinese ambassador and his staff have accepted that they must 
work with the descendants [of Chinese immigrants]. It’s possible we 
may see new Chinese immigration, and this could help strengthen the 
embassy’s relationships with the Chinese associations. But they won’t 
come unless there are advantages for them in doing so, and unless they 
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are made aware of these advantages. This will be one of the functions 
of the newspaper. (interview, May 16, 2013)
Chui believes that bottom-up proposals in Barrio Chino are a start-
ing point for engaging the state and gaining visibility in China. This, he 
thinks, should generate commercial benefits that will in turn stimulate 
and “awaken the blood of the community” to propose further neighbor-
hood development projects. Lau Quan of the Lung Kong Association is 
hopeful that this process will attract Chinese investment:
The Lung Kong has around two million members and 143 associations 
around the world, with its headquarters in China. We [in the Cuban 
branch] receive a lot of Chinese businesspeople, who are ready to 
invest here because they think the competition will be less than in 
Canada or other places. But we can’t receive foreign investment by 
law. If that changes, you’ll see a real transformation here. The Lung 
Kong Association could have a general grocery store, for example, 
and expand the restaurant. There’s a ready market for this, and that’s 
what we’ve been telling the Ministry of Justice. There are thousands of 
Chinese students living in Cuba, and many have already approached 
us looking for the daily things they need and the food they are ac-
customed to. (interview, February 25, 2011)
Association leaders are keenly watching for signals of legal change, 
particularly as the Raúl Castro administration rolls out reforms to put 
state and nonstate enterprises on more equal footing. Especially rele-
vant are statements like that of Marino Murillo, vice president of the 
Council of Ministers, to the National Assembly in July 2013: “The plan 
for the coming year has to be different. . . . The plan is designed so that 
a businessman from whatever sector does not have to ask permission to 
make minor investments to ensure production does not stop” (quoted 
in Frank 2013). For Barrio Chino’s associations, the question is whether 
such statements will lead to authorization from the Office of the His-
torian and the Ministry of Justice to receive investments, expand their 
businesses, and sell imported Chinese consumer goods. The ministry’s 
director of associations, Miriam Garcia Mariño, says that lifting the re-
strictions would mean breaking with a long- standing policy: “The main 
thing is that community groups respect the Law of Association, which 
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Cuba inherited from Spain in 1888. The point of that law is to keep some 
overall structure in place so that ngos and other associations stay fo-
cused on their original tasks. Without it they would just turn to com-
merce, as some of the Chinese associations have begun to do through 
their restaurants. Law 1320 put the associations under our jurisdiction 
in 1978, and since then they’ve focused, as they should, on the welfare of 
the Chinese community. That’s their purpose, and it’s best that they stay 
committed to it” (interview, January 9, 2012).
The ministry’s intentions may be sound, but its restrictions have 
caused frustrations as Sino- Cuban ties deepen. The Min Chih Tang’s 
public relations officer reports that its branch in the city of Cienfuegos 
was in need of a truck to manage a small agricultural project. The Chi-
nese embassy heard of the project and donated a truck, but the Min Chih 
Tang was forbidden by the Law of Association from accepting it because 
of the project’s commercial nature. The Min Chih Tang crossed the Min-
istry of Justice again in 2012 when it tried to organize a business forum 
with fifteen trade representatives from China to mark its 125th anniver-
sary. Invited to speak at the event, I recorded some impressions in my 
research diary:
NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS
There was supposed to be a Chinese business delegation, but at the last minute the 
Ministry [of Justice] ruled that the event must be strictly “academic” and focus on 
cultural themes rather than business networking. This hasn’t stopped some deter-
mined Chinese entrepreneurs from coming to explore opportunities for setting up su-
permarkets, electronics outlets, and tourism services. . . . The political attaché from 
the Chinese embassy, Yu Bo, shares his thoughts with me: “Our young people, including 
some who have come to this event, are not that interested in traditions and culture. 
They’re focused on making money for themselves. That’s not easy to do here because 
of the restrictions, but they’re determined.” Flora Fong, the renowned Cuban artist, is 
also reflecting on the determination of the Chinese visitors. She tells me a fable: “A 
woman decided that the best way to get from her house to the market was across a 
mountain rather than around it. People laughed at her, saying it would take a lifetime 
to build a path across that mountain, but she vowed to do it. By the time she completed 
the path everyone had forgotten her promise, and they asked how she could travel so 
quickly to the market. Rather than tell them it was none of their business, she shared 
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her secret openly so that the entire village could benefit.” Luis Chang, no stranger 
to determination judging by the thirty- foot sculpture of the Great Wall he has single- 
handedly installed on the wall of the Min Chih Tang common room, chimes in: “These 
folks [the Chinese visitors] are going to find their own mountain here in Cuba, but I 
doubt they’ll be shown the path.”
—Havana, January 10, 2012
The Min Chih Tang event demonstrated the disposition of indepen-
dent Chinese businesspeople to trade and invest in Cuba, but also the 
difficulty of doing so legally. The reform process headlined by the Linea-
mientos may inspire local optimism, but many people remain skeptical 
that any resulting legal changes will endure. At the Casino Chung Wah’s 
120th anniversary celebration in 2013, a member of its executive board 
described his community’s hopes and fears: “We believe that if the laws 
change, they could just as quickly change back. They have before. Any 
new law will have to be in place for some time before people are con-
fident enough to invest their time and money. A lot of people lost their 
entire livelihoods when the unthinkable happened in the 1960s. Cuba’s 
friendship with China is strong at the moment, but things have turned 
bad before, and what would happen if at some point they turn bad again?” 
(interview, May 9, 2013).
Reinforced by memories of the Great Revolutionary Offensive, fears 
of loss continue to dampen the confidence of Barrio Chino’s commu-
nity leaders. Until these fears are overcome, neighborhood proposals for 
initiatives like the pharmacy and newspaper will remain scarce. In turn, 
new sources of income, registered partnerships with Chinese business-
people, and a sense of creative “awakened blood” will also remain sub-
dued. Trust in the state’s ability to fashion a stable and productive legal 
environmental is therefore a key determinant of Barrio Chino’s future.
The Office of the Historian’s accountability codes aim to inspire con-
fidence in its ability to govern, but Barrio Chino’s ambivalent responses 
have transmitted an important message in return: bottom-up endorse-
ment is critical to the success of government development policies. A 
proven pathway to local support is the advocacy of community leaders 
like Vargas Lee, but as China’s influence grows, even this is not enough 
to ensure trust in the state. Faced with the prospect of deepening illicit 
business connections, the Office has become more publicly engaged, for 
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instance by responding to neighborhood proposals for the restoration of 
the Chinese pharmacy and newspaper. This has motivated Barrio Chino’s 
associations to put competitive differences aside in pursuit of collective 
benefits. The extent to which the pharmacy and newspaper will secure 
these benefits is yet to be seen, but as I conclude below, these projects 
and the turbulent local history that gave rise to them crystallize Cuba’s 
broader development challenge: to formulate consensual policy frame-
works that accommodate and encourage trust rather than destroy it.
CONCLUSION: SPHERES OF TRUST IN BARRIO CHINO
Barrio Chino’s future cannot be divorced from its tumultuous past. The 
inhumanity of the coolie trade, the xenophobia of colonial administra-
tors, the commercial injunctions of the anti- Chinese movement, the de-
meaning fantasies of foreign tourists, the nationalization campaign of the 
early revolution, and the disinterest of a government at diplomatic odds 
with Beijing produced more than a century and a half of neglect and ac-
rimony. These unrelenting pressures are matched only by the endurance, 
protection, and promise of the Casino Chung Wah and its affiliated Chi-
nese associations. Historical legacies persist in Barrio Chino, not least 
through the entrenched informal sector, but contemporary pressures 
and opportunities are reshaping the civic landscape. These include grow-
ing foreign tourism, the Office of the Historian’s tax and accountability 
codes, the Ministry of Justice’s administrative red tape, and the increas-
ing presence on the ground of Chinese diplomats and businesspeople. 
The contemporary regulatory environment seeks to contain the black 
market while ensuring attention to community welfare, but it also places 
a toll on the efficiency and viability of daily affairs, from running a soup 
kitchen to holding a conference.
The Office of the Historian is not alone in the quest for local compli-
ance with the law; around the world administrators and tax bureaus face 
an uphill battle in convincing citizens that adherence to commercial reg-
ulations is worth their while (O’Donnell 2006; Portes and Sassen 1987). 
Barrio Chino’s restaurant operators have yet to accept this proposition, 
especially in light of the high taxes they pay. They prefer to work quietly 
at the margins of the formal economy, securing supplies from alternative 
sources and sustaining a network of unregistered ethnic entrepreneur-
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ship that now extends across the Pacific. These independent relation-
ships constitute a potentially valuable resource for the broader Cuban 
economy if they can be brought out of the shadows, but to achieve this 
the Office must develop more dynamic and conciliatory state- society 
synergies. Its task, in deceptively simple terms, is to simultaneously build 
horizontal and vertical trust.
Barrio Chino’s community leaders have clearly identified the threats 
and opportunities they face. At the dawn of the Office’s takeover, Carmen 
Eng, the director of the House of Chinese Arts and Traditions, was ap-
prehensive about the introduction of new accountability codes but was 
confident that “with a solid organizational structure, getting things done 
will be easier. No more doing deals by word of mouth. Instead we’ll do 
things in a more disciplined manner” (interview, March 12, 2006). Nib, 
director of the Residencia, criticized the growing bureaucracy involved 
in handling foreign donations and acquiring new furniture, but she also 
perceived advantages in a more official governance framework: “An ad-
vantage is that the Office of the Historian has contacts with foreign ngos 
and sources of funds. Now there’s an official mechanism for linking up 
with donors” (interview, January 16, 2006). She also predicted that Barrio 
Chino’s circles of trust and ethnic allegiance would remain intact: “One 
thing I’m absolutely sure of is that our community will keep working in 
its own way below the surface, as it always has.” This intriguing predic-
tion has proven accurate, striking to the core of the Office’s challenge: it 
must incorporate the broad range of horizontal linkages underpinning 
Barrio Chino’s informal sector, and its nascent connections to China, 
into its administrative plan.
For all the Office’s historical expertise, it has learned the hard way 
that cultural sensitivity is a prerequisite for grassroots endorsement. The 
Muralla pizza and spaghetti affair revealed a clash between the Office’s 
commercial goals and community perceptions of tradition, making the 
Office’s outsider status an easy target for detractors. Unveiling a statue 
of Confucius may have convinced onlookers of Leal’s personal respect 
for traditional Chinese values, but residents are less easily convinced by 
the Office’s broader plan to rescue traditions. Statues, altars, and monu-
ments serve largely to attract revenue from tourism, and the spoils must 
be shared with Barrio Chino’s associations and businesses if they are to 
endorse the new governance model. As the Office seeks local approval to 
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convert neighborhood heirlooms and artifacts into tourist attractions, it 
must forge consensus on both the immediate present and the distant past.
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1992) have argued that the “in-
vention of tradition” is standard practice in the building of nations. Bar-
rio Chino’s evolution shows that a comparable process is under way at 
the local level: the commercial recycling of cultural schemas is inherent 
in the building of trust. The Office is well suited to this task, as its at-
tempts to rescue traditions are appraised largely according to the mate-
rial benefits they bring. The opening of the San Fan Kon altar to tourists, 
for instance, was wholeheartedly endorsed by the Lung Kong Associa-
tion, which retained control of the altar’s administrative and financial 
management. Similarly, the pharmacy and newspaper initiatives indicate 
an emerging consensus on the interplay of traditional community prac-
tice and contemporary economic aspiration.
The cultural convergence underpinning those two initiatives is mani-
festly political: these are among the first projects in Barrio Chino to be 
conceived deliberatively, proposed representatively, and received en-
thusiastically by a governing institution. This process improves on past 
practice by more genuinely articulating horizontal community linkages 
with vertical state- society synergies, in effect drawing its stakeholders 
into a multidimensional sphere of trust. This does not imply rationaliza-
tion as envisioned by Fedderke, de Kadt, and Luiz (1999), in which social 
capital is divorced from culture and individual identities. Rather, it treats 
grassroots allegiances and neighborhood trust as public resources to be 
harnessed through locally formulated projects. This process should, at its 
best, encourage the use of informal networks of ethnic entrepreneurship 
like those of Barrio Chino’s associations—as well as previously closed 
circles of unregistered friends like those of Felipe and Daisy—in the ser-
vice of a larger national community.
The newspaper and pharmacy projects hold promise, but they are 
works in progress. Although they were initiated from the bottom up to 
serve local needs, the benefits they generate may disproportionately flow 
to the state. Both cases demonstrate improved state- society communica-
tion, but they also warrant attention to Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari’s 
(2001) point that participation in official programs does not guarantee 
positive outcomes or fair treatment. Unless these projects are brought to 
fruition in ways that carry broadly shared benefits, Barrio Chino’s resi-
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dents will continue to doubt that their concerns matter to official admin-
istrators.
Critical to the upward mobility of neighborhood concerns is the sup-
port of intermediaries capable of advocating on their behalf to policy 
makers. Facilitating communication between community groups and 
government institutions, “amphibians” like Vargas Lee are integral to the 
conduct of state- society interactions in Cuba (Crahan and Armony 2007, 
2). As a former member of the Casino Chung Wah’s executive board, 
major player in Barrio Chino’s restaurant sector, host to visiting Chinese 
officials, and charismatic martial artist, he is embedded in community 
networks. Among the messages he has conveyed upward is the need for 
greater leeway in the conduct of local business, including authorization 
for the associations and restaurants to expand the scope of their services 
and openly receive investment. With the Office’s support, Vargas Lee’s 
martial arts school has become a focal point of Sino- Cuban cultural ex-
change and a prominent neighborhood landmark. He cannot transform 
the Office into an insider, but in return for its assistance he has endorsed 
its stewardship of Barrio Chino’s development, enabling it to consult 
more genuinely with residents.
Vargas Lee’s amphibious capacity is also evident in the exposure he 
affords to visiting Chinese officials. The Cuban School of Wushu is prob-
ably the only non- mass- mediated venue in Cuba where foreign vips are 
authorized to deliver impromptu speeches on bilateral relations directly 
to hundreds of citizens. For all their openness, though, these occasions 
seek to contain face- to-face ties between citizens of the two nations 
within an environment trusted by the state to function as “an arm of 
the revolution.” In the absence of such a forum, Chinese visitors would 
logically turn to the associations, whose independent people- to-people 
activities would consequently gain momentum. The Office of the Histo-
rian’s restoration of the Cuban School of Wushu and support for Vargas 
Lee’s international tours indicate the value it places on his service.
Regulating nascent foreign linkages has long been a priority for the 
Cuban state. Since 1959 it has monitored and largely monopolized in-
ternational connections as a matter of national sovereignty (Hearn 
2005). The Office of the Historian’s efforts to establish regulatory codes 
for mediating partnerships between Barrio Chino’s residents and Chi-
nese visitors reflect this preoccupation. Paradoxically, the imposition of 
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tighter rules may ultimately give rise to more open people- to-people ties 
between Cuba and China. Just as the broader liberalization of Cuba’s re-
tail, services, and other sectors depends on the prior establishment of 
regulated supply chains (see chapter 1), a freer flow of independent actors 
between the two nations requires that the economic environment in Bar-
rio Chino first be more effectively regulated.
Cuba’s Chinese associations are well placed to diversify bilateral rela-
tions from the ground up, and more heterogeneous ties would benefit 
both nations. Association members have knowledge and connections 
that could attract investment and capital goods from China and open new 
channels of exports to China. However, as the experience of the Grupo 
showed, the lack of opportunities to legally conduct business in Bar-
rio Chino has previously driven commercial cooperation underground. 
How effectively the district’s emerging international connections are har-
nessed for national benefit will depend both on local responses to the 
Office of the Historian’s regulatory designs and on the operational leeway 
afforded the associations by Ministry of Justice. This complex bottom-up 
and top- down compromise raises again the encompassing challenge of 
incorporating local networks and their emerging global connections into 
official development programs. Barrio Chino’s lesson for Cuba—and 
other nations in transition—is that successful reform requires vertical 
lines of state- society engagement that support, rather than erode, exist-
ing horizontal circles of trust.
Across Cuba the government is taking stock of the benefits brought by 
small business development and foreign investment. As home to Cuba’s 
first private vegetable markets, stores, and wholesale warehouses since 
1959, Barrio Chino provides insights into the pitfalls of state- society 
alienation and the steps necessary to achieve functional synergies. Con-
sidered by many to portend future directions of national reform, Barrio 
Chino raises pressing questions about the containment of unregistered 
domestic and international partnerships, grassroots support for the ex-
pansion of tourism and economic development, and the introduction of 
a comprehensive blueprint for managing cooperation with China. It also 
calls attention to the importance of neighborhood solidarity and trust—
whether rooted in ethnicity, historical resistance to oppression, or opti-
mism about new forms of engagement with the state—in shaping Cuba’s 
development agenda.
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Mutual aid and internal support structures are prevalent in overseas 
Chinese communities, but the inward- looking guanxi and other informal 
connections that have long underpinned these structures present unprec-
edented policy dilemmas. If the world’s emboldened Chinese communi-
ties are to willingly permit their social capital to be harnessed by official 
development agendas, then—as the case of Barrio Chino shows—locally 
formulated strategies and proposals are prerequisite. This is the case 
not only in state- led contexts such as Cuba, but also in market- oriented 
economies like Mexico. As in Cuba, intermediaries embedded in the 
Chinese communities of Mexico City, Tijuana, and Mexicali are bridging 
top- down and bottom-up concerns. What they have in common with 
their Cuban counterparts is the quest for a new balance of horizontal and 
vertical forces that accommodates the internal social capital they have 
accrued over a century and a half, and the transpacific trust they are only 
now beginning to leverage.
While Cuba’s aging Chinese immigrants and their descendants gradu-
ally reposition themselves in the political economy of the Cuban revo-
lution, their counterparts in Mexico are faced with more urgent prob-
lems. Criticized in the mass media for deepening Mexico’s trade deficit 
with China, targeted by thieves and kidnappers, and unprotected by the 
police, Chinese people have few friends in Mexico and even fewer in high 
places. Image- conscious private- and public- sector officials are reluctant 
to openly support trade fairs organized by Mexico’s Chinese associations, 
since these events are widely viewed as conduits for the import of manu-
factured goods that compete with Mexican products (see chapter 2).
When Mexican officials have seen past the disincentives and engaged 
local Chinese communities, positive results have quickly followed. The 
government of the state of Baja California has led the way, harnessing 
the social connections of Chinese associations in Mexicali and Tijuana 
to attract investors from China and negotiate access to the Chinese 
market for Mexican products. However, once these partnerships are off 
the ground, a lack of regulatory follow- through has left the way open 
for abuse. Smuggling of Chinese contraband into Mexico is part of the 
problem, but more serious is the illegal recruitment of employees from 
China to work in the restaurants and maquiladoras of northern Mexico. 
Mexico’s Chinese associations have sometimes brokered these exploit-
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ative connections, departing in every respect from their historical tradi-
tion of humanitarian protection, mutual aid, and trust.
This chapter begins by discussing the turbulent lives of the pioneer 
Chinese settlers in Mexico. Arriving during the revolution of the early 
twentieth century, thousands of Chinese cotton, copper, and railroad 
workers found themselves on the wrong side of history. Unlike their coun-
terparts in Cuba, Chinese immigrants in Mexico were excluded from the 
revolutionary struggle, whose main purpose was to advance the rights 
and interests of Mexico’s disenfranchised indigenous population. As the 
number of Chinese settlers grew and their businesses prospered, public 
hostility toward them increased. By the mid- 1920s, the Valley of Mexicali 
was home to nearly ten thousand Chinese, outnumbering the Mexican 
population and giving rise to a strong backlash against them. Turning 
inward for economic and social defense intensified their segregation and 
fueled anti- Chinese campaigns in the 1920s and 1930s and ultimately the 
expulsion of some ten thousand Chinese people from across Mexico. As 
Grace Peña Delgado has observed, Mexico’s revolutionary vision was 
rooted in a carefully guarded blend (mestizaje) of Spanish and indige-
nous influences: “Mestizaje guided the efforts of post- revolutionary ar-
chitects to assimilate native populations into mainstream Mexican soci-
ety, to exclude blacks from the national image, and to expel most Chinese 
from the country. . . . Chinese Mexicans are nearly absent from the Mexi-
can national narrative” (2012, 5). Despite the efforts of President Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934– 40) in the 1930s to set Mexico on a more inclusive and 
progressive course, in the second half of the twentieth century Chinese 
immigrants and their descendants continued to face prejudice and suspi-
cion, stirred up not least by Mexico’s fervent anticommunist movement. 
From its beginnings, the Chinese diaspora in Mexico was viewed as a 
foreign intrusion, with no place in the revolutionary vision of national 
identity.
Echoes from the early twentieth century still resound in the predica-
ment of Mexico’s Chinese diaspora. Accusations of unfair commercial 
practices channeled through obscure Asian networks appear frequently 
in the mass media, as they did a hundred years ago. But allegations that 
the Chinese community and its trade fairs are deepening the bilateral 
deficit are only the tip of the iceberg. Even more confrontational are re-
actions to Chinese involvement in Mexico’s massive informal sector. The 
TRUST AND TREACHERY IN MEXICO’S CHINESE DIASPORA  165
chapter’s second section looks at a bitter debate that has broken out in 
Mexico City’s historic center, where small business owners complain that 
the influx of Chinese contraband toys, shoes, dvds, and other products 
is forcing them to close their shops. As Chinese suppliers gain a foothold 
in the notorious Tepito black market district on the perimeter of the his-
toric center, critics have even accused Mexico City’s former mayor, Mar-
celo Ebrard, of colluding with Chinese businesses to “invade our capital 
city” (Uno más Uno 2007). Proposals for containing the black market and 
its Chinese connections range from the expulsion of street vendors to the 
provision of more weapons to police, but strategies for managing the so- 
cial dimensions of the informal sector are yet to emerge. The latter would 
involve engagement with Chinese communities and their social net-
works, a course of vertical synergy that Mexican leaders have been reluc-
tant to explore. To do so would not only expose them to public criticism 
but also require them to demonstrate their trustworthiness to Mexico’s 
Chinese associations.
As is the case in Cuba, Chinese networks in Mexico have long co-
alesced around ethnic associations. The chapter’s third section examines 
the work of the Chinese associations of Mexicali and Tijuana, two of the 
country’s most active. The state government of Baja California has been 
more active than its federal- and state- level counterparts in forging coop-
erative synergies with Chinese associations. Its endorsement of Chinese 
street fairs, marketplaces, and business networking have promoted public 
awareness of Chinese cultural heritage, facilitated trade and investment 
with Chinese partners, and helped to improve Sino- Mexican diplomatic 
relations. The Chinese government has also offered financial and logisti-
cal support to Baja California’s Chinese associations, on the condition 
that they agree to publicly adopt the One- China policy, break ties with 
Taiwanese institutions, conduct official business in Mandarin, and assist 
Chinese firms to expand into Mexico. Association leaders describe these 
commitments as a matter of building trust between investors, suppliers, 
customers, and ultimately between Mexico and China, but they have yet 
to convince local Mexicans that they stand to benefit.
The fourth section explores the human fallout from the Chinese asso-
ciations’ hot pursuit of business ties with China. The associations’ advo-
cacy of corporate interests has sometimes clashed with the very humani-
tarian commitments they were founded to honor. As well as promoting 
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bilateral trade in commercial goods, the associations also help northern 
Mexico’s factories and restaurants recruit Chinese employees. As the as-
sociations increasingly focus on business consulting, matching employ-
ers with workers, and arranging visas, they have turned a blind eye to 
the plight of exploited laborers. The victims of this process live on the 
margins of a marginalized community, unable to turn to the associations 
for help and cut off from nearly all avenues of support. One of the few av-
enues open to them is a Baptist church in Mexicali, whose congregation 
of past and present Chinese contract workers has traveled there from 
around the region in search of protection. Introduced by their minister, 
these individuals speak of the pressures they face to keep quiet about 
their situation. To break their silence or associate with anybody beyond 
their immediate community invites retribution against themselves and 
their families. This extreme form of enforceable trust has underpinned a 
tightly guarded system of migration and employment, underscoring the 
need for regulatory follow- through once deals are struck between Mexi-
can businesses and Chinese suppliers.
China’s relations with Mexico have great potential, including the po-
tential for abuse. To reduce commercial and humanitarian exploitation 
will require forms of cooperation between the Chinese associations and 
the Mexican government that extend beyond business facilitation. Jointly 
conducted visa monitoring, workplace audits, and commercial inspec-
tions are possible first steps. As President Enrique Peña Nieto endeavors 
to set Mexican relations with China on a more amicable and produc-
tive course, the Chinese associations and their wider communities have 
much to gain from proactive engagement with state and society. As well 
as establishing themselves as credible brokers of Sino- Mexican trade and 
investment, they might also begin to turn back the tide of public distrust 
that has surrounded them for over a century.
REVOLUTION: EQUALITY FOR WHOM?
A bold statement adorns the iconic central library of the National Auton-
omous University of Mexico (unam): “por mi raza hablará el espíritu” 
(my spirit will speak through my race; figure 4.1). Inspired by the indig-
enous pride of the Mexican Revolution, Secretary of Education José Vas-
concelos penned the motto in 1921 while also serving as unam’s presi-
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dent. The statement openly challenged a European legacy of racial and 
cultural stratification by vindicating the raza bronce (bronze race) as a 
source of dignity rather than shame.
Vasconcelos would have known that thousands of Chinese migrant 
workers had by then settled in the arid lands adjacent to the United States 
to pick cotton and mine copper. Many arrived after abandoning the search 
for gold in California and finding themselves denied permission to work 
or bring family members to join them in the United States (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993, 1328). Laws passed in California between 1850 and 
1870 prohibited Chinese employment in chartered corporations, required 
Chinese people to live outside of incorporated towns, and even banned the 
carrying of poles laden with goods on public sidewalks. Many of these laws 
were overturned because they violated federal jurisdiction, but as Adam 
Mc Keown (2008, 129) notes, this drove California’s senators in Washing-
figure 4.1 The coat of arms of unam. Photo by the author.
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ton to advocate more centralized restrictions. The federal 1882 Chinese Ex-
clusion Act made Chinese people “the first group specifically designated 
by race to be barred from entering the country” (Hu- DeHart 2007, 41) and 
made Mexico a more practical destination for Chinese immigrants.
The Treaty of Friendship and Navigation between Mexico and China, 
signed in 1899 and ratified in 1900, facilitated direct migration from 
China, as had Peru’s and Brazil’s treaties with China in 1874 and 1881, 
respectively. The introduction of Chinese contract laborers indirectly 
supported Mexico’s revolutionary cause: populating the northern states 
diminished the chance of a second U.S. annexation. Arriving in Mexico 
both directly and via the United States, Chinese immigrants established 
themselves as the fourth largest minority group in the country, repre-
senting 11 percent of the population.
Commercial and migratory ties between Mexico and China had com-
menced in the mid- sixteenth century. The Manila Galleons, known in 
Mexico as the Nao de China, would set sail once (later twice) per year 
from the Philippines, then a node of contact between the Chinese and 
Spanish empires. Landing in Acapulco, the Nao unloaded Asian silk, por-
celain, medicines, and high- quality furniture for distribution throughout 
the Spanish American colonies and on the return voyage carried silver 
from across the Americas. This pattern of trade between China, the Phil-
ippines, and the Americas persisted for some 250 years. The first Chinese 
migrant workers arrived in Mexico in 1864, contracted by U.S. employ-
ers first to build railroads between the cities of El Paso, Chihuahua, and 
Juárez and then to expand the rail network in the 1880s to the cities of 
Sonora, Tampico, and Tamaulipas. By the mid- 1890s, 1,800 workers had 
been contracted from Macao and Hong Kong to work in Mexican agri-
culture, but nearly half died from disease and extreme working condi-
tions (Auyón Gerardo 2003, 32).
The ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Navigation in 1900 
was expected to boost trade and migration between Mexico and China, 
but Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, Manuel de Azpiroz, ar-
gued that the treaty would signal to the world that his country was “dem-
onstrating sympathy for that barbaric nation . . . that has no idea about 
modern international law” (quoted in Valdés Lakowsky 1981, 255– 56). 
Azpiroz’s opinions of China were widely shared, and by the time Vascon-
celos became president of unam, negative perceptions of Chinese immi-
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grants, reinforced by the revolution’s racial pride, were beginning to fuel 
violence against them (Young 2014). In the chaos that followed the 1910 
fall of José Porfirio Díaz’s government, the immigrants’ hopes for protec-
tion and representation from China collapsed, as did the Qing dynasty 
in 1911. On May 15, 1911, the revolutionary troops of Antonio Madero, 
led by Francisco “Pancho” Villa, took the city of Torreón, where Chinese 
immigrants had set up convenience stores, banks, and small agricultural 
operations. With the assistance of local residents, the troops rounded 
up and killed some three hundred Chinese people and destroyed their 
businesses. A commission led by the prominent Chinese diplomat Woo 
Chung- yen traveled to Mexico to investigate these events and, with the 
assistance of an Anglo- American law firm, secured the signing of the 
1912 Protocol of Indemnity on Chinese Interests (R. Romero 2010, 154). 
The protocol settled on a compensation of three million one hundred pe-
sos, but the 1913 military coup that installed President Victoriano Huerta 
ensured that this was never paid (Connelly and Cornejo Bustamante 
1992, 43).
From its inception, the Mexican Revolution was closely tied to the 
politics of race. As early as 1908 Emiliano Zapata, a speaker of Nahuatl, 
was advocating the land rights of rural indigenous and mestizo people 
in his home state of Morelos (Horcasitas 1968). In a tense environment 
saturated by racial politics, economic grievances were directed at ethnic 
“others.” The Chinese community was a convenient target and became 
an example of a well- established sociological premise: the consolidation 
of solidarity among insiders entails the simultaneous rejection of out-
siders. Galvanized by popular pride in the raza bronce, the revolution 
found no convenient place for linguistically and visibly distinct foreign-
ers (Sato 2006).
Deeply embedded in Chinese Mexican historical lore is the arrival 
of the first group of Chinese people in the Valley of Mexicali in 1908. 
Abandoning the copper mines of Sonora in search of opportunities in the 
town of Mexicali, 160 Chinese sailed across the Gulf of California to San 
Felipe and were advised to walk the remaining 121 miles across the state 
of Baja California to their destination. After three days in temperatures 
of 125 degrees Fahrenheit, they became disoriented in the desert with-
out a compass and began to die of thirst and exhaustion; only a handful 
reached Mexicali. The desert where they perished came to be known as 
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the Sierra de los Chinos or El Chinero by locals, who report that those 
willing to visit this place of tragedy and sorrow have found coins and 
other objects abandoned by the Chinese pioneers. The former director of 
the Chinese Association of Mexicali, Eduardo Auyón Gerardo, told me 
that “when clouds gather over El Chinero, you can still hear their voices 
screaming for water” (interview, October 7, 2008).
The horrors of El Chinero were prelude to a turbulent period of settle-
ment for the Chinese of Baja California. The size of the community 
grew through the activities of the Mau Li and Chung Hwa corporations, 
which by 1921 were operating across Mexico and had contracted between 
40,000 and 50,000 Chinese laborers to work in mining, construction, 
and agriculture (mainly cutting sugarcane and picking cotton). Assisted 
by the sympathetic immigration policies of Baja California’s Governor 
Esteban Cantú (1915– 20), Chinese traders came to dominate niche econ-
omies in cities across the state, while making deep commercial inroads 
into the neighboring state of Sonora and onward into the state of Sinaloa. 
They manufactured tobacco and other agricultural products, furni-
ture, leather goods, and clothing, all of which were distributed through 
a network of convenience stores stretching from the town of Culiacán 
in Sinaloa through Mexicali to San Francisco, laying the foundation of 
Mexico’s commercial infrastructure (Chou 2002, 17).
As noted above, by the mid- 1920s Chinese settlers in the Valley of 
Mexicali outnumbered the local Mexican population (Velázquez Morales 
2001, 59; Werne 1980, 16). The tendency of Chinese companies in Mexi-
cali and across Mexico to trade primarily with each other and to employ 
staff members from within their ethnic community provoked popular 
resentment and legal action. As in Cuba and Panama, anti- Chinese cam-
paigns in the 1920s and 1930s convinced the federal government to im-
plement laws requiring Chinese businesses to guarantee that 80 percent 
of their workforces were national citizens.
Public hostility gave rise to protective measures among Chinese mu-
tual aid associations, which since the early 1920s had underpinned the de-
velopment of the Chinatowns of Mexicali and Mexico City. Many people 
outside the community perceived the alternative framework of trade, 
distribution, and finance provided by the Chinese associations (seven-
teen of which were registered in Mexicali in 1920) as giving Chinese im - 
migrants an unfair advantage. Media articles and pamphlets of the time 
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described the solidarity and mutual aid of the Chinese community as a re-
flection of its inherent “meanness” and “selfishness” (Monteón González 
and Trueba Lara 1988, 41; also see J. Romero 1911; Velázquez Morales 
1989). La Frontera and other northern Mexican newspapers were promi-
nent forums for spreading anti- Chinese sentiment, publishing state-
ments such as: “[The Chinese community] is rejected not for the mere 
fact that it is Chinese, nor for racial hatred, nor for its color, and much 
less for its ambition to imitate our Northern neighbors. . . . It is rejected 
because it is the incarnation of a rotten tree trunk: selfishness. . . . And 
the selfish Chinese community par excellence sows a bad seed wherever 
it implants itself” (quoted in Velázquez Morales 2001, 270).
The reputation of Mexico’s Chinese communities suffered further as 
conflicts erupted between supporters of the conservative Manchu Chee 
Kung Tong faction and the National China League (later the Chinese Na-
tionalist Party), which followed Sun Yat- sen. The two groups undertook 
violent actions against each other, including the assassination of leaders, 
which gave the Mexican government a pretext for the expulsion of Chi-
nese people from the country. In the words of President Álvaro Obregón 
(1920– 24), “our office firmly believes in the need to impose order and 
prevent our country from becoming a theater for the intrigues and assas-
sinations driven by the passions of foreign gangs” (quoted in González 
Oropeza 1997, 49– 50).
Obregón chose his interior minister, Plutarco Elías Calles, to suc-
ceed him as president (1924– 28), paving the way for the anti- Chinese 
campaign to expand. Together with his son, the governor of Sonora, 
Calles endorsed the prohibition of Chinese- Mexican intermarriage and 
the forced closure of Chinese businesses. In 1924 the Pro- Race Commit-
tee (Comité Pro Raza) of Baja California proposed the expulsion of all 
Chinese people from Mexico, while the Anti- Chinese Committee (Co-
mité Anti chino) of Sinaloa backed a law requiring Chinese people to live 
in districts segregated from the rest of Mexican society. The municipal 
president of Nogales, Walterio Pesqueira, alleged that “the isolation of 
the Chinese race is a matter of public interest, considering that they have 
monopolized all of the local sources of wealth,” while his counterpart in 
the municipality of Huépac proposed abrogating the Treaty of Friend-
ship and Navigation “to ensure the health of la raza” (quoted in González 
Oropeza 1997, 53, 54).
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The first Grand Convention of Anti- Chinese Committees of the Re-
public of Mexico was held in Nogales in 1925, augmenting the move-
ment’s visibility and giving rise to a series of subgroups. These included 
the Anti- Chinese Youth Subcommittee of Mazatlán, anti- Chinese asso-
ciations in Durango and San Luis Potosí, and the National Anti- Chinese 
Workers’ League, which declared that Mexicans “find themselves at risk 
of losing their noble Latin heritage” (quoted in González Oropeza 1997, 
55). With the slogan of Mexico for Mexicans, the various groups shared 
four goals: the prohibition of Chinese immigration, expulsion of illegal 
Chinese immigrants, prohibition of Chinese- Mexican intermarriage, 
and establishment of special residential districts for Chinese people. 
The movement drew inspiration from a concurrent surge of xenopho-
bia in the United States, among whose victims were Mexicans. Manuel 
González Oropeza notes that “on February 12, 1926, Francisco Martínez 
wrote to President Calles to suggest the expulsion of all Chinese, whom 
he categorized as a ‘stench,’ just as officials in the United States had an-
nounced in Brawley, California, in relation to Mexicans; Martínez sug-
gested taking advantage of this idea” (1997, 51).
In the late 1920s the Grand National Pro- Race League (Gran Liga Na-
cional Pro- Raza) had come to champion the anti- Chinese cause at the 
national level. The historian Catalina Velázquez Morales has collected 
the organization’s numerous press releases and pamphlets, including 
one titled “La bestia amarilla” (The yellow beast) that offers the follow-
ing advice: “Fathers—do not allow your daughters to the get close to the 
Chinese. Mothers who are proud of your bronze complexion, who carry 
in your veins the blood of Cuauhtémoc; matrons who have inherited the 
language of Cortés! Do not mix the blood of jackals with the blood of 
Incas. How deep is the misery and abundant the filth that Hong Kong 
has thrown at our shores! For Mexico and our race—if you are a patriot 
of good stock, be sure this notice circulates profusely throughout the Re-
public” (Gran Liga Nacional Pro- Raza 1927).
The pamphlet describes the Mexican race as hybrid, yet a resource 
whose purity should be protected and preserved. Citizens of “good stock” 
are enjoined to take pride in both their indigenous Latin American an-
cestry (via Cuauhtémoc) and their Spanish heritage (via Cortés). In the 
spirit of the Mexican Revolution, indigenous and European ethnicity are 
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placed on equal footing, and both are elevated above the “filth” of Chi-
nese impurity.
Nationalist movements are fertile ground for the reification of race 
and moralization of place, as China’s own revolutionary history attests. 
Two decades before “La bestia amarilla” was circulated in Mexico, Sun 
Yat- sen’s supporters were imploring Chinese settlers in southeast Asia to 
limit their foreign commitments, return home, and join the insurgency 
against the Qing dynasty. A patriotic appeal to racial loyalty permeates 
the Geming Ge (革命歌; Song of the revolution), which nationalist sym-
pathizers promoted among overseas Chinese communities:
It is hard to be happy all one’s life,
You need but little conscience to feel shame.
What then is the most shameful matter?
To forget one’s ancestors deserves the greatest hate!
If not that, then to register as a foreign national,
Forgetting that you come from Chinese stock. (quoted in Wang G. 
2000, 69)
The Geming Ge offers overseas Chinese settlers a stark choice: return 
home to fight for the national cause and be exalted, or remain abroad and 
be hated. Like “La bestia amarilla,” it invokes racial stock as a moral com-
pass for orienting its audience to the preferred decision. Both works limit 
the possible choices to two extreme alternatives that carry momentous 
consequences and afford no middle ground. If the Chinese revolutionar-
ies tried to force this moral hyperbole on men living in southeast Asia, 
in Mexico it was local women, writes Peña Delgado, who were forced 
to choose between the extremes of becoming national “gatekeepers” or 
“traitors”: “In reinforcing women’s primary role in the revolutionary 
project, state- makers simultaneously cast women at two extremes of the 
moral- political tandem: as traitors of the Mexican state by way of mar-
riage to Chinese men, and as gatekeepers of the revolutionary state by 
way of marriage to Mexican men. To choose one over the other circum-
scribed women’s relationship to Mexico’s revolution” (2012, 10).
Adding further tension to this vitriolic blend of race, nationality, and 
gender, in the early 1930s the Great Depression forced the mass return of 
unemployed Mexican men from the United States. Angered and hard-
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ened by the expulsion of its citizens, the Mexican government deported 
around ten thousand Chinese nationals and their descendants, citing vio-
lence between rival Chinese gangs and illegal lending and exclusionary 
hiring practices as the reason (Carr 1973; Rojas Peña 2009). This hard- 
line policy reflected the continuing influence of Calles, who by then had 
declared himself Mexico’s jefe máximo (maximum political chief ) and 
had quietly supervised the short presidencies of Emilio Portes Gil (1928– 
30), Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930– 32), and Abelardo L. Rodríguez (1932– 
34). Many Chinese immigrants were sent with their Mexican wives and 
children to Macao and Hong Kong, leaving behind only five thousand 
Chinese people in Mexico, according to the census of 1940 (Pardiñas 
1982, 478– 79).
Mexico’s rejection of China and its people would have continued into 
the late 1930s had it not been for the diplomatic skill of Cárdenas. Calles 
had trusted Cárdenas—they had served together in the military—and 
expected to manipulate him as he had the previous three presidents 
 (Buchenau 2006). However, Cárdenas gradually removed Calles’s allies 
from office and eventually had Calles arrested and deported to the United 
States in 1936, where he became acquainted with several known fascists 
and forged a friendship with Vasconcelos, the designer of unam’s coat 
of arms and motto.
Cárdenas sought to reverse many aspects of Mexico’s economic and 
social trajectory, including the treatment of Chinese migrants. In 1937 
and 1938, as war broke out between China and Japan, he repatriated four 
hundred previously expelled Mexican women and a large (but undocu-
mented) number of Mexican Chinese children (Schiavone Camacho 
2009, 560; Schuler 1998, 57 and 94). Despite these advances, the Cárde-
nas administration maintained a restrictive view of Mexican nationhood, 
which, as Julia Schiavone Camacho writes, denied Chinese men the right 
to return with their families: “Families that had not split up had to decide 
whether to do so, since Chinese men remained barred from returning 
to Mexico. The choice brought immense heartache to families who had 
wanted to stay unified but saw no other option than to be divided for the 
well- being of the women and children in a climate of war and uncertainty 
in China” (2012, 122). Mexico’s former economic consul to China, Juan 
José Ling, was personally affected by these developments:
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My grandfather moved from Taishan in Guangdong Province to 
Tampico during Mexico’s oil boom in the early twentieth century. 
He met my grandmother there, but they were forced to go to China 
when things turned nasty for Chinese people in the early 1930s. My 
grandmother finally returned to Tampico with her seven children, 
but not my grandfather, on one of the ships sent by Lázaro Cárdenas 
at the end of the 1930s. One of the children was my mother. In my 
community people were basically ashamed to be Chinese, and I think 
many still are. Have you noticed that in many photographs and in 
public, even recently, Chinese people like to wear sunglasses? That’s 
to blend in better, because apart from our eyes we don’t look that dif-
ferent to Mexicans. In my whole family I am the only one who has 
married a woman of Chinese descent, and the only one with an in ter-
est in Chinese culture. The rest all wanted to be more Mexican. (inter- 
 view, June 8, 2010)
Like thousands of Chinese Mexicans, Ling’s family endured forced 
migration, division, and ethnic discrimination. Their predicament was 
not helped by a steady flow of postwar movies, television, and radio pro-
ductions (many imported from the United States) that negatively por-
trayed Chinese people and their government. Witnessing this renewed 
hostility, Ling recalls that for at least three decades after Mao Zedong 
established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Chinese Mex-
icans were perceived to be associated with communism. As the histo-
rian Wang Gungwu writes, “after 1949, especially in the anticommunist 
nation- states, every Chinese was suspected of being a communist, or at 
least a sympathizer, whose loyalty could never be trusted” (2000, 82). 
Nothing was further from the truth for most Mexicans of Chinese ances-
try, particularly those who cited their rejection of communism as ground 
for their being repatriated from China. Championing their cause in the 
1950s, the political activist Ramón Lay Mazo argued that thousands of 
people who had been expelled from Mexico were stranded in China, 
hoping for the Mexican government to save them from communism 
(Schiavone Camacho 2012, 145– 46).
Although China Popular—a Spanish- language magazine that sup-
ported the Chinese government—was available in Mexico in the 1950s, 
its voice was drowned out by a wave of anticommunist literature. Citing 
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China as the epitome of political depravity, articles such as “If Commu-
nism Comes to Mexico” (1961, 9) were widely distributed in rural and 
urban Mexico by the U.S. Christian Anti- Communism Crusade to show 
“what would happen to the Mexican people in the event of a Communist 
takeover.” Mexico’s first ambassador to the PRC, Eugenio Anguiano Roch, 
believed that the persistence of these fears into the 1970s was inflamma-
tory and damaging to bilateral relations, and after his return to Mexico 
he attempted to dispel them (interview, June 9, 2010). Between 1973 and 
1980 he tirelessly lobbied the Ministry of Education, urging it to permit 
Chinese students to study Spanish at the Colegio de México. The minis-
try finally granted two hundred visas on the condition that the Chinese 
students live in a designated dormitory with minimal public contact, and 
in this way be impeded from spreading communism.
Mexican fiction also portrayed China and Mexicans of Chinese de-
scent in a negative light, focusing on the criminal activities of gangsters 
and opium dealers. Rafael Bernal’s (1969) novel El Complot Mongól (The 
Mongolian conspiracy) describes the corruption of the Mexican political 
system, which is surpassed only by the inadequacies and moral short-
comings of the protagonist, a Chinese Mexican police detective named 
Filiberto García. Meanwhile, history textbooks made no mention of 
Mexico’s Chinese diaspora and—according to Yolanda Trápaga Delf ín, 
a China specialist at unam—generally still do not (interview, June 16, 
2010). Both the Mexican and Cuban Revolutions were underpinned 
by class struggle, but as Gerardo Rénique (2000 and 2003) has shown, 
narrow nationalistic notions of racial identity have continued to shape 
Mexico’s development. This has complicated the lives of Chinese people 
in Mexico, as have political differences between the two countries—from 
Mexican anticommunism in the mid- to late twentieth century to recent 
tensions over the so-called disloyal competition of China’s state- backed 
manufacturers (see chapter 2).
Like their Cuban counterparts, leaders of Mexico’s Chinese commu-
nity are attempting to leverage China’s growth to advance their interests. 
But unlike the situation in Cuba, Chinese people and their descendants 
in Mexico face public opposition to the expansion of their transpacific 
commercial ties. Journalists have fervently described the damage in-
flicted on Mexican industries as Chinese imports—both legal and con-
traband—flood into the country and deepen the bilateral deficit. Fear of 
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public criticism has discouraged state and private- sector engagement 
with the Chinese diaspora, impeding the development of consensual 
efforts to regulate its deepening business partnerships with China. The 
next section argues that this vertical disjuncture has fueled the expan-
sion of informal Sino- Mexican trade, evident in Mexico City’s notorious 
Tepito district.
CHINA GOES GLOBAL: PRODUCTS, PEOPLE, AND PERCEPTIONS
China’s unparalleled economic growth, recorded by the World Bank 
(2015a) as averaging 9.3 percent between 1980 and 2014, is sustained 
by a massive flow of exports to the world. Overseas Chinese communi-
ties have played an important role in familiarizing mainland suppliers 
with foreign markets. To consolidate a sense of belonging, loyalty, and 
Chinese cultural identity among emigrants, in 1978 the State Council 
of China provided new funding for the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 
(ocao). The office had been established more than sixty years earlier, 
shortly after Sun Yat- sen’s nationalist forces overthrew the last Qing 
emperor and founded the Republic of China in 1911. Initially ocao fo-
cused on extending diplomatic protection to Chinese expatriates, but it 
increasingly dedicated resources to promoting their cultural affinity and 
national allegiance.
Wang notes that prior to the Republican period, successive imperial 
regimes professed that overseas travel could erode subjects’ moral com-
mitment to their homeland and discouraged anything more than tem-
porary “sojourning”: “Throughout the centuries since the Song dynasty 
(since the tenth century), the Chinese who went overseas in the ports 
across the South China Sea were not supposed to have left China perma-
nently. If they were good sons who were filial and loved their homes, they 
would always have planned to return. Thus when they were away from 
China, they would not have stopped being Chinese. This normative ap-
proach clearly represented a view from the top, an elitist view describing 
an ideal type. There was ample evidence throughout those centuries that 
it was often not practicable, and often not true” (Wang G. 2000, 44– 45).
Struggling to publicly justify the growth of enduring overseas Chinese 
communities, imperial lawmakers had categorized émigrés as huaqiao 
(华侨), a term borrowed from classical poetry to describe dutiful foreign 
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service while temporarily sojourning. The creation of ocao under the 
Republican government went much further, signaling for the first time 
that Chinese leaders not only approved the practice of overseas work 
and settlement but also “confirmed it as a patriotic obligation” (Wang 
G. 2000, 70). This break with the past nevertheless sustained a quintes-
sentially imperial ethos: Chinese people, wherever they may live, should 
remain trusted subjects of their motherland.
Today, ocao assists overseas Chinese communities to create oppor-
tunities for trade with China, to overcome linguistic and cultural misun-
derstandings, and ostensibly to build “harmony with the governments 
and communities that host them” (Minor 2010). ocao’s Mexican activi-
ties (discussed below) range from trade facilitation to advocacy of the 
One-China Policy, but the prospect of harmonious public- and private- 
sector relationships remains distant. A remark made in 2008 by China’s 
then consul general in Tijuana, Gao Shoujian, remains true today: the 
convergence of economic competition with persisting social and diplo-
matic tensions constitutes a formidable challenge to any Chinese effort 
to build trust with the Mexican government, let alone with Mexican cus-
tomers (interview, November 5, 2008).
Mexico’s trade deficit with China is the largest in Latin America, sur-
passing 60 billion in 2014 (United Nations Commodity Trade Statis-
tics Database 2015). For more than a decade, a pervasive effect of the 
economic imbalance has been a homogenizing tendency in the Mexican 
public sphere to equate Chinese businesses, products, and people with 
the global ambitions of the Chinese state (Haro Navejas 2007, 457). This 
tendency is strengthened by the frequent appearance in the mass me-
dia of domestic and foreign articles critical of human rights abuses in 
Chinese state- operated factories, the substandard quality of the products 
they manufacture, and the unfair competition they represent for Mexi-
can businesses (González Alvarado 2008; La Prensa 2005). As illustrated 
by the assault on the Chinese travel agency described at the beginning 
of this book, Chinese resident in Mexico are viewed by many as the foot 
soldiers of China’s commercial invasion.
According to Mexico’s most recent census (conducted in 2010), the 
country is home to 6,655 Chinese- born individuals, the twelfth largest 
foreign group. The Chinese embassy counts 20,000 Mexicans of Chinese 
origin, and community leaders report that Mexicali and Tijuana alone 
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are home to some 60,000 Chinese people (including Mexican- born de-
scendants of Chinese immigrants). Even in light of these informal re-
ports, this is a small populace compared to the 738,103 expatriates from 
the United States, the largest foreign group (Instituto Nacional de Es-
tadísticas y Geograf ía 2010).
Unofficial reports estimate the number of U.S. citizens residing in 
Mexico to exceed one million, many of them unregistered. These figures 
are not surprising considering that in 2014 U.S.-Mexico trade amounted 
to 537 billion (more than seven times the value of China- Mexico trade) 
(United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 2015). Commer-
cial ties, though, are only part of the explanation. The other part concerns 
the aging U.S. population: in 2005 some 250,000 U.S. senior citizens were 
living in gated villages on Mexico’s Pacific coast, where Spanish is barely 
spoken and “you can’t really tell you’re in Mexico” (“Retiring Americans: 
Go South, Old Man” 2005). These communities are growing, promoted 
by a Mexican government plan to attract some five million U.S. retirees 
by 2025 (Oppenheimer 2010). This objective reveals a sharp divergence 
of public attitudes toward U.S. and Chinese migrants, though the reasons 
for this extend beyond historical familiarity and trade integration and 
other economic considerations. As a student at the Autonomous Univer-
sity of Baja California explained, “Even though we hate the gringos, we 
wish we could be like them. It bothers us that they look down on us, so 
we pass this feeling on, especially to Chinese people” (interview, Octo-
ber 31, 2008).
It does not require a detailed investigation to reveal that multiple eth-
nic origins, historical backgrounds, political affiliations, and economic 
aspirations have produced considerable diversity in Mexico’s Chinese di-
aspora. Communities descended from Chinese migrant laborers of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for instance, did not automatically 
embrace the 1949 establishment of the PRC and have generally maintained 
only distant relations with its diplomatic missions. For thousands of Chi-
nese Mexican entrepreneurs, diplomatic indifference has stemmed less 
from political considerations than a reluctance to expose their blend of 
local, global, formal, and informal business activities to the scrutiny and 
regulatory designs of Chinese and Mexican authorities. For their part, 
the governments of both countries have shown little interest in Mexico’s 
Chinese community or even in each other, instead focusing what little 
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cooperation they have on the upper echelons of transnational business. 
Their failure to find bilateral solutions to Mexico’s chronic trade deficit 
with China has not as yet provoked serious efforts from Mexico’s federal 
government to harness the entrepreneurial capacities of resident Chi-
nese communities.
Identifying missed opportunities for engagement, Chinese entrepre-
neurs and their descendants in Mexico City—as in Havana—have begun 
to develop commercial initiatives with partners in China. Conscious of 
these thickening international ties, the Chinese embassy has pressured 
resident Chinese communities to register their activities officially, ad-
vance opportunities for Chinese firms through local political and busi-
ness connections, and explicitly articulate support for the PRC’s One-
China Policy. In response, the Confederation of Chinese Associations of 
Mexico (cachimex) has sought open endorsement from the Mexican 
and Chinese governments for its commercial expos and trade fairs. How-
ever, as noted in chapter 2, official support from either government has 
been hindered by the political sensitivity of Mexico’s trade deficit with 
China and popular perceptions that such activities are dedicated to im-
porting Chinese products—legally and otherwise—into Mexico.
Chinese communities in Mexico—like those in Cuba—have faced 
pressure to integrate into their surrounding economic and legal environ-
ments, but unlike in Cuba, in Mexico the pressure has been intensified by 
commercial competition on the ground. Cuban industries do not com-
pete with China, especially in the commercial sector—which prior to the 
revival of Sino- Cuban relations in the 1990s relied on consumer goods 
imported from the Soviet Union. The Cuban state’s dependence on allies 
for manufactured goods, combined with the U.S. embargo’s detrimental 
impact on economic diversification, has produced a vacuum that Chi-
nese products fill without opposition. No such vacuum exists in Mexico, 
where industrialization in the 1970s and subsequent market reforms un-
derpinned the growth of manufacturing to meet U.S. demand for con-
sumer goods. Since the 1980s Mexico’s liberal democratic governments 
have remained committed to free trade in spite of the recent wrangling 
over customs tariffs on Chinese exports and allegations of disloyal com-
petition.
Extending to the activities of Chinese importers resident in Mexico, 
anti- Chinese allegations emanate mainly from small and medium- sized 
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Mexican enterprises unable to compete with the flood of inexpensive 
Chinese consumer goods. These sectors perceive a chronic lack of fair-
ness and transparency in the apparent ethnic exclusivity of Chinese trade 
fairs, the labor conditions and low wages in Chinese factories, the piracy 
of traditional Mexican handicrafts, and the seemingly ungovernable ex-
pansion of illegally imported Chinese textiles, shoes, toys, office equip-
ment, and steel products.
Criticism of Chinese people in Mexico has drawn on long- standing 
beliefs about Chinese cultural and economic practices. This legacy did 
not go unnoticed by the historian Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, when the 
Chinese Mexican drug trafficker Zhenli Ye Gon was arrested in 2007: 
“Prejudice comes to us from a past era, in which the Chinese community 
in Mexico was the object of resentment, jealousy, and violent assault car-
ried out by nationalistic groups backed by a range of state institutions. 
In the mass- mediated lynching of [Zhenli] Ye Gong, a series of Mexican 
social perceptions of China and its people have reappeared. Prejudice 
and ignorance, as always, go hand in hand when mobilization draws on 
the formation of phobias. . . . The racist hostility toward ‘the Chinaman’ 
is not new in our country” (2007, 5– 6).
Media reports have perpetuated essentialist portrayals of Chinese cul-
ture, suggesting that Chinese people in Mexico are “reserved, because 
their culture forces them to be . . . they are determined to generate their 
own sources of employment” (G. López 2009). Some articles, Internet 
sites, and radio broadcasts are overtly malicious, criticizing the disloyal, 
opportunistic, and dishonest nature of Chinese business activities, which 
have allowed “China to invade us with its products through disloyal com-
petition” (“¿Y la soberanía?” 2007; also see El Economista 2008; A. Simón 
2007). Chinese immigrants and their descendants are publicly associated 
with Mexico’s diminishing productivity and competitiveness as local 
producers are squeezed out of the market (Páramo 2008). They are also 
publicly accused of importing counterfeit goods, including traditional 
Mexican handicrafts such as blankets and pottery for the domestic and 
tourist markets.
Just as the xenophobic pamphlets of the 1930s urged Mexicans to os-
tracize the “yellow beasts” whose “selfish” and “mean” mutual aid activi-
ties gave them an unfair economic advantage, contemporary Mexican 
websites—as discussed in chapter 2—carry inflammatory titles such as 
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“Pinche Chinos” (Damn Chinese), “Fourteen Reasons Not to Buy Chi-
nese Products This Christmas,” and “Buying Fraud from China.” As Chi-
nese Mexican businesses and associations become more active in estab-
lishing commercial partnerships with mainland Chinese exporters, the 
historical parallels are deepening. A Tijuana taxi driver shed light on 
local perceptions of China’s impact:
It’s sad because we were proud of our industrial advancement, but now 
we’ve been undercut. I know this is the free market and globalization, 
and I accept that there will be winners and losers, but people like me 
are the losers. I was a manager in a factory making microchips, well 
paid, and in charge of a team of thirty- five workers. Now look at me: 
driving a taxi. Not only have Chinese workers taken our jobs, but the 
products we used to make are now being sold to us, and the Chinese 
people here in Tijuana are helping to make it happen. To answer your 
question, yes, I do blame them. Chinese people have come here, set 
up their import businesses, and we’ve suffered the consequences. 
(interview, December 20, 2011)
An emerging focal point of face- to-face tension between Mexican 
critics and Chinese vendors is Tepito, a notorious outlet for unregistered 
merchandise on the eastern perimeter of Mexico City’s historic center. 
As early as the 1870s Tepito was known as the “Thieves Market,” where 
“stolen merchandise could be sold three months after the theft, without 
fear of prosecution” (Piccato 2001, 37). By the mid- 1970s the Tepito dis-
trict had evolved into a labyrinth of tents and stalls (known as tianguis) 
dedicated to the sale and bartering of clothing, food, live animals, and 
practically anything else (figure 4.2). By 2006 it had grown to more than 
seventy- five city blocks, accommodating some 150,000 vendors (Mon-
dragón 2006). It has since expanded to a hundred blocks and 175,000 
retailers, who—according to a representative of 500 vendors—perceive 
little need for external law enforcement: “The police leave us alone be-
cause we have our own security systems and our own rules for organizing 
the district” (interview, June 21, 2010). Research by John Cross (1998) and 
Carlos Alba Vega (2012) confirms this point, noting sophisticated modes 
of representation and advocacy developed by Mexican street vendors 
to protect their commercial interests. Another Tepito organizer put it 
this way: “our basic needs are more important than official legal regula-
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tions; street vending is a safety valve” (quoted in Mondragón). Former 
Economic Consul Ling agrees: “Mexicans should realize that their in-
formal sector, which constitutes something like 40 percent of business 
in the country, is something they need. The official figure of 5 percent 
unemployment is a blatant lie. There is an abundance of people we call 
nini: ni trabajan ni estudian [neither work nor study]. They need infor-
mality to survive. The real problem is the lack of government support for 
education, training, Mexican companies—which should be actively find-
ing new markets, including in China—and creating jobs. Without Tepito, 
Mexico would be in trouble. There’d probably be another revolution!” 
(interview, June 8, 2010).
Tepito’s steady expansion since the 1870s demonstrates its ongoing ap-
peal for thousands of Mexicans in search of inexpensive consumer goods, 
but not everybody perceives its value as a safety valve for averting “an-
other revolution.” Residents of the adjacent historic center, for instance, 
contend that tourism to their neighborhood and the commercial viability 
of their businesses are being negatively affected. Unable to compete with 
low- priced contraband, owners of the historic center’s 17,670 registered 
figure 4.2 The informal market of Tepito, which is expanding into Mexico City’s 
historic center, May 2012. Photo by the author.
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enterprises are increasingly converting their shops into warehouses for 
the 40,000 unregistered merchants who have spilled over from Tepito 
(M. López 2006a). At the forefront of the campaign against the expan-
sion of Tepito is the Unión del Centro Histórico, which has lobbied the 
city government to place restrictions on where vendors can set up their 
stalls. The Unión points out that some 80 percent of merchandise sold 
in the historic center is contraband from China, and that the street ven-
dors who sell these products do not pay taxes to help pay for the physical 
maintenance and legal governance of the district.
The Unión alleges that government officials have taken bribes to al-
low some 17,000 Chinese and Korean immigrants to illegally take up 
residence in Tepito and establish 2,500 registered businesses to import 
contraband from China (Bazán 2005). According to the Unión’s presi-
dent, Victor Cisneros Taja, “the historic center has been kidnapped and 
is a lawless territory” that could follow Tepito’s lead in becoming a safe 
haven for drug- related activities (quoted in S. González 2006; also see 
M. López 2007). Local authorities, he lamented in a 2010 interview, are 
not willing to intervene:
We’ve raised the problem with the city government, but the officials 
have a convenient excuse: contraband is a federal problem, so not their 
responsibility. This is actually not the case, because it’s written into 
law that if something is going on in the streets under your jurisdiction, 
then it’s your responsibility. Because of Tepito over 80 percent of what 
is sold in the historic center is contraband, nearly all of it from China. 
You can see the Chinese vendors in their stalls in Tepito. They used to 
do this in the [historic] center, but in October 2007 we started to get 
them out. They mostly sell women’s goods because those items sell 
fast—handbags, watches, shoes, and clothes that are copies of brand 
names. We’re talking about organized crime. There are showrooms 
in China where Mexicans go to look at products. The Chinese even 
pay for the twenty- hour charter flight to go over and look at their 
merchandise, and you can simply pay for the products at Western 
Union here in Mexico City. We recently denounced Western Union 
for this in the press, and they came out a few days later with a public 
statement saying that it’s not their responsibility. Apparently it’s no-
body’s responsibility. (interview, June 18, 2010)
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To interrupt the flow of Chinese contraband, Cisneros Taja sent a list to 
the city government of 250 businesses that illegally rent their shops to un-
registered traders (Solis Peña 2006). Constant lobbying by the Unión and 
thirty- two prominent business leaders to strengthen the Law of Merchant 
Establishments (Ley de Establecimientos Mercantiles) finally led the 
city government, on October 12, 2007, to order vendors to remove their 
stalls from the thirty- four restored blocks of Mexico City’s historic center 
(Osorio 2007). To diminish resistance from the informal sector, Cisneros 
secured a commitment from registered businesses that they would also 
remove merchandise from public spaces outside their shops and stores. 
Street vendors, he argued, should be relocated to delineated open- air 
 plazas so that the historic center could once again become orderly, “like it 
was in the era of the conquest” (quoted in Osorio and Díaz 2007).
Unimpressed with this vision of history, representatives of the infor-
mal sector confronted Cisneros in a public forum, arguing: “We street 
vendors are the pride of Mexico. . . . We do not want more commercial 
plazas; street stalls are better because people can buy from us as they 
walk by” (quoted in Páramo 2007). To build public support for their case, 
informal traders—the majority of whom are Mexican—turned on the 
mayor of Mexico City, Marcelo Ebrard, and accused him of conspiring 
with Chinese businesspeople in his plan to redevelop the historic center:
They [government officials] want to expel the people into the street, 
and give their territory over to companies that will build large 
commercial centers, but not for the informal vendors or even for 
registered businesses, but rather for the Chinese. Marcelo Ebrard, the 
interviewees say, is destroying the local informal sector; he is going to 
take it away by force on October 12, from one day to the next, leaving 
nearly 10,000 street vendors with no way to feed their families. The 
local government is complicit, but everyone loses out. The only people 
benefiting from the expropriation, with the protection of the city 
government, are the Chinese businessmen who will find ways to sell 
contraband and their merchandise freely. . . . [Ebrard] is helping Asian 
networks to invade our capital city. (Uno más Uno 2007)
It is well known that Mexico City’s government is eager to accept Chi-
nese investment in tourism, communications, and information tech nol ogy 
(Courtade 2013), but the historic center’s street vendors are concerned 
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about the influx of Chinese products and people that might accom-
pany this investment. Alleging collusion between the city government 
and Chinese businesspeople, the vendors have publicly distanced them-
selves from Chinese merchandise, which is widely associated with the 
massive growth of the informal sector and its deleterious economic im-
pact (M. López 2006b). Cheap Chinese- made blank dvds (1.9 pesos, or 
15 U.S. cents, each) and high- speed copying devices are believed to be 
responsible for the annual production of some sixty million musical cds 
in Tepito, which are subsequently distributed around the country and 
throughout Latin America (Aguiar 2012, 37; Padgett 2005; Sierra 2004).
Ling argues that allegations like these use China as a scapegoat: “Ac-
tually China produces much more than cheap goods, and the Mexican 
Chinese community isn’t that involved in piracy. Ninety percent of pi-
racy is operated by Mexicans, including those who import goods from 
China and then change labels to ‘made in USA’ or ‘made in Mexico.’ To 
escape the attention they blame the Chinese community” (interview, 
June 8, 2010). Ling’s contention is supported by evidence that Chinese 
contraband is smuggled and distributed in partnership with Mexicans, 
including unscrupulous officials on the country’s southern border with 
Guatemala and northern border with the United States (M. González 
2005; Ochoa León 2008). As one report has it: “Whether it be with shoes, 
clothes, ‘brand name’ perfumes, or 10 percent of the value of fake jewelry, 
the Chinese traffickers pay the officials to smuggle their merchandise 
during the night through the Suchiate River [on Mexico’s border with 
Guatemala]. . . . Most of the Chinese mafia operating in Tepito are actu-
ally owners of distribution centers” (J. García 2008).
Cisneros Taja of the Unión del Centro Histórico does not deny Mexi-
can collusion, but he argues that it results from the irresistible overtures 
of Chinese traffickers and providers. The latter, he says, pay Mexican 
“big sellers” to visit factories in Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces, buy 
cheap consumer goods in bulk, and sell them in Tepito and other orga-
nized street markets (interview, June 18, 2010). They have become espe-
cially attracted to the city of Yiwu in Zhejiang, which allegedly operates 
“as a sort of ‘Wall Street’ for the counterfeiting industry” (Fingleton 2008, 
41). This arrangement gives Chinese wholesalers a presence in Mexican 
street markets to which their access would otherwise be limited (Ellis 
2012, 71).
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The informal networks that enable the movement of undeclared prod-
ucts from factories in Guangdong and Zhejiang across Mexican borders 
and into street markets are expansive, robust, and evolving. By 2014 Cis-
neros saw evidence that Tepito’s illicit supply network was changing, and 
for his own safety he stopped campaigning against it:
Since we met in 2010, middlemen have become less prominent 
because Chinese traders now have a foothold and dan cara [show 
their face] directly in Tepito. Some of the old guard don’t like it, but 
the Chinese distributors have bought their way into retail and even 
have their own building for coordinating supplies from China. In a 
place like Mexico, where there is little enforcement of the law, they can 
do what they like. . . . The Partido Revolucionario Democrático [Party 
of the Democratic Revolution, prd] asked if I’d like to represent it, but 
it became dangerous. My denunciation of the city government for not 
enforcing commercial laws shone a light on a bigger problem. Drugs 
and arms are being traded, and a lot of money is changing hands be-
tween criminals and local politicians. I wasn’t trying to expose this, 
but once you look under the rock you can’t help uncovering things. 
The city government ran a campaign to trash my name, and it affected 
my family. I’ll take on anybody one on one, but we’re talking about 
fighting an enormous monster. You can’t win, so it’s better not to try. 
And safer. (interview, May 30, 2014)
Counterfeit merchandise is one strand in Tepito’s intricate web of in-
formal goods and services, sustained by connections that have flourished 
in step with a well- documented lack of regulatory enforcement. The re-
sulting scenario, described by Cisneros Taja as a “culture of impunity,” 
has permitted the expansion of illicit trade in everything from consumer 
goods to narcotics and arms. It has also further eroded public trust in the 
state’s ability to govern (evident in the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project and National Electoral Institute surveys noted in chapter 2), par-
ticularly since public servants appear to be bound up in the “enormous 
monster” of organized crime.
Policy recommendations for stemming illicit commerce range from 
mandatory taxation of bank deposits through the system of Impuesto 
Empresarial a Tasa Única (Unified Business Tax Rate) to arming cus-
toms officials and police officers with more powerful weapons to com-
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bat offenders (Ayón et  al. 2009; Dussel Peters 2009; Organisation for 
Economic Co- Operation and Development 2009, 59). These and other 
proposals reflect the enormity of Mexico’s informal sector, but they have 
placed growing emphasis on negative rather than positive reinforcement: 
sticks instead of carrots.
Fighting the hard edge of organized crime has entangled Mexican po-
lice in de facto warfare along with the armed forces, deployed by Presi-
dent Felipe Calderón in 2012 to combat drug cartels. Critics argue that 
this strategy and the broader U.S.-financed Plan Mexico, also known as 
the Mérida Initiative, are counterproductive because they have milita-
rized police and security services that are themselves implicated in vio-
lations of the law (Behrens 2009). They also leave few resources for po-
licing the softer dimensions of the informal sector, a point that has not 
escaped the attention of sensationalist reporters eager to expose Chinese 
involvement in Mexico’s black market:
Could it be that pursuing one kind of criminal network has obscured 
the pursuit of another, which is responsible for even more damage 
by causing unemployment, putting the textile, shoe, electronics, toy, 
and accessory industries out of business, and furthermore, operating 
in a totally illegal way in the very center of the Republic? . . . If we 
compare the damage caused by the traditional criminals of Tepito, 
however associated with cartels they were, with the damage caused 
by the Chinese, the differences are enormous, gigantic, because the 
latter are leaving millions of Mexicans with nothing to eat, nowhere to 
work, and without opportunities to develop, and nobody stops them. 
(Arellano 2013)
To pin Mexico’s structural problems on Chinese contraband is facile, 
but the allegation that criminal cartels have drawn police attention away 
from the broader informal sector merits consideration. There is evidence 
that the allocation of resources to hard- line mano dura law enforcement 
has compromised the resilience of civilian police forces and impeded 
more socially engaged containment strategies (Casey- Maslen 2014, 13).
Among the casualties of socially disengaged policing is vertical trust 
between state and society, already fragile in Mexico owing to successive 
electoral scandals, economic mismanagement, and collusion between 
politicians and criminal networks. A more constructive policy orienta-
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tion to Mexico’s informal sector and China’s role in it would set out to 
understand, engage, and harness the social capital underpinning its 
cooperative networks. This proposition has recently been tested in the 
northern state of Baja California, where local government initiatives have 
tried to accommodate unregistered trade in regulated street markets and 
an official chamber of commerce. Baja California is a historical settling 
place of Chinese people in Mexico, and the Chinese associations of the 
region have long been a hub of regional business connections—regis-
tered and otherwise. Identifying and collaborating with the leaders of 
these associations has opened a channel of community engagement for 
the state government and revealed the practical benefits of culturally 
sensitive policy design.
The next section draws on research I conducted in Tijuana and Mexi-
cali between 2008 and 2012 to examine how Mexico’s oldest Chinese as-
sociations are forging new partnerships both in China and with the Baja 
California state government. Resulting as much from a gradual process 
of relationship building as from more immediate economic goals, these 
partnerships have the added capacity to overcome popular distrust built 
up over more than a century.
CHINA GOES LOCAL: THE CHINESE ASSOCIATIONS OF MEXICALI AND TIJUANA
The problems endured by Chinese people in Mexico City have also 
emerged in the northern state of Baja California, where a vicious circle 
of hostility and protection has long revolved around the region’s Chinese 
associations. Despite these conditions, geographic and legislative dis-
tance from federal politics has afforded government officials in Baja Cali-
fornia more room than their peers in the capital to reach out to the as-
sociations. The presence of Chinese people in the state for over a century 
has favored this process, since their associations in the cities of Mexicali 
and Tijuana have provided a longstanding institutional platform for offi-
cial communication.
mexicali
From 1990 until 2006 Eduardo Auyón Gerardo served as president of the 
Chinese Association of Mexicali, a position he used to initiate commu-
nication with outward- looking commercial exporters in China. In 2001 
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his efforts to connect Chinese exporters with Mexican retail networks 
were recognized by ocao, which appointed him as one of its thirty- two 
worldwide “assessors.” Providing a stable nexus for bilateral trade, to-
gether with the related advertising, matchmaking, and visas, have made 
Auyón (as he is known) a key node of contact for entrepreneurs from 
both sides. Building commercial networks under the auspices of ocao, 
he says, has provided a robust and enduring framework for business de-
velopment:
The important thing is security. Some Chinese businesses have 
shipped their products over only to find that the market has turned 
against them because of exaggerated media reports about product 
safety and competition with Mexican producers. As an assessor for 
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office I am responsible for selecting 
trustworthy clients who will follow through with their commitments. 
This has worked very well for us with electronic products and home 
appliances. Mexicali is on the same latitude as the Sahara Desert, so 
we are sourcing a new line of powerful air conditioners under our 
“Kooling Air” and “Dragón Refrigeraciones” brands and selling these 
through the network. (interview, October 7, 2008)
Auyón was born in Zhongshan, Guangdong, shortly after his Chinese 
father and Mexican mother were expelled from Chiapas, Mexico, in the 
1930s. In Zhongshan they reestablished themselves as small traders, but 
they lost their business in 1949 when the communist government seized 
power. Again facing political hostility, they migrated to Macao, where 
Auyón studied visual arts. He eagerly seized an opportunity to visit his 
brother in Mexicali in 1960 and soon became one of Baja California’s 
foremost painters of traditional Chinese and Chinese- Mexican themes 
(figure 4.3). His trademark series of celestial horses drew acclaim, en-
abling him to work his way into the executive ranks of Baja California’s 
School of Fine Arts. Among Auyón’s students were the school’s former 
director and the secretary of education of Baja California, people he later 
drew on to support cultural exchanges with China, such as a visit by 
forty members of the China Central Opera and a series of artistic expo-
sitions in the 1980s. “These relationships,” he says, “gave me a platform 
for making contacts in China. . . . I have blood from both countries, and 
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I’ve always wanted to be a bridge between them” (interview, November 9, 
2008).
Auyón’s aspiration to become a “bridge” between Mexico and China 
is no doubt stimulated by his fragmented family history, but as David 
Palumbo- Liu writes, among Chinese and other diasporic communities 
“there is an abiding possibility that the cultural identification with home 
is more than (merely) sentimental” (2007, 283). For Auyón, the gradual 
construction of bilateral ties has the added advantage of increasing mar-
ket opportunities to import Chinese products. This is evident in the 
delegations of forty to fifty Mexican businesspeople (mostly of Chinese 
descent) that he brings four times each year to Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou.
The delegations visit important historical and cultural sites in China, 
but their primary focus is the Fair of Canton. Sponsored by the govern-
ment of Guangdong and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the fair 
is China’s largest trade convention, bringing together thousands of the 
country’s leading exporters. Each year the fair has a theme, such as medi-
cine or interior design, around which Auyón designs his trips. At the fair, 
the Mexican visitors contract suppliers, collect product catalogues, and 
organize visits for Chinese business partners to Baja California. “Last 
figure 4.3 Eduardo Auyón Gerardo’s renowned mural on the outside of a Mexicali 
nursery school, whose students are mostly Chinese or descendants of Chinese 
immigrants. Photo by the author.
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year [2007],” explained Auyón, “we arranged for slightly over a hundred 
Chinese businesspeople we had met at the fair to visit trade expos that 
we organized in Mexico. The Chinese Association is not a government 
organization, but we work through the Chinese consulate in Tijuana and 
the Mexican embassy in Beijing to arrange the visas” (interview, Novem-
ber 9, 2008).
Throughout his career, Auyón has cultivated relationships to facili-
tate cultural and commercial initiatives between Mexico and China. In 
2004 he began arranging meetings for the governor of Baja California, 
Eugenio Elorduy Walther, with Chinese counterparts such as the gover-
nor of Jiangsu Province, Liang Baohua. When President Hu Jintao visited 
Mexico in 2005 to discuss strategies for reducing the trade imbalance, 
he recognized Auyón’s leadership in facilitating new business linkages. 
The government of Baja California praised the potential benefits of 
these connections during National Immigration Week in October 2008. 
Seven Mexican states participated in the festivities, but the Baja Cali-
fornia branch of the National Institute of Migration (Instituto Nacional 
de Migración, inami) dedicated the week specifically to Chinese immi-
gration, holding all related events and ceremonies in the main hall of the 
Chinese Association of Mexicali (figure 4.4). The city’s mayor, Rodolfo 
Valdez Gutiérrez, described the Chinese community as “a motor of the 
local economy” (Mejía 2008), while Javier Reynoso Nuño, Baja Califor-
nia’s delegate to inami, promised to simplify the process of visa acquisi-
tion for relatives of local Chinese people (La Crónica 2008).
The Baja California government first showed its interest in working 
with Auyón by sponsoring Chinese festivals, parades, and marketplaces. 
These initial activities, he says, have matured into broader public- private 
partnerships:
The Baja California government wanted to work more closely with 
China, so we set up the Sister City relationship between Mexicali and 
Nanjing in 1991. In 2005 when Hu Jintao came to Mexico I met him 
personally, and the Mexican government started to see our community 
as a bridge to China. We created the Chamber of Chinese Enterprises 
of the Northwest [in 2010]. The Chamber takes advantage of the 
relationships we’ve built up with the Baja California government and 
businesses in the area to export Mexican food and other products to 
TRUST AND TREACHERY IN MEXICO’S CHINESE DIASPORA  193
China, and to promote Chinese investment in Mexico in the copper 
mining and the energy sectors. (interview, December 19, 2011)
The Chamber of Chinese Enterprises coordinates the activities of 
some four thousand businesspeople living in the states of Baja Cali-
fornia, Sonora, Coahuila, and Chihuahua. As well as working with the 
Baja California government, it also benefits from the logistical support of 
ocao’s Guangdong office, which views such initiatives as an opportunity 
to advance the Chinese government’s worldwide aspiration to become 
“the central force of the Chinese community” (Barabantseva 2005, 17). 
Through the Chamber, Auyón aims to “generate a bridge to support com-
merce between Chinese entrepreneurs and producers in Asia and those 
in this region of Mexico,” particularly in the maquiladora and automotive 
sectors (Minor 2010).
Embedded in his dislocated personal history, Auyón’s attempts to 
build connections between Mexico and China resonate with ocao’s 
more overtly instrumental goals. Overlapping personal pursuits and 
figure 4.4 The headquarters of the Chinese Association of Mexicali. Photo by the 
author.
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political strategies, writes Khachig Tölölyan, are a common feature of 
diasporic communities, which have often been complicit in the projects 
of the nation-state (1991 and 1996). Indeed, as Palumbo- Liu observes, 
the concept of diaspora entails not only “longing for home, but political 
strategizing for a nation- state. . . . Historically the notion of diasporic 
identity (a shared disseminated/ dispersed identity) was in large part a 
compensation for the loss of a state. Diaspora was precisely the condition 
of statelessness read as homelessness. It mourned deeply that loss, yet 
retained the possibility of its recovery or re- creation” (2007, 283).
Whether or not ocao aspires to expand the global reach of the Chi-
nese nation- state, Auyón believes his work serves Mexico by helping to 
place its products in the Chinese market and attracting Chinese investors 
to copper mining projects and renewable energy initiatives in Mexicali’s 
emerging Silicon Border complex. His nephew, Alfonso Auyón, a busi-
nessman who works in the U.S. border town of Calexico, shares his un-
cle’s vision of win- win cooperation: “We’ve been looking at how we can 
export products to China, like tequila, abalone, beets, and shark fins for 
soup and medicine. We’re also working with Chinese investors in Mexi-
can copper mining in Chihuahua and the central states. On the other 
side of the coin, we’re always looking for opportunities to help Chinese 
exporters enter the Mexican market, and where possible the U.S. market. 
It’s important that the benefits flow both ways. . . . We’re Mexican as well 
as Chinese, and the last thing we want is to be attacked for being against 
Mexico somehow” (interview, December 21, 2011). Mutually beneficial 
outcomes are sorely needed for both Mexico and its Chinese commu-
nities, whose difficulties stem largely from public perceptions that they 
have monopolized economic opportunities rather than extending them 
beyond their tight- knit business networks. Support from Baja California 
politicians, their Chinese counterparts, and ocao may prove decisive in 
this regard, as institutionalized cooperation would enable the diversifica-
tion and formalization of previously narrow trade ties and reduce per-
ceptions of unfairness and illegality. Conscious of the power of percep-
tions, Auyón has undertaken a media campaign to publicly demonstrate 
the mutual benefits of Sino- Mexican cooperation brokered by Mexicali’s 
Chinese community. Luis Ongay Flores, director of the Institute of Cul-
tural Research at the Mexicali Museum, has observed this firsthand:
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Some time ago Auyón donated part of his collection of Chinese- 
Mexican artifacts to the museum, and every so often he visits with 
Chinese government officials, Mexican politicians, and an entourage 
of photographers. I don’t really know what they want, besides to snap 
some photos together. I guess they do their business and then have a 
symbolic moment for the press. The museum is a symbol of Mexicali’s 
multicultural heritage and of human ties between China and Mexico 
in general, so it makes for a good visual backdrop. When those photos 
appear in the press in China and in Mexico, they demonstrate respect 
for local history and culture. (interview, December 21, 2011)
The photographs imply that Mexico’s Chinese community is ensuring the 
continuity of a historical human connection, and in the process doing its 
part to advance Mexican national interests. This message is not trivial, 
especially in light of the negative reactions to the Chinese diaspora that 
China’s growing impact has provoked. Hostility has taken an especially vis-
ible form in Tijuana, where the city’s Chinese association has been over-
whelmed by the growing frequency of attacks on its members’ businesses.
tijuana
The Chinese Association of Tijuana, 135 miles west of Mexicali, has also 
positioned itself as an intermediary of bilateral trade. Its secretary general, 
Willy Liu Ke Wei, was a key lobbyist in a local effort to persuade the air-
line Aeroméxico to operate a direct flight between Shanghai and Tijuana. 
The effort paid off, and in May 2008 the new route was launched with the 
ambition of attracting 30,000 Chinese tourists per year, inspiring Liu to 
set up a travel agency catering to Chinese entrepreneurs exploring op-
portunities in Mexico. The agency set out to generate new Chinese trade 
and investment at a time when the global financial crisis had reportedly 
caused the earnings of Baja California’s Chinese businesses to decline by 
30 percent (G. López 2009).
To stimulate business partnerships Liu initially focused on building 
Chinese and Mexicans’ understanding of each others’ cultural traditions, 
since in his view “commerce and culture are like sisters, and if you go 
down the path of culture, you arrive at the path of business” (interview, 
October 21, 2008). The path forged by Liu’s agency was paved with both 
culture and commerce, bringing Chinese entrepreneurs to Tijuana three 
196 CHAPTER 4
times a year to meet Mexican business partners at conventions and ban-
quets coinciding with the Chinese New Year, the PRC’s Independence 
Day, and the Qingming Festival (which commemorates ancestors). By 
2012 these events had expanded through a partnership with the Autono-
mous University of Baja California that enabled a series of trade exhibi-
tions inspired by cachimex’s annual Expo China (see chapter 2).
Between 2005 and 2014 Liu’s events were accompanied by public pa-
rades and Chinese- themed street markets, coordinated by his associa-
tion at the invitation of the Tijuana city government. The Chinese con-
sulate contributed resources to support these occasions, for as Liu says, 
“the PRC needs our help in creating a good public image” (interview, Oc- 
tober 21, 2008). Consul General Gao confirmed this point, noting that 
the expansive networks developed by the Chinese Association of Tijuana 
function as a catalyst for advancing China’s political as well as economic 
interests (interview, November 5, 2008). For instance, with ocao’s sup-
port, Liu’s association has been instrumental in convincing other Chi-
nese associations to break their ties with Taiwan. To this end, in 2001 
ocao established the Chinese Peaceful Pro- Unification Alliance of Baja 
California, which the state’s three Chinese associations (in the cities of 
Tijuana, Mexicali, and Ensenada) immediately joined, adopting Manda-
rin as their operating language as a condition of membership.
For the Chinese Association of Tijuana, 2001 marked the first time 
since its 1918 founding that it did not conduct its annual meeting in Can-
tonese, the first language of 98 percent of its members. The adjustment, 
along with vigilance against anti- PRC and pro- Taiwan activities, appears 
to be the price of institutional recognition. This recognition, says Liu, 
has enabled the association to attract additional support from the Baja 
California government and begin to develop officially endorsed business 
activities, like its counterpart in Mexicali. Operating in Mandarin is fun-
damental to this process, and therefore translators fluent in Cantonese, 
Mandarin, and Spanish are in demand. One such person is Li Zhuohong, 
who is contracted by the association as an intermediary for Chinese and 
Mexican lawyers:
When I was fifteen I came to Mexico to join my father, who had been 
here for three years. I’m from Guangdong, so I speak Cantonese, like 
most Chinese people here. The problem is that to do business with 
TRUST AND TREACHERY IN MEXICO’S CHINESE DIASPORA  197
China these days, you have to speak Mandarin. I learned Mandarin in 
school in China, and then I improved here in the Chinese Association 
of Tijuana. Then the association hired me to teach Mandarin to the 
children of newly arrived Chinese. From there I’ve become a sort of 
translator and interpreter. . . . I was hired by Geely [a Chinese carmaker] 
to help it negotiate the establishment of a factory in Guanajuato. If 
there are legal documents that Chinese firms need, then I point 
them in the right direction. I also get a lot of calls from the Chinese 
consulate, which sends Chinese businesspeople to our association 
because we have good relations with practically all industries in the 
Tijuana area. Some of these are restaurants, some are maquiladoras, 
and some are retail outlets. (interview, November 11, 2008)
In 1998 the Chinese Association of Tijuana published a set of guide-
lines for its members, titled “Laws of the Chinese Community of Tijuana.” 
Circulated in Mandarin and Spanish, the document spells out the orga-
nization’s four primary responsibilities: (1) assist the government of the 
PRC in any way possible; (2) strengthen the unity of the Chinese commu-
nity, promote its peaceful development, and secure maximum possible 
benefits for it; (3) build friendship between Chinese and Mexican people 
and their countries through economic and cultural exchange; and (4) en-
courage the Chinese people of Tijuana to compensate other members of 
the community for losses resulting from calamities with donations and 
support (Chinese Association of Tijuana 1998).
While the first responsibility leaves the association’s political alle-
giance to the PRC in no doubt, the second and fourth reveal a specific 
preoccupation with the community’s well- being. Considering the adver-
sity faced by Chinese people in Mexico, past and present, this is a logical 
concern. Indeed, while the efforts of people like Liu, Li, and Auyón to 
build Mexican trust with mainland Chinese businesses are recognized 
and praised in China, anti- Chinese “calamities” are commonplace in Baja 
California (Xinhua 2007; Zhan 2002). Liu laments that his community 
has borne the brunt of this hostility:
In the last five years, things have gotten worse for our community. All 
of our businesses, 100 percent, have been robbed or assaulted in some 
way, some of them four or five times in one year! We don’t go to the 
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police because we feel they won’t resolve anything for us and we’ll just 
waste more time and money dealing with them. Criminals target us 
because they know the police won’t investigate. My agency was robbed 
three times this year. That’s why my door is locked with a buzzer. If 
you don’t have an appointment or we don’t know you, we don’t let 
you in. Now Chinese businesses have to hire security guards. . . . We’re 
suffering, and we’re running out of hope. Many are scared, and many 
are leaving. When your businesses are attacked you have to make a 
choice. You can either turn around to make a fuss or you can go on 
without looking over your shoulder. We choose to go on and not draw 
even more attention to ourselves. (interview, October 21, 2008)
In the second half of 2008 alone, the Chinese Association of Tijuana 
registered over ten attacks on its members’ businesses, prompting Con-
sul General Gao to publicly denounce the assaults. The perpetrators, he 
said, were probably emboldened by expectations of police indifference to 
Chinese immigrants and their descendants. Liu had previously expressed 
his dismay to the newspaper La Frontera about the fact that the law can-
not help his community: “We want protection, but we do not know which 
institution or individuals to go to because we don’t trust the authorities, 
the police, or others” (quoted in Ramírez 2007). When I followed up with 
Liu in December 2011, he noted that little had changed: victims of abuse 
still preferred not to involve the police, instead turning to the association 
for social and financial support.
Faced with ineffective law enforcement and fears of police discrimina-
tion, it is no surprise that community protection should reemerge as a 
core activity of Mexico’s Chinese associations. While adversity has re-
newed the associations’ purpose, their members’ reliance on customary 
internal procedures rather than the police and institutional legal defense 
has further ingrained their reputation as a community unwilling to in-
tegrate. As Alejandro Portes puts it, “sociability cuts both ways” (1998, 
18). Liu acknowledged his community’s part in perpetuating this reputa-
tion: “I am aware that our silence is partly to blame for society’s lack of 
understanding of us. It’s one of the things we have to change” (interview, 
October 21, 2008). More than three years later, Liu conceded that beyond 
the creation of a group that performed folk music and a festival of Chi-
nese food, the association had made little progress in building external 
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trust: “culturally things are going well, but people are still suspicious; the 
problem is politics” (interview, December 22, 2011).
Mexico’s Chinese associations have long protected and advanced their 
members’ interests, but deepening business ties to China may be com-
promising this humanitarian tradition. Their networks now include Chi-
nese providers of low- skilled labor for Baja California’s industries, not 
least the maquiladora sector. Oppressive working conditions and inad-
equate safety standards have brought misery to thousands of Chinese 
immigrants, whose passage to Mexico has been overseen by the associa-
tions. Severe consequences await those who complain or even discuss 
their predicament outside a tight circle of fellow employees. The next 
section examines this closed circle of trust and how a lack of regulatory 
oversight has let it spin out of control.
ENFORCING TRUST: THE DEPTHS OF NEGATIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL
Investors from mainland China and Taiwan have taken a keen interest in 
northern Mexico’s maquiladoras, whose geographic location and rapid 
turnaround times have made them responsive to the fluctuations of the 
U.S. market and enabled the region to retain a foothold in the textile, 
electronics, and automobile industries (Hu- DeHart 2003, 248). The Han 
Young maquiladora in Tijuana, for instance, manufactures truck chas-
sis, which under the North American Free Trade Agreement are shipped 
free of duty to the Hyundai assembly plant in San Diego and sold on the 
U.S. market. The success of this model owes much to the long working 
hours of maquiladora employees, and, according to the workers’ rights 
activist Antonio Velázquez Loza, “it is not only Mexican workers who 
are victims of low wages and ill treatment; Chinese laborers who work 
in these plants suffer even worse abuses” (quoted in Gómez Mena 2006). 
Employed in China as technicians, most Chinese maquiladora workers 
live onsite, are prohibited from interacting with Mexicans, and have lim-
ited access to medical attention. Like the Chinese immigrants of the early 
twentieth century, they arrive in Mexico with hopes of earning a respect-
able living, but according to Veláquez Loza soon find themselves “practi-
cally living in slavery.”
The Chinese associations assist Mexican and Chinese companies to 
navigate the legal procedures of sponsoring and contracting Chinese em-
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ployees. This assistance is not limited to the maquiladora sector; other 
major importers of labor include northern Mexico’s thriving Chinese 
restaurants and clothing retailers (Spagat 2005). Tijuana and Mexicali 
are each home to approximately six hundred Chinese restaurants, but 
approximately one- third of these are reportedly not formally registered. 
The labor force that supports this wide range of businesses is similarly 
diverse. It includes migrants seeking to enter the United States, who have 
traveled for weeks or months from mainland China and Hong Kong by 
air to Colombia and then by a combination of land and sea voyages to 
Panama and across Central America (Protocolo 2007).
In the border cities of Tijuana and Mexicali, unregistered Chinese mi-
grants work alongside descendants of Chinese immigrants and a growing 
pool of laborers who enter Mexico on temporary work and study visas 
and remain indefinitely. Depending on the complexity of their passage, 
Chinese migrant workers incur costs ranging from 30,000 to 60,000 
per person, and according to a senior figure in the Chinese community 
of Tijuana, these costs must be repaid: “It’s very expensive for Chinese 
workers to come. Officially the cost to arrange a work visa for an em-
ployee is 800 pesos [80], and there was a point when this worked, es-
pecially for chefs. But things have tightened up, and now, after paying 
lawyers to push the case through, it costs about 8,000 per employee just 
for the paperwork. When they get here they work extremely hard, almost 
without sleep, so the restaurant and factory owners make their money 
back in this way. It can take fifteen or twenty years to pay back the debt” 
(interview, October 2, 2008).
Bound to their sponsors until their debts are paid, Chinese immi-
grants are in no position to formally advocate for improved working con-
ditions. To do so would leave them destitute, subject to retribution, and 
in many cases exposed to prosecution under immigration laws. Their fate 
illuminates the underside of globalization, as observed by Wanni Ander-
son and Robert Lee: “Many thousands of Asian migrants who belong to 
the transnational working class, the new hewers of wood and haulers of 
water in the global economy, are tied to ‘homelands’ by debt, familial 
obligation, and statelessness” (2005, 13).
In a context of extreme pressure against independent unionization, 
Chinese migrant workers in Mexico have few sources of support. Even 
the Chinese associations have not extended their assistance, in part be-
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cause their efforts focus on Chinese migrants and their descendants who 
have already established themselves in Mexico, but also because their 
business commitments impede them from doing so. According to Juan 
Arroyo, a Baptist minister who works with Chinese newcomers in Mexi-
cali, the associations’ tradition of humanitarian support to marginalized 
workers has been turned on its head, since their assistance goes instead to 
the managers of factories and restaurants in the name of building bridges 
to China: “The leaders of the Chinese associations are too busy arrang-
ing business deals for wealthy mainland investors to pay attention to the 
problems of these people. Most of the new arrivals are victimized. They 
are targets of discrimination in hospitals, in workplaces, and in public . . . 
[they are] denied services and refused legal representation. When they 
have difficulties learning Spanish they are humiliated, and sometimes 
they are even physically abused” (interview, October 12, 2008).
The Chinese associations have provided unofficial channels of mi-
gration into Mexico, and onward to the United States, since the mid- 
nineteenth century (Taylor 2002). Whether or not they have abandoned 
their humanitarian tradition, as Arroyo believes, they continue to broker 
a social contract that commits new arrivals to pay for their passage by 
working hard and keeping quiet. For the few who refuse to honor these 
terms in northern Baja California, Arroyo has been a beacon of hope. His 
congregation, which consists mainly of Chinese contract employees, has 
grown to include over a hundred migrant workers who have walked away 
from exploitative factory and restaurant jobs and others who are con-
sidering doing so. After a Sunday worship service in a Baptist outreach 
center in downtown Mexicali, Arroyo invited me to his nearby house for 
lunch.
THE DEFECTORS
Arroyo takes me from room to room, introducing me to groups of people standing with 
bowls of fried beef and pork with rice in hand, conversing in Mandarin. In each room he 
describes me, in Spanish, as an anthropologist from the Autonomous University of Baja 
California [where I was working at the time] doing a research project on Chinese people 
in Mexico. I’m here, he explains, because I want to learn more about the outreach 
activities of the Baptist church, and I am a trustworthy person who won’t reveal people’s 
information to the authorities. My Mandarin salutations evoke smiles and soon lead to 
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conversations about where people are from and how they are finding Mexico. I hear 
stories about unexpected hardship, the impossibility of acquiring legal residence 
papers, the constant threat of corrupt police officers, and the unrelenting demands of 
sponsors. A restaurant worker says she was kidnapped last year, and a diabetic factory 
worker says that his sponsor threatened to harm his family in China if he continued to 
take sick days. The hub of activity is a grill outside the back door, around which four 
men and two women busily take requests and sizzle thin strips of beef. Arroyo suggests 
that we all take a photo together, but polite smiles accompanied by exaggerated waves 
of the hand force him to abandon this idea. His mobile phone rings, and he says we need 
to leave. Another victim has asked him to come and help at the hospital.
—Mexicali, November 5, 2008
Some of Arroyo’s guests that Sunday were also staying with him, their 
former accommodation withdrawn by their sponsors when they left 
their jobs. One young man said the official fee for coming to Mexico and 
acquiring residence papers is 18,000, but that unofficial payments of 
thousands of dollars are also necessary to advance the paperwork and 
upgrade a tourist visa to a work visa. The restaurant owner who had em-
ployed him had still not paid these unofficial fees, and after two years 
he was still working illegally. An older man had been stopped by the 
police, and when they found he was without his residence documents, 
they asked him to pay an impossibly large fine on the spot. His spon-
sor, a prominent member of Mexicali’s Chinese association, paid the fine 
but then required the man to work days and nights without rest in an 
electronics assembly plant. A woman spoke of the unsafe conditions at 
the plastics factory where she worked, which had resulted in her young 
daughter burning her hand. She had to wait eight hours for treatment in 
the public hospital.
These and other stories revealed frequent abuse by sponsors, ne-
glected labor standards, and public discrimination. Arroyo’s church was 
doing all it could for its desperate congregation, he said, but it did not 
have the resources to sustain the growing number of new arrivals. Other 
religious groups, including Baptist congregations in Mexicali, had “cut 
us off,” Arroyo said, because they did not want to be publicly associated 
with Chinese workers and face the potential vengeance of their employ-
ers. During my subsequent visits, Arroyo answered several calls on his 
mobile phone each hour, providing advice, making appointments, and 
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responding to the latest crises. Driving through Mexicali with me, he 
pointed out apartments housing ten to twenty Chinese laborers in one 
or two rooms. “You don’t see them,” he said during one of our meetings, 
“and nor does anybody else. They leave for work before light and return 
after dark.” As Liu confirmed, Chinese immigrants are disproportion-
ately targeted by kidnappers emboldened by their victims’ illegal status, 
and by confidence that their sponsors will pay a high price to recover 
their investments (interview, October 21, 2008; also see Ramírez 2007).
The detail in which Arroyo introduced me to his congregation re-
flected its delicate predicament and the circle of trust defining its bound-
aries. The understandable reluctance of its members to be photographed, 
even at Arroyo’s request, suggested the danger of transgressing these lim-
its. To do so could expose them to their sponsors’ wrath in the form of 
longer work hours, withdrawal of access to housing, and even threats to 
family members in China. These sanctions constitute an extreme form 
of “enforceable trust,” a concept that Portes (1998, 8) borrows from Max 
Weber ([1922] 1947) to describe informal sanctions applied within a com-
munity to ensure compliance with rules of conduct. For Arroyo’s congre-
gation, the rules are clear: focus on your work, do not complain, speak to 
nobody, and in return you will be safe and eventually free. These condi-
tions make it almost impossible for hundreds of Chinese migrant work-
ers in Mexico to build linkages and friendships beyond each other. Pre-
vented from doing so both by the fear of retributions from their sponsors 
and the insecurity of being Chinese in Mexico, they live on the margins 
of a marginalized community.
There is no shortage of solidarity among Baja California’s Chinese mi-
grant workers, but as Raphael De Kadt (1994) and Johannes Fedderke, 
Raphael de Kadt, and John Luiz (1999) have shown, the benefits of social 
capital result more from optimization than from maximization. Optimi-
zation in this case would mean extending relationships outward, with 
Arroyo’s help, to potential allies and advocates. Barred from this path by 
ruthless employers and recruiters, the members of Arroyo’s congregation 
were almost entirely isolated from external connections. Ronald Burt 
(1992) describes such scenarios as “structural holes,” social vacuums that 
confer especially high value on intermediaries who endeavor to fill them. 
Arroyo was such an intermediary and embodied this point: he provided 
a lifeline to pull the Chinese workers out of their hole and sought only 
204 CHAPTER 4
spiritual fulfillment in return. As Nan Lin (2001, 39– 40) writes, coopera-
tion across community boundaries requires a reciprocal flow of rewards, 
whether social, economic, or divine.
The problem for Arroyo and, consequently, his congregation was that 
his own external affinities were weak. Facing rejection from his broader 
religious network for his association with Chinese immigrants, Arroyo 
risked being trapped in the social void he had dared to enter. The missing 
ingredient for him was vertical synergy—with the church, a nongovern-
mental organization, a business, or a government outreach office—that 
might lift him and his congregation out of isolation and into contact with 
potential friends and allies. Without vertical institutional support, they 
had no way to develop horizontal alliances.
Closer economic cooperation between Mexico and China will not in 
itself create vertical structures capable of addressing the predicament of 
Chinese migrant workers and may even do the opposite. The Peña Nieto 
administration’s negotiations with China to establish more direct flights 
to and from Mexico and to increase the number of Chinese tourists from 
the current 50,000 (only one- tenth the number of Chinese who visit the 
United States) could result in further abuse, as could inami’s promise 
to facilitate Chinese immigration to Baja California. As the number of 
Chinese visitors grows, integrating these efforts into a broader gover-
nance strategy will become more urgent. Early attempts to do so have 
been unsuccessful. In 2008 an official at the Mexican embassy in Beijing 
proposed to hold information sessions to inform visa applicants of po-
tential risks, but these were not authorized for fear of repelling prospec-
tive tourists. A 2010 scheme to track the conversion of tourist visas into 
work visas was also abandoned owing to insufficient consular resources.
The proven disposition of Baja California’s government to work with 
the Chinese associations of Tijuana and Mexicali could provide a more 
promising platform for confronting abuse. The associations have pre-
viously embraced opportunities for vertical collaboration through cul-
tural festivals, street markets, and the Chamber of Chinese Enterprises 
of the Northwest. These activities provide a foundation for promoting 
social responsibility within Chinese business networks. Initiatives could 
include periodic briefing sessions among inami, the Chinese consulate 
in Tijuana, and the associations; joint outreach services for victimized 
employees; and audits of conditions in local restaurants, factories, and 
TRUST AND TREACHERY IN MEXICO’S CHINESE DIASPORA  205
other sectors powered by Chinese contract workers. The Chinese asso-
ciations would gain much from actively participating in such schemes, 
not least an opportunity to improve their reputations as responsible and 
trustworthy intermediaries. As China’s economic and demographic ties 
to Mexico deepen, official support for such vertical partnerships, and the 
disposition of the Chinese associations to participate in them, will carry 
growing political and humanitarian weight.
CONCLUSION
Compassion alone rarely stimulates political action, and Mexican officials 
are unlikely to engage more closely with their nation’s Chinese diaspora 
unless doing so secures tangible benefits. As in Cuba, motivation for new 
synergies will come not from goodwill, but in response to perceived op-
portunities and threats. People- to-people ties with China are generating 
both. New channels of trade, such as those developed by the Chamber 
of Chinese Enterprises of the Northwest, have caught the eye—and re-
ceived the endorsement—of the Baja California government. By support-
ing the organization’s commercial partnerships with China, facilitating 
trade fairs, and inviting Chinese associations to conduct public festivals, 
administrators are discovering that their electorates stand to gain when 
business networks and the trust underpinning them are integrated into 
formal development strategies.
Failure to engage more assertively with its Chinese communities will 
leave the Mexican state exposed to an expanding informal sector fueled 
by imported Chinese merchandise. Cisneros’s characterization of Tepito 
as one limb of “an enormous monster” is worrying, especially since the 
monster’s other limbs reach outward to suppliers across the Pacific and 
inward to unscrupulous customs officials and politicians. To cage the 
monster and limit the expansion of illicit trade networks, Cisneros ad-
vocates more assertive policing and stricter enforcement of the Law of 
Merchant  Establishments. Stronger rule of law would no doubt help con-
tain illicit transpacific networks, but inadequate legal resilience extends 
beyond specific commercial regulations into the daily conduct of poli-
ticians.
Allegations of undue cooperation between so-called Chinese eco-
nomic invaders and civil servants—including Marcelo Ebrard, Mexico 
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City’s former mayor—are symptomatic of broad public suspicion of gov-
ernment. The profound “distrust and disconnect among citizens, and 
between the population and the government” acknowledged by the Na-
tional Electoral Institute in 2014 constitutes fertile ground for narratives 
of unwelcome Chinese informal trading (Saldierna 2014). The electoral, 
security, and procurement irregularities described in chapter 2 have gen-
erated a vertical disjuncture that must be bridged through comprehen-
sive anticorruption measures alongside tighter regulation of the black 
market. The two problems are intertwined and mutually reinforcing, and 
neither can be fully understood—or remedied—independently of the 
other.
Sustainable trust between state and society requires carrots as well as 
sticks. As the case of Baja California showed, social engagement strate-
gies have made headway in integrating informal Chinese networks into 
registered markets. Experiences of state- society collaboration in Mexi-
cali and Tijuana offer lessons for the broader Mexican public and private 
sectors, which have been slow to reach out to Chinese networks because 
of public concern about the national trade deficit with China and the 
supposed role of the resident Chinese community in deepening it. Evi-
dent in the press, on Internet sites, and in violent acts against private 
businesses, popular antagonism toward the Chinese diaspora in Mexico 
echoes the nationalism of the early twentieth century, predicated on the 
perceived selfishness of Chinese people. The response from Chinese 
communities—then and now—has been to avoid direct confrontation 
with opponents and seek protection within the long- standing mutual aid 
and economic assistance services of the Chinese associations.
External hostility and internal protectionism constitute a perennial vi-
cious circle surrounding Mexico’s Chinese communities, but as the circle 
revolves over time, the distrust it generates has extended outward. Ac-
cording to analysts at unam’s China- Mexico Research Center, aggres-
sion toward Chinese interests is discouraging Chinese investors and im-
porters from proceeding with their Mexican projects. This is detrimental 
to Mexico, as Chinese investors and importers possess more power than 
anybody else to restore some measure of balance to the bilateral trade 
relationship. The potentially massive demand of Chinese markets for 
Mexican products, coupled with the apparent inability of the two gov-
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ernments to formulate projects that produce genuine mutual benefits, 
endows the activities of intermediaries like Eduardo Auyón, Willy Liu, 
and Li Zhuohong with considerable gravity. The challenge lying before 
these individuals and the Chinese associations they represent is to ex-
pand the scope of their networks horizontally beyond Chinese suppliers 
to Mexican exporters, and vertically to secure government endorsement 
at the state and federal levels.
The community support structures of the Chinese diaspora in Mexico 
have benefited those with a stake in the international expansion of Chi-
nese firms, but for thousands of Chinese migrant workers, conformity 
to internal codes of loyalty has been less beneficial. Indebtedness and 
subservience to employers has subjected them to inhumane working 
conditions and to the threat of kidnappers seeking to cash in on their 
precarious legal standing and their value to commercial sponsors. The 
predicament of Chinese laborers in Mexico bears out a truth observed 
by Peter Evans (1997): social capital is no more inherently beneficial than 
financial capital.
The concept of enforceable trust among Chinese migrant workers 
helps illuminate the conditions they endure, but the facts on the ground 
warrant cautious application of this and other sociological constructs. 
The control exercised over desperate migrant laborers by powerful spon-
sors belies the existence of a cohesive Chinese diaspora in Mexico. At 
most a Weberian ideal type, “the term diaspora holds within it a series 
of contradictions that the name itself seeks to elide” (Palumbo- Liu 2007, 
282). More accurately understood as a hub of diversity than uniformity, 
the Chinese community in Mexico demonstrates the extent of inequality, 
fragmentation, and diversification created by twenty- first- century labor 
migration. With this process comes the need for conceptual tools that are 
less reliant on bounded notions of community and more sensitive to the 
globalization of trust in all its forms.
Social and financial capital are interacting in new ways as the reach of 
mainland Chinese formal and informal institutions extends further over-
seas. Emerging labor markets and production chains are creating new 
contexts for the deployment of trust, and trust is enabling the creation 
of new niches in the global economy. This book’s conclusion argues that 
a looming challenge for the governments and citizens of Mexico, Cuba, 
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and other nations that are pursuing closer relations with China is to more 
effectively harness the resulting social affinities to create inclusive de-
velopment opportunities. Implicit in this challenge is the formulation of 
analytic concepts capable of grasping the social as well as economic im-
plications of China’s historic rise.
CONCLUSION
CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF HISTORY
As China’s brand of state capitalism goes global, developing countries 
have become at once alarmed and inspired. For two decades prior to the 
global financial crisis, Western policy analysts confidently advised gov-
ernments around the world—those of China, Cuba, and Mexico among 
them—to scale back their interventions in economic affairs. The appar-
ent Cold War victory of liberal democracy, markets, and civil society as 
the prime movers of development led Francis Fukuyama (1992) to fa-
mously declare that the world had reached “the end of history.”
The fact that Cuban history continued defiantly along a state- centric 
path is noteworthy, but even more so is the Chinese government’s mas-
tery of international markets. Over the past decade China has contrib-
uted around 25 percent to global economic growth, more than any other 
country. Set against the backdrop of today’s financial volatility in the 
West, China’s rise has institutions from the International Monetary Fund 
to the U.S. government questioning whether we are witnessing “the re-
turn of history” (Kagan 2008).
For all the trepidations of the world’s liberal democracies, one thing 
is certain: history is not repeating itself. Despite its communist under-
pinnings, the Chinese government now looks outward with a brand of 
economic pragmatism unknown to Cold War contenders. Furthermore, 
formal and informal cooperation forged through the Chinese diaspora 
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is advancing a unique blend of materialist and idealist agendas. David 
Shambaugh has recognized the hybrid approach of Chinese actors and 
has suggested that their growing global influence is internationalizing a 
tradition that diverges from Western protocol: “for the Chinese, coopera-
tion derives from trust—whereas Americans tend to build trust through 
cooperation” (2009). There is nothing essentialist about Shambaugh’s 
claim; efforts to build trust are embedded from the start in Chinese proj-
ects throughout Latin America. Across the region, Chinese enterprises 
have offered the confidence of long- term cooperation, agreeing to pur-
chase energy and agriculture products for more than a decade into the 
future and taking on considerable risk through potentially irrecoverable 
trade credits and loans.
Cuba illustrates Shambaugh’s point, having accrued an estimated 
6 billion debt to China, including 115 million pledged during Xi Jin-
ping’s 2014 visit to upgrade the Port of Santiago de Cuba. The fact that 
China continues to financially and politically support the Cuban govern-
ment illustrates Beijing’s faith that reforms on the island will eventually 
yield economic results, among them the repayment of loans. Mexico 
underscores the human dimension of trust as a prime mover: support 
from the Chinese government’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (ocao) 
has used transpacific ethnic affinities to foment the personal confidence 
necessary for commercial partnerships between leaders of the Chinese 
diaspora and exporters in mainland China. Where official attempts at 
bilateral engagement have failed, informal cooperation has flourished.
Deepening commercial exchanges in the Chinese diaspora, alongside 
cooperation on development projects with powerful Chinese state en-
terprises, present new challenges for Latin America. This book has ar-
gued that effective responses require more dynamic and inclusive part-
nerships between people, companies, and their governments. Chinese 
diasporic communities have begun to leverage a broad set of social and 
economic resources to stimulate this process from the bottom up. Their 
dynamism contrasts with the difficulties of large enterprises, both public 
and private, in responding to the competitive pressures and commercial 
opportunities generated by China’s rise. Whether mandated to source 
supplies from small providers, as proposed by Cuba’s Lineamientos 
(República de Cuba 2011), or forced to share tax and funding benefits 
with a wider variety of economic actors, as signaled by Mexican lawmak-
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ers under President Enrique Peña Nieto, established industrial winners 
are under pressure to reform.
Although closer dealings with Chinese actors have provoked greater 
emphasis on local economic dynamism, there is no guarantee that initial 
responses will consolidate into long- term policies. As China’s interna-
tional influence grows, its preference for state- to-state cooperation may 
not support the efforts of partner countries to decentralize and diversify 
their economies. On the contrary, official cooperation agreements or-
chestrated by foreign ministries suggest an ongoing process of top- down 
agenda setting. The only significant countercurrent is the proliferation 
of personal collaborations between overseas Chinese communities and 
mainland business partners, which is beginning to generate economic 
results and political responsiveness from the bottom up.
For Cuba, cooperation with China is managed exclusively by the state. 
As discussed in chapter 1, this top- down approach has served the pur-
pose of coordinating initiatives across the education, electronics, and lo-
gistics sectors. It has also enabled the controlled import and distribution 
of agricultural equipment, automobiles, and electronic goods. Regulated 
supply chains orchestrated by the Cuban and Chinese governments have 
diminished the unregistered circulation of these items. As the expansion 
of Cuba’s agricultural cooperatives and deregulation of its automobile 
market show, lawful supply is a prerequisite for subsequent liberalization.
The incremental growth of private initiative under state hegemony 
may be one of “China’s lessons for Cuba” (Cheng 2007a; Ratliff 2004), 
but equally salient is the lesson that communist ideology can no lon-
ger supersede economic rationalism. Chinese officials have repeatedly 
conveyed this message to their Cuban counterparts since the fall of the 
Soviet Union. This was evident in 1995, when Li Peng urged Fidel Cas-
tro to start opening the Cuban economy, and in 1996, when China ter-
minated the barter- based trade and payment agreement. The Chinese 
government has since sent a stream of envoys to advise Cuba on foreign 
investment and the creation of consumer markets. According to Chinese 
officials quoted by a U.S. diplomat in Havana, discussions between China 
and Cuba about carrying out Chinese- style reforms have been tense and 
at times caused “a real headache” (U.S. Department of State 2010). The 
changing basis of bilateral relations hit home for Cuba in 2011, when the 
Chinese firm Yutong insisted that replacement parts for its buses would 
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be sold rather than donated to Cuba. As Omar Pereira Hernández, a for-
mer Cuban diplomat, put it, “political trust is still important in our rela-
tionship, but now it’s a matter of pragmatism, because the Chinese insist 
that the numbers have to add up” (interview, May 28, 2012).
Numbers that refuse to add up are also a persisting theme of Mexico’s 
relations with China, reinforcing a pattern of governmental interactions 
fraught with acrimony. As noted in chapter 2, 72 billion of trade with 
China in 2014 left Mexico with a bilateral deficit of 60 billion (United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 2015). The emerging su-
perpower has progressively encroached on the Mexican handicrafts, 
textiles, shoes, electronics, and—more recently—automotive sectors. 
The last is a pillar of the Mexican economy that has also come to face 
Chinese competition in the U.S. market (Watkins 2013). Powerful lobby 
groups, such as the Council for Business Coordination and the Mexican 
Council of Businessmen, have long lobbied their government on behalf 
of the interests of Mexico’s largest companies. These elite organizations 
have secured state subsidies, tax breaks, and permits for the automo-
tive, telecommunications, and agribusiness sectors. As competition with 
China intensifies, pressure is mounting on the government to extend 
these benefits to smaller businesses. This not only would diversify the 
economy and expand the tax base but would also entice workers out of 
the rampant informal sector, which is estimated to employ some thirty 
million people, or 60 percent of Mexico’s workforce (Hughes 2013). The 
need for formal opportunities at the grass roots is becoming more urgent 
as the flow of contraband Chinese consumer goods into Mexico gains 
momentum.
Subsidies and other forms of state intervention will not by themselves 
overcome the much- heralded China threat that Mexico faces, but neither 
will unsupported initiatives from the private sector and civil society. So-
lutions will more likely emerge from a framework of engagement between 
state and society, between independent actors, and between Mexico and 
China. Chapter 2 identified potential steps toward the creation of such 
synergies. Tax breaks, rebates, and travel support could be extended to 
small businesses that present their products in the Fair of Canton and 
other Chinese trade expositions. Official sponsorship could be offered 
to China- oriented trade fairs in Mexico, such as the annual Expo China, 
which attempts to bring together Mexican, Latin American, and Chinese 
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commercial partners. Cases of successful engagement with China, such 
as Nemak, could be studied with the aim of learning and emulating best 
practices among a broader range of exporters. Small steps like these, so 
far impeded by an overemphasis on assistance to large enterprises, would 
foment trusting relationships among the Mexican state, a broad range of 
businesses, and their prospective Chinese partners.
The reforms under way in Cuba and Mexico will broaden both coun-
tries’ international horizons. Cuba is attempting to update its economy 
through the Lineamientos process initiated in 2011, the opening of the 
automobile and real estate markets, and the revision of the 1995 Foreign 
Investment Law. The 2014 version of the law protects investors against 
the nationalization of their assets, exempts them from personal income 
and labor taxes, and guarantees a profits tax ceiling of 15 percent pre-
ceded by an eight- year grace period. The architect of these measures, 
Marino Murillo, was reappointed as minister of the economy in 2014, 
affording him the executive authority to supervise implementation. Raúl 
Castro aspires to attract 2.5 billion of foreign finance, but investors must 
weigh opportunities in oil exploration, tourism, and the Mariel Special 
Economic Zone against political risks. For instance, if the U.S. govern-
ment relaxes its trade embargo, Chinese and U.S. investors will be forced 
to balance the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence with the pressures of 
strategic competition. Cuba could become a regional testing ground for 
Sino- U.S. interactions.
Sino- U.S. encounters in Cuba are becoming more likely as Havana 
and Washington negotiate steps toward diplomatic and commercial rap-
prochement. The Chinese political scientist Wang Yiwei (2014) argues 
that U.S. policy toward Cuba has generated friction across Latin America 
and that the embargo is akin to “lifting a rock only to drop it upon one’s 
own foot” (搬起石头砸自己的脚). The sentiment is gaining traction in 
Miami- Dade County, in Florida, where 68 percent of Cuban Americans 
now favor the restoration of diplomatic relations (Florida International 
University 2014). More conciliatory public opinion underpinned Presi-
dent Barack Obama’s 2014 pledge to advance political détente with Cuba, 
which has unleashed a flurry of trade and fact- finding missions to Havana 
by U.S. businesspeople and politicians, including Assistant Secretary of 
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson and Congress-
woman Nancy Pelosi. Opportunities exist for U.S. businesses to supply 
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Cuba’s agriculture cooperatives, emerging small businesses, and unde-
requipped state enterprises, but Chinese competitors have the advantage 
of trade credits, low- interest loans, and supply contracts deriving from 
Sino- Cuban presidential accords. Under these conditions, Chinese sup-
pliers are less affected than their U.S. counterparts by Cuba’s tight import 
regulations, dual currency regime, and lack of conventional foreign ex-
change financing.
Diverging visions of state intervention will continue to generate diffi-
culties among Cuba, China, and the United States. Although Sino- Cuban 
relations have become more pragmatic, their continuing reliance on the 
“supreme guidance of the state” (discussed in chapter 1) is at odds with 
U.S. conventions of transnational business and civic governance (Hearn 
2009; Mao et al. 2011). Diverging views of government intervention are 
intertwined with the impasse over human rights in Cuba. Jacobson said 
that she broached this sensitive topic in Havana with Josefina Vidal, the 
Cuban Foreign Ministry’s director for U.S. relations, but Vidal emerged 
from the meeting denying that the issue was even raised (“US, Cuba 
Move toward Embassies, Disagree on Human Rights” 2015). A key ques-
tion for future research, as noted below, is whether China’s deepening 
trade and investment relations with Cuba will favor or impede more par-
ticipatory modes of governance and steps toward financial liberalization. 
The answer to this question will set the tone for interactions not only 
between Cuba and China, but for interactions between both countries 
and the United States.
Like the reforms in Cuba, those in Mexico under Peña Nieto are at-
tracting attention from Chinese investors, who are eager to enter the 
country’s energy, electricity, telecommunications, automobile, and man-
ufacturing sectors. Chinese ambitions in Mexico will also unfold in the 
context of relations with the United States, whose multinational enter-
prises are likely to dominate new opportunities. In the oil sector, Exxon 
Mobil, Chevron, and other U.S. firms will leverage the 2013 U.S.-Mexico 
Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement to outmaneuver Chinese com-
petitors. Similarly, as Mexico’s Telecommunication Reform Bill forces 
América Móvil to reduce its market share to below 50 percent, at&t has 
positioned itself to acquire divested mobile and landline assets.
Mexican industries will become further intertwined with the United 
States if the proposed Trans- Pacific Partnership (tpp) comes to fruition. 
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The tpp aspires to accelerate investment among its twelve Pacific Rim 
members, which include the United States and Mexico but not China. A 
recent study reveals conflicting views of the tpp among senior Mexican 
advisors, some of whom believe that a better strategy would be to priori-
tize “triangular” Chinese investments in Mexico that target U.S. markets 
(Armony, Chávez, and Hearn, under review). Whether or not the tpp is 
ever implemented, U.S. and Chinese firms (among others) will continue 
to vie for Mexico’s strategic assets. Like their Cuban counterparts, Mexi-
can citizens can therefore expect more intense collective and personal 
encounters with the conflicting forces of globalization.
While the policy declarations of the Mexican, Cuban, and Chinese 
governments attempt to define the contours of engagement, interactions 
between individuals propel relations in unforeseen directions. With or 
without government approval, independent ties between the Chinese 
diaspora and partners in mainland China are thickening. This presents 
a diplomatic challenge for the Cuban state, which since 1959 has left no 
aspect of foreign interaction to chance, closely supervising external part-
nerships in line with Lenin’s dictum that “trust is good, but control is bet-
ter.” Top- down control of foreign contact has minimized Cuba’s exposure 
to external influences, limited the ability of foreign nongovernmental 
organizations to foment an independent civil society on the island, and 
defended against the U.S. government’s Cuban Democracy Act, which 
attempts to reach around the Cuban state to support organizations that 
could destabilize it (Hearn 2008a, 107– 9). Cuban apprehension about 
foreign intervention, including at the level of people- to-people ties, fo-
cuses for good reason on the United States. Meanwhile, Chinese visitors 
ranging from official delegates to unofficial businesspeople are exempt 
from visa requirements and, for the time being, free to collaborate with 
Havana’s Chinese associations.
Never before in Barrio Chino’s 150-year history has the Chinese Cu-
ban community been able to draw support from an external superpower. 
With their bargaining power augmented, community leaders have found 
the Cuban government more responsive than ever to their ideas and 
proposals. The state’s growing disposition to work with the Chinese as-
sociations may be strengthened by the commitment of the Office of the 
Historian of the City to participatory development, but paramount is 
a top- down desire to maintain control over local affairs. As chapter 3 
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showed, the revival of Barrio Chino’s traditional pharmacy was accorded 
high priority when the Office became concerned that Chinese visitors 
might otherwise illegally supply the community with medicines. Simi-
larly, a local proposal to revamp the newspaper Kwong Wah Po attracted 
the Office’s interest not only for its capacity to deliver revenue, but also 
for its ability to balance China’s growing media presence with a Cuban 
perspective.
The introduction of new businesses, restaurants, infrastructure, and 
tourist attractions into Barrio Chino should be understood in light of 
the Cuban state’s determination to bring emerging entrepreneurs into 
the fold of its hegemony. Nevertheless, opportunities resulting from this 
flurry of activity are encouraging the Chinese community to put internal 
differences aside, collectively formulate proposals, and pursue common 
goals. A critical question for the future is whether or not the Chinese as-
sociations’ revived horizontal solidarity will equip them to challenge the 
state’s hegemony and potentially inspire other groups to pursue a similar 
course. It is noteworthy that the powerful Afro- Cuban religious group 
Ifá Iranlowo, in the neighboring district of Los Sitios, is keenly aware 
that registration with the Ministry of Justice has advanced the Chinese 
associations’ goals and is now lobbying for the same status (interview 
with Victor Betancourt Estrada, leader of Ifá Iranlowo, June 6, 2014; also 
see Hearn 2008a, 50– 52). How deeply and broadly such attempts at local 
empowerment progress will depend on the degree of state endorsement 
they attract, and how deftly they leverage this support to consolidate in-
dependent circles of cooperation and trust.
Mexico’s Chinese diaspora is bound together by more intense pres-
sures than its Cuban counterpart, including a widespread perception that 
its business activities are exacerbating Mexico’s trade deficit with China 
and fueling the black market. Such perceptions result indirectly from the 
lack of functional official partnerships between Mexico and China and, 
as chapter 4 showed, directly from concerns about the unconventional 
modes of exchange that have emerged in their stead. These exchanges 
include import and distribution schemes supported by the Chinese gov-
ernment’s ocao, illicit trade and employment practices underpinned by 
emerging community ties to manufacturers and recruitment agencies in 
China, and defensive networks of ethnic entrepreneurship and mutual 
aid consolidated by Mexico’s Chinese associations. A sociological lesson 
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from the upheavals that gripped Mexico in the 1930s has apparently not 
been learned: the stronger the antagonism against Chinese communities, 
the more they will defend themselves by strengthening internal loyal-
ties, ethnic protectionism, and guanxi. In this environment, the prospect 
of rationalizing Chinese cooperative networks into formal structures of 
governance is remote.
The consequences of enclave economies, or what Michael Woolcock 
calls “integration without linkages” (1998, 172), are on display in Mexico’s 
Tepito district, where thousands of black- market vendors abide by inter-
nal rules and procedures that are completely disarticulated from broader 
legal codes. Opponents of street vending argue that government disin-
terest has enabled informal traders not only to evade taxes, but also to 
smuggle Chinese consumer goods and potentially narcotics into Mexico. 
Proposals for mitigating this “culture of impunity,” as noted in chapter 
4, aim to contain illicit networks through more aggressive policing and 
harsher penalties but have so far neglected cooperative solutions. If the 
goal is to foment stable, law- abiding interpersonal ties to China, then the 
resident Chinese community is ideally placed to assist, as it has begun to 
do in Baja California.
The social connections of the Chinese associations of Tijuana and 
Mexicali bypass government protocols but have nevertheless advanced 
official efforts to build registered trade and investment relations with 
Chinese partners. A challenge now facing the Chinese associations and 
their supporters in the Baja California government is to integrate ethical 
concerns into their shared economic agenda. To confront the circles of 
“enforceable trust” that sustain the abuse of twenty- first- century Chinese 
migrant workers will require broader avenues of state- society engage-
ment, from visa tracking to workplace monitoring. Cooperation on these 
matters would also build public trust in Mexico’s Chinese community, 
enabling it to work with a wider range of national actors.
Cuba and Mexico show that regardless of the prevailing blend of 
public- and private- sector carrots and sticks, Chinese communities rep-
resent a valuable resource. Whatever their political orientation, govern-
ments and citizens stand to reap substantial rewards if the activities of 
these communities are consensually integrated into broader develop-
ment strategies. Those who fail to harness the capacities of Chinese net-
works may find themselves bypassed as the flow of transpacific products, 
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finance, and people intensifies. Conversely, those who build bridges with 
the Chinese diaspora will unlock exchanges that reach beyond China-
towns into other sectors of their own societies and across the Pacific. 
Whether focused on domestic economic development or international 
trade and investment, policy makers can draw strength like never before 
from social engagement at home.
As China reaches out to the worldwide Chinese diaspora, local govern-
ments will need to formulate more meticulous strategies for governing 
Chinatowns. These strategies may be driven by the pursuit of economic 
growth, efforts to manage and police local- foreign partnerships, or at-
tempts to frame bilateral relations with China in a particular historical 
light. Whatever their motivations, more assertive efforts to work with 
Chinese communities will generate opportunities to reconcile the lega-
cies of ethnic marginalization with fresh prospects for future cooperation.
The so-called Asian Century heralded by China’s rise involves more 
than great- power politics. It also involves a reassessment of how poli-
tics and society intertwine to shape the trajectory of global change. The 
growing capacities of Chinese diasporic communities to build coopera-
tion between their countries of residence and mainland China, and to 
attract support from host country governments, illustrate the interplay 
of local social dynamics and geopolitical relations. Researchers who wish 
to grasp the significance of this interplay will need to develop conceptual 
approaches that blend the broad comparative vista of international rela-
tions with ethnographic sensitivity to the lives of individuals.
As the twentieth century drew to a close, Aihwa Ong proposed that 
the emerging field of diaspora studies would do well to experiment with 
the “ethnography of transnational practices and linkages” (1999, 5) as a 
framework for understanding the political economies of overseas Chi-
nese communities. The need for research that blends micro and macro 
perspectives has increased in step with China’s intensifying engagement 
with Latin America, and as Ariel Armony and Julia Strauss write, this 
need is set to increase further:
Future work ought to be designed so as to accommodate the multi- 
dimensional nature of the China– Latin America interaction and 
capture the empirical realities of a rapidly changing and complex 
set of relationships while developing concepts that lend themselves 
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to a mixture of comparison and generalization. We need to continue 
to explore China– Latin America from a transnational perspective, 
understanding how global phenomena are expressed in different ways 
at the local level, how various actors (governments, corporations, 
diasporas, non- state organizations and so on) interact with each 
other, and how international and domestic agendas shape interactions 
between China and Latin America. (2012, 14– 15)
Armony and Strauss concur with Ong that local actors are central to 
contemporary Chinese transnationalism, and that their endeavors are 
best understood from the bottom up. To this end, ethnographic study of 
daily life among overseas Chinese communities enables a sharper appre-
ciation of their diverse identities and aspirations. The facts of life on the 
ground belie, for instance, the facile tendency of recent public debates 
whose “keenest interest,” writes Wang Gungwu, “has been in the political 
ramifications of having unassimilated migrants within modern nation- 
states” (2000, 39). The proposition that Chinese communities remain 
stubbornly “unassimilated” is an appealing hook for conservative com-
mentators, but in modern nation- states (and their postmodern succes-
sors) it is as misleading as the notion of cultural homogeneity. Fantasies 
of national purity are anachronistic in what Evelyn Hu- DeHart perceives 
as an increasingly hybrid world: “ ‘China’ is enlarged to be wherever Chi-
nese people and their descendants are to be found, and ‘America’ is not 
confined to just the United States. Multiplicities of Chineseness interact 
with multiplicities of Americanness, producing new and unique kinds of 
mestizaje or hybridity” (2005b, 80).
To explore mestizaje on the ground is to discover how old loyalties 
are maintained, how new alliances are forged, and how resulting com-
promises transcend any easy association of race and nation. Personal 
histories of loss, hope, and identity provide a human corrective to the 
sanitized economic and demographic analyses that characterized early 
transnational studies and continue to prevail in policy making (Angel- 
Ajani 2006; Castles 2006).
Personal experiences of transnationalism among Chinese migrants 
constitute what Donald Nonini and Aihwa Ong call “new Chinese sub-
jectivities found in the global arena” (1997, 4), conditioned at once by 
local imaginaries, national policies, and international connections (Ver-
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tovec 2009; Wilson and Dissanayake 1996). These individual and insti-
tutional factors interact in innumerable ways to shape history, but as 
Fernand Braudel (1982) argued, grand narratives are discernible over the 
longue durée. Historical narratives of socialism and democracy, for in-
stance, are manifest in contemporary Cuban and Mexican interactions 
among citizens, their governments, and foreign actors. At the dawn of 
the Asian Century, these grand narratives are entering a transformative 
phase. China’s reemergence as a global power after an often- invoked 
“century of humiliation” is introducing narratives of personal identity, 
state- society relations, and international cooperation that support and 
undermine each other in unforeseen ways. Conceptualizing this interac-
tive process as part of an emerging grand narrative of transnationalism 
and formulating more comprehensive policies on this basis are among 
the most important challenges of the twenty- first century.
Recognizing the need for approaches that more effectively bridge 
personal histories and grand narratives, Armony and Strauss encour-
age scholars to develop concepts that accommodate local experience 
and economic globalization in a holistic research design. The “multi- 
dimensional” framework they envision underscores Christopher Lee’s 
call for more “inclusive” analyses of Asian diasporas that bridge ideal-
ist and materialist perspectives (2007, 32). The building blocks of such a 
bridge will be unifying themes that have equal relevance to international 
relations, economic development, and social participation. I have argued 
that trust is one such theme.
Trust is an inclusive concept that sheds new light on interactions 
among nations, industries, and people. It is the common denomina-
tor underpinning the ethnic affinities that connect mainland China to 
its global diaspora, the tight circles of bonding social capital that con-
solidate around emerging business activities, and official attempts to 
integrate these circles into frameworks of governance and regulation. 
Trust permeates the horizontal circumstances of diplomatic engagement 
across borders and network formation across communities, as well as 
the vertical channels through which local interests intersect with gov-
ernment agendas. Analyzing macro- and micro- level interactions side by 
side through the lens of trust opens fresh lines of inquiry into the future 
of China’s deepening engagement with Cuba, Mexico, and the world:
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• Will deepening formal and informal connections to the mainland 
enhance the ability of Chinese diasporic communities to secure rec-
ognition and support from host country governments, businesses, 
and publics? Will resulting initiatives provide bottom-up alterna-
tives to the model of top- down state- to-state interactions favored 
by the Chinese government?
• Will the elite public and private enterprises that currently dominate 
Cuban, Mexican, and most other countries’ relations with China 
cede space so that smaller actors—including those in the Chinese 
diaspora—can participate more fully in setting bilateral agendas?
• What kinds of public- private cooperation can overcome exagger-
ated perceptions that overseas Chinese communities remain locked 
into allegiance to the Chinese state? To what extent can collabora-
tive endeavors, like those pursued by Baja California’s government 
and the Chinese Association of Mexicali, challenge historically en-
trenched correlations of race with nation and counteract vicious 
circles of hostility and self- defense?
• As the capacities of overseas Chinese communities are consolidated, 
how can concepts like social capital, synergy, linkage, and trust sup-
port the development of consensual and responsive regulations? 
What conceptual innovations will enable policy makers, business 
leaders, and civil societies to accommodate China’s expanding eco-
nomic and social influence within robust structures of governance?
• What opportunities do China’s engagements with Latin America 
and the world create for researchers to test established theoretical 
models and sharpen their conceptual tools? Which institutions and 
forums best enable Chinese and non- Chinese scholars to compare, 
contrast, and integrate their intellectual traditions in pursuit of 
original approaches and mutually beneficial policy outcomes?
Implicit in these questions is a core problem of political sociology: 
how can governments, businesses, and people work together in ways that 
build trust? The pressures and opportunities created by China’s rise have 
introduced new ideas into this old debate. More dynamic approaches 
are becoming evident in Cuba and Mexico, where—despite fundamental 
economic and political differences—there is growing recognition of the 
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value harbored by synergies and linkages that extend beyond traditional 
partners.
China’s engagement with Latin America and the world is stimulating 
the renovation of existing institutions and the establishment of new ones 
to question and create knowledge. One of the oldest Chinese institutions 
in the Americas, Havana’s Casino Chung Wah (founded in 1883), now 
hosts regular research seminars in partnership with the University of 
Havana’s Center for the Study of Chinese Immigration to Cuba. In Mex-
ico, the Latin American and Caribbean Academic Network on China, 
inaugurated in 2012 at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, has 
brought together over 400 specialists in conferences to foreground re-
gional interpretations of Chinese foreign affairs. In 2015 Renmin Uni-
versity of China launched a Latin America Research Center to promote 
intellectual synergies related to Chinese development initiatives in the 
region. In the United States, the Inter- American Dialogue and the Latin 
American Studies Association have established divisions to advance crit-
ical analyses of Sino– Latin American interactions.
Institutional innovations have yielded a decade of quantitative data 
on Sino– Latin American trade and finance and a growing recognition 
that these must be more effectively integrated with qualitative analyses. 
As this book’s case studies illustrate, understandings of history, identity, 
and the state condition the deployment of capital even as they respond 
to it. A holistic approach that accommodates this interaction of material 
and cultural factors promises fertile ground for conceptual innovation 
and policy input. This unprecedented process is redrawing disciplinary 
as well as institutional boundaries, prompting the world to move away 
from the end of history and toward a more interdependent politics of 
diaspora and trust.
NOTES
2. MEXICO, CHINA, AND THE POLITICS OF TRUST
1. Eradicating prejudices through cultural awareness is also a goal of the Chinese 
Ministry of Education’s Confucius Institutes, five of which are operating in Mex-
ico at the time of writing. The Chinese newspaper People’s Daily reports that the 
institutes and related educational programs play a dual diplomatic and educa-
tional role: “China hopes to dissolve the misconception of its development as 
the ‘China threat,’ by making its traditional value systems known to the world” 
(“ ‘China Threat’ Fear Countered by Culture” 2006).
3. HAVANA’S CHINATOWN AND THE QUEST FOR SYNERGY
1. According to Ernesto, Carlos, and Jorge Alay Jó (2002), the first Chinese arrived 
in Cuba in approximately 1830, from the Mandarin- speaking Chinese commu-
nity in the Philippines. Generally able to speak Spanish, these “Chinos de Manila” 
worked primarily as domestic servants and later as florists and horticulturalists.
2. While Ortiz wrote little on Chinese heritage in Cuba, classic Cuban ethnolo-
gists such as José Baltar Rodríguez (1997), Antonio Chuffat Latour (1927), Jesús 
Guanche (1983), Juan Jiménez Pastrana (1963 and 1983), Juan Pérez de la Riva 
(2000), and Gonzalo de Quesada (1946) documented the social practices and 
demographic characteristics of Chinese communities throughout Cuba. Build-
ing on this foundation, a new wave of Cuban scholarly interest in Chinese Cu-
ban heritage has emerged. Pedro Cosme Baños (1998) and Ana Valdés Millán 
(2005), for instance, have published ethnographic studies of Chinese- descended 
communities in Regla and Guantanamo, respectively. The University of Havana’s 
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Catedra de Estudios sobre la Inmigración China en Cuba (Center for the Study 
of Chinese Immigration to Cuba), directed by María Teresa Montes de Oca 
Choy, has produced a multimedia cd- rom on Havana’s Chinese ethnic associa-
tions (Montes de Oca Choy 2007). Yrmina Eng Menéndez, former director of 
the Grupo Promotor de Barrio Chino, wrote a master’s thesis on Chinese civic 
integration in Havana and a chapter on Barrio Chino for the volume I edited on 
community development in Cuba (Eng Menéndez 2008). A description of Barrio 
Chino in the early twentieth century by the historian Federico Chang (2007) ap-
pears in a volume on Cuban multiculturalism by Raimundo, Gómez Navia, and 
Graciela Chailloux (2007). The two most comprehensive historical analyses of 
Sino- Cuban cultural and political interaction are by Mauro García Triana (2003), 
former Cuban ambassador to China, and the historian Mercedes Crespo Villate 
(2004).
  Recent years have also witnessed a flourishing interest in Chinese Cuban 
history from scholars outside Cuba. Joseph Dorsey (2004), Evelyn Hu- DeHart 
(1993, 1999, 2005a, and 2010), Moon- Ho Jung (2006), Kathleen López (2004, 
2008, 2009, and 2013), and Lisa Yun (2008) have each made original contribu-
tions to the historical record of the coolie trade, describing both the difficulties 
faced by its victims and the ways they tried to organize and raise their commu-
nity out of poverty. Earlier publications include Duvon C. Corbitt’s ethnographic 
history, A Study of the Chinese in Cuba, 1847– 1947 (1971), and Beatriz Varela’s 
account of Chinese linguistic influences in Cuban daily life, Lo Chino en el Habla 
Cubana (1980). The Chinese in Cuba: 1847– Now (Garcia Triana, Eng Herrera, 
and Benton 2009) presents the reflections of Mauro García Triana and the Chi-
nese Cuban revolutionary leader Jesús Pedro Eng Herrera in their own words, 
with annotation by Gregor Benton. Autobiographical accounts of Chinese in-
tegration into Cuban revolutionary society are also presented in Our History Is 
Still Being Written: The Story of Three Chinese Cuban Generals (Choy, Chui, and 
Sío Wong 2006). Emerging at a time of intensifying Chinese engagement with 
Latin America and the world, this literature provides a historical framework for 
understanding the significance of Chinese presence in Cuba for both countries.
3. The declaration is now inscribed on a monument in Central Havana, visited by 
twenty- first- century visitors interested in tracing the tribulations of Chinese im-
migrants through Cuban history.
4. The Casino Chung Wah keeps meticulous records of the number of Chinese as-
sociation members in Cuba. Jorge Chao Chiu, who maintains these records, re-
ports that many who left Cuba in the 1960s were not association members and 
that it is therefore impossible to determine their numbers. The records show a 
sharp increase in the number of Chinese nationals adopting Cuban citizenship at 
the time, most likely so they could then enter the United States.
5. The absence of such ties in cases as diverse as Salvador (Brazil), Georgetown 
(Malaysia), and Madras (South India) has manifested in poor civic participation, 
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political apathy, and conflicting interpretations of local cultural heritage (Crook 
1993; Kahn 1997; Woolcock 1998). Black markets and informal rules often take 
root in such contexts, posing challenges to institutions seeking to assert eco-
nomic governance and discourage social fragmentation (Armony 2011; Hilgers 
2008).
6. A similar process is evident in Cholon Chinatown in Ho Chi Minh City, where 
the Vietnamese government has attempted to selectively revive those aspects of 
Hoa (ethnic Chinese) heritage that attract tourism and portray multicultural har-
mony. Hoa residents’ affinities with traditional and even contemporary Chinese 
culture, however, are tenuous at best (Yu 2006).
7. For details of the Kwong Wah Po’s origins and history, see Garcia Triana, Eng 
Herrera, and Benton (2009, 32– 33, 40).
 4. TRUST AND TREACHERY IN MEXICO’S CHINESE DIASPORA
1. Chinese production of Mexican artisanal handicrafts is perceived as piracy in 
Mexico. It began with the imitation of wooden products from the state of Mi-
choacán and has extended to rebozos (traditional Mexican shawls), tapetes (dec-
orative rugs), embroidered dresses, talavera (traditional pottery from Puebla), 
baskets, hojas de lata (tin plates), and silver and stone jewelry sold in tourist 
centers and markets around the country. This has outraged Mexican artisans, 
who claim that their sales have diminished by 70– 80 percent. See Cruz García 
2003; González Alvarado 2008; Noticieros Televisa 2005.

REFERENCES
AgendAsia. 2012. Agenda estratégica México- China. Mexico City: AgendAsia.
Agosin, Manuel R., Pablo Rodas Martini, and Neantro Saavedra- Rivano, eds. 
2004. The Emergence of China: A View from Central America. Washington: 
Inter- American Development Bank.
Aguiar, José Luis. 2012. “They Come from China: Pirate cds in Mexico in Trans-
national Perspective.” In Globalization from Below: The World’s Other Economy, 
edited by Gordon Mathews, Gustavo Lins Ribeiro, and Carlos Alba Vega, 36– 53. 
London: Routledge.
Alay Jó, Carlos A., and Julio Hun Calzadilla. 2015. La Danza del león chino en 
Cuba. Havana: Ediciones Extramuros.
Alay Jó, Ernesto, Carlos A. Alay Jó, and Jorge A. Alay Jó. 2002. “El Barrio Chino de 
la Habana: Un producto turístico.” Paper presented at the Fifth Festival of Over-
seas Chinese, Havana, May 31, 2002.
Alba Vega, Carlos. 2012. “Local Politics and Globalization from Below: The Ped-
dler Leaders of Mexico City’s Historic Center Streets.” In Globalization from 
Below: The World’s Other Economy, edited by Gordon Mathews, Gustavo Lins 
Ribeiro, and Carlos Alba Vega, 203– 20. London: Routledge.
Alfonso Rodríguez, Mayelín. 2009. “La presencia China en la conformación de 
Centro Habana: La farmacia y su rehabilitación.” MA thesis, Institute Superior 
Politécnico José Antonio Echevarría, Havana.
Álvarez Medina, Lourdes. 2007. “La industria automotriz China: Posibilidades 
de competir con la industria automotriz en México.” In China y México: Impli-
caciones de una nueva relación, edited by Enrique Dussel Peters and Yolanda 
Trápaga Delf ín, 191– 208. Mexico City: unam/ cechimex.
228 REFERENCES
Amess, Kevin, Jun Du, and Sourafel Girma. 2011. “Turning to the Govt’s Helping 
Hand.” China Daily European Weekly, June, 10– 16.
Anderson, Wanni W., and Robert G. Lee. 2005. “Asian American Displacements.” 
In Displacement and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas, edited by Wanni W. 
Anderson and Robert G. Lee, 3– 22. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press.
Angel- Ajani, Asale. 2006. “Displacing Diaspora: Trafficking, African Women, and 
Transnational Practices.” In Diasporic Africa: A Reader, edited by Michael Go-
mez, 290– 308. New York: New York University Press.
Arellano, Lilia. 2013. “China en México.” EstosDías .com, July 29. Accessed May 25, 
2015. www .estosdias .com.mx/ blog/ archivos/ 4649.
Armony, Ariel C. 2004. The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratiza-
tion. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
———. 2011. “The China- Latin America Relationship: Convergences and Diver-
gences.” In China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, edited by 
Adrian H. Hearn and José Luis León- Manríquez, 23– 50. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner.
Armony, Ariel C., Nashira P. Chávez, and Adrian H. Hearn. Forthcoming. “Latin 
American Perspectives on the Pacific Alliance and the Trans- Pacific Partner-
ship.” Manuscript unpublished and under review.
Armony, Ariel C., and Julia C. Strauss. 2012. “From Going Out (zou chuqu) to 
 Arriving In (desembarco): Constructing a New Field of Inquiry in China– Latin 
America Interactions.” In From the Great Wall to the New World: China and 
Latin America in the 21st Century, edited by Julia C. Strauss and Ariel C. Ar-
mony, 1– 17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Arrow, Kenneth. 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York: W. W. Norton.
Association of Former Intelligence Officers. 2006. “Chinese Signal Intelligence 
and Cyber Warfare Operations in Cuba.” afio Weekly Intelligence Notes, no.  
23- 06, June 12. Accessed April 25, 2014. www .afio .com/ sections/ wins/ 2006 
/ 2006-23 .htmlChinaInCuba.
Auyón Gerardo, Eduardo. 2003. El dragón del desierto. Mexicali, Mexico: Centro 
de Investigación de la Cultura China.
Ayón, David R., et al. 2009. The United States and Mexico: Towards a strategic 
partnership. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Azel, José. 2011. “So Much for Cuban Economic Reform.” Wall Street Journal, 
January 10.
Bain, Ben, and Eric Martin. 2014. “Mexico Sets Borrower Standard 20 Years af-
ter Tequila Crisis.” Bloomberg, September 22. Accessed August 4, 2015. www 
.bloomberg .com/ news/ articles/ 2014-09-21/ mexico- sets- latin- america 
- standard- 20-years- after- crisis.
Baltar Rodríguez, José. 1997. Los Chinos de Cuba: Apuntes etnograficos. Havana: 
Fundación Fernando Ortiz.
REFERENCES 229
Barabantseva, Elena. 2005. “Trans- Nationalising Chineseness: Overseas Chinese 
Policies of the PRC’s Central Government.” asien 96: 7– 28.
Bate, Peter. 2004. “The Story behind Oportunidades.” focus Online Magazine. 
Washington: Inter- American Development Bank. Accessed August 4, 2015. 
www .iadb .org/ en/ news/ webstories/ 2004-10-01/ the- story- behind 
- ioportunidadesi,5552 .html.
Bazán, Ligia. 2005. “Inundan coreanos centro histórico.” El Diario, January 18.
Behrens, Susan Fitzpatrick. 2009. “Plan Mexico and Central American Migration.” 
North American Congress on Latin America, January 12. Accessed June 6,  
2015. http:// nacla .org/ news/ plan- mexico- and- central- american- migration.
Bell, Duran. 2000. “Guanxi: A Nesting of Groups.” Current Anthropology 41 (1): 
133– 38.
Bernal, Rafael. 1969. El complot mongol. Mexico City: Joaquín Mortiz.
Bermúdez Liévano, Andrés. 2012. “La deferencia de haber sido recibida por Xi 
Jinping refleja la importancia y la madurez de la relación entre México y China: 
Canciller Mexicana Patricia Espinosa.” China Files, April 13. Accessed August 4, 
2015. http:// china- files .com/ es/ link/ 16757/ la- deferencia- de- haber- sido- recibida 
- por- xi- jinping- y- wang- qishan- refleja- la- importancia- la- riqueza- y- la- madurez 
- de- la- relacion- entre- mexico- y- chinaE2809D-canciller- mexicana- patricia 
- espinosa.
Blázquez- Lidoy, Jorge, Javier Rodríguez, and Javier Santiso, eds. 2006. Angel 
or Devil? China’s Trade Impact on Latin American Emerging Markets. Paris: 
 Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development.
Boltvinik, Julio. 2003. “Welfare, Inequality, and Poverty in Mexico, 1970– 2000.” In 
Confronting Development, edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook and Eduardo Zepeda, 
385– 446. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Branigan, Tania, Julian Borger, and Jo Tuckman. 2009. “Swine Flu: Mexican Citi-
zens Flown Back from China after Being Held in Hotels.” Guardian. May 5.  
Accessed July 17, 2015. // www .theguardian .com/ world/ 2009/ may/ 05/ swine- flu 
- china- mexico.
Braudel, Fernand. 1982. On History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchenau, Jürgen. 2006. “Plutarco Elías Calles and the Maximato in Revolution- 
ary Mexico: A Reinterpretation.” Jahrbuch für geschichte Lateinamerikas 43:  
229– 53.
Burawoy, Michael, ed. 2000. Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imagi-
nations in a Postmodern World. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Burt, Ronald. 1992. Structural Holes: the Social Structure of Competition. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Calderon, Ángel. 2015. “Instability and Uncertainty Follow Killing of Students.” 
University World News, February 20. Accessed February 23, 2015. www 
.universityworldnews .com/ article .php?story=20150218105730190.
Calderón, Felipe. 2008. “Mensaje del Presidente Felipe Calderón sobre el pro-
230 REFERENCES
grama para impulsar el crecimiento y el empleo.” La Crónica, October 9. 
 Accessed April 28, 2014. www .cronica .com.mx/ notas/ 2008/ 390120 .html.
Calva, José Luis. 2012. “Prólogo.” In Nueva estrategia de industrialización, edited 
by José Luis Calva, 9– 21. Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Universitarios.
Cámara Nacional de la Industria Textil. 2006. “Noticias de nuestro sector.” 
 Accessed August 4, 2015. www .canaintex .org.mx. Subscription required.
Canseco, Mario. 2006. “The Second Campaign of Vicente Fox.” Banderas News, 
March 18. Accessed August 4, 2015. www .banderasnews .com/ 0603/ eded 
- secondcampaign .htm.
Carr, Barry. 1973. “Las peculiaridades del norte Mexicano, 1880– 1927: Ensayo de 
interpretación.” Historia Mexicana 22 (31): 320– 46.
Carrier, James G. 1999. “People Who Can Be Friends: Selves and Social Relation-
ships.” In The Anthropology of Friendship, edited by Sandra Bell and Simon 
Coleman, 21– 38. New York: Berg.
Casey- Maslen, Stuart. 2014. “The Use of Firearms in Law Enforcement.” In Weap-
ons under International Human Rights Law, edited by Stuart Casey- Maslen, 
3– 31. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Castles, Stephen. 2006. Global Perspectives on Forced Migration. Asian and Pacific 
Migration Journal 15 (1): 7– 28.
Cattan, Nacha, and Eric Martin. 2013. “Mexico’s Peña Nieto Seeks Capital Gains, 
High Earners Taxes.” Bloomberg, September 9. Accessed August 4, 2015. www 
.bloomberg .com/ news/ articles/ 2013-09-09/ pena- nieto- seeks- taxes- on- capital 
- gains- highest- income- earners.
Cereijo, Manuel. 2001. “China/ Cuba: A New Dangerous Axis.” Guaracabuya, sum-
mer. Accessed April 25, 2014. www .amigospais- guaracabuya .org/ oagmc065 .php.
———. 2010. “Inside Bejucal Base in Cuba: A Real Threat.” Americano, August 27.
Céspedes, Benjamín de. 1888. La prostitución en la ciudad de La Habana. Havana: 
Tipograf ía O’Reilly.
Chang, David W. 1973. “Current Status of Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia.” 
Asian Survey 13 (6): 587– 603.
Chang, Federico. 2007. “La inmigración china en Cuba: Asociaciones y tradi-
ciones.” In De dónde son los cubanos, edited by Raimundo Gómez Navia and 
 Graciela Chailloux, 117– 64. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
Chen, Albert H. Y. 1999. “Rational Law, Economic Development and the Case of 
China.” Social and Legal Studies 8 (1): 97– 120.
Chen Xiaoping, and C. Chao Chen. 2004. “On the Intricacies of the Chinese 
Guanxi: A Process Model of Guanxi Development.” Asia- Pacific Journal of 
Management 21: 305– 24.
Cheng Yinghong. 2007a. “Fidel Castro and ‘China’s Lessons for Cuba’: A Chinese 
Perspective.” China Quarterly 189: 24– 42.
———. 2007b. “Sino- Cuban Relations and Cuba’s Future after Fidel Castro.” His-
tory Compass 5 (2): 725– 36.
REFERENCES 231
———. 2012. “The ‘Socialist Other’: Cuba in Chinese Ideological Debates since the 
1990s.” China Quarterly 209: 198– 216.
“China and Cuba Co- Develop New Anti- Cancer Vaccine.” 2012. China Daily. 
March 29. Accessed August 4, 2015. www .chinadaily .com.cn/ m/ beijing/ zhong 
guancun/ 2012-03/ 29/ content_14938029 .htm.
“China Confirms Leadership Change.” 2012. bbc News. November 15. Accessed 
July 14, 2015. www .bbc.co .uk/ news/ world- asia- china- 20338586.
China National Petroleum Corporation. 2008. “cnpc and cupet Reach Frame-
work Agreement on Further Cooperation.” November 27. Accessed April 25, 
2014. www .cnpc .com.cn/ en/ nr2008/ 201211/ 557bf652cd624c64a240a504b 
beb882b .shtm.
“ ‘China Threat’ Fear Countered by Culture.” 2006. People’s Daily, May 29. Ac-
cessed April 28, 2014. http:// english.peopledaily .com.cn/ 200605/ 29 
/ eng20060529_269387 .html.
Chinese Association of Tijuana. 1998. “Laws of the Chinese Community of Ti-
juana.” Booklet for distribution among association members.
Chong López, Alfredo. 2006. “Proyecto: Barrio Chino—Hua Qu.” Unpublished 
report. Havana: Casa de Artes y Tradiciones Chinas.
Chou, Diego. 2002. Los Chinos en Hispanoamérica. San José, Costa Rica: Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.
Choy, Armando, Gustavo Chui, and Moisés Sío Wong. 2006. Our History Is Still 
Being Written: The Story of Three Chinese Cuban Generals in the Cuban Revo-
lution. New York: Pathfinder.
Christian Anti- Communism Crusade. 1961. “If Communism Comes to Mexico.” 
cacc Newletter, September 9.
Chuffat Latour, Antonio. 1927. Apunte histórico de los chinos en Cuba. Havana: 
Molina y Cía.
Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” 
American Journal of Sociology, supplement 94: S95– 120.
Comisión Económica para América Latina. 2004. Panorama de la inserción inter-
nacional de América Latina y el Caribe, 2002– 2003. Santiago, Chile: Comisión 
Económica para América Latina.
Connelly, Marisela, and Romer Cornejo Bustamante. 1992. China América Latina. 
Mexico City: El Colegio de México.
Cooke, Bill, and Uma Kothari. 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny. New York: 
Zed.
Corbitt, Duvon C. 1944. “Chinese Immigrants in Cuba.” Far Eastern Survey 13 (14): 
130– 32.
———. 1971. A Study of the Chinese in Cuba, 1847– 1947. Wilmore, KY: Asbury 
 College.
Coronel, Rogelio. 2008. “El rastro chino en la cultura cubana.” Anales del Caribe 1 
(1): 158– 77.
232 REFERENCES
Cortés, Cecilia Téllez. 2009. “Admite Calderón: Hay 6 millones más de pobres 
desde que estalló la crisis.” La Crónica, October 3.
Cosme Baños, Pedro. 1998. Los Chinos en regla, 1847– 1997: Documentos y comen-
tarios. Santiago de Cuba: Editorial Oriente.
Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 2011. Cuban Oil Demands Washington’s Atten-
tion. Washington: Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
Courtade, Luis Pérez. 2013. “Mancera entrega las llaves de la ciudad a presidente 
de China.” Excelsior (published in Mexico), June 6. Accessed May 2, 2014. http:// 
www .excelsior .com.mx/ comunidad/ 2013/ 06/ 06/ 902676.
Crahan, Margaret E., and Ariel C. Armony. 2007. “Does Civil Society Exist in 
Cuba?” Florida International University, Cuban Research Institute. Accessed 
June 6, 2015. https:// cri.fiu .edu/ research/ commissioned- reports/ civil- society 
- crahan0armony .pdf.
Crespo Villate, Mercedes. 2004. Legación Cubana en China, 1904– 1959: Primeros 
consulados diplomaticos Cubanos y vivencias historicas con la nacion Asiatica. 
Havana: Editorial si- mar.
Crook, Larry N. 1993. “Black Consciousness, Samba Reggae, and the Re- 
Africanization of Bahian Carnival Music in Brazil.” World of Music 35 (2): 90– 108.
Cross, John C. 1998. Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Cruz García, Hortencia. 2003. “Instrumentos musicales Chinos invaden el mer-
cado nacional.” Xiranhua Comunicaciones, September, 1– 15.
“Cuba Claims Massive Oil Reserves.” 2008. bbc News, October 17. Accessed 
April 25, 2014. http:// news.bbc.co .uk/ 2/ hi/ 7675234.stm.
Cubaencuentro. 2009. “Más acuerdos con China. Esta vez en industria básica, 
transporte e informática.” Editorial, November 16. Accessed April 25, 2014. 
http:// cubaencuentro .com/ es/ cuba/ noticias/ mas- acuerdos- con- china- esta- vez 
- en- industria- basica- transporte- e- informatica- 223337.
“Cuba Seeks Chinese Investment.” 2013. China Daily, November 4.
Cuba Standard. 2011. “China, Cuba Agree on Refinery Project, New Loans.” Edito-
rial, June 6. Accessed 12 July 2015. www .gasandoil .com/ news/ south_east_asia 
/ f665a752191284342a49572ae311b70c.
Cypher, James M., and Raúl Delgado Wise. 2010. Mexico’s Economic Dilemma:  
The Developmental Failure of Neoliberalism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little-
field.
De Kadt, Raphael. 1994. “Modernization and Moral Progress.” Theoria 83 (4):  
43– 60.
Délano, Alexandra. 2011. Mexico and Its Diaspora in the United States: Policies of 
Emigration since 1848. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Devlin, Robert. 2008. “China’s Economic Rise.” In China’s Expansion into the West-
ern Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States, edited by 
Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, 111– 47. Washington: Brookings Institution.
REFERENCES 233
Dickson, Bruce, and Chao Chien- Min. 2001. Introduction to Remaking the Chi-
nese State, edited by Bruce Dickson and Chao Chien- Min, 1– 16. London: Rout-
ledge.
Domínguez, Jorge I., et al. 2006. “China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared 
Gains, Asymmetric Hopes.” Washington: Inter- American Dialogue.
Dorsey, Joseph C. 2004. “Identity, Rebellion, and Social Justice among Chinese 
Contract Workers in Nineteenth- Century Cuba.” Latin American Perspectives 
31 (3): 18– 47.
Durand, Jorge, Douglas S. Massey, and Rene M. Zenteno. 2001. “Mexican Im-
migration to the United States: Continuities and Changes.” Latin American 
Research Review 36 (1): 107– 27.
Dussel Peters, Enrique. 2009. “The Mexican Case.” In China and Latin America: 
Economic Relations in the Twenty- First Century, edited by Rhys Jenkins and 
Enrique Dussel Peters, 279– 393. Mexico City: unam/ cechimex.
———. 2011a. “China’s Challenge to Latin American Development.” In China 
Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, edited by Adrian H. Hearn and 
José Luis León- Manríquez, 91– 101. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
———. 2011b. México: Hacia una agenda estratégica en el corto, mediano y largo 
plazo con China. Propuestas resultantes de las labores del Grupo de Trabajo 
México- China (2009– 2010). Mexico City: unam/ cechimex.
———. 2012. “Mexican Firms Investing in China 2000– 2011.” Washington: Inter- 
American Development Bank.
Dussel Peters, Enrique, and Samuel Ortiz Velázquez. 2012. Monitor de la manu-
factura Mexicana 8 (9). Mexico City: unam/ cechimex.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 2010. Database of 
the División de Comercio Internacional e Integración. Accessed June 1, 2015. 
www .cepal .org/ comercio/ SIGCI.
Economist Intelligence Unit. 2008. Country Profile: Cuba 2008. London: Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit.
efe. 2014. “Mexico Gov’t Imposes Tariff of up to 30 pct on Footwear Imports.” 
Editorial, August 28.
———. 2015. “Oil Prices to Stay Low for Years, Bank of Mexico Says.” Editorial, 
February 3.
El Economista. 2008. “China produce 90 de las ‘banderitas’ de México.” Editorial, 
September 15.
El Mural. 2011. “Plantean de nuevo prórroga a apertura.” Editorial, December 8.
El Universal (published in Mexico). 2008. “México tendrá catarrito por crisis en 
EU: Carstens.” Editorial, February 7. Accessed July 17, 2015. http:// archivo 
.eluniversal .com.mx/ notas/ 480345 .html
Ellis, R. Evan. 2005. U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in 
Latin America. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
234 REFERENCES
———. 2009. China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner.
———. 2012. “Chinese Organized Crime in Latin America.” Prism 4 (1): 65– 77.
Ely, Northcutt. 1961. Summary of Mining and Petroleum Laws of the World. Wash-
ington: Bureau of Mines.
Eng Menéndez, Yrmina G. 2008. “Revitalización de las tradiciones Chinas en 
Cuba: El proyecto integral de reanimación del Barrio Chino de La Habana.” In 
Cultura, tradición, y comunidad: Perspectivas sobre la participación y el desar-
rollo en Cuba, edited by Adrian H. Hearn, 200– 243. Havana: Imagen Contem-
poránea.
Epoch Times. 2007. “En México todos le declaran la guerra al ‘comercio desleal’ 
chino.” Editorial. April 1.
Erikson, Daniel P., and Adam Minson. 2006. “China and Cuba: The New Face of 
an Old Relationship.” Hemisphere 17 (22): 12– 15.
Evans, Peter. 1997. “Introduction: Development Strategies across the Public- 
Private Divide.” In State- Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in De-
velopment, edited by Peter Evans, 1– 10. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fedderke, Johannes, Raphael de Kadt, and John Luiz. 1999. “Economic Growth and 
Social Capital: A Critical Reflection.” Theory and Society 28 (5): 709– 45.
Feinberg, Richard E. 2011. Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the Interna-
tional Response. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Fernández Jilberto, Alex E., and Barbara Hogenboom, eds. 2010a. Latin America 
Facing China: South- South Relations beyond the Washington Consensus. New 
York: Berghan.
———. 2010b. “Latin America from Washington Consensus to Beijing Consen-
sus?” In Latin America Facing China: South- South Relations beyond the Wash-
ington Consensus, edited by Alex Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom, 
181– 93. New York: Berghan.
Fernández Soriano, Armando. 1999. “Realidades, retos y posibilidades de los 
 municipios Cubanos en el fin de siglo.” In Gobiernos de izquierda en América 
Latina, edited by Beatriz Stolowicz, 165– 82. Mexico City: Plaza Valdés.
Fingleton, Eamonn. 2008. In the Jaws of the Dragon: America’s Fate in the Coming 
Era of Chinese Hegemony. New York: St. Martin’s.
Florida International University. 2014. fiu Cuba Poll. Miami: Florida International 
University Cuban Research Institute.
Fornieles Sánchez, Luz María. 1993. “El Barrio Chino.” Contrapunto 3 (27): 25– 26.
Frank, Marc. 2006. “Trade with China Primes Cuba’s Engine for Change.” Finan-
cial Times, March 7.
———. 2012. “Cuba Plans Massive Shift to ‘Non- State’ Sector.” Reuters, April 23.
———. 2013. “Cuba to Embark on Deregulation of State Companies.” Reuters, 
July 8.
REFERENCES 235
Freitag, Markus. 2003. “Beyond Tocqueville: The Origins of Social Capital in 
 Switzerland.” European Sociological Review 19 (2): 217– 32.
French, Howard W. 2007. “Propina crisis de seguridad.” El Mural, July 15.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free 
Press.
———. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: 
Free Press.
———. 2000. “Social Capital and Civil Society.” Washington: International Mon-
etary Fund.
Fung, Archon, et al. 2004. “The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes 
Disclosure Policies Effective?” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University. Accessed May 24, 2015. http:// www .transparencypolicy .net/ assets 
/ whatnakesdisclosureeffective .pdf.
Gallagher, Kevin P., and Roberto Porzecanski. 2010. The Dragon in the Room: 
China and the Future of Latin American Industrialization. Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press.
García, Anne- Marie. 2013. “Cuba OKs More Private Businesses, New Regulations.” 
Associated Press, September 26.
García, Judith. 2008. “Burlan chinos estaciones migratorias para llevar fayuca a 
Tepito.” Organización Editorial Mexicana, November 2. Accessed June 6, 2015. 
www .oem .com.mx/ esto/ notas/ n915852 .htm.
García, Myriam. 2007. “Abren la puerta a China.” El Mural, July 13.
García Triana, Mauro. 2003. Los Chinos de Cuba y los nexos entre las dos naciones. 
Havana: Sociedad Cubana de Estudios e Investigaciones Filosóficas.
García Triana, Mauro, Pedro Eng Herrera, and Gregor Benton. 2009. The Chinese 
in Cuba: 1847– Now. Lanham, MD: Lexington.
García Zamora, Rodolfo. 2009. “Migration under nafta: Exporting Goods and 
People.” In The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from nafta, 
edited by Kevin P. Gallagher, Enrique Dussel Peters, and Timothy A. Wise, 79– 
83. Boston: Boston University/ Pardee Center.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: 
Basic.
Gibson, William E. 2014. “Russia Plunges into Cuban Oil Exploration.” Sun Senti-
nel, June 15.
Global Times. 2014. “Premier ‘Regrets’ Mexico’s Scrapping of Rail Deal.” Editorial, 
November 12.
Gómez Izquierdo, Jorge. 2007. “La sinofobia de los Mexicanos: Una historia de 
prejuicios y estereotipos racistas.” Paper presented at the conference “China- 
Mexico: Oportunidades y tetos de la economía de la República Popular China 
para México,” Faculty of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, September 12.
236 REFERENCES
Gómez Mena, Carolina. 2006. “En condiciones de esclavitud, cientos de traba-
jadores chinos en Guanajuato.” La Jornada, February 25. Accessed May 2, 2014. 
www .jornada.unam.mx/ 2006/ 02/ 25/ index .php?section=sociedad&article=045
n1soc.
Gómez Navia, Raimundo, and Graciela Chailloux, eds. 2007. De dónde son los 
Cubanos. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
González, Angel T. 2005. “La milicia china de Castro.” El Mundo, June 19.
González, María de la Luz. 2005. “El zurcido invisible.” La Jornada, June 13.
González, Palmira. 2007. “Invierten 142 millones para tecnología en nl.” El 
Norte, October 6.
González, Susana. 2006. “Que no regrese el ambulantaje al centro: Comercio 
 establecido.” Reforma, January 14.
González Alvarado, Rocio. 2008. “Piratería china de artesanías amenaza subsis-
tencia del mercado de la ciudadela.” La Jornada, July 14.
González Oropeza, Manuel. 1997. “La discriminación en México: El caso de los 
nacionales Chinos.” In La problemática del racismo en los umbrales del siglo 
XXI: VI jornadas lascanianas, 47– 56. Mexico City: unam.
Graham, Mary. 2001. “Information as Risk Regulation: Lessons from Experience.” 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Accessed May 24, 
2015. http:// www .transparencypolicy .net/ assets/ information .pdf.
Gran Liga Nacional Pro- Raza. 1927. “La bestia amarilla.” Pamphlet for public dis-
tribution. Collection of Catalina Velázquez Morales, Department of History, the 
Autonomous University of Baja California.
Granma (published in Cuba). 2008. “Firmados importantes acuerdos.” Editorial, 
November 5.
———. 2014. “Ligero crecimiento turístico en Cuba en 2013.” Editorial, January 6.
Granovetter, Mark. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 78 (6): 1360– 80.
Greene, Graham. 1981. Ways of Escape. New York: Penguin.
Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital. 2001. La maqueta de La Habana. 
Havana: Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital.
Guanche, Jesús. 1983. Componentes etnicos de la nación Cubana. Havana: Edito-
rial Ciencias Sociales.
Guthrie, Douglas. 1998. “The Declining Significance of Guanxi in China’s Eco-
nomic Transition.” China Quarterly 154: 254– 82.
Hall, Derek. 1992. “Tourism Development in Cuba.” In Tourism and the Less De-
veloped Countries, edited by David Harrison, 102– 20. London: Belhaven.
Hall, Simon. 2013. “Asia Faces Competition in Mexico’s Energy Sector.” Wall Street 
Journal, December 16.
Haro Navejas, Francisco. 2007. “El dominio de las emociones: Percepciones Mexi-
canas sobre China.” In China y México: Implicaciones de una nueva relación, 
REFERENCES 237
edited by Enrique Dussel Peters and Yolanda Trápaga Delf ín, 455– 70. Mexico 
City: unam/ cechimex .
He Shuangrong, ed. 2012. China– Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis. 
Reading, UK: Paths International. Translated from Chinese to English by Liu 
Maomin.
Hearn, Adrian H. 2004. “Afro- Cuban Religions and Social Welfare: Consequences 
of Commercial Development in Havana.” Human Organization 63 (1): 79– 88.
———. 2005. “Political Dimensions of International ngo Collaboration with 
Cuba.” In Cuba Today: Continuity and Change since the “Periodo Especial,” , 
edited by Mauricio A. Font with the assistance of Scott Larson and Danielle 
Xuereb, 209– 27. New York: City University of New York Graduate Center.
———. 2008a. Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and Development. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
———, ed. 2008b. Cultura, tradición, y comunidad: Perspectivas sobre la partici-
pación y el desarrollo en Cuba. Havana: Imagen Contemporánea.
———. 2009. “Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States.” 
Miami: Florida International University Cuban Research Institute. Accessed 
February 12, 2015. https:// cri.fiu .edu/ research/ commissioned- reports/ cuba 
- china- hearn .pdf.
———. 2010. “中国在全球一体化下的关键主题” [Transparency and good 
 governance: Key themes in China’s global integration]. Chinese Social Sciences 
Today. March 4. Accessed April 24, 2014. http:// sspress .cass.cn/ news/ 8127 
 .htm.
Hearn, Adrian H., and Félix J. Alfonso. 2012. “Antecedentes locales y globales de 
las reformas cubanas.” Temas 71: 21– 28.
Hearn, Adrian H., and José Luis León- Manríquez, eds. 2011. China Engages Latin 
America: Tracing the Trajectory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Hearn, Adrian H., Alan Smart, and Roberto Hernández Hernández. 2011. “China 
and Mexico: Trade, Migration, and Guanxi.” In China Engages Latin America: 
Tracing the Trajectory, edited by Adrian H. Hearn and José Luis León Man-
ríquez, 139– 57. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Hernández, Rafael, Yenisel Rodríguez, and Juan Triana. 2011. “Dossier.” Espacio 
Laical 1: 24– 47. Accessed July 14, 2015. http:// espaciolaical .org/ contens/ 25 
/ 2447 .pdf.
Hernández Hernández, Roberto. 2012. “Economic Liberalization and Trade Rela-
tions between Mexico and China.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 41 (1): 
49– 96.
Herrera Jerez, Miriam, and Mario Castillo Santana. 2003. De la memoria a la vida 
pública: Identidades, espacios, y jerarquías de los Chinos en La Habana republi-
cana (1902– 1968). Havana: Juan Marinello.
Heryanto, Ariel. 1998. “Ethnic Identities and Erasure: Chinese Indonesians in 
Public Culture.” In Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Rep-
238 REFERENCES
resentation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, edited by Joel S. 
Kahn, 95– 114. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Hilgers, Tina. 2008. “Recentering Informality on the Research Agenda: Grass- 
roots Action, Political Parties, and Democratic Governance.” Latin American 
Research Review 43 (2): 272– 81.
Hill, Matthew J. 2007. “Reimagining Old Havana: World Heritage and the Pro-
duction of Scale in Late Socialist Cuba.” In Deciphering the Global: Its Scales, 
Spaces, and Subjects, edited by Saski Sassen, 59– 76. New York: Routledge.
Hira, Anil. 2007. An East Asian Model for Latin American Success. London: 
 Ashgate.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1984. Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots Experiences in 
Latin America. New York: Pergamon.
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger. 1992. The Invention of Tradition. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horcasitas, Fernando. 1968. De Porfirio Díaz a Zapata: Memoria náhuatl de 
Milpa Alta. Mexico City: unam.
Hsing, You Tien. 1998. Making Capitalism in China: The Taiwan Connection. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hsu, Carolyn L. 2005. “Capitalism without Contracts versus Capitalists without 
Capitalism: Comparing the Influence of Chinese Guanxi and Russian Blat on 
Marketization.” Communist and Post- Communist Studies 38 (3): 309– 27.
Hua, Shajun. 2005. “Puros en China.” China Hoy 46 (3): 34– 37.
Hu- DeHart, Evelyn. 1993. “Chinese Coolie Labour in Cuba in the Nineteenth 
 Century: Free Labour or Neoslavery?” Slavery and Abolition 14 (1): 67– 86.
———. 1999. “Race Construction and Race Relations: Chinese and Blacks in 
Nineteenth- Century Cuba.” In Encounters: People of Asian Descent in the 
Americas, edited by Roshni Rustomji- Kerns, 105– 12. Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield.
———. 2003. “Globalization and Its Discontents: Exposing the Underside.” Fron-
tiers 24 (2– 3): 244– 60.
———. 2005a. “Opium and Social Control: Coolies on the Plantations of Peru and 
Cuba.” Journal of Chinese Overseas 1 (2): 169– 83.
———. 2005b. “On Coolies and Shopkeepers: The Chinese as Huagong (laborers) 
and Huashang (merchants) in Latin America/ Caribbean.” In Displacement and 
Diasporas: Asians in the Americas, edited by Wanni W. Anderson and Rob-
ert G. Lee, 78– 110. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
———. 2007. “Latin America in Asia- Pacific Perspective.” In Asian Diasporas: New 
Formations, New Conceptions, edited by Rhacel S. Parreñas and Lok C. D. Siu, 
29– 62. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
———. 2010. “Indispensable Enemy or Convenient Scapegoat? A Critical Exami-
nation of Sinophobia in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1870s to 1930s.” In 
REFERENCES 239
The Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by Walton Look Lai 
and Tan Chee- Beng, 65– 102. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill.
Hughes, Krista. 2013. “Mexico Aims to Bring Shadow Economy into the Light.” 
Reuters, June 26.
Hun Calzadilla, Julio. 2010. “Las sociedades Chinas en Cuba: Escudo y sostén.” 
Monograf ías .com. Accessed May 1, 2014. http:// www .monografias .com 
/ trabajos39/ sociedades- chinas- cuba/ sociedades- chinas- cuba .shtml.
Hurst, William. 2002. “ ‘Comrade Can You Spare a Dime?’ Political Status, Guanxi, 
and the Transition from State to Market for China’s Workers.” Paper presented 
at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31.
Hutchinson- Jafar, Linda. 2011. “China’s cnpc in Talks for Possible Cuba Oil 
Block.” Reuters, July 13. Accessed April 25, 2014. www .reuters .com/ article/ 2011 
/ 07/ 13/ cuba- china- oil- idUSN1E76C1S620110713.
Iliff, Laurence. 2009. “Remittances to Mexico Fall 36.” Wall Street Journal, De-
cember 1.
“Importancia de las Pymes.” Las Pymes, June 14. Accessed April 28, 2014. http:// 
laspymes .com.mx/ importancia- de- las- pymes .html.
“Indigna en redes, vestuario usado por Angélica Rivera e hija en gira por Londres.” 
2015. Proceso .com, March 6. Accessed March 9, 2015. www .proceso .com.mx 
/ ?p=397721.
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Geograf ía. 2010. “Censo de población y vivi-
enda 2010.” Accessed May 2, 2014. http:// www .censo2010 .org.mx/.
Jiang Shixue. 2009. Cuba’s Economic Reforms in Chinese Perspective. Beijing: 
 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
———. 2011. “Ten Key Questions.” In China Engages Latin America: Tracing the 
Trajectory, edited by Adrian H. Hearn and José Luis León Manríquez, 51– 65. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Jung, Moon- Ho. 2006. Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of 
Emancipation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kagan, Robert. 2008. The Return of History and the End of Dreams. New York: 
Knopf.
Kahn, Joel. 1997. “Culturalizing Malaysia.” In Tourism, Ethnicity, and the State in 
Asian and Pacific Societies, edited by Michel Picard and Robert E. Wood, 99– 
127. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Keister, Lisa A. 2002. “Guanxi in Business Groups: Social Ties and the Formation 
of Economic Relations.” In Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, 
and the Changing Nature of Guanxi, edited by Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie, 
and David Wank, 77– 96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kirk, John M. 2007. “Toward an Understanding of the Tourism Potential in Cuba.” 
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 48 (4): 416– 18.
Klepak, Hal. 2010. Raúl Castro, estratega de la defensa revolucionaria de Cuba. 
Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual.
240 REFERENCES
Kuhn, Philip A. 2008. Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times. Lan-
ham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2007. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transform-
ing the World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
———. 2008. “China’s Growing Influence in Southeast Asia.” In China’s Expansion 
into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United 
States, edited by Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, 193– 212. Washington: 
Brookings Institution.
Labrador Ruiz, Enrique. 1952. “Chinatown, Havana.” Americas 4 (8): 6– 8, 42– 43.
La Crónica (published in Mexico). 2008. “Prometen a Chinos traer a sus familias.” 
Editorial, October 24.
“La economía informal representa 15 del pib.” 2012. Informador.Mx, June 7. 
 Accessed April 28, 2014. www .informador .com.mx/ economia/ 2012/ 381491/ 6 
/ la- economia- informal- representa- 15-del- pib .htm.
La Jornada (published in Mexico). 2015. “Militares heridos en los hechos de Tlat-
laya también serán indemnizados: ceav.” Editorial, February 22.
Lam, Willy. 2004. “China’s Encroachment on America’s Backyard.” China Brief 4 
(23): 1– 3.
La Prensa (published in Mexico). 2005. “Acusan a China de competencia desleal.” 
Editorial, January 30.
Laverty, Collin. 2011. Cuba’s New Resolve: Economic Reform and Its Implications 
for U.S. Policy. Washington: Center for Democracy in the Americas.
Lederman, Daniel, Marcelo Olarreaga, and Guillermo E. Perry, eds. 2008. China’s 
and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat? Washington: 
World Bank.
Lee, Christopher. 2007. “Diaspora, Transnationalism, and Asian American Stud-
ies: Positions and Debates.” In Asian Diasporas: New Formations, New Con-
ceptions, edited by Rhacel S. Parreñas and Lok C. D. Siu, 23– 38. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.
León- Manríquez, José Luis. 2011. “China’s Relations with Mexico and Chile: Boom 
for Whom?” In China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, edited by 
Adrian H. Hearn and José Luis León- Manríquez, 159– 201. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner.
Lin Hua. 2012. “Functions of Chinese Communities in the Development of China- 
Latin America Relations.” In China– Latin America Relations: Review and Anal-
ysis, edited by He Shuangrong, 107– 19. Reading, UK: Paths International.
Lin, Nan. 2001. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Linares Savio, María Teresa. 2000. “Expresiones de la cultura China en Cuba: El 
teatro, la música.” Catauro 2 (2): 41– 49.
Lo, Ming- Cheng M., and Eileen M. Otis. 2003. “Guanxi Civility: Processes, Poten-
tials, and Contingencies.” Politics and Society 31 (1): 131– 62.
REFERENCES 241
Lombera, Manuel. 2009. “México no supo manejar la crisis: Stiglitz.” El Universal, 
November 19.
López, Guadalupe. 2009. “Expanden cultura china.” La Frontera (published in 
Mexico), February 12.
López, Johnny. 1942. Vocal performance of “El chinito pichilón” by Ñico Saquito 
Bimbi, Luis M. Bosch, Hermenegildo Cardenas Bimbi. Recorded on Cuarteto la 
Playa, Decca [format: 78– 10, publish : 21266– 1].
López, Kathleen. 2004. “One Brings Another: The Formation of Early- Twentieth- 
Century Chinese Migrant Communities in Cuba.” In The Chinese in the Carib-
bean, edited by Andrew Wilson, 93– 127. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener.
———. 2008. “Afro- Asian Alliances: Marriage, Godparentage, and Social Status in 
Late- Nineteenth- Century Cuba.” Afro- Hispanic Review 27 (1): 59– 72.
———. 2009. “The Revitalization of Havana’s Chinatown: Invoking Chinese Cuban 
History.” Journal of Chinese Overseas 5 (1): 177– 200.
———. 2013. Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press.
López, Mario. 2006a. “Cambian giros de comercios a bodegas.” Reforma, June 5.
———. 2006b. “Reconocen incapacidad en aduanas.” Reforma, January 16.
———. 2007. “Urgen para tepito plan contra piratería.” Reforma, January 13.
Lopez, Mark H., Gretchen Livingstone, and Rakesh Kochhar. 2009. “Hispanics  
and the Economic Downturn: Housing Woes and Remittance Cuts.” Pew His-
panic Center Report, January 8. Accessed August 5, 2015. www .pewhispanic 
.org/ 2009/ 01/ 08/ hispanics- and- the- economic- downturn- housing- woes- and 
- remittance- cuts/.
Lopez- Levy, Arturo. 2011a. Change in Post- Fidel Cuba: Political Liberalization, 
Economic Reform and Lessons for U.S. Policy. Washington: New America Foun-
dation.
———. 2011b. “Reformas económicas y desarrollo en el Este de Asia: ¿Una experi-
encia para Cuba?” Espacio Laical 3: 40– 44.
Macaluso, Grace. 2010. “Incentives Sealed Deal with Nemak; City Steps Up to 
Save Jobs with Tax Breaks.” Windsor Star, September 29.
Mao, Xianglin, et al. 2011. “China and Cuba: Past, Present, and Future.” In China 
Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, edited by Adrian H. Hearn and 
José Luis León- Manríquez, 187– 201. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Mao, Xianglin, Adrian H. Hearn, and Liu Weiguang. 2015. “China and Cuba: 160 
Years and Looking Ahead.” Latin American Perspectives 42 (6).
Marcus, George E. 1995. “Ethnography in/ of the World System: The Emergence of 
Multi- Sited Ethnography.” Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 95– 117.
Marquez, Julio. 1994. “Bad News, Good News: Colosio’s Untimely Death Could 
Mean the Rebirth of Reform.” Reason, July. Accessed July 16. http:// reason .com 
/ archives/ 1994/ 07/ 01/ bad- news- good- news.
242 REFERENCES
Martin, Andrew. 2007. “Escándalos favorecen seguridad alimenticia.” El Mural, 
June 15.
Mau, Steffen. 2010. Social Transnationalism: Lifeworlds beyond the Nation- State. 
London: Routledge.
Mayoral Jiménez, Isabel. 2011. “México se ‘blinda’ por contrabando Chino.” 
CNNExpansión, December 6. Accessed April 27, 2014. www .cnnexpansion 
.com/ economia/ 2011/ 12/ 06/ mexico- se- blinda- vs- pirateria- de- china.
McKeown, Adam M. 2001. Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, 
Chicago, and Hawaii, 1900– 1938. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2008. Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Bor-
ders. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mejía, Javier. 2008. “Festejó asociación China la ‘semana de migración.’ ” La Voz de 
la Frontera, October 24. Accessed May 2, 2014. http:// www .oem .com.mx/ esto 
/ notas/ n904413 .htm.
Meo, Paul. 2011. “Change in Cuba?” asce Newsletter, September 6– 10. Accessed 
August 5, 2015. www .ascecuba .org/ c/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2014/ 09/ newsletter 
- 2011-09-03 .pdf.
Mesa- Lago, Carmelo. 2013. Cuba under Raul Castro: Assessing the Reforms. Boul-
der, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Mesa- Lago, Carmelo, and Pavel Vidal- Alejandro. 2010. “The Impact of the Global 
Crisis on Cuba’s Economy and Social Welfare.” Journal of Latin American Stud-
ies 42: 689– 717.
Millán, Ana Valdés. 2005. Una cultura millenaria en el siglo XX guantanamero. 
Guantánamo: Editorial el Mar y la Montaña.
Mingramm, Rafael Valdez. 2012. “2012, Año de oportunidad para renovar votos 
con China.” In 40 años de la relación entre México y China: Acuerdos, des-
encuentros y futuro, edited by Enrique Dussel Peters, 97– 106. Mexico City: 
unam/ cechimex.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba. 1960. “Memorandum of the Conversation 
between Premier Zhou Enlai and Cuban Revolutionary Government Economic 
Delegation, November 18, 1960.” Available from the Wilson Center History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC fma 204-00098-02,1-16. Translated  
by Zhang Qian. Accessed July 9, 2015. http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter .org 
/ document/ 115156.
Minor, Milthon. 2010. “Abren en Mexicali cámara de empresarios Chinos del 
noroeste.” La Frontera, March 6.
Mondragón, Santos. 2006. “Ambulantes invaden el centro histórico.” Noticieros 
Televisa, December 25.
Monteón González, Humberto, and José Luis Trueba Lara. 1988. Chinos y anti-
chinos en México: Documentos para su estudio. Guadalajara: Gobierno de 
Jalisco, Secretaría General, Unidad Editorial.
REFERENCES 243
Montes de Oca Choy, María Teresa. 2007. Las sociedades Chinas en Cuba: Pasado 
y presente. Havana: Imagen Contemporánea, 2007. cd- rom.
Montes de Oca Choy, María Teresa, and Roberto Vargas Lee. 2008. “Llevando a la 
práctica la cultura China: La cátedra de estudios Chinos y la Escuela Cubana de 
Wushu.” In Cultura, tradición, y comunidad: Perspectivas sobre la participación 
y el desarrollo en Cuba, edited by Adrian H. Hearn, 162– 99. Havana: Imagen 
Contemporánea.
Morán, Francisco. 2005. “Volutas del deseo: Hacia una lectura del orientalismo en 
el modernismo Hispanoamericano.” Modern Language Notes 120: 383– 407.
Moreno, Alejandro, and Daniel Calingaert. 2011. Change Comes to Cuba: Citizens’ 
Views on Reform after the Sixth Party Congress. Washington: Freedom House.
Morris, Stephen D. 2001. Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico. Tusca-
loosa: University of Alabama Press.
Morris, Stephen D., and Joseph L. Klesner. 2010. “Corruption and Trust: Theoreti-
cal Considerations and Evidence from Mexico.” Comparative Political Studies 
43 (10): 1258– 85.
Mujal- León, Eusebio. 2011. “Survival, Adaptation and Uncertainty: The Case of 
Cuba.” Journal of International Affairs 65 (1): 149– 68.
Murray, Mary. 2004. “China Gives Boost to Cuba’s Economy.” NBCNews .com,  
November 23. Accessed April 25, 2014. http:// www .msnbc.msn .com/ id 
/ 6566988/.
Newton, Kenneth. 2001. “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy.” 
International Political Science Review 22 (2): 201– 14.
Nonini, Donald M., and Aihwa Ong. 1997. “Chinese Transnationalism as an Al-
ternative Modernity.” In Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern 
Chinese Transnationalism, edited by Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, 3– 33. 
London: Routledge.
Noticieros Televisa (published in Mexico). 2005. “Productos mexicanos ‘made’ en 
China.” Editorial, September 13.
Ochoa León, Sara María. 2008. “Corrupción y contrabando en el sector textil en 
México.” Report for the Chamber of Deputies of Mexico. Accessed August 5, 
2015. https:// www .yumpu .com/ es/ document/ view/ 10326979/ corrupcion- y 
- contrabando- en- el- sector- textil- en- camara- de- .
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 2006. “On Informal Institutions, Once Again.” In Informal 
Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, edited by Gretchen 
Helmke and Steven Levitsky, 285– 89. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press.
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información. 2014. Anuario estadístico de Cuba 
2013. Havana: Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información.
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
244 REFERENCES
Ong, Aihwa, and Stephen Collier, eds. 2004. Global Assemblages: Technology, Poli-
tics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems. London: Blackwell.
Oppenheimer, Andres. 1992. Castro’s Final Hour: An Eyewitness Account of the 
Disintegration of Castro’s Cuba. New York: Touchstone.
———. 2010. “La gran esperanza de México: Lograr tener 5 millones de Norte-
americanos retirados.” Excelsior, April 30.
Opus Habana (published in Cuba). 2013. “Mensajero de paz y amor.” Editorial, 
March 25. Accessed August 5, 2015. www .opushabana.cu/ index .php?option 
=com_content&view=article&id=3738&Itemid=43.
Organisation for Economic Co- Operation and Development. 2009. oecd Eco-
nomic Surveys: Mexico. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co- operation and 
Development.
Ortiz, Fernando. 1940. “América es un Ajiaco.” La Nueva Democracia 21 (11):  
20– 24.
———. [1940] 1995. Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar. Translated by Har-
riet de Onís, introduction by Bronislaw Malinowski, prologue by Herminio Por-
tell Vilà, new introduction by Fernando Coronil. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press.
Ortner, Sherry B. 1991. “Patterns of History: Cultural Schemas in the Founding of 
Sherpa Religious Institutions.” In Culture through Time: Anthropological Ap-
proaches, edited by E. Ohnuki- Tierney, 57– 93. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Osorio, Ernesto. 2007. “Descarta barrios retirar ambulantes.” Reforma, August 8.
Osorio, Ernesto, and Mariana Díaz. 2007. “Ofrece el comercio formal liberar ban-
quetas del Centro.” Reforma August 17.
Oxfeld, Ellen. 1993. Blood, Sweat, and Mahjong: Family and Enterprise in an Over-
seas Chinese Community. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Padgett, Humberto. 2005. “Abastece tepito a piratas.” Reforma, February 15.
Padilla, Art, and Jerome L. McElroy. 2007. “Cuba and Caribbean Tourism after 
Castro.” Annals of Tourism Research 34 (3): 649– 72.
Padura Fuentes, Leonardo. 1994. El viaje más largo. Havana: Ediciones Unión.
Palumbo- Liu, David. 2007. “Asian Diasporas, and Yet . . . .” In Asian Diasporas: 
New Formations, New Conceptions, edited by Rhacel S. Parreñas and Lok C. D. 
Siu, 279– 84. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Pan, Tao. 2004. “Timeless Theme of International Relations.” Beijing Review 47 
(23), 10 June.
Páramo, Arturo. 2007. “Se alían informales: No rinden la plaza.” Excelsior, April 28.
———. 2008. “Barrio chino: Muralla productiva.” Excelsior, August 5.
Parás García, Pablo, Carlos López Olmedo, and Dinorah Vargas. 2011. “Cultura 
política de la democracia en México, 2010: Consolidación democrática en las 
Américas en tiempos dif íciles.” Latin America Public Opinion Project, Vander-
REFERENCES 245
bilt University. Accessed July 18, 2015. http:// vanderbilt .edu/ lapop/ mexico 
/ 2010-culturapolitica .pdf.
Par Darmstadt. 2004. Factores que contribuyen al éxito de las iniciativas comuni-
tarias a nivel barrial: Casos observados en la Habana, Cuba. Accessed July 26, 
2015. www .academia .edu/ 9680271/ Factores_que_contribuyen_al_C3A9xito 
_de_las_iniciativas_comunitarias_a_nivel_barrial.
Pardiñas, Felipe. 1982. Relaciones diplomáticas entre México y China, 1898– 1948. 
Mexico City: sre.
Parreñas, Rhacel S., and Lok C. D. Siu. 2007. “Introduction: Asian Diasporas—
New Conceptions, New Frameworks.” In Asian Diasporas: New Formations, 
New Conceptions, edited by Rhacel S. Parreñas and Lok C. D. Siu, 1– 27. Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Pastrana, Juan Jiménez. 1963. Los Chinos en las luchas por la liberación de Cuba, 
1847– 1930. Havana: Instituto de Historia.
———. 1983. Los Chinos en la historia de Cuba: 1847– 1930. Havana: Editorial de 
Ciencias Sociales.
Peña Delgado, Grace. 2012. Making the Chinese Mexican: Global Migration, Lo-
calism, and Exclusion in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
People’s Daily. 1996. “Chairman Qiao Shi Met with Chairman Alarcon.” Editorial, 
April 10.
———. 2003a. “Hu Jintao Held Talks with Castro.” Editorial, February 28.
———. 2003b. “Jiang Zemin Held Talks with Castro.” Editorial, February 27.
People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1987. A General Survey of 
Chinese Diplomacy. Beijing: World Affairs.
———. 2003. China’s Stand on South- South Cooperation. August 18. Accessed 
May 3, 2014. http:// enfaohn.hainan .gov.cn/ swsqwywb/ ForeignPolicies/ 200910 
/ t20091027_12096 .html.
———. 2008. China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Accessed 
May 3, 2014. http:// english .gov.cn/ official/ 2008– 11/ 05/ content_1140347 .htm.
———. 2012. “Barrio Chino de La Habana atesora nueva estatua de Confucio.” 
 December 12. Accessed May 1, 2014. http:// cu .chineseembassy .org/ esp/ sgxx 
/ sgxw/ t1002717 .htm.
———. 2013. “Xi Jinping Attends Eighth G20 Leaders’ Summit and Delivers Im-
portant Speech.” September 6. Accessed May 3, 2014. www .chinaembassy.lt 
/ eng/ xwdt/ t1074372 .htm.
Pérez, Ladyrene. 2014. “Presidente chino inicia visita a la Isla: ‘Cuba es un país de 
peso.’ ” Cuba Debate, July 2.
Pérez Brito, Arnaldo. 1953. Vocal performance of “Chino Li- Wong,” by Armando 
Orefiche. Recorded by Armando Orefiche and His Havana boys on Vintage 
Cuba no. 79 ep Almendra.
246 REFERENCES
Pérez de la Riva, Juan. 2000. Los culíes Chinos en Cuba. Havana: Editorial Ciencias 
Sociales.
Pérez Pizarro, Renato. 2009a. “Chinese Buses Are Assembled in Havana.” Miami 
Herald, December 4.
———. 2009b. “Chinese Cars Are on Their Way to Cuba.” Miami Herald, June 11.
Pew Research Center. 2007. Global Unease with Major World Powers,” chapter 3. 
Accessed April 28, 2014. www .pewglobal .org/ 2007/ 06/ 27/ chapter- 3-views- of 
-china- and- its- increasing- influence/.
Piccato, Pablo. 2001. City of Suspects: Crime in Mexico City, 1900– 1931. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.
Piñón, Jorge. 2011. “Why the United States and Cuba Collaborate (and What 
Could Happen If They Don’t).” Hemisphere 20: 24– 25.
Pitts, Pietro. 2014. “U.S.-Cuba Deal Shows Venezuelan Oil Giveaways Running 
Out.” Bloomberg, December 20. Accessed August 5, 2015. www .bloomberg .com 
/ news/ articles/ 2014-12-19/ u- s- cuba- deal- shows- venezuelan- oil- giveaways 
- running- out.
Portes, Alejandro. 1998. “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern 
Sociology.” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 1– 24.
Portes, Alejandro, and Saskia Sassen. 1987. “Making It Underground: Comparative 
Material on the Informal Sector in Western Market Economies.” American Jour-
nal of Sociology 93 (1): 30– 61.
Portes, Alejandro, and Julia Sensenbrenner. 1993. “Embeddedness and Immigra-
tion: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action.” American Journal 
of Sociology 98 (6): 1320– 50.
Pringle, James. 2003. “Cuban Chop Suey.” Far Eastern Economic Review 166 (27): 
53.
Protocolo (published in Mexico). 2007. “Mafia China intensifica tráfico de perso-
nas en América Latina.” May 5. Accessed May 2, 2014. www .protocolo .com.mx 
/ internacional/ mafia- china- intensifica- trafico- de- personas- en- america- latina/.
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
———. 2007. “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty- First 
Century.” Scandinavian Political Studies 30 (2): 137– 74.
Quesada, Gonzalo de. 1946. Los Chinos y la revolución Cubana. Havana: Ucar, 
García y Cía.
Rabinow, Paul. 1977. Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Rainsford, Sarah. 2012. “Cuba Oil: Offshore Exploration Brings Hopes and Fears.” 
bbc News, February 1. Accessed April 25, 2014. www .bbc.co .uk/ news/ world 
- latin- america- 16795321.
Ramírez, Ana. 2007. “ ‘Traen el jaque’ a los extranjeros.” La Frontera, December 27.
REFERENCES 247
Ramos Pérez, Jorge. 2009. “Cordero pide a Stiglitz leer sobre México.” El Univer-
sal, November 19.
Ratliff, William. 2004. China’s “Lessons” for Cuba’s Transition? Coral Gables, FL: 
University of Miami Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies.
———. 2006. “Cereijo, Bejucal, China and Cuba’s Adversary Foreign Intelligence.” 
World Association of International Studies, March 4. Accessed April 25, 2014. 
www .waisworld .org/ go.jsp?id=02a&objectType=post&o=9526&objectTypeId= 
3776&topicId=10.
Ravsberg, Fernando. 2012. “Cuba Plans to Drill as Oil Rig Arrives.” Havana Times, 
January 20. Accessed April 25, 2014. www .havanatimes .org/ ?p=60134.
Reich, Robert B. 1982. “Making Industrial Policy.” Foreign Affairs, spring, 852– 81.
Rénique, Gerardo. 2000. “Race, Mestizaje and Nationalism: Sonora’s Anti- Chinese 
Movement and State Formation in Post- Revolutionary Mexico.” Political Power 
and Social Theory 14: 91– 140.
———. 2003. “Race, Region, and Nation: Sonora’s Anti- Chinese Racism and 
Mexico’s Post- Revolutionary Nationalism, 1920s– 1930s.” In Race and Nation in 
Modern Latin America, edited by Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, 
and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, 211– 36. Chapel Hill: North Carolina Univer-
sity Press.
República de Cuba. 2011. Lineamientos de la política económica y social del par-
tido y la revolución. Havana: República de Cuba.
Reséndiz, Francisco. 2014. “Resalta epn compromiso de México con transparen-
cia.” El Universal, September 24.
“Retiring Americans: Go South, Old Man.” 2005. Economist, November 24. Ac-
cessed May 2, 2014. www .economist .com/ node/ 5214922.
Reuters Havana. 2004. “News release.” Editorial, November, 22.
Ritter, Archibald. 2011. “El VI congreso del partido y los lineamientos: ¿Un punto 
de viraje para Cuba?” Espacio Laical 3: 18– 22.
Roberts, Walter A. 1953. Havana: The Portrait of a City. New York: Coward- 
McCann.
Rodríguez, Ivet. 2011. “Comercio ilegal acapara mercado de ropa.” CNNExpansión, 
January 25. Accessed April 27, 2014. www .cnnexpansion .com/ manufactura 
/ 2011/ 01/ 25/ comercio- ilegal- acapara- mercado- de- ropa.
Rojas Peña, Alberto. 2009. “Un viaje al pasado.” El Diario de Sonora, February 21.
Romero, José María. 1911. Comisión de Inmigración, encargada de estudiar la in-
fluencia social y económica de la inmigración asiática en México. Mexico City: 
A. Carranza e Hijos.
Romero, Robert Chao. 2010. The Chinese in Mexico, 1882– 1940. Tucson: University 
of Arizona Press.
Romeu, Rafael. 2012. “Cuba: Reform Continues.” In Latin American Economic 
Perspectives—All Together Now: The Challenge of Regional Integration, edited by 
248 REFERENCES
Eduardo Levy- Yeyati, with Lucio Castro and Luciano Cohan, 60– 68. Washing-
ton: Brookings Institution.
Rovner, Eduardo Sáenz. 2004. “Contrabando, juego, y narcotráfico en Cuba en-
tre los años 20 y comienzos de la revolución.” Paper delivered at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, March 17. Accessed April 30, 
2014. http:// taniaquintero.blogspot .com.au/ 2007/ 08/ contrabando- juego- y 
- narcotrfico- en- cuba .html.
Saco, José Antonio. [1864] 2000. “Los Chinos en Cuba.” Catauro 2 (2): 193– 97.
Saldierna, Georgina. 2014. “Mexicanos desconf ían principalmente de diputados, 
partidos, policías y jueces.” La Jornada, June 15.
Salinas, Daniel. 2008. “Buscan crear Barrio Chino en la ‘Revu.’ ” La Frontera, 
March 1.
Santiso, Javier, and Rolando Avendaño. 2011. “Economic Fundamentals of the Re-
lationship.” In China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory, edited by 
Adrian H. Hearn and José Luis León- Manríquez, 67– 90. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner.
Sato, Kanji. 2006. “Formation of La Raza and the Anti- Chinese Movement in 
Mexico.” Transforming Anthropology 14 (2): 181– 86.
Scarpaci, Joseph L., Roberto Segre, and Mario Coyula. 2002. Havana: Two Faces of 
the Antillean Metropolis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Schambra, William. 1994. “By the People: The Old Values of the New Citizenship.” 
Policy Review (summer): 32– 38.
Schiavone Camacho, Julia M. 2009. “Crossing Boundaries, Claiming a Homeland: 
The Mexican Chinese Transpacific Journey to Becoming Mexican, 1930s– 
1960s.” Pacific Historical Review 78 (4): 545– 77.
———. 2012. Chinese Mexicans: Transpacific Migration and the Search for a 
Homeland 1910– 1960. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Schneider, Ben Ross. 2002. “Why Is Mexican Business So Organized?” Latin 
American Research Review 37 (1): 77– 118.
Schuler, Friedrich E. 1998. Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign 
Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cardenas, 1934– 1940. Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press.
Schwartz, Rosalie. 1997. Pleasure Island: Tourism and Temptation in Cuba. Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press.
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público. 2009. “La economía Mexicana.” Paper 
presented at the 2009 Forum of the Mexican Institute of Financial Executives, 
Monterrey. June 3. Accessed July 17, 2015. shcp.gob.mx/ SALAPRENSA/ sala 
_prensa_presentaciones/ acc_presentacion_la_economia_mexicana_03062009 
.pdf
Shambaugh, David. 2009. “China’s New Foray into Latin America.” Brookings East 
Asia Commentary, November. Accessed August 3, 2015. http:// atakapa4.rssing 
.com/ browser .php?indx=3536754&last=1&item=8.
REFERENCES 249
Sharpley, Richard, and Martin Knight. 2009. “Tourism and the State in Cuba: 
From the Past to the Future.” International Journal of Tourism Research 11:  
241– 54.
Shi Weimin. 2011. “Reforma progresiva bajo orientación política en China.” Temas 
66:17– 28.
Sierra, Arturo. 2004. “Montan con 9 mil ‘minilab’ de piratería.” Reforma, June 7.
Simón, Angélica. 2007. “Comunidad estigmatizada.” El Universal, April 12.
Simon, Bernard. 2011. “Canadian Banks Eye Return to Cuba.” Financial Times, 
December 18.
Simoni, Valerio. 2009. “Touristic Encounters in Cuba: Informality, Ambiguity, and 
Emerging Relationships.” PhD diss., Leeds Metropolitan University.
Sirkin, Harold, Michael Zinser, and Justin Rose. 2014. The Shifting Economics of 
Global Manufacturing. Boston: Boston Consulting Group.
Siu, Lok. 2008. “Chino Latino Restaurants: Converging Communities, Identities, 
and Cultures.” Afro- Hispanic Review 27 (1): 161– 71.
Skocpol, Theda. 1996. “Unraveling from Above.” American Prospect 7 (25): 20– 25.
Smart, Alan. 1993. “Gifts, Bribes, and Guanxi: A Reconsideration of Bourdieu’s 
Social Capital.” Cultural Anthropology 8 (3): 388– 408.
Smart, Alan, and Jinn Yuh Hsu. 2004. “The Chinese Diaspora, Foreign Investment 
and Economic Development in China.” The Review of International Affairs 3 (4): 
544– 66.
Smart, Josephine, and Alan Smart. 2009. “Personal Relations and Divergent Econ-
omies: A Case Study of Hong Kong Investment in China.” International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 15 (2): 216– 33.
Solis Peña, Margarita. 2006. “Al vapor la ley antipiratería en el df, denuncian co-
merciantes.” La Crónica, May 8.
Spagat, Elliot. 2005. “Terrorist Hoax Exposes Little- Known Chinese Smuggling 
Route.” Associated Press, 5 February.
Steele, James W. 1885. Cuban Sketches, 2nd ed. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
Strauss, Julia C., and Ariel C. Armony, eds. 2012. From the Great Wall to the New 
World: China and Latin America in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Strubbe, Bill, and Karen Wald. 1995. “Start with a Dream: Rebuilding Havana’s 
Chinese Community.” World and I, September, 188– 97.
Tai, Kuan. 2012. “La experiencia de la Expo China- México 2009– 2011 y Expo 
Asia- Pacífico- México 2011, misiones mexicanas a China 2012.” In 40 años de la 
relación entre México y China: Acuerdos, desencuentros y futuro, edited by  
Enrique Dussel Peters, 365– 70. Mexico City: unam/ cechimex.
Tan, Clement. 2015. “China Rail Stocks Sink after Mexico Shelves High- Speed Rail 
Line.” Bloomberg, February 2. Accessed August 5, 2015. www .bloomberg .com 
/ news/ articles/ 2015-02-02/ china- rail- stocks- sink- after- mexico- shelves- high 
- speed- rail- line.
250 REFERENCES
Taylor, Lawrence. 2002. “El contrabando de Chinos en la frontera de las Califor-
nias durante el Porfiriato (1876– 1911).” Migraciones Internacionales 1 (3): 5– 31.
Tokatlian, Juan Gabriel. 2008. “A View from Latin America.” In China’s Expansion 
into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United 
States, edited by Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, 59– 89. Washington: Brook-
ings Institution.
Tölölyan, Khachig. 1991. “The Nation- State and Its Others: In Lieu of a Preface.” 
Diaspora 1 (1): 1– 2.
———. 1996. “Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Mo-
ment.” Diaspora 5 (1): 3– 36.
Torres Pérez, Ricardo. 2011. “La actualización del modelo económico cubano: 
Continuidad y ruptura.” Temas Catalejo. Accessed August 5, 2015. www .temas 
.cult.cu/ catalejo/ economia/ Ricardo_Torres .pdf.
Trápaga Delf ín, Yolanda, Enrique Dussel Peters, and Sergio Martínez Rivera. 2012. 
Programa de becas ciudad de México- China: Propuestas de cooperación 2010– 
2011. Mexico City: unam/ cechimex.
Tsai, Kellee S. 2002. Back- Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. 2015. “un comtrade.” Ac-
cessed July 10, 2015. http:// comtrade.un .org/ db/ default .aspx.
United Nations Development Program. 1990. Human Development Report 1990. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Uno más Uno (published in Mexico). 2007. “Centro histórico: Bomba de tiempo.” 
Editorial, July 17.
“US, Cuba Move toward Embassies, Disagree on Human Rights.” 2015. Associated 
Press, January 22.
U.S. Department of State. 2010. “Key Trading Partners See No Big Economic Re-
forms.” Wikileaks U.S. Embassy Cables, 10HAVANA84, November 28. Accessed 
August 3, 2015. https:// wikileaks .org/ cable/ 2010/ 02/ 10HAVANA84 .html.
usgs (U.S. Geological Survey). 2005. “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas 
Resources of the North Cuba Basin, Cuba, 2004.” Reston, VA: U.S. Geological 
Survey.
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 2002. 1999 Statistical Yearbook of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Washington: Government Printing 
Office.
Uslaner, Eric M. 1999. “Democracy and Social Capital.” In Democracy and Trust, 
edited by Mark E. Warren, 121– 50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Valdés Lakowsky, Vera. 1981. Vinculaciones sino- mexicanas: Albores y testimonios 
(1974– 1899). México: unam.
Van Ziegert, Sylvia. 2006. Global Spaces of Chinese Culture: Diasporic Chinese 
Communities in the United States and Germany. New York: Routledge.
Varela, Beatriz. 1980. Lo Chino en el habla Cubana. Miami, FL: Universal.
REFERENCES 251
Velázquez Morales, Catalina. 1989. “Los Chinos agricultores y comerciantes en 
Mexicali 1929– 1934.” Meyibo 3 (9– 10): 97– 108.
———. 2001. Los inmigrantes Chinos en Baja California 1920– 1937. Mexicali, 
 Mexico: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California.
Vertovec, Steven. 2009. Transnationalism. London: Routledge.
Villalba Garrido, Evaristo. 1993. Cuba y el turismo. Havana: Editorial Ciencias 
 Sociales.
Wang Gungwu. 2000. The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest 
for Autonomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wang Hongying. 2000. “Informal Institutions and Foreign Investment in China.” 
Pacific Review 13 (4): 525– 56.
Wang, Ping. 2013. “The Impacts of China’s Peaceful Influence on U.S.-Mexican 
Relations: A Triangular Perspective.” In China and the New Triangular Rela-
tionships in the Americas: China and the Future of U.S.-Mexico Relations, edited 
by Enrique Dussel Peters, Adrian H. Hearn, and Harley Shaiken, 25– 35. Coral 
Gables, FL: University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies.
Wang Yiwei. 2014. “Improving Relations between the United States and the Re-
lease of the Ancient Triple Signal.” People’s Daily, December 19.
Watkins, Ralph. 2013. “Meeting the China Challenge to Manufacturing in Mexico.” 
In China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and 
the Future of US- Mexico Relations, edited by Enrique Dussel Peters, Adrian H. 
Hearn, and Harley Shaiken, 37– 55. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Cen-
ter for Latin American Studies.
Webber, Jude, and Tom Mitchell. 2014. “Mexico Cancels China- Led High- Speed 
Rail Contract.” Financial Times, November 7.
Weber, Max. [1922]. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New 
York: Free Press.
Weil, David. 2002. “The Benefits and Costs of Transparency: A Model of Disclo-
sure Based Regulation.” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni-
versity. http:// papers.ssrn .com/ sol3/ papers .cfm?abstract_id=316145. Accessed 
May 24, 2015.
Weissert, Will. 2008. “China Expands Trade with Cuba.” Miami Herald, Novem-
ber 19.
Werne, Joseph R. 1980. “Esteban Cantú y la soberanía mexicana en Baja Cali-
fornia.” Historia Mexicana 30 (117): 1– 32.
Wheat, Andrew. 1995. “The Fall of the Peso and the Mexican ‘Miracle.’ ” Multina-
tional Monitor 17 (4). Accessed April 27, 2014. http:// multinationalmonitor .org 
/ hyper/ issues/ 1995/ 04/ mm0495_06 .html.
Wilson, Rob, and Wimal Dissanayake. 1996. “Introduction: Tracking the Global/ 
Local.” In Global/ Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary, 
edited by Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, 1– 18. Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press.
252 REFERENCES
Wonders, Nancy, and Raymond Michalowski. 2001. “Bodies, Borders, and Sex 
Tourism in a Globalized World: A Tale of Two Cities—Amsterdam and Ha-
vana.” Social Problems 48 (4): 545– 71.
Wong, Alejandro Chiu, and Eradio Salgado Baez. 1993. “El Barrio Chino de La 
Habana: Una legendaria opción turística.” Paper delivered at the Third Ibero- 
American Symposium on Tourism, Havana, May 25– 28.
Woolcock, Michael. 1998. “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward  
a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework.” Theory and Society 27 (2):  
151– 208.
World Bank. 2015a. Data: China. Accessed July 10, 2015. http:// data.worldbank .org 
/ country/ china.
———. 2015b. “Gross Domestic Product 2014, ppp.” World Development Indicators 
database. Accessed July 10, 2015. http:// databank.worldbank .org/ data/ down 
load/ GDP_PPP .pdf.
World Economic Forum. 2012. The Global Competitiveness Report 2011– 2012. 
 Geneva: World Economic Forum.
Wu Kai. 2006. “Breves desde México.” Chinatoday .com, May 1. Accessed August 5, 
2015. www .chinatoday .com.cn/ hoy/ 2006n/ s2006n5/ p28 .html.
Xinhua (published in China). 1994. “La Comunidad China en Cuba.” Editorial, 
April 6.
———. 2007. “China’s Top Political Adviser Voices Hope for Overseas Chinese.” 
Editorial, September 15.
———. 2008. “Chinese President Visits Cuban Leader Fidel Castro.” Xinhua,  
November 19. Accessed August 5, 2015. http:// news.xinhuanet .com/ english 
/ 2008-11/ 19/ content_10378183 .htm.
Yahuda, Michael. 1985. Towards the End of Isolationism: China’s Foreign Policy 
after Mao. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Midori Yamagishi. 1994. “Trust and Commitment in the 
United States and Japan.” Motivation and Emotion 18 (2): 129– 66.
Yan Jirong. 2011. “El ‘modelo Chino’: ¿Qué dicen las investigaciones?” Temas 66: 
12– 16.
Yan, Yunxiang. 2009. The Individualization of Chinese Society. New York: Berg.
Yang, Mayfair Mei Hui. 1994. Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art of Social Rela-
tionships in China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
———. 2002. “The Resilience of Guanxi and Its New Deployments: A Critique of 
Some New Guanxi Scholarship.” China Quarterly 170: 459– 76.
“¿Y la soberanía?” 2007. Reforma, January 15.
Young, Elliot. 2014. Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the Americas from the 
Coolie Era through World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press.
Yu, LiAnne Sandra. 2006. “The Reemergence of Vietnam’s Ethnic Chinese Com-
REFERENCES 253
munity through Local, National, and Transnational Structures.” PhD diss., Uni-
versity of California, San Diego.
Yun, Lisa. 2008. The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African 
Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Yun, Lisa, and Ricardo René Laremont. 2001. “Chinese Coolies and African Slaves 
in Cuba 1847– 74.” Journal for Asian American Studies 4 (2): 99– 122.
Zamora, Rodolfo García. 2005. “Collective Remittances and the 3x1 Program as a 
Transnational Social Learning Process.” Paper presented at the “Mexican Mi-
grant Social and Civic Participation in the United States” seminar, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, November 4– 5.
Zhan Lisheng. 2002. “Event Lauds Role of Overseas Chinese.” China Daily, De-
cember 4.
Zhu Wenchi, Mao Xianglin, and Li Keming. 2002. Communist Movements in 
Latin America. Beijing: Contemporary World.

INDEX
Accord 2951/ 29252, 137– 38
Aeroméxico, 195
Afro- Cuban religious heritage, 26, 137, 
138
Agenda Estratégica México- China, 93
AgendAsia, 93
Alarcón, Ricardo, 51, 63
Alay Chang, Rufino, 116
Alay Jó, Carlos, 2, 117– 18, 119, 120
Alba Vega, Carlos, 182
Alemán, Arsenio, 44
Alfa Group, 94
Alfonso Rodíguez, Mayelín, 150– 51
Alianza Nueva Democracia de China 
en Cuba, 116
Alianza Socialista China de Cuba, 111
Alliance for Open Government, 78
Altadis, 122– 23
Alzugaray Treto, Carlos, 59– 60
América Móvil, 80, 214
amsde. See Asociación de Secretarios 
de Desarrollo Económico
Anderson, Wanni, 200
Anguiano Roch, Eugenio, 65
Anti- Chinese Committee, 171– 72
Anti- Chinese Youth Subcommittee of 
Mazatlán, 172
antidumping quotas, 84
Armony, Ariel, 18, 23, 24– 25, 217– 18,  
220
Arroyo, Juan, 201– 4
Asian Century, 218
Asia Pacific Institute of Tecnológico de 
Monterrey, 91
Asociación de Secretarios de Desarrollo 
Económico (amsde), 91
Aspe, Pedro, 69
Association for the Study of the Cuban 
Economy, 62
Association of Former Intelligence 
 Officers, 46
at&t, 214
Autonomous University of Baja Cali-
fornia, 196
Auyón, Alfonso, 194, 197




Bank of Nova Scotia, 58
Barbara, Saint, 142
Barreiro, José, 60– 61
Barrio Chino (Havana, Cuba), 2, 119,  
215– 16; below the bar practices, 123– 
28; bottom-up proposals for, 153– 54, 
161; creation of, 111; economic evolu-
tion in, 100– 102; Grupo Promotor, 
2, 104, 118– 21; impact of revolution 
on, 115– 22; informal sector, 122– 24; 
mercado chino, 123; tourism in, 103, 
112– 13, 138, 139– 45, 158– 59; trust 
in, 102– 5, 135, 146– 48, 158– 59, 161. 
See also Office of the Historian of the 
City (Havana, Cuba)
Batista, Fulgencio, 115
Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), 33
bbc, 42
Bernal, Rafael, 176
Betancourt Estrada, Victor, 216
Bi- National Commission, 72
black markets, 20– 23, 216– 17; in Barrio 
Chino, 123; regulation and, 60, 206; 
reliance on, 29– 30, 59; trust and, 
20– 23, 67
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, 44
Braudel, Fernand, 220




buses, Chinese in Cuba, 47– 49, 48
Bush, George W., 37, 72
Cabrisas, Ricardo, 34, 49, 133
cachimex. See Confederation of Chi-
nese Associations of Mexico
Calderon, Ángel, 78
Calderón, Felipe, 74– 75, 82– 83, 188
Calles, Plutarco Elías, 171– 72, 174
Calva, José Luis, 67
Cámara Nacional de la Industria del 
Vestido (cniv), 67, 82– 83




Cárdenas, Lázaro, 7, 65, 164, 174, 175
Caribbean Academic Network, 222
Carstens, Agustín, 74, 80
Casa Blanca incident (2014), 78– 79
Casa Ley, 85– 86
Casino Chung Wah, 12, 99, 100, 101, 111, 
116, 119, 134, 149– 50, 156– 57, 222
Castro, Fidel, 6, 51, 54, 63, 117, 211; Bei-
jing visits, 35– 36, 37, 39; on Fox, 71– 72; 
Li Peng and, 31; rise to power, 103, 
115; on Taiwan, 33; transfer of power 
from, 136
Castro, Raúl, 43, 63; assault on corrup-
tion by, 123; on Chinese products, 61; 
on decentralization, 136; on indepen-
dent entrepreneurship, 102; on private 
property, 53; reforms by, 29– 30, 36, 
40, 54, 58, 138, 154, 213; on tourism, 
143; visit to China, 39, 51
cce. See Consejo Coordinador Empre-
sarial
cechimex. See China- Mexico Research 
Center
Center for Democracy in the Americas, 
58
Center for the Study of Chinese Im-
migration to Cuba (University of 
Havana), 110, 222




Chamber of Chinese Enterprises of the 





Chao Chiu, Jorge, 100, 131, 131
INDEX 257
Charm Offensive (Kurlantzick), 23
Chee Kung Tong, 171
Cheng Yinghong, 35, 39
Chevron Corporation, 7, 66, 79, 214
Chiang Kai- Shek, 116
China Central Opera, 190
China Daily (newspaper), 53
China Engages Latin America (León- 
Manríquez), 24
China Export and Credit Insurance 
Corporation, 47
China in Latin America (Ellis), 23– 24
China- Latin American Relations (He, 
ed.), 24
China- Mexico Research Center (cechi-
mex), 91, 97, 206
China Minmetals Corporation, 39
China National Petroleum Corporation 
(cnpc), 6, 38, 41
China Popular (magazine), 175– 76
China Putian, 45
China Railway Construction Corpora-
tion, 79
China Scholarships Council, 49
China Suntime International, 56
China Today (magazine), 153
Chinatown, Havana, Cuba. See Barrio 
Chino (Havana, Cuba)
China Viaje travel agency, 1
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 24, 
52, 66
Chinese Association of Mexicali, 189– 90, 
192, 193, 217
Chinese Association of Tijuana, 1, 194, 
195– 99, 217
Chinese associations: Cuban, 99– 100, 
111, 115, 118, 125, 143– 48, 157; on labor 
concerns, 199– 201; Mexican, 163– 64, 
165, 170– 71, 189– 200. See also specific 
groups
Chinese diaspora: anti- Chinese move-
ments, 1– 3, 11– 12, 105– 6, 168, 171– 77, 
180– 82, 197– 98; as asset, 9– 11; “Cali-
fornian,” 110– 11, 112; census figures in 
Mexico, 178– 79; foreign policy and, 
24; huaqiao, 177– 78; hybridity and, 
219; identity, 17, 113, 141, 177, 194; im-
migration limits, 11; labor concerns, 
106– 7, 165– 66, 199– 201; Mexican 
informal sector and, 164– 65, 216; 
Mexican Revolution and, 164, 168– 69; 
from Philippines, 223n3; self- exclusion 
and, 105– 15, 170; shared experiences, 
21, 110– 11; stereotypes, 11, 93, 109, 111, 
157, 170– 71, 172, 176; ties with, 4, 215; 
trust and, 10, 21– 22, 220; undocu-
mented status, 13; Valley of Mexicali 
immigrants, 169– 70
Chinese Exclusion Act, U.S. (1882), 11, 
110– 11, 168
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 191
Chinese National People’s Party (kmt), 
13, 116, 171
Chinese Peaceful Pro- Unification Alli-
ance of Baja California, 196
Chinese Socialist Alliance (Cuba), 117– 18
Chinese trade: Chinese associations and, 
195– 96; export competition, 73; ex-
ports from Mexico, 65, 88– 95; impact 
on Cuba, 4, 5– 7, 12– 13, 19– 20, 31– 33, 
61– 62; impact on Latin America, 
23– 25; impact on Mexico, 7– 8, 13– 14, 
19– 20, 68, 72– 74, 95– 98, 178– 89; im-
ports to Mexico, 65, 82– 88; Mexican 
government incentives, 67; tariffs, 8, 
20, 76– 77, 82, 83– 88, 96, 180
Chin Lanpin, 109
Chiong Lee, Manuel, 123– 24
Chi Tack Tong Association. See Sociedad 
Chi Tack Tong
Chiu, Guillermo, 150, 152, 152– 53
Choy, Armando, 131
Chuffat Latour, Antonio, 114
Chui, Gustavo, 131, 151– 52
Chung Hwa, 170
cigar production, Cuban, 122– 23
258 INDEX
Cisneros Taja, Victor, 184– 87
citma. See Ministry of Science, Tech-
nology and Environment (Cuba)
Clinton, Bill, 71
cmhn. See Consejo Mexicano de Hom-
bres de Negocios
cniv. See Cámara Nacional de la Indu-
stria del Vestido
cnpc. See China National Petroleum 
Corporation
Colegio del Santo Ángel (Havana, Cuba), 
137
Colegio Universitario San Gerónimo, 57
Collier, Stephen, 25
Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 70
Communist Party (China), 34– 37, 126
Communist Party (Cuba), 58, 118; Con-
gress, 31, 53
Communist Party (Mexico), 65
Communist Party (Soviet Union), 19, 34
community solidarity, 4
Confederación de Cámaras Industriales 
(concamin), 67, 83– 84
Confederation of Chinese Associations 
of Mexico (cachimex), 88– 89, 180, 
196
Confucius Institute, 138– 39
Confucius Park (Havana, Cuba), 139– 40, 
140, 148
ConocoPhillips, 66
Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (cce), 
9, 81
Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Ne-
gocios (cmhn), 9, 81, 94
Cooke, Bill, 159
coolie trade, 106, 157
Corbitt, Duvon, 112
Cordero, Ernesto, 75– 76
Coronel, Rogelio, 107
Council for Business Coordination 
(Mexico), 212
Council of State (Cuba), 122, 123, 137
Cuban Democracy Act, U.S. (1992), 215
Cuban Department of Housing, 110
Cubaniquel, 55– 56
Cuban Revolution (1959), 12
Cuban School of Wushu, 104, 127– 35, 
128, 129, 131, 132, 160
Cuba’s National Assembly, 51
cupet. See National Petroleum Com-
pany of Cuba
Cuvenpetrol, 42
decentralization, 20, 33, 51, 54– 55, 62, 
125– 26, 135– 37, 211
Decree Law 91, 55, 136
Decree Law 143, 137
Decree Law 283, 138
de Kadt, Raphael, 121, 159, 203
Délano, Alexandra, 69
Deng Xiaoping, 34, 51
deregulation in Mexico, 65– 66
Díaz- Canel, Miguel, 60
Díaz Porfirio, José, 169
Dragon in the Room, The (Gallagher/ 
Porzecanski), 23
drug trafficking, 115, 184, 187, 188
Duke of Argyle, The (ship), 106
Durkheim, Émile, 16
Dussel Peters, Enrique, 89, 92
Ebrard, Marcelo, 165, 185, 205– 6
Echevarría, Luis, 82
Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 93
eez. See exclusive economic zone
electronics manufacturing, 46
Ellis, R. Evan, 23– 24
Elorduy Walther, Eugenio, 192
Empresa Medicuba, 150
Eng, Carmen, 158
Eng, Juan, 99, 131
Eng Herrera, Pedro Jesús (Tai Chao), 
106, 107, 115, 116, 139
Eng Menéndez, Yrmina, 2, 119– 21, 120
Espacio Laical (journal), 62
INDEX 259
Espinosa, Patricia, 94– 95, 97
European Union (eu), 59– 60
Evans, Peter, 207
exclusive economic zone (eez), 41– 42
Expo China trade fair, 88– 90, 96– 97, 
196, 212– 13
Exxon Corporation, 7, 79
Exxon Mobil, 66, 214
Fair of Canton, 191– 92, 212
Fedderke, Johannes, 18, 121, 159, 203
Feinberg, Richard, 38
Fernández Jilberto, Alex, 24
Fiat- Teksid, 94
financial crisis, global, 53, 75
Fondo para Pegueñas y Medianas Em-
presas, 90
Fong, Flora, 99, 155
foreign investment: Brazilian in Cuba, 
44; Canadian in Cuba, 58; Chinese in 
Cuba, 37– 38, 44– 48, 60
Foreign Investment Law (Cuba), 45,  
213
foreign trade. See Chinese trade
Fox, Vicente, 71– 72
Freedom House, 30
Frente Demoncrático Nacional, 69
From the Great Wall to the New World 
(Strauss/ Armony, eds.), 24– 25
Frontera, La (newspaper), 171, 198
Fukuyama, Francis, 18, 19, 209
Gallagher, Kevin, 23
Gao Shoujian, 178, 196, 198
García Mariño, Miriam, 154– 55
García Triana, Mauro, 32
gatt. See General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs
Gazpromneft, 42
gdp. See gross domestic product
Geely, 47, 61, 197
Geertz, Clifford, 138
Geming Ge, 173
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(gatt), 69
Global Competitiveness Report (World 
Economic Forum), 77
Goldman Sachs, 71
Gómez Izquierdo, Jorge, 181
González Oropeza, Manuel, 172
gps capital, use of term, 22
Grand Convention of Anti- Chinese 
Committees of the Republic of 
Mexico, 172
Grand National Pro- Race League, 172
Gran Meliá Shanghai hotel, 56– 57
Granovetter, Mark, 17
Grau San Martín, Ramón, 112, 117
Great Depression (1929– 1939), 3, 173– 74
Great Revolutionary Offensive (1968), 
103, 116, 156
Great Wall Drilling Company, 41
Greene, Graham, 113
Grito Obrero Campesino (newsletter), 115
gross domestic product (gdp): of Cuba, 
31, 35, 40, 41, 52; of Mexico, 74– 75, 76, 
80, 86, 90
Grupo de la Electrónica, 46
Grupo Higa, 78
Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la 
Capital, 47, 126– 27, 135




guanxi, 14– 16, 22, 162, 216– 17
Guerreros Unidos, 78
Guevara, Ernesto, 34





Havana International Trade Fair, 45
Havana Night Cuban Cabaret, 56
260 INDEX
Hernández, Rafael, 54






horizontal power. See vertical/ horizontal 
power




Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering 
Corporation, 42– 43
Hu- DeHart, Evelyn, 10– 11, 219
Huerta, Victoriano, 169
Hu Jintao, 26, 37, 39, 46, 49, 50, 61, 102, 
123, 143, 192
Human Rights Commission, 71
Hun Calzadilla, Julio, 2, 117– 18, 119, 120
identity: community, 113, 122, 136; dia-
sporic, 17, 113, 141, 177, 194; national, 
108, 164; personal, 220; racial, 176
Ifá Iranlowo, 216
Iguala student killings (September 2014), 
78
imf. See International Monetary Fund
Impuesto Empresarial a Tasa Única, 
187– 88
inami. See National Institute of Migra-
tion
industrial policy: Mexican state, 66– 67, 
72– 75, 82– 83; trust and, 64, 68– 82, 
156– 57; use of term, 76
Inquiry into Antidumping Quotas 
against Imports of Chinese Origin, 84
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geo-
graf ía, 86
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de 
México, 92
Inter- American Development Bank, 23
Inter- American Dialogue, 222
intermarriage, 171
International Monetary Fund (imf), 19, 
59, 75, 209
iqom Trade Intelligence, 84
Jacobson, Roberta, 213, 214
Jiang Jiemin, 38
Jiang Zemin, 6, 35, 37, 41, 60, 118
José Wong Brigade, 115– 16
Juventud Rebelde (newspaper), 151– 52
kau cim tradition, 143
Kennedy, John F., 22
Kirk, John, 140
Klepak, Hal, 36, 113
kmt. See Chinese National People’s Party
Kodak, 72
Kothari, Uma, 159
Kuang Kong. See San Fan Kon
Kuhn, Philip, 10
Kuomintang. See Chinese National 
People’s Party
Kurlantzick, Joshua, 23, 43
Kwong Wah Po (newspaper), 150– 53, 152, 
216
Labrador Ruiz, Enrique, 113– 14
Laig Siu- Yi, 111
Lane, Cuchillo, 125
Latin America Facing China (Fernández 
Jilberto/ Hogenboom), 24
Latin American and Caribbean Aca-
demic Network on China, 222
Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(Vanderbilt University), 77
Latin American Studies Association,  
222
Latin America Research Center, 222
Lau Quan, Graciela, 144, 154
Law of Association (Cuba), 154– 55
Law of Merchant Establishments, 185, 
205
INDEX 261
“Laws of the Chinese Community of 
Tijuana,” 197
Lay Mazo, Ramón, 175
lazaretto (Mariel), 110
Lázaro Cárdenas Port, 84
Lazo Hernández, Esteban, 40




Lee, Roberto Vargas, 110
Lenin, Vladimir, 32– 33, 215
León- Manríquez, José Luis, 24, 76
Ley, Sergio, 85– 86
Li, Jimmy, 89– 90
Liang Baohua, 192
Li Jianmin, 49
Li Keqiang, 39, 79
Lin, Nan, 16, 18, 134, 204
Linares Savio, María Teresa, 114
Lineamientos de la política económica y 
social del partido y la revolución, 3– 4, 
9, 31, 33, 54, 57, 58, 62, 135– 36, 156, 
210– 11, 213
Ling, Juan José, 174– 75, 183
linkage, 4, 20
Li Peng, 31, 35, 211
Li San, 146, 149
Liu Ke Wei, Willy, 195– 97, 203, 207
Li Yuanchao, 60
Li Zhuohong, 196– 97, 207
López, Kathleen, 114, 139, 141
Luiz, John, 18, 121, 159, 203
Lung Kong Association, 143, 144, 154, 159
Lung Kong Cun Sol, 120
Madero, Antonio, 169
Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, 7, 68, 70
Maduro, Nicolás, 43
Malmierca, Rodrigo, 44– 45, 50– 51
Mandarin language, 13– 14, 91, 129– 31, 
138– 39, 151, 165, 196– 97, 223n3
Manila and Tait Company, 106
Manila Galleons (ship), 168
Manzanillo Port, 84
Mao Xianglin, 36– 37
Mao Zedong, 6, 34, 175
maquiladoras, 199
Marcus, George, 25
Mariel Free Trade Zone, 63









McKeown, Adam, 11, 167– 68
Medicuba, Empresa, 150
Mérida Initiative, 188
Mexican Business Council for Foreign 
Trade, Investment and Technology, 85
Mexican Council of Businessmen, 212
Mexican immigrants, 69– 70
Mexican Tax Administration Service, 81
Mexico- China Bi- National Commission, 
72
Mexico- China Working Group, 92
Mexico for Mexicans (slogan), 172
Michalowski, Raymond, 114
Ministry of Culture (Cuba), 117
Ministry of Finance (Mexico), 69, 74– 75
Ministry of Information and Communi-
cation (Cuba), 46
Ministry of Justice (Cuba), 125, 133, 147, 
155, 161, 216
Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment (Cuba), 52
Ministry of the Economy (Mexico), 67, 
76– 77, 83– 84, 85, 96
Montes de Oca Choy, María Teresa, 26, 
110, 116– 17
Morán, Francisco, 108
Mujal- León, Eusebio, 54
262 INDEX
Mural, El (newspaper), 82
Muralla de China (Great Wall), 145
Muralla de China, La restaurant, 145,  
158
Murillo, Marino, 55, 154, 213
Nacional Financiera (nafinsa), 76
nafta. See North American Free Trade 
Agreement
Nao de China, 168
National Anti- Chinese Workers’ League, 
172
National Autonomous University of 
Mexico (unam), 91, 166– 67, 167
National China League, 171
National Council of Science and Tech-
nology (Mexico), 81, 94
National Electoral Institute (Mexico), 
77, 206
National Immigration Week, 192
National Institute of Migration (inami), 
192, 204
National Petroleum Company of Cuba 
(cupet), 41, 55– 56
National Revolutionary Militia, 115
Naturalization Service, 69
Navarrete, Alfonso, 86
nec (Nippon Electric Company), 72
Nemak, 93– 94
Newton, Kenneth, 81
Nib, Kristina, 146, 158
nickel industry, Cuban, 38, 55– 56
Nonini, Donald, 219– 20
North American Free Trade Agreement 




ocao. See Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office
oecd. See Organisation for Economic 
Co- Operation and Development
Office of the Historian of the City (Ha-
vana, Cuba), 105, 122, 123, 125, 133– 51, 
154, 156– 57, 158, 160, 215
oil industry: Cuban, 34, 41– 44, 55– 56; 
Mexican, 65, 214
Old Havana (Havana, Cuba), 137, 142, 
143, 147, 150
Oliveras, Rosa, 47
One- China policy, 165, 180
Ong, Aihwa, 25, 218, 219– 20
Ongay Flores, Luis, 194– 95
open. See Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries
“Operational Plan for Chinese Group 
Tourists Visiting Cube,” 56
opium trade, 110
Opium War, First (1840– 1842), 106
Oppenheimer, Andrés, 56
Oquendo (ship), 106
Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (oecd), 
23, 76, 81, 90
Organización Nacional de Asuntos 
Tributarios, 145– 46
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (opec), 43
Ortiz, Fernando, 106– 7
Ortiz Rubio, Pascual, 174
Ortner, Sherry, 138
Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (ocao), 
13, 177– 78, 189– 90, 193– 94, 196, 210, 
216
Palumbo- Liu, David, 10, 194
pan. See Partido Acción Nacional
Parreñas, Rhacel, 17, 130– 31
Partido Acción Nacional (pan), 71, 74,  
89
Partido Revolucionario Democrático 
(prd), 187
Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(pri), 66, 68– 69, 70, 74, 89
Pelosi, Nancy, 213
INDEX 263
pemex. See Petróleos Mexicanos
Peña Delgado, Grace, 164, 173
Peña Nieto, Enrique, 4, 7, 66, 77– 79, 84, 
93, 166, 204, 210– 11, 214
People’s Republic of China (PRC), 6, 12, 
33, 65, 116, 134, 175, 176, 179, 196, 197
Pereira Hernández, Omar, 56, 133, 212
Pérez de la Riva, Juan, 110
Pérez Roque, Felipe, 133
Pesqueira, Walterio, 171
Petrocaribe, 43
Petróleos de Venezuela, 42
Petróleos Mexicanos (pemex), 66, 75, 
79– 80
Petronas, 42
Pew Research Center, 83
Plan Mexico, 288
Popular Councils, 136
Portes, Alejandro, 16, 22– 23, 88, 120, 122, 
198, 203
Porzecanski, Roberto, 23
PRC. See People’s Republic of China
prd. See Partido Revolucionario 
Democrático
pri. See Partido Revolucionario Institu-
cional
Pringle, James, 113
Priority Zone for Conservation (Havana, 
Cuba), 137– 38
private sector: Cuban, 30, 32– 33, 40, 
53– 54, 57– 58, 60– 63, 98, 118; Mexican, 
67– 68, 72– 74, 88, 93, 176– 77, 206; 
public- private cooperation, 3, 4, 17, 
20, 67– 68, 88, 93, 96, 126, 178, 192– 93, 
206, 217; trust in, 9




Pro- Race Committee (Baja California), 
171
Protocol of Indemnity on Chinese Inter-
ests (1912), 169
Provincial Center of Plastic Arts and 
Design, 117
public sector: Cuban, 52, 55; Mexican, 
67– 68, 163; public- private coopera-
tion, 3, 4, 17, 20, 67– 68, 88, 93, 96,  
126, 178, 192– 93, 206, 217; trust in, 9, 
23, 81
Putnam, Robert, 16– 17
Qian Qichen, 35
Qing dynasty, 169, 173
Quesada, Gonzalo de, 108– 9
Ranger, Terence, 159
Reagan, Ronald, 8





Renmin University of China, 222
Repsol, 41– 42
Republic of China, 177
Revolutionary Armed Forces, 54




Roch, Eugenio Anguiano, 176
Rodríguez, Abelardo L., 174
Rodríguez, Yenisel, 63




Royal Dutch Shell, 66
Rubin, Robert, 71
Rubio, Laura, 92
Saco, José Antonio, 108
Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 69, 70– 71, 77
San Fan Kon (Kuang Kong), 142, 143, 144, 
148, 159
264 INDEX
San Man Woo medical center, 149– 50, 
151
Santiago de Cuba Port, 210
sars. See severe acute respiratory 
syndrome
Scarabeo- 9 Ultra- Deepwater Rig, 42
Schiavone Camacho, Julia, 174
Schneider, Ben, 81
School of Fine Arts (Baja California), 190
School of Government, 22
Schwartz, Rosalie, 101, 112– 13
Sensenbrenner, Julia, 16, 122
Serra Puche, Jaime, 69




Shanghai Park (Havana, Cuba), 139– 40, 
140
Sino- Cuban relations, 33– 40, 116, 155, 
160, 211, 214; credits and loans, 6, 37– 
38, 47, 60– 61, 210, 213– 14; educational 
exchanges, 50; electronics, 44– 47; oil 
industry, 41– 44; reforms, 52– 53; self- 
exclusion and, 105– 15; transportation, 
47– 49; trust in, 40, 49– 50, 102, 210. 
See also Chinese trade
Sino- Mexican relations, 65– 68, 212; 
associations and, 165– 66; trust in, 65, 
67, 95– 96, 126, 162, 165, 178, 197– 99. 
See also Chinese trade
Sinopec, 41
Sío Wong, Moisés, 132




small and medium- size enterprises 
(smes), 4; funding and support for, 
8– 9, 20, 52, 58– 60, 75, 80, 90, 96; 
horizontal linkages, 17, 67– 68, 83, 96, 
98, 105, 158– 59, 207
social capital, 4, 162; bonding, 16– 17,  
147, 220; bridging, 16– 17, 147; inter-
mediaries and, 18; negative, 199– 201; 
networks, 22, 189; optimization of, 
203; rationalization of, 18– 19, 121– 22, 
135
Sociedad Chang Weng Chung Tong,  
111
Sociedad Chi Tack Tong, 111, 146
Sociedad Chung Shan, 111
Sociedad Kow Kong, 111
Sociedad Long Sai Li, 111
Sociedad Lung Kong Cun Sol, 111. 
See also Lung Kong Association
Sociedad Min Chih Tang, 111, 155, 156
Sociedad On Teng Tong, 111
Sociedad Sue Yuen Tong, 111
Sociedad Wong Kong Ja Tong, 111




Soviet support for Cuba, 34– 35, 103– 4, 
116
Special Period in Time of Peace, 6, 56, 
137
State Council of China, 177
state enterprises, Cuban, 52, 55– 56, 62
state- society engagement, 4, 88, 97– 98, 
220; trust and, 19, 206; vertical syner-
gies, 5, 8, 12, 17, 55, 62, 68, 83, 89, 96– 
98, 105, 159, 161, 165, 204– 5, 220
Steele, James William, 109
Stiglitz, Joseph, 75– 76
Strauss, Julia C., 24– 25, 217– 18, 220
Student City Tarará, 50
Suárez Coello, Pablo, 79
sugar industry (Cuba), 37, 39
Sun Yat- sen, 171, 173, 177
surveillance, 46– 47
swine flu (AH1N1), 74
synergy, 4, 20
INDEX 265
Tai Chao. See Eng Herrera, Pedro Jesús
Tam Kin Cho, 111
Tang, Min Chih, 120, 155– 56
Tao Jin Rong, 133
tariffs: Chinese trade and, 8, 20, 76– 77, 
82, 83– 88, 96, 180; smuggling and, 82; 
trust and, 88
tax reform, Mexican, 81
Teatro Shanghai, 113, 115, 139
technical smuggling, 84– 85
Technip, 42
Telecommunication Reform Bill 
(Mexico), 214
Temas (journal), 31, 62
Ten Years’ War (1869– 1878), 108– 9
Tepito (Mexico City, Mexico), 165, 182– 
87, 183
Thatcher, Margaret, 8
Tiananmen Square incident (1989), 35
Tien Tan restaurant, 133
Tölölyan, Khachig, 193– 94
tourism: in Barrio Chino, 103, 112– 13, 
138, 139– 45, 158– 59; Chinese, to 
Mexico, 91, 93, 103, 112– 13, 204; in 
Cuba, 56– 57, 140, 143; folklore, 137, 138
tpp. See Trans- Pacific Partnership
trade sanctions, U.S. against Cuba, 42, 
213
traditional medicine, 149– 55
Transition Trade Agreement on Com-
pensatory Fees (2007), 83
Trans- Pacific Partnership (tpp), 214– 15
Trápaga Delf ín, Yolanda, 176
Treaty of Friendship and Navigation 
(Mexico- China), 168, 171
Treaty of Nanking (1843), 106
Triana, Juan, 57
triangulación, 85
trust, 4, 5, 7; in Barrio Chino, 102– 5, 135, 
146– 48, 158– 59, 161; black markets 
and, 20– 23, 67; Chinese diaspora and, 
10, 21– 22, 220; of Chinese products, 
82; vs. control, 32– 33, 215; between 
Cuba and China, 40, 49– 50, 102, 126, 
210, 220– 21; enforceable, 203, 207, 217; 
erosion of, 8– 9, 15, 63, 77, 82, 83, 88, 
148, 187, 189; forms of, 18, 19; general-
ized, 18, 19, 21– 23, 147; horizontal, 19, 
67, 77, 88, 148, 158, 161, 220; industrial 
policies and, 64, 68– 82, 156– 57; insti-
tutionalization and, 121– 22; between 
Mexico and China, 65, 67, 95– 96, 162, 
165, 178, 197– 99, 220– 21; particular-
ized, 18, 147; of police, 87; politics of, 
19– 20, 23– 28, 32, 49, 65, 68– 82, 212, 
222; tariffs and, 88; transnational, 21, 
162; vertical, 77, 88, 98, 104, 158, 188
U.K. Export Finance, 80
unam. See National Autonomous Uni-
versity of Mexico
Unión del Centro Histórico (Mexico 
City, Mexico), 184, 186
United Nations Human Rights Commis-
sion, 71– 72
Universidad de Ciencias Informáticas, 46
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, 222
University of Havana, 110, 138– 39, 222
U.S. Christian Anti- Communism Cru-
sade, 176
U.S. Federal Reserve, 68
U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocar-
bons Agreement, 66, 214
Vagas Lee, Roberto, 128– 30
Valdés Menéndez, Ramiro, 46
Valdez Gutiérrez, Rodolfo, 192
Valdez Mingramm, Rafael, 93
Vanderbilt University, 77
Van Ziegert, Sylvia, 143– 44
Vargas Arreola, Eloy, 91
Vargas Lee, Roberto, 110, 127– 35, 128, 
148– 49, 156, 160
266 INDEX
Vasconcelos, José, 166– 67, 174
Vedado, El (Havana, Cuba), 146– 47
Velázquez Loza, Antonio, 199
Velázquez Morales, Catalina, 172
vertical/ horizontal power, 4, 17, 19, 33, 
88, 162. See also under small and 




Villa, Francisco “Pancho,” 169
Villanueva, Manuel, 107– 8
VTech, 72
Wang Gungwu, 10, 175, 177, 219
Wang Yiwei, 213
Weber, Max, 203
Wen Jiabao, 37, 39
Will, George, 19
Wonders, Nancy, 114
Woo Chung- yen, 169
Woolcock, Michael, 17, 87– 88, 217
World Bank, 23, 75, 177
World Confucian Academy, 139
World Economic Forum, 77
World Trade Organization (wto), 51, 
72, 83
Wu Hongyin, 38





Yang Jiechi, 94– 95






Zedillo, Ernesto, 70– 71
Zhang Tuo, 131
Zhenli Ye Gon, 181
Zhou Enlai, 33– 34, 39
Zhu Rongji, 36– 37
zte, 45
